Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q124. Martyrdom
Source context
- Theme
- martyrdom as supreme act of fortitude and witness to faith
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 265a, 1913-02-06Steiner connects early Christian martyrdom to the etheric body of Christ having dissolved into the physical substances of the earth, from which strength arose in individuals to undergo martyrdom in the first post-Christian centuries.
- GA 157a, 1915-11-20Steiner indicates that a life of martyrdom in a previous incarnation generates, in a subsequent life, deeply devotional natures oriented toward the spiritual, framing self-sacrifice as a karmic cause with spiritualizing effects.
- GA 70b, 1915-11-26Steiner treats sacrificial deaths and martyrdoms as causes operating behind sensory and intellectual connections, discernible only to a clairvoyant reading of supersensible reality.
- GA 104a, 1909-05-18Steiner notes that those who received the Christ-principle in the first era of Christianity underwent intense external physical martyrdom, situating this suffering within the broader eschatological development described in the Apocalypse.
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic Christian (Aquinas, Secunda Secundae Q124)Aquinas defines martyrdom as an act of the virtue of fortitude by which a person endures death for the sake of truth and justice, ranking it as the greatest external act of virtue and insisting that love of God must be its formal motive.
- Early Christian martyrologyThe Acts of the Martyrs and patristic theology frame martyrdom as bearing witness (Greek: martyria) to Christ through blood, constituting a 'second baptism' that perfectly unites the witness with the Passion — a structural parallel to Aquinas's theological account.
- Islamic tradition (shahada/shahid)The concept of the shahid (witness/martyr) in Islamic theology presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's formal definition: death borne in testimony to divine truth, conferring a privileged eschatological status.
Q124. Martyrdom
Article 1
[II-II.q.124.a.1.arg.1] It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod martyrium non sit actus virtutis. Omnis enim actus virtutis est voluntarius. Sed martyrium quando non est voluntarium, ut patet de Innocentibus pro Christo occisis, de quibus dicit Hilarius Sup. Matth., c. i, § 7, col. 923, t. 4, quod « in aternitatis profectum per martyrii gloriam efferebantur. » Ergo martyrium non est actus virtutis. 2. Præterea, nullum illicitum est actus virtutis. Sed occidere seipsum est illicitum, ut supra habitum est, per quod tamen martyrium consummatur; dicit enim 1. Equivalenter sub his verbis: « Animo malum est quod a ratione deflexerit. » 2. Nicol.: « fructus. » Augustinus in I De civ. Dei, c. xxvi, col. 39, t. 7, quod « quædam sanctæ feminæ tempore persecutionis, ut insectatores suæ pudicitiae devitarent, se in fluvium projecerunt, eoque modo defunctæ sunt, earumque martyria in catholica Ecclesia veneratione celeberrima frequentantur. » Non ergo martyrium est actus virtutis.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.arg.2] Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above (Question 64, Article 5), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.arg.3] Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, laudabile est quod aliquis sponte se offerat ad exequendum actum virtutis. Sed non est laudabile quod aliquis martyrio se ingerat, sed magis videatur esse præsumptuosum et periculosum. Non ergo martyrium est actus virtutis.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.sc] The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Matthew 5:10): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod præmium beatitudinis non debetur nisi actui virtutis. Debetur autem martyrio, secundum illud Matth., v, 10: Beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam, quoniam ipsorum est regnum cælorum. Ergo martyrium est actus virtutis.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.co] As stated above (123, 1 and 3), it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above (109, 1 and 2; 123, 12). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is an act of virtue.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ad virtutem pertinet quod aliquis in bono rationis conservetur. Consistit autem bonum rationis in veritate sicut in proprio objecto, et in justitia sicut in proprio effectu, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Pertinet autem ad rationem martyrii ut aliquis firmiter stet in veritate et justitia contra persequentium impetus. Unde manifestum est quod martyrium est actus virtutis.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.ad.1] Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer."
