Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q139. The gift of fortitude
Source context
- Theme
- the Holy Spirit's gift of fortitude as supernatural strengthening of the soul's irascible appetite for perseverance in difficult good
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Stoic virtue ethicsStoic accounts of andreia (courage) as rational mastery of fear in pursuit of the kathekon offer a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's structural claim that fortitude moderates fear and daring toward a proportionate end, though Aquinas roots the gift in infused grace rather than natural reason alone.
- Vedantic tradition — tapasThe concept of tapas (austerity, steadfast inner fire) in the Vedantic and Bhagavad-Gita traditions presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's gift of fortitude insofar as both identify a capacity for endurance under spiritual difficulty that exceeds ordinary natural strength.
Q139. The gift of fortitude
Article 1
[II-II.q.139.a.1.arg.1] It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fortitudino non sit donum. Virtutes enim a donis differunt. Sed fortitudino est virtus. Ergo non debet poni donum.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.arg.2] Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above (I-II, 68, 6). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that "fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven." Therefore fortitude is not a gift.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actus donorum manent in patria, ut supra habitum est. Sed actus fortitudinis non manet in patria: dicit enim Gregorius in I Moral., c. xxxii, § 44, col. 547, t. 1, quod « fortitudino » dat fiduciam trepidanti contra adversa, quæ nulla erunt in patria. » Ergo fortitudino non est donum.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that "it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show." Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in II De doct. christ., c. VII, col. 39, t. 3, quod « fortitudinis est ab omni mortifera jucun- 2 Sic omnes cod.; id est: « Sustinendis. » Symditate transeuntium sese extrahere. » Sed circa noxias jucunditates seu delectationes magis consistit temperantia, quam fortitudo. Ergo videtur quod fortitudo non sit donum respondens virtuti fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.sc] Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Isaiah 11:2).
[II-II.q.139.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Isa., xi, fortitudo inter alia dona Spiritus sancti computatur.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.co] Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (123, 2; I-II, 61, 3): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Question 123, Article 2).
Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above (I-II, 68, 1 and 2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod fortitudo importat quamdam animi firmitatem, ut supra dictum est. Et hæc quidem firmitas animi requiritur et in bonis faciendis, et in malis perseverandis, et præcipue in arduis bonis vel malis. Homo autem secundum proprium et connaturalem sibi modum hanc firmitatem in utroque potest habere, ut non deficiat a bono propter difficultatem vel alicujus ardui operis implendi, vel alicujus gravis mali perferendi: et secundum hoc fortitudo ponitur virtus specialis vel generalis, ut supra dictum est. Sed ulterius a Spiritu sancto movetur animus hominis ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cujuslibet operis inchoati, et evadat quæcumque pericula imminentia: quod quidem excedit naturam humanam. Quandoque enim non subest potestati hominis ut consequatur finem sui operis, vel evadat mala seu pericula, cum quandoque opprimatur ab eis in morte; sed hoc operatur Spiritus sanctus in homine cum perducit eum ad vitam æternam, quæ est finis omnium bonorum operum, et evasio omnium periculorum: et hujus rei infundit quamdam fiduciam menti Spiritus sanctus, contrarium timorem excludens; et secundum hoc fortitudo donum Spiritus sancti ponitur. Dictum est enim supra, quod dona respiciunt motionem animæ a Spiritu sancto.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.ad.1] Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod fortitudo quæ est virtus, perficit animum ad sustinendum quæcumque pericula; sed non sufficit dare fiduciam evadendi quæcumque pericula: sed hoc pertinet ad fortitudinem quæ est donum Spiritus sancti.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.ad.2] The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dona non habent eosdem actus in patria quos habent in via; sed ibi habent actus circa perfruitionem finis. Unde actus fortitudinis ibi est perfrui plena securitate a laboribus et malis.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.ad.3] The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.
[II-II.q.139.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod donum machus (10, ep. 75) simili fere modo scripsit: « Quæ perseverandæ religionis reverentia (vestra) decernenda credidit? » Edit. habent: « Perferendis. » fortitudinis respicit virtutem fortitudinis, non solum secundum quod consistit in sustinendo pericula, sed etiam secundum quod consistit in quocumque arduo opere faciendo. Et ideo donum fortitudinis dirigitur a dono consilii, quod videtur præcipue esse de melioribus bonis.
Article 2
[II-II.q.139.a.2.arg.1] It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod quarta beatitudo, scilicet: Beati qui esuriunt et sitinnt justitiam, non respondeat dono fortitudinis. Donum enim fortitudinis non respondet virtuti justitiae, sed potius donum pietatis. Sed esurire et sitire justitiam pertinet ad actum justitiae. Ergo beatitudo ista magis pertinet ad donum pietatis quam ad donum fortitudinis.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.arg.2] Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above (Article 45). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, esuries et sitis justitiae importat desiderium boni. Sed hoc proprie pertinet ad charitatem, cui non respondet donum fortitudinis, sed magis donum sapientiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ista beatitudo non respondet dono fortitudinis, sed dono sapientiae.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.arg.3] Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fructus consequuntur ad beatitudines, quia de ratione beatitudinis est delectatio, ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. viii, a med. Sed in fructibus non videtur aliquid poni quod pertineat ad fortitudinem. Ergo nec beatitudo aliqua ei respondet.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): "Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil."
[II-II.q.139.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I De serm. Dom. in monte, c. iv, col. 1234, t. 3: «Fortitudo congruit esuriuntibus et sitientibus; laborant enim desiderantes gaudium de veris bonis, et amorem a terrenis et corporalibus avertere cupientes.»
[II-II.q.139.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 121, Article 2), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.
Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (1), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Augustinus attribuit beatitudines donis secundum ordinem enumerationis, considerata tamen aliqua convenientia. Et ideo quartam beatitudinem, scilicet de esurie et siti justitiae, attribuit quarto dono, scilicet dono fortitudinis. Est tamen ibi aliqua convenientia: quia, sicut est dictum, fortitudo in arduis consistit. Est autem valde arduum quod aliquis non solum opera virtuosa faciat, quæ communiter dicuntur opera justitiae; sed quod faciat ea cum insatiabili quodam desiderio; quod potest significari per famem et sitim justitiae.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.ad.1] As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut Chrysostomus dicit Super Matth., hom., xv, § 4, col. 486, t. 11, justitia hic potest accipi non solum particularis, sed etiam universalis, quæ se habet ad omnium virtutum opera, ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. i, a med., in quibus arduum intendit fortitudo, quæ est donum.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.ad.2] Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (23, 8, ad 3; I-II, 68, 4, ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitas est radix omnium donorum et virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo quidquid pertinet ad fortitudinem, potest etiam ad charitatem pertinere.
[II-II.q.139.a.2.ad.3] There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.139.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod inter fructus ponuntur duo quæ sufficienter correspondent dono fortitudinis; scilicet patientia, quæ respicit sustinentiam malorum; et longanimitas, quæ respicere potest diuturnam expectationem et operationem bonorum.
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