Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q162. Pride
Source context
- Theme
- pride as capital vice: the soul's disordered elevation of self above right order toward God
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 148, 1913-11-18Steiner identifies pride and the feeling of superiority as the deepest temptation confronting Christ Jesus, noting that all forces of pride and self-importance are released in the soul when it is posed the question of self-elevation.
- GA 131, 1911-10-11Steiner observes that modern human pride—operating below conscious awareness—prevents the intellect from acknowledging its own incompetence before fundamental spiritual questions.
- GA 5, chapter 1Steiner analyzes Nietzsche's valuation of pride as a force that arouses self-estimation, causing the human being to regard himself as the sole meaning and purpose of existence—a tendency Steiner treats with critical distance from an anthroposophical standpoint.
- GA 90a, 1904-03-11Steiner identifies pride as the eighth fetter in a Buddhist-theosophical schema, describing it as the struggle for the elevation of personal existence and an obstacle on the path to liberation.
Cross-tradition
- Augustinian theologyAugustine treats pride (superbia) as the root of all sin, the soul's refusal to remain subject to God in favor of self-sufficient autonomy—a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of pride as the queen of the vices in Q162.
- Dante, PurgatorioDante places the prideful on the lowest terrace of Purgatory, bearing stone weights to invert the upward gaze of self-elevation, structurally congruent with Aquinas's account of pride as the inversion of right creaturely order.
- Islamic moral theology (kibr)In Sufi and Islamic ethical traditions, kibr (arrogance/pride) is the cardinal vice of the nafs ammara, the commanding self, whose correction requires recognition of absolute dependence on the divine—exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's ordering of humility as the remedy for pride.
Q162. Pride
Article 1
[II-II.q.162.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written (Isaiah 60:15): "I will make thee to be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and generation." Therefore pride is not a sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod superbia non sit peccatum. Nullum enim peccatum est repromissum a Deo. Promittit enim Deus quod ipse facturus est; non est autem actor peccati. Sed superbia connumeratur inter repromissiones divinas: dicitur enim Isa., Lx, 15: Ponam te in superbiam sæculorum, gaudium in generationem et generationem. Ergo superbia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all." Therefore pride is not a sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, appetere divinam simili-tudinem non est peccatum: hoc enim naturaliter appetit quælibet creatura, et in hoc optimum ejus consistit, et præcipue hoc convenit rationali creaturæ, quæ facta est ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Sed, sicut dicitur in lib. Sentent. Prosperi, sent. ccxcn, col. 1884, t. 10, « superbia est amor propriæ excellentiæ, » per quam homo Deo assimilatur, qui est excellen-tissimus; unde dicit Augustinus in II Confess., c. vi, § 13, col. 680, t. 1: « Superbia celsitudinem imitatur, cum tu sis unus super omnia Deus excelsus. » Ergo superbia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.arg.3] Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum non solum contrariatur virtuti, sed etiam opposito vitio, ut patet per Philosophum, in II Ethic., cap. viii. Sed nullum vitium inventur oppositum esse superbiæ; ergo superbia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.sc] It is written (Tobit 4:14): "Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words."
[II-II.q.162.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Tob., iv, 14: Superbiam nunquam in tuo sensu, aut in tuo verbo dominari permittas.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.co] Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he really is"; for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod superbia nominatur ex hoc quod aliquis per voluntatem tendit supra id quod est. Unde dicit Isidorus, in lib. X Etymol., § 248, col. 393, t. 3: « Superbus dictus est, quia super vult videri quam est; » qui enim vult super-gredi quod est, superbus est. Habet autem hoc ratio recta ut voluntas uniuscujusque feratur in id quod est proportionatum sibi. Et ideo manifestum est quod superbia importat aliquid quod adversatur rationi rectæ. Hoc autem facit rationem peccati, quia, secundum Dionysium IV De div. nomin., § 32, col. 734, t. 4, « malum animæ est præter rationem esse. » Unde manifestum est quod superbia est peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.ad.1] Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Isaiah 61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He bestows."
It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod superbia dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo ex eo quod supergreditur regulam rationis, et sic dicimus eam esse peccatum: alio modo potest superbia nominari simpliciter a superexcessu; et secundum hoc omne superexcedens potest nominari superbia; et ita repromittitur a Deo superbia, quasi quidam superexcessus bonorum. Unde et Glossa Hieronymi, dicit ibidem, quod « est superbia bona et mala; » vel « superbia in vitio cui Deus resistit, et superbia quæ accipitur pro gloria quam confert. » Quamvis etiam dici possit quod superbia ibi accipitur materialiter pro superabundantia rerum, de quibus possunt homines superbire.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.ad.2] Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the "desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over our fellow-creatures."