[II-II.q.124.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod qui dam dixerunt quod in innocentibus acceleratus est miraculose liberi arbitri usus, ita quod etiam voluntarie martyrium passi sunt. Sed quia hoc per auctoritatem Scripturæ non comprobatur, ideo melius dicendum est quod martyrii gloriam, quam in aliis propria voluntas meretur, illi parvuli occisi per Dei gratiam sunt assecuti. Nam effusio sanguinis propter Christum vicem gerit baptismatis. Unde sicut in pueris baptizatis per gratiam baptismalem meritum Christi operatur ad gloriam obtinendam, ita et in occisis propter Christum, meritum martyrii Christi operatur ad palmam martyrii consequendam. Unde Augustinus dicit in quodam sermone De Epiph., cccLxxiii, c. iii, col. 1665, t. 5, quasi eos alloquens: « Ille de vestra corona dubitabit in passione pro Christo, qui etiam baptismum parvulis prodesse non existimat Christi. Non habebatis ætatem, qua in Christum passurum crederetis; sed habebatis carnem, in qua pro Christo passuro passionem sustineretis. »
[II-II.q.124.a.1.ad.2] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus to honor the memory of those holy women [Cf. 64, 1, ad 2]."
[II-II.q.124.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus ibidem dicit, « esse possibile quod aliquibus fide dignis testificationibus divina persuaserit auctoritas Ecclesia ut istarum sanctarum memoriam honoraret. »
[II-II.q.124.a.1.ad.3] The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated (I-II, 108, 1, ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. On the same way certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.
[II-II.q.124.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod præcepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum. Dictum autem est supra, quædam præcepta legis divinæ tradita esse secundum præparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus hoc vel illud facere, cum fuerit opportunum. Ita etiam et aliqua pertinent ad actum virtutis secundum præparationem animi, ut scilicet superveniente tali casu, homo secundum rationem agat. Et hoc præcipue videtur observandum in martyrio, quod consistit in debita sustinentia passionum injuste inflictarum. Non autem debet homo occasionem dare alteri injuste agendi, sed si alius injuste egerit, ipse moderate tolerare debet.
Article 2
[II-II.q.124.a.2.arg.1] It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek martyr signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod martyrium non sit actus fortitudinis. Dicitur enim martyr in græco, quasi testis. Testimonium autem redditur fidei Christi, secundum illud Act., 1, 8: Eritis mihi testes in Jerusalem, etc., et Maximus dicit in quodam sermone: « Mater martyrii est fides catholica, in qua illustres athletæ suo sanguine subscripserunt. » Ergo martyrium est potius actus fidei quam fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.arg.2] Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom, according to John 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Corinthians 13:3, "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actus laudabilis ad illam virtutem præcipue pertinet quæ ad ipsum inclinat, et quæ ab ipso manifestatur, et sine qua ipse non valet. Sed ad martyrium præcipue inclinat charitas: unde in quodam sermone Maximi dicitur: « Charitas Christi in suis martyribus vincit. » Maxime etiam charitas per actum martyrii manifestatur, secundum illud Joan., xv, 13: Majorem directionem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro 1 Ita Mss. et editi passim. tantum. Gnostici martyrium contemnebant et damnabant. amicis suis. Sine charitate etiam martyrium nihil valet, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 3: Si tradidero corpus meum ita ut ardeam, charitatem autem non habuero, nihil mihi prodest. Ergo martyrium magis est actus charitatis quam fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.arg.3] Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: "It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and patience." Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in quodam Sermone de S. Cypriano, cccxi, col. 1444, t. 5: «Facile est honorem martyris celebrari, magnum est fidem atque patientiam martyris imitari.» Sed in uno-quoque actu virtutis præcipue laudatur virtus cujus est actus. Ergo martyrium magis est actus patientiae quam fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.sc] Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?" Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Cyprianus dicit in Epist. viii ad martyres et confessores, col. 246: «O beati martyres, quibus vos laudibus prædicem? O milites fortissimi, robur pectoris vestri, quo præconio vocis explicem?» Quilibet autem laudatur ex virtute cujus actum exercet. Ergo martyrium est actus fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.co] As stated above (123, 1, seqq.), it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): "The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ's servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine." Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They "became valiant in battle" [Hebrews 11:34.