Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q160. Modesty
Source context
- Theme
- modesty as a moral virtue moderating the desire for external honor and recognition
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 297a, 1921-02-28Steiner identifies 'intellectual modesty' as the prerequisite disposition for approaching spiritual science, distinguishing it from ordinary social modesty.
- GA 329, 1919-11-06Steiner argues that intellectual modesty is an urgent cognitive need for contemporary human beings in order to comprehend developmental stages of history and culture.
- GA 265a, 1924-01-03Steiner links modesty specifically to the relationship with the ego, treating it as an inward spiritual prerequisite for esoteric work.
- GA 71b, 1918-02-25Steiner distinguishes between ordinary social modesty and an inward, intellectual modesty and humility that arises from genuine self-knowledge and makes one suited for spiritual development.
- GA 125, 1910-01-23Steiner associates true modesty with dignified humility grounded in the recognition of human developmental reality, contrasting it with false or performative self-deprecation.
- GA 80c, 1921-02-23Steiner locates intellectual modesty as a specific quality in the soul's makeup that has particular importance given the unprecedented height of modern intellectual development.
- GA 295, 1919-08-27Steiner indicates that modesty and its contrary, conceit, should be treated as topics for moral education in children, with detail and practical application.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle treats modesty (aidōs) in the Nicomachean Ethics not as a full virtue but as a quasi-virtue appropriate to the young, structurally analogous to Aquinas's placement of modesty as a potential part of temperance rather than a cardinal virtue in its own right.
- Stoic ethicsStoic moral philosophy treats reverent restraint (aidōs) as a component of self-governance, representing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's grounding of modesty in the rational ordering of external comportment.
Q160. Modesty
Article 1
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order." Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod modestia non sit pars temperantiæ. Modestia enim a modo dicitur. Sed in omnibus virtutibus requiritur modus: nam virtus ordinatur ad bonum; « bonum » autem, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De natura boni, cap. III, col. 553, t. 8, « consistit in modo, specie et ordine. » Ergo modestia est generalis virtus. Non ergo debet poni pars temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.2] Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, laus temperantiæ videtur consistere præcipue in quadam moderatione. Ex hac autem sumitur nomen modestiæ. Ergo modestia est idem quod temperantia, et non ejus pars.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.3] Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Timothy 2:24-25, "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Question 33, Article 1). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, modestia videtur consistere circa proximorum correctionem, secundum illud II ad Timoth., II, 24: Servum Dei* non oportet litigare, sed man-suetum esse ad omnes, cum modestia corripientem eos qui resistunt veritati. Sed correctio delinquentium est actus justitiæ vel charitatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod modestia magis sit pars justitiæ quam temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.sc] Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius, lib II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., ponit modestiam partem temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.co] As stated above (141, 4; 157, 3), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (134, 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, temperantia moderationem adhibet circa ea in quibus difficillimum est moderari, scilicet circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Ubicumque autem est aliqua virtus specialiter circa aliquod maximum, oportet esse aliam virtutem circa ea quæ mediocriter se habent, eo quod oportet quantum ad omnia vitam hominis secundum virtutes esse regulatum: sicut supra dictum est, quod magnificentia est circa magnos sumptus pecuniarum; præter quam est necessaria liberalitas quæ fit circa mediocres sumptus. Unde necessarium est quod sit quædam virtus moderativa in quibus non est ita difficile moderari; et hæc virtus vocatur modestia, et adjungi-tur temperantiæ tamquam principali.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.1] When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. On the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod no-men commune quando appropriatur 1 Al.: « severitatem. » his quæ sunt infima, sicut nomen commune angelorum appropriatur infimo ordini angelorum; ita etiam et modus, qui communiter observatur in qualibet virtute, appropriatur specialiter virtuti quæ in minimis modum ponit.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.2] Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqua indigent temperaturee propter suam vehementiam, sicut forte vinum temperatur; sed moderatio requiritur in omnibus; et ideo temperantia magis se habet ad passiones vehementes, modestia vero ad mediocres.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.3] Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod modestia accipitur ibi modo communiter sumpto, prout requiritur in omnibus virtutibus.
