Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q160. Modesty
Source context
- Theme
- modesty as a moral virtue moderating the desire for external honor and recognition
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 297a, 1921-02-28Steiner identifies 'intellectual modesty' as the prerequisite disposition for approaching spiritual science, distinguishing it from ordinary social modesty.
- GA 329, 1919-11-06Steiner argues that intellectual modesty is an urgent cognitive need for contemporary human beings in order to comprehend developmental stages of history and culture.
- GA 265a, 1924-01-03Steiner links modesty specifically to the relationship with the ego, treating it as an inward spiritual prerequisite for esoteric work.
- GA 71b, 1918-02-25Steiner distinguishes between ordinary social modesty and an inward, intellectual modesty and humility that arises from genuine self-knowledge and makes one suited for spiritual development.
- GA 125, 1910-01-23Steiner associates true modesty with dignified humility grounded in the recognition of human developmental reality, contrasting it with false or performative self-deprecation.
- GA 80c, 1921-02-23Steiner locates intellectual modesty as a specific quality in the soul's makeup that has particular importance given the unprecedented height of modern intellectual development.
- GA 295, 1919-08-27Steiner indicates that modesty and its contrary, conceit, should be treated as topics for moral education in children, with detail and practical application.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle treats modesty (aidōs) in the Nicomachean Ethics not as a full virtue but as a quasi-virtue appropriate to the young, structurally analogous to Aquinas's placement of modesty as a potential part of temperance rather than a cardinal virtue in its own right.
- Stoic ethicsStoic moral philosophy treats reverent restraint (aidōs) as a component of self-governance, representing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's grounding of modesty in the rational ordering of external comportment.
Q160. Modesty
Article 1
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order." Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod modestia non sit pars temperantiæ. Modestia enim a modo dicitur. Sed in omnibus virtutibus requiritur modus: nam virtus ordinatur ad bonum; « bonum » autem, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De natura boni, cap. III, col. 553, t. 8, « consistit in modo, specie et ordine. » Ergo modestia est generalis virtus. Non ergo debet poni pars temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.2] Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, laus temperantiæ videtur consistere præcipue in quadam moderatione. Ex hac autem sumitur nomen modestiæ. Ergo modestia est idem quod temperantia, et non ejus pars.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.3] Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Timothy 2:24-25, "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above (Question 33, Article 1). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, modestia videtur consistere circa proximorum correctionem, secundum illud II ad Timoth., II, 24: Servum Dei* non oportet litigare, sed man-suetum esse ad omnes, cum modestia corripientem eos qui resistunt veritati. Sed correctio delinquentium est actus justitiæ vel charitatis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videtur quod modestia magis sit pars justitiæ quam temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.sc] Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius, lib II De invent., aliquant. ante fin., ponit modestiam partem temperantiæ.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.co] As stated above (141, 4; 157, 3), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above (134, 3, ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, temperantia moderationem adhibet circa ea in quibus difficillimum est moderari, scilicet circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus. Ubicumque autem est aliqua virtus specialiter circa aliquod maximum, oportet esse aliam virtutem circa ea quæ mediocriter se habent, eo quod oportet quantum ad omnia vitam hominis secundum virtutes esse regulatum: sicut supra dictum est, quod magnificentia est circa magnos sumptus pecuniarum; præter quam est necessaria liberalitas quæ fit circa mediocres sumptus. Unde necessarium est quod sit quædam virtus moderativa in quibus non est ita difficile moderari; et hæc virtus vocatur modestia, et adjungi-tur temperantiæ tamquam principali.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.1] When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. On the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod no-men commune quando appropriatur 1 his quæ sunt infima, sicut nomen commune angelorum appropriatur infimo ordini angelorum; ita etiam et modus, qui communiter observatur in qualibet virtute, appropriatur specialiter virtuti quæ in minimis modum ponit.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.2] Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqua indigent temperaturee propter suam vehementiam, sicut forte vinum temperatur; sed moderatio requiritur in omnibus; et ideo temperantia magis se habet ad passiones vehementes, modestia vero ad mediocres.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.3] Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.
[II-II.q.160.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod modestia accipitur ibi modo communiter sumpto, prout requiritur in omnibus virtutibus.
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