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, ad fortitudinem pertinet ut confirmet hominem in bono virtutis, et maxime contra pericula, et præcipue contra pericula mortis, et maxime ejus quæ est in bello. Manifestum est autem quod in martyrio homo firmiter confirmatur in bono virtutis, dum fidem et justitiam non deserit propter imminentia pericula mortis, quæ etiam in quodam certamine particuliari a persecutoribus imminent. Unde Cyprianus dicit in eadem epist.: «Vidit admirans præsenium multitudo cæleste certamen: et in prælio stetisse servos Christi voce libera, mente incorrupta, virtute divina.» Unde manifestum est quod martyrium est fortitudinis actus: et propter hoc de martyribus legit Ecclesia: Fortes facti sunt in bello.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.ad.1] Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man's mind in human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man's soul in the good of Divine justice, which is "through faith in Christ Jesus," according to Romans 3:22. Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in actu fortitudinis duo sunt consideranda, quorum unum est bonum, in quo fortis firmatur, et hoc est fortitudinis finis; aliud est ipsa firmitas qua quis non ce- Si dicas unam virtutem perfectam sufficere ut amore sui quis mortem perferat; — respondeo: Sufficit ad amorem sui finis, ad electionem diæ solitæ ad finem, non autem absque fortitu-vine ad electionem mediorum ad finem insolitorum et difficillimorum. — Lessius aliter nodum solvit dicens: raro virtus ad martyrium absque fortitudine sufficit, et si sufficeret, nihilominus de Patrum more loquendi communi martyrium adhuc vocaretur actus fortitudinis. Solutio prima dit contrariis prohibentibus ab illo bono; et in hoc consistit essentia fortitudinis. Sicut autem fortitudo civilis firmat anium hominis in justitia humana, propter cujus conservationem mortis pericula sustinet, ita etiam fortitudo gratuita firmat anium hominis in bono justitiæ Dei, quæ est per fidem Christi Jesu, ut dicitur ad Rom., iii, 22. Et sic martyrium comparatur ad fidem sicut ad finem in quo aliquis confirmatur; ad fortitudinem autem sicut ad habitum elicientem.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.ad.2] Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without charity.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad actum martyrii inclinat quidem charitas sicut primum et principale motivum per modum virtutis imperantis; fortitudo autem sicut motivum proprium, per modum virtutis elicientis. Et inde est quod martyrium est actus charitatis ut imperantis, fortitudinis autem ut elicientis. Et inde etiam est quod utramque virtutem manifestat. Quod autem sit meritorium, hoc habet ex charitate, sicut et quilibet virtutis actus. Et ideo sine charitate non valet.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.ad.3] As stated above (Question 123, Article 6), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their patience.
[II-II.q.124.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, principalior actus fortitudinis est sustinere; ad quem pertinet martyrium, non autem ad secundarium actum ejus, qui est aggredi. Et quia patientia deservit fortitudini ex parte actus principalis, qui est sustinere, inde est quod concomitanter in martyribus patientia commendatur.
Article 3
[II-II.q.124.a.3.arg.1] It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Romans 10:10), "With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation," and it is written (1 John 3:16), that "we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.arg.2] Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is preferable to all sacrifices." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad majorem perfectionem videtur pertinere quod aliquis det Deo animam, quod fit per obedientiam, quam quod Deo det proprium corpus, quod fit per martyrium: unde Gregorius dicit, XXXV Moral., c. xiv, §28, col. 765, t. 2, quod «obedientia victimis jure præfertur.» Ergo martyrium non est actus maximæ perfectionis.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.arg.3] Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the "good of the nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, melius esse videtur aliis prodesse, quam seipsum in bono conservare: quia « bonum gentis melius est quam bonum unius hominis, » secundum Philosophum in I Ethic., cap. 11, in fin. Sed ille qui martyrium sustinet, sibi soli prodest; ille autem qui docet, proficit multis. Ergo actus docendi et gubernandi subditos est perfectior quam actus martyrii.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.sc] Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in lib. De sancta virginitate, c. xlvi, col. 423, t. 6, præfert martyrium virginitati, quæ ad perfectionem pertinet. Ergo martyrium maxime ad perfectionem pertinere videtur.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.co] We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. On this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better.
A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (Colossians 3:14), that "charity . . . is the bond of perfection." Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man's love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, "from fear of which even dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures," as Augustine observes (Q83, qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends."
[II-II.q.124.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum quod de aliquo actu virtutis loqui possumus dupliciter: uno modo secundum speciem actus ipsius, prout comparatur ad virtutem proxime elicientem ipsum: et sic non potest esse quod martyrium, quod consistit in debita tolerantia mortis, sit perfectissimus inter virtutis actus; quia tolerare mortem non est laudabile secundum se, sed solum secundum quod ordinatur ad aliquod bonum, quod consistit in actu virtutis, puta ad fidem et ad directionem Dei: unde ille actus virtutis, cum sit finis, melior est. Alio modo potest considerari actus virtutis, secundum quod comparatur ad primum motivum, quod est amor charitatis; et ex hac parte præcipue aliquis actus habet quod ad perfectionem vitæ pertineat, quia, ut Apostolus dicit ad Col., 11, 14, charitas est vinculum perfectionis. Martyrium autem inter omnes actus virtuosos maxime demonstrat perfectionem charitatis: quia tanto magis ostenditur aliquis aliquam rem amare, quanto pro ea rem magis amatam contemnit, et rem magis odiosam eligit pati. Manifestum est autem quod inter omnia alia bona præsentis vitæ maxime amat homo ipsam vitam, et contrario maxime odit ipsam mortem, et præcipue cum doloribus corporalium tormentorum, quorum metu etiam bruta animalia a maximis voluptatibus abstrahuntur, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. xxxvi, col. 25, t. 6. Et secundum hoc patet quod martyrium inter cæteros actus humanos est perfectius secundum suum genus, quasi maximæ charitatis signum, secundum illud Joan., xv, 13: Majorem charitatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.ad.1] There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency, through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation of the mind.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nullus est actus perfectionis sub consilio cadens, qui in aliquo eventu non cadat sub præcepto, quasi de necessitate salutis existens; sicut Augustinus dicit in II lib. De adulterinis conjugis, c. xiii, col. 479, t. 6, quod aliquis incidit in necessitatem continentiæ servandæ propter absentiam vel infirmitatem uxoris. Et ideo non est contra perfectionem martyrii, si in aliquo casu sit de necessitate salutis: est enim aliquis casus in quo martyrium perferre non est de necessitate salutis, puta cum ex zelo fidei et charitate fraterna multoties leguntur sancti martyres sponte se obtulisse martyrio. Illa autem præcepta sunt intelligenda secundum præparationem animi.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.ad.2] Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Philippians 2:8) that He became "obedient unto death." Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered absolutely.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod martyrium complectitur id quod summum in obedientia esse potest, ut scilicet aliquis sit obediens usque ad mortem, sicut legitur de Christo ad Philipp., 11, 8, quod factus est obediens usque ad mortem. Unde patet quod martyrium secundum se est perfectius quam obedientia absolute dicta.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.ad.3] This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.
[II-II.q.124.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de martyrio secundum propriam speciem actus, ex qua non habet excellentiam inter omnes actus virtutum; sicut nec fortitudo est excellentior inter omnes virtutes.
Article 4
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.1] It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): "I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace": and Gregory says (Hom. iii in Evang.): "Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit." Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod mors non sit de ratione martyrii. Dicit enim Hieronymus in Serm. de Assumpt., t. 14: « Rectedixerim quod Dei Genitrix virgo et martyr fuit, quamvis in pace vitam finiverit; » et Gregorius dicit Hom. III in Evang., § 4, col. 1089, t. 2: « Quamvis occasio persecutionis desit, habet tamen et pax nostra suum martyrium, quia etsi carnis colla ferro non subdimus, spirituali tamen gladio carnalia desideria in mente trucidamus. » Ergo absque passione mortis potest esse martyrium.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.2] Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ's faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown."
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pro integritate carnis servanda aliquæ mulieres leguntur laudabiliter contempsisse vitam suam; et ita videtur quod corporalis integritas castitatis præferatur vitæ corporali. Sed quandoque ipsa integritas carnis aufertur aut auferri intentatur pro confessione fidei christianæ, ut patet de Agnete et Lucia. Ergo videtur quod martyrium magis debeat dici, si aliqua mulier pro fide Christi integritatem carnis perdat, quam si etiam perderet corporalem vitam; unde et Lucia dicit: « Si me invitam feceris violari, castitas mihi duplicabitur ad coronam. »
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.3] Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ's faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one's goods, as mentioned in Hebrews 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, martyrium est fortitudinis actus. Ad fortitudinem autem pertinet non solum mortem non formidare, sed nec alias adversitates, ut Augustinus dicit in VI Musicæ, c. xv, col. 1489, t. 1. Sed multæ sunt aliæ adversitates præter mortem, quas aliqui possunt sustinere pro fide Christi, scilicet carcerem, exilium, rapinam bonorum, ut patet ad Hebr. x; unde et sancti Marcelli papæ martyrium celebratur, qui tamen fuit mortuus in carcere. Ergo non est de martyrii necessitate quod aliquis sustineat pœnam mortis.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.4] Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (2, ad 1; 3). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, martyrium est actus meritorius, ut dictum est. Sed actus meritorius non potest esse post mortem. Ergo 1 Opus S. Hieronymo abjudicandum. Martyres sunt vel designati, vel consumati, vel vindicati. — Designati, quamvis mortem adhuc non subierint, damnati sunt. Consummati, vel in tormentis, vel paulo post ex vi tormentorum occubuere. Vindicati, rebus mature perpensis, cultui Fidelium ab Ecclesia ponuntur. Quidam supplicia perpessi, sed a Deo miraculose ante mortem; et ita mors non est de ratione martyrii.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.sc] Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that "in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living without faith."
[II-II.q.124.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Maximus dicit in quodam Sermone de martyrio, quod « vincit pro fide moriendo qui vinceretur sine fide vivendo. »
[II-II.q.124.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 2), a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Hebrews 11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): "Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul" [Douay: 'life'] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ's sake.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, martyr dicitur quasi testis fidei Christianæ, per quam nobis visibilia pro invisibilibus contemnenda proponuntur, ut dicitur ad Heb., xi. Ad martyrium ergo pertinet ut homo testificetur fidem, se opere ostendens cuncta præsentia contemnere, ut ad futura et invisibilia bona perveniat. Quamdiu autem homini remanet vita corporalis, nondum se opere ostendit corporalia cuncta despicere. Consueverunt enim homines et consanguineos et omnia bona possessa contemnere, et etiam dolores corporis pati, ut vitam conservent. Unde et Satan contra Job induxit, Job, ii, 4: Pellem pro pelle, et cuncta quæ homo habet, dabit pro anima sua, idest pro vita sua corporali. Et ideo ad perfectam rationem martyrii requiritur quod aliquis mortem sustineat propter Christum.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.1] The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illæ auctoritates, et si quæ similes inventiuntur, loquuntur de martyrio per quamdam similitudinem.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.2] When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. On the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in muliere quæ integritatem carnis perdit, vel ad perdendam eam damnatur occasione fidei christianæ, non est apud homines manifestum utrum hoc mulier patiatur propter amorem fidei christianæ, vel magis pro contemptu castitatis; et ideo apud homines non redditur per hoc testimonium sufficiens; unde hoc non proprie habet rationem martyrii. Sed apud Deum, qui corda scrutatur, potest hoc ad præmium deputari, sicut Lucia dixit.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.3] As stated above (123, 4,5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, fortitudo principaliter consistit circa pericula mortis, circa alia autem consequenter; et ideo nec martyrium proprie dicitur pro sola tolerantia carceris, vel exilii, vel rapinæ divitiarum, nisi forte secundum quod ex his sequitur mors. liberati, vocantur ab Ecclesia martyres, sicque coluntur; non sunt martyres, nisi improprie. S. Thomas et Sylvius sentire videntur eum qui, seposita causa fidei, in bello justo pro bono communi militat cum relatione ad Deum, et moritur, esse martyrem. A fortiori qui moriuntur in bello pro Ecclesia, quidquid contrarium dictitent Lessius et Layman.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.4] The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ's sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.
[II-II.q.124.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod meritum martyrii non est post mortem, sed in ipsa voluntaria sustinentia mortis, prout scilicet aliquis voluntarie patitur inflictionem mortis. Contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis post mortalia vulnera pro Christo suscepta vel quascumque alias tribulationes continuatas usque ad mortem, quas a persecutoribus patitur pro fide Christi, diu vivat: in quo statu actus martyrii meritorius est, et etiam ipso eodem tempore quo hujusmodi afflictiones patitur.
Article 5
[II-II.q.124.a.5.arg.1] It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (1 Peter 4:15-16): "Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men's things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name." Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sola fides sit causa martyrii. Dicitur enim I Petr., iv, 45: Nemo vestrum patiatur ut homicida, aut fur, aut aliquid hujusmodi; si autem ut christianus, non erubescat, glorificet autem Deum in isto nomine. Sed ex hoc dicitur aliquis christianus, quia tenet fidem Christi. Ergo sola fides Christi dat patientibus martyrii gloriam.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.arg.2] Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, martyr dicitur quasi testis. Testimonium autem non redditur nisi veritati. Non autem aliquis dicitur martyr ex testimonio cujuslibet veritatis, sed solum ex testimonio veritatis divinæ; alioquin si quis moreretur pro confessione veritatis geometriæ vel alterius speculativæ scientiæ, esset martyr; quod videtur ridiculum. Ergo sola fides est martyrii causa.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.arg.3] Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since "the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter alia virtutum opera illa videntur esse potiora quæ ordinantur ad bonum commune; quia «bonum gentis melius est quam bonum unius hominis, » secundum Philosophum in I Ethic., cap. ii, in fin. Si ergo aliquod aliud bonum esset causa martyrii, maxime videretur quod illi essent martyres qui pro defensione reipublicæ moriuntur: quod Ecclesiae observatio non habet: non enim militum qui in bello justo moriuntur, martyria celebrantur. Ergo sola fides videtur esse martyrii causa.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.sc] It is written (Matthew 5:10): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake," which pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome's commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., v, 40: Beati qui persecutionem patiuntur propter justitiam, quod pertinet ad martyrium, ut Glossa ord., et Hieron. in hunc loc. dicit. Ad justitiam autem pertinet non solum fides, sed etiam aliæ virtutes. Ergo et aliæ virtutes possunt esse martyrii causa.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.co] As stated above (Article 4), martyrs are so called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore Christ's martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.
But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to James 2:18, "I will show thee, by works, my faith." Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): "They profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him." Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, martyres dicuntur quasi testes, quia scilicet corporalibus suis passionibus usque ad mortem testimonium perhibent veritati, non cuicumque, sed veritati quæ secundum pietatem est, quæ per Christum nobis innotuit: unde et martyres Christi dicuntur quasi testes ipsius. Hujusmodi autem est veritas fidei. Et ideo cujuslibet martyrii causa est fidei veritas. Sed ad fidei veritatem non solum pertinet ipsa credulitas cordis, sed etiam exterior protestatio; quæ quidem fit non solum per verba, quibus aliquis confitetur fidem, sed etiam per facta, quibus aliquis fidem se habere ostendit, secundum illud Jacobi, ii, 18: Ego ostendam tibi ex operibus fidem meam. Unde et de quibusdam dicitur ad Titum, i, 16. Confitentur verbis se nosse Deum, factis autem negant. Et ideo omnium virtutum opera, secundum quod referuntur in Deum, sunt quædam protestationes fidei, per quam nobis innotescit quod Deus hujusmodi opera a nobis requirit, et nos pro eis remunerat: et secundum hoc possunt esse martyrii causa. Unde et beati Joannis Baptistæ martyrium in Ecclesia celebratur, qui non pro neganda fide, sed pro reprehensione adulterii mortem sustinuit.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.ad.1] A Christian is one who is Christ's. Now a person is said to be Christ's, not only through having faith in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to Romans 8:9, "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His"; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to Galatians 5:24, "They that are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences." Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ's sake, because this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod christianus dicitur qui Christi est. Dicitur autem aliquis esse Christi, non solum ex eo quod habet fidem Christi, sed etiam ex eo quod spiritu Christi ad opera virtuosa procedit, secundum illud ad Rom., viii, 9: Si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est ejus; et etiam ex hoc quod ad imitationem Christi peccatis moritur, secundum illud ad Galat., v, 24: Qui Christi sunt, carnem suam crucifixerunt cum vitiis et concupiscentiis. Et ideo ut christianus patitur, non solum qui patitur pro fidei confessione, quæ fit per verba, sed etiam quicumque patitur pro quocumque bono opere faciendo, vel pro quocumque peccato vitando propter Christum, quia hoc totum pertinet ad fidei protestationem.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.ad.2] The truth of other sciences has no connection with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as stated above (110, 3,4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against the Divine Law.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod veritas aliarum scientiarum non pertinet ad cultum divinitatis: et ideo non dicitur esse veritas secundum pietatem, unde nec ejus confessio potest esse directe martyrii causa. Sed quia omne mendacium peccatum est, ut supra habitum est, vitatio mendacii, contra quamcumque veritatem sit, inquantum mendacium est peccatum divinæ legi contrarium, potest esse martyrii causa.
[II-II.q.124.a.5.ad.3] The good of one's country is paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.124.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod bonum reipublicæ est praecipuum inter bona humana. Sed bonum divinum, quod est propria causa martyrii, est potius quam humanum. Tamen quia bonum humanum potest effici divinum, ut si referatur in Deum, ideo potest esse quodcumque bonum humanum martyrii causa, secundum quod in Deum refertur.
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