Article 2
[II-II.q.160.a.2.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Philippians 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtutes quæ sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur a virtute justiæ, quæ est circa operationes. Sed modestia videtur esse una virtus. Si ergo est circa operationes exteriores, non erit circa aliquas exteriores passiones.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite--which is proper to the moral virtues--and about things pertaining to knowledge--which is proper to the intellectual virtues--and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulla virtus una et eadem est circa ea quæ pertinent ad appetitum, quod est proprium virtutum moralium, et circa ea quæ pertinent ad cognitionem, quæ est proprie virtutum intellectualium, neque etiam circa ea quæ pertinent ad irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Si ergo modestia est una virtus, non potest esse circa omnia prædicta.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.sc] On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the "mode" whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.sc] Sed contra, in omnibus prædictis oportet observare modum, a quo modestia dicitur. Ergo circa omnia prædicta est modestia.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.co] I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.
In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility." The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [Cf. 145, 1], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.
To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [De Affectibus] mentions "meekness, simplicity, humility," and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (143); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned eutrapelia to pleasures in games, as stated above (I-II, 60, 5). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, modestia differt a temperan-tia in hoc quod temperantia est moderativa eorum quæ difficillimum est refrenare, modestia autem est moderativa eorum quæ in hoc mediocriter se habent. Diversimode autem aliqui de modestia videntur esse locuti. Ubicumque enim consideraverunt aliquam specialem rationem boni vel difficultatis in moderando, illud subtraxerunt modestiæ, relinquentes modestiam circa minora. Manifestum est autem omnibus quod refrenatio delectationum tactus specialem quamdam difficultatem habet. Unde omnes temperantiam a modestia distinxerunt. Sed præter hoc Tullius, lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., consideravit quoddam speciale bonum esse in moderatione pænarum: et ideo etiam clementiam subtraxit modestiæ, ponens modestiam circa communia quæ relinquuntur moderanda. Quæ quidem videntur esse quatuor. Quorum unum est motus animi ad aliquam excellentiam, quam moderatur « humilitas. » Secundum autem est desiderium eorum quæ pertinent ad cognitionem; et hoc moderatur « studiositas, » quæ opponitur curiositati. Tertium autem quod pertinet ad corporales motus et actiones; ut scilicet decenter et honeste fiant tam in his quæ serio quam in his quæ ludo aguntur. Quartum autem est quod pertinet ad exteriorem apparatus, puta in vestibus et in aliis hujusmodi. Sed circa quædam eorum alii posuerunt quasdam speciales virtutes; sicut Andronicus mansuetudinem, simplicitatem, humilitatem et alia hujusmodi, de quibus supra dictum est. Aristoteles autem, lib. IV Ethic., cap. viii, circa delectationem ludorum posuit « eutrapeliam, » ut dictum est; quæ omnia continentur sub modestia, secundum quod a Tullio accipitur. Et hoc modo modestia se habet non solum circa exteriores actiones, sed etiam circa interiores.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus loquitur de modestia, prout est circa exteriora; et tamen etiam interiorum moderatio manifestari potest per quædam exteriora signa.
[II-II.q.160.a.2.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.160.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sub modestia continentur diversæ virtutes, quæ a diversis assignantur. Unde nihil prohibet modestiam esse circa ea quæ requirunt diversas virtutes. Et tamen non est tanta diversitas inter partes modestia ad invicem, quanta est justitiæ, quæ est circa operationes, ad temperantiam, quæ est circa passiones : quia in actionibus et passionibus in quibus non est aliqua excellens difficultas ex parte materiæ, sed solum ex parte moderationis, non attenditur virtus, nisi una, scilicet secundum rationem moderationis. Et per hoc patet etiam responsio ad tertium.
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