[II-II.q.162.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod eorum quæ naturaliter homo appetit, ratio est ordinatrix: et ita si aliquis a regula rationis recedit vel in plus, vel in minus, erit talis appetitus vitiosus, sicut patet de appetitu cibi qui naturaliter desideratur. Superbia autem appetit excellentiam in excessu ad rationem rectam. Unde Augustinus dicit in XIV De civ. Dei c. xiii, col. 420, t. 7, quod « superbia est perversæ celsitudinis appetitus. » Et inde est etiam quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in XIX De civ. Dei, c. xii, § 2, col. 639, t. 7, « superbia perverse imitatur Deum: odit namque cum sociis æqualitatem sub illo, sed imponere vult sociis dominationem suam pro illo. »
[II-II.q.162.a.1.ad.3] Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above (161, 1, ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. On the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.
[II-II.q.162.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod superbia directe opponitur virtuti humilitatis, quæ quodammodo circa eadem cum magnanimitate existit, ut supra dictum est; unde et vitium quod opponitur superbiæ, in defectum vergens, propinquum est vitium pusillanimitatis, quæ opponitur magnanimimitati secundum defectum. Nam sicut ad magnanimimitatem pertinet impellere animum ad magna contra desperationem; ita ad humilitatem pertinet retrahere animum ab inordinato appetitu magnorum contra præsumptionem. Pusillanimitas autem, si importet defectum a prosecutione magnorum, proprie opponitur magnanimimitati per modum defectus; si autem importet applicationem animi ad aliqua viliora quam hominem deceant, opponitur humilitati secundum defectum; utrumque enim ex animi parvitate procedit: sicut et e contrario superbia potest secundum superexcessum et magnanimimitati, et humilitati opponi, secundum rationes diversas: humilitati quidem, secundum qnod subjectionem aspernatur; magnanimimitati autem, secundum quod inordinate ad magna se extendit. Sed quia superbia superioritatem quamdam importat, directius opponitur humilitati; sicut et pusillanimitas, quæ importat parvitatem animi in magna tendentis, directius opponitur magnanimimitati.
Article 2
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "you will find no sin that is not labelled pride"; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that "without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible." Therefore pride is a general sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.2] Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, "That He may withdraw man from wickedness [Vulgate: 'From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride']," says that "a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin." Now according to Ambrose [De Parad. viii], "every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Job, xxxiii, super illud: Ut avertat hominem ab iniquitate, dicit Glossa ord., quod « contra conditorem superbire, est ejus præcepta peccando transcendere. » Sed secundum Ambrosium, lib. De parad., c. viii, §39, col. 309, t. 1, « omne peccatum est prævaricatio legis divinæ, et cælestium inobedientia præceptorum. » Ergo omne peccatum est superbia.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.3] Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): "Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body"; and Isidore says (Etym. [De Summo Bono ii, 38) that it is "the downfall of all virtues." Therefore pride is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne peccatum speciale alicui speciali virtuti opponitur. Sed superbia opponitur omnibus virtutibus; dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., c. xxiii, § 48, col. 744, t. 2: « Superbia nequaquam est unius virtutis extinctione contenta: contra cuncta animæ membra se erigit, et quasi generalis ac pestifer morbus corpus omne corrumpit; » et Isidorus dicit in lib. II De summo bono sive Sentent., cap. xxxviii, col. 639, t. 6, quod « est ruina cunctarum virtutum. » Ergo superbia non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.4] Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne peccatum speciale habet specialem materiam; sed superbia habet generalem materiam: dicit enim Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., ibidem, § 49, quod « alter intumescit auro, alter eloquio; alter infimis et terrenis rebus, alter summis cælestibusque virtutibus. » Ergo superbia non est speciale peccatum, sed generale.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): "If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God's law, pride is a very different sin from other vices." Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in libro De natura et gratia, c. xxix, col. 263, t. 10: « Quærat diligenter, et inveniet secundum legem Dei multum discretum esse a cæteris peccatum superbiæ. » Genus autem non distinguitur a Ex Gregorio desumpta, XXIII Moral., c. xxii, § 44, col. 278, t. 2. suis speciebus. Ergo superbia non est generale peccatum, sed speciale.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.co] The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. On this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one's own excellence, as stated (1, ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. On this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one's own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jeremiah 2:20, "Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve."
It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that "many things are done amiss which are not done through pride."
[II-II.q.162.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum superbiæ dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo secundum propriam speciem, quam habet ex ratione proprii objecti, et hoc modo superbia est speciale peccatum, quia habet speciale objectum: est enim inordinatus appetitus propriæ excellentiæ, ut dictum est; alio modo potest considerari secundum redundantiam quamdam in alia peccata, et secundum hoc habet quamdam generalitatem, inquantum scilicet ex superbia oriri possunt omnia peccata, duplici ratione: uno modo per se, inquantum scilicet alia peccata ordinantur ad finem superbiæ, qui est propria excellentia, ad quam potest ordinari omne id quod quis inordinate appetit; alio modo indirecte, et quasi per accidens, scilicet removendo prohibens, inquantum scilicet homo per superbiam contemnit divinam legem, per quam prohibetur a peccando, secundum illud Jerem., 11, 20: Confregisti jugum: rupisti vincula, dixisti: Non serviam. Sciendum tamen quod ad hanc generalitatem superbiæ pertinet quod omnia vitia interdum ex superbia oriri possint; non autem ad eam pertinet quod omnia vitia semper ex superbia oriantur. Quamvis enim omnia præcepta legis possit quis transgredi qualicumque peccato ex contemptu, qui pertinet ad superbiam, non tamen semper ex contemptu aliquis præcepta divina transgreditur, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quando ex infirmitate. Et inde est quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. De natura et gratia, ubi supra, « multa perperam fiunt quæ non fiunt superbe. »
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.1] These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus illa verba inducit in lib. De natura et gratia, non ex sua persona, sed ex persona alterius, contra quem disputat. Unde et postmodum improbat ea, ostendens quod non semper ex superbia peccatur. Potest tamen dici quod auctoritates illæ intelliguntur quantum ad exteriorem effectum superbiæ, qui est transgredi præcepta, quod invenitur in quolibet peccato; non autem quantum ad exteriorem actum superbiæ, qui est contemptus præcepti. Non enim semper peccatum fit ex contemptu, sed quandoque ex ignorantia, quandoque ex infirmitate, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.2] A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God's commandment is said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quandoque aliquis committit aliquod peccatum secundum effectum, sed non secundum affectum: sicut ille qui ignoranter occidit patrem, committit parricidium secundum effectum, sed non secundum affectum, quia hoc non intendebat: et secundum hoc transgredi præceptum Dei, dicitur esse contra Deum superbire, secundum effectum quidem semper, non autem semper secundum affectum.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.3] A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. On one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. On another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod peccatum aliquod potest corrumpere virtutem dupliciter: uno modo per directam contrarietatem ad virtutem, et hoc modo superbia non corrumpit quamlibet virtutem, sed solam humilitatem, sicut et quodlibet aliud speciale peccatum corrumpit specialem virtutem sibi oppositam, contrarium agendo; alio modo peccatum aliquod corrumpit virtutem, abutendo ipsa virtute, et sic superbia corrumpit quamlibet virtutem, inquantum scilicet ex ipsis virtutibus sumit occasionem superbiendi, sicut ex quibuslibet aliis rebus ad excellentiam pertinentibus. Unde non sequitur quod sit generale peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.4] Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.
[II-II.q.162.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod superbia attendit specialem rationem objecti, quæ tamen inveniri potest in diversis materiis: est enim inordinatus amor propriæ excellentiæ: excellentia autem in diversis rebus potest inveniri.
Article 3
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.2] Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit, XXIV Moral., cap. viii, § 21, col. 298, t. 2, quod « superbi non eorum vitam considerant quibus se humiliando postponant, sed quibus superbiendo se praeferant; » et sic videtur quod superbia ex indebita consideratione procedat. Sed consideratio non pertinet ad irascibilem, sed potius ad rationalem. Ergo superbia non est in irascibili, sed potius in rationali.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.3] Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Sirach 10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, superbia non solum quærit excellentiam in rebus sensibilibus, sed etiam in rebus spiritualibus et intelligibilibus: ipsa autem principaliter consistit in contemptu Dei, secundum illud Eccli., x, 14: Initium superbiæ hominis apostatare a Deo. Sed irascibilis, cum sit pars appetitus sensitivi, non potest se extendere in Deum et in intelligibilia. Ergo superbia non potest esse in irascibili.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.4] Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, ut dicitur in lib. Sententiarum Prosperi, sent. ccxcii, col. 1884, t. 10: « Superbia est amor propriæ excellentiæ. » Sed amor non est in irascibili, sed in concupiscibili. Ergo superbia non est in irascibili.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.sc] Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, in II Moral., c. xlix, § 77, col. 592, t. 1, ponit contra superbiam donum timoris. Timor autem pertinet ad irascibilem. Ergo superbia est in irascibili.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.co] The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of one's own excellence, as stated above (1 and 2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in I, 59, 4; I-II, 82, 5, ad 1 and 2.
Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod subjectum cujuslibet virtutis vel vitii oportet inquirere ex proprio objecto. Non enim potest esse aliud objectum habitus vel actus, nisi quod est objectum potentiæ, quæ utrique subjicitur. Proprium autem objectum superbiæ est arduum; est enim appetitus propriæ excellentiæ, ut dictum est. Unde oportet quod superbia aliquo modo ad vim irascibilem pertineat. Sed irascibilis dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo proprie; et sic est pars appetitus sensitivi, sicