Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q119. Prodigality
Source context
- Theme
- prodigality as vice of excess in the use of material wealth, opposed to liberality
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
- GA 97, 1906-02-11In a lecture on Dante, Steiner describes the avaricious and prodigal as experiencing on the astral level mirror-images of their own passions, pairing the two vices as inversely related disorders of the soul's relation to material goods.
- GA 181, 1918-03-05Steiner identifies a dissipation of cognitive force — a prodigality of thinking — as a spiritual-moral obstacle, treating reckless expenditure of inner resources as structurally parallel to material prodigality.
- GA 155, 1912-05-28Steiner uses the case of Francis of Assisi to distinguish youthful material prodigality from a transformed prodigality of moral and spiritual forces, reframing excess-expenditure as capable of a higher metamorphosis.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (Book IV) treats prodigality (asōtia) as the vice of excess opposed to liberality, distinguished from avarice as the vice of deficiency — the structural framework Aquinas directly inherits and systematises in Q119.
- Gospel parable traditionThe parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15) supplies the primary scriptural referent for prodigality in the Western Christian moral tradition, representing the disorder of squandering goods followed by conversion — a narrative Aquinas presupposes in treating prodigality's moral gravity.
Q119. Prodigality
Article 1
[II-II.q.119.a.1.arg.1] It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod epicheia non sit virtus. Nulla enim virtus aufert aliam virtutem. Sed epicheia aufert aliam virtutem, quia tollit id quod justum est secundum legem, et opponi videtur severitati. Ergo epicheia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.arg.2] Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera religione, c. xxxi, col. 148, t. 3: « In istis temporalibus legibus quamquam de his homines judicent, cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerint institutæ et firmatæ, non licebit judici de ipsis judicare, sed secundum ipsas. » Sed epicheia videtur judicare de lege, quando eam existimat non esse servandam in aliquo casu. Ergo epicheia magis est vitium quam virtus.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.arg.3] Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated above (I-II, 62, 3). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he "wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad epicheiam videtur pertinere ut attendat ad intentionem legislatoris, ut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. x. Sed interpretari intentionem legislatoris ad solum principem pertinet: unde Imperator dicit in codice De legibus et constitutionibus princ., lege 1: « Inter æquitatem jusquè interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et oportet, et licet inspicere. » Ergo actus epicheia non est licitus. Ergo epicheja non est virtus.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give here the name of covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus in V Ethic., loc cit., ponit eam virtutem.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.co] In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de legibus ageretur, quia humani actus, de quibus leges danur, in singularibus contingentibus consistunt, quæ infinitis modis variari possunt; non fuit possibile aliquam regulam legis institui quæ in nullo casu deficeret; sed legislatores attendunt ad id quod in pluribus accidit, secundum hoc legem ferentes; quam tamen in aliquibus casibus servare, est contra æqualitatem justitiæ, et contra commune bonum, quod lex intendit: sicut lex instituit quod deposita reddantur, quia hoc ut in pluribus justum est; contingit tamen aliquando esse nocivum, puta si furiosus deposuit gladium, et eum reposcat, dum est in furia; vel si aliquis reposcat depositum ad patriæ impugnationem. In his ergo et similibus casibus malum est sequi legem positam; bonum autem est, prætermissis verbis legis, sequi id quod poscit justitiæ ratio et communis utilitas. Et ad hoc ordinatur epicheia, quæ apud nos dicitur æquitas. Unde patet quod epicheia est virtus. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod epicheja non deserit justum simpliciter, sed justum quod est lege determinatum; nec etiam opponitur severitati quæ sequitur veritatem legis in quibus oportet. Sequi autem verba legis in quibus non oportet, vitiosum est. Unde dicitur in codice De legibus et const. princ., leg. v: « Non dubium est in legem committere eum qui verba legis amplexus, contra legislatoris nititur voluntatem. » Ad secundum dicendum, quod ille de lege judicat qui dicit eam non esse bene positam; qui vero dicit verba legis non esse in hoc casu servanda, non judicat de lege, sed de aliquo negotio particulari quod occurrit. Ad tertium dicendum, quod interpretatio locum habet in dubiis, in quibus non licet absque determinatione principis a verbis legis recedere; sed in manifestis non est opus interpretatione, sed executione.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.ad.1] Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be "covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet eidem inesse opposita secundum diversa. Ab illo enim aliquid magis denominatur quod inest principalius. Sicut autem in liberalitate, quæ medium tenet, præcipua est datio, ad quam acceptio et retentio ordinantur, ita etiam avaritia et prodigalitas præcipue attenduntur secundum dationem. Unde ille qui superabundat in dando, vocatur prodigus; qui autem deficit in dando, vocatur avarus. Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis deficit in dando, qui tamen non excedit in accipiendo, ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. I, a med. Similiter etiam contingit quod aliquis excedat in dando, et ex hoc est prodigus; et simul cum hoc excedat in accipiendo, vel ex quadam necessitate: quia dum superabundat in dando, deficiunt ei propria bona, unde cogitur indebite acquirere, quod pertinet ad avaritiam; vel etiam propter animi inordinationem: dum enim non dat propter bonum, quasi contempta virtute, non curat undecumque et qualitercumque accipiat; et sic non secundum idem est prodigus et avarus.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.ad.2] Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prodigalitas attenditur circa passiones pecuniæ non sicut superabundans in eis, sed sicut deficiens.
[II-II.q.119.a.1.ad.3] The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) "that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate."
[II-II.q.119.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum quod prodigi non semper abundant in dando propter voluptates, circa quas est intemperantia; sed quandoque quidem ex eo quod liter sunt dispositi ut divitias non curent, quandoque autem propter aliquid aliud. Ut frequentius tamen ad intemperantias declinant, tum quia ex quo superflue expendunt in aliis, etiam in rebus voluptuosis expendere non verentur, ad quas magis inclinat concupiscentia carnis; tum etiam quia ex quo non delectantur in bonis virtutum, quærunt sibi corporales delectationes. Et inde est quod Philosophus in IV Ethic., cap. I, a med., dicit quod « multi prodigorum fiunt intemperati. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.119.a.2.arg.1] It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says (1 Timothy 6:10): "Covetousness [Douay: 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod epicheia non sit pars justitiæ. Ut enim patet ex supra dictis, duplex est justitia, una particularis, alia legalis. Sed epicheia non est pars justitiæ particularis, quia se extendit ad omnes virtutes, sicut et justitia legalis: similiter etiam non est pars justitiæ legalis, quia operatur praeter id quod lege positum est. Ergo videtur quod epicheia non sit pars justitiæ.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (1 Timothy 6:17-18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others." Now this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus principalior non assignatur virtuti minus principali ut pars: cardinalibus enim virtutibus, quasi principalibus, assignantur secundariæ virtutes ut partes. Sed epicheia videtur esse principalior virtus quam justitia, ut ipsum nomen sonat: dicitur enim ab epi quod est supra, et dicaion quod est justum. Ergo epicheia non est pars justitiæ.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.arg.3] Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Matthew 6:34), "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow," and (Matthew 19:21), "Sell all [Vulgate: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore prodigality is not a sin.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, videtur quod epicheia sit idem quod modestia. Nam ubi Apostolus ad Philipp., iv, 5, dicit: Modestia vestra nota sit omnibus hominibus, in Græco habetur epieicheia. Sed secundum Tullium, lib. II de Invent., aliquant. ante fin., modestia est pars temperantiæ. Ergo epicheia non est pars justitiæ.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.sc] The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. x, quod « epicheia est quoddam justum.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), the opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus aliqua triplicem habet partem, scilicet partem subjectivam, partem integralem et partem potentialem. Pars autem subjectiva est de qua essentialiter prædicatur totum: et est minus. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: quando enim aliquid prædicatur de pluribus secundum unam rationem, sicut animal de equo et bove: quandoque autem prædicatur secundum prius et posterius, sicut ens prædicatur de substantia et accidente. Epicheia ergo est pars justitiæ communiter dictæ, tamquam justitia quædam existens, ut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., loc. cit. Unde patet quod epicheia est pars subjectiva justitiæ; et de ea justitia dicitur per prius quam de legali: nam legalis justitia dirigitur secundum epicheiam. Unde epicheia est quasi superior regula humanorum actuum.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.ad.1] Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the "fomes" [Cf. I-II, 81, 3, ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Timothy 6:9): "They that will become rich," etc. On this sense covetousness is said to be "the root of all evils," not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod epicheia correspondet proprije justitiæ legali, et quodammodo continetur sub ea, et quodammodo excedit eam. Si enim justitia legalis dicatur quæ obtemperat legi sive quantum ad verba legis, sive quantum ad intentionem legislatoris, quæ potior est, sic epicheia est pars potior legalis justitiæ. Si vero justitia legalis dicatur solum quæ obtemperat legi secundum verba legis, sic epicheia non est pars legalis justitiæ, sed est pars justitiæ communiter dictæ, divisa contra justitiam legalem, sicut exceedens ipsam.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.ad.2] The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), "his giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing."
[II-II.q.119.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in V Ethic., cap. x, « epicheia est melior quadam justitia, » scilicet legali, quæ observat verba legis: quia tamen et ipsa est justitia quædam, non est melior omni justitia.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.ad.3] The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly liberal.
[II-II.q.119.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad epicheiam pertinet aliquid moderari, scilicet observantiam verborum legis. Sed mo- Ita Mss. et editi communius. In Græco textu legitur: To èπειεχές ὑμῶν. destia, quæ ponitur pars temperantiæ, moderatur exteriorem hominis vitam, puta in incessu, vel habitu, vel aliis hujusmodi. Potest tamen esse quod nomen epicheiæ apud Græcos per quamdam similitudinem transferatur ad omnes moderationes.
Article 3
[II-II.q.119.a.3.arg.1] It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, according to Sirach 14:5, "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prodigalitas sit gravius peccatum quam avaritia. Per avaritiam enim aliquis nocet proximo, cui bona sua non communicat; per prodigalitatem autem quis sibi ipsi nocet; dicit enim Philoso-phus in IV Ethic., cap. 1, circa princ., quod « corruptio divitiarum, per quas homo vivit, est quædam ipsius esse perditio. » Gravius autem peccat qui sibi ipsi nocet, secundum illud Eccli., xiv, 5: Qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit? Ergo prodigalitas est gravius peccatum quam avaritia.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.arg.2] Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, inordinatio quæ provenit cum aliqua conditione laudabili, minus est vitiosa. Sed inordinatio avaritiae quandoque est cum aliqua laudabili conditione, ut patet in illis qui volunt sua expendere, nec aliena accipere: prodigalitatis autem inordinatio provenit cum conditione vituperabili; unde et prodigalitatem attribuimus intemperatis hominibus, ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. 1. Ergo prodigalitas est gravius peccatum quam avaritia.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.arg.3] Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above (56, 1, ad 1; I-II, 61, 2, ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (Proverbs 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prudentia præcipua est inter morales virtutes, ut supra habitum est. Sed prodigalitas magis opponitur prudentiae quam avaritia: dicitur enim Proverb., xxi, 20,: Thesaurus desiderabilis, et oleum in habitaculo justi; et imprudens homo dissipabit illud; et Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. 1, a med., quod « insipientis est superabundanter dare, et non accipere ». Ergo prodigalitas est gravius peccatum quam avaritia.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man."
[II-II.q.119.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., ibid., quod « prodigus multo videtur melior illiberali. »
[II-II.q.119.a.3.co] Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (118, 5, ad 3).
[II-II.q.119.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prodigalitas secundum se considerata minus pecatum est quam avaritia; et hoc triplici ratione: primo quidem quia avaritia magis differt a virtute opposita; magis enim ad liberalem pertinet dare, in quo superabundat prodigus, quam accipere vel retinere, in quo superabundat avarus. Secundo, quia prodigus est multis utilis, quibus dat; avarus autem nulli, sed nec sibi ipsi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., loc. cit. Tertio, quia prodigalitas est facile sanabilis; et per hoc quod declinat ad ætatem senectutis, quæ est contraria prodigalitati, et per hoc quod pervenit ad egestatem de facili, dum multa inutiliter consumit, et sic pauper factus non potest in dando superabundare; et etiam quia de facili perducitur ad virtutem, propter similitudinem quam habet ad ipsam. Sed avarus non de facili sanatur, ratione supradicta.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.ad.1] The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. On like manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written (Ecclesiastes 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof." Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dif- 1 Sic cod.; Parm.: « nolunt sua expendere, ferentia prodigi et avari non attenditur secundum hoc quod est peccare in seipsum et in alium. Nam prodigus peccat in seipsum, dum bona sua consumit, unde vivere debet: peccat etiam in alterum consumendo bona, ex quibus aliis deberet providere. Et præcipue hoc apparet in clericis, qui sunt dispensatores bonorum Ecclesiæ, quæ sunt pauperum, quos defraudant, prodige expendendo. Similiter et avarus peccat in alios, inquantum deficit in dationibus; peccat et in seipsum, inquantum deficit in sumptibus; unde dicitur Eccle., vi, 2: Vir cui dedit Deus divitias, nec tribuit ei potestatem ut come* Ex eo. dat ex* eis. Sed tamen in hoc superabundat prodigus, quia sic sibi et quibusdam aliis nocet, quod tamen aliquibus prodest. Avarus autem nec aliis, nec sibi prodest, quia non audet uti etiam ad suam utilitatem bonis suis.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.ad.2] In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum de vitiis communiter loquimur, judicamus de eis secundum proprias rationes ipsorum; sicut circa prodigalitatem attendimus quod superflue consumit divitias; circa avaritiam vero, quod superflue eas retinet. Quod autem quis propter intemperantiam superflue consumat, hoc jam nominat simul peccata multa: unde et tales prodigi sunt pejores, ut dicitur in IV Ethic., cap. 1, post princ. Quod autem illiberalis sive avarus abstineat ab acci-piendis alienis, etsi in se laudabile videatur, tamen ex causa propter quam facit, vituperabile est, dum ideo non vult ab aliis accipere, ne cogatur aliis dare.
[II-II.q.119.a.3.ad.3] All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.119.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia vitia prudentiæ opponuntur, sicut et omnes virtutes a prudentia diriguntur; et ideo vitium ex hoc ipso quod opponitur soli prudentiæ, levius reputatur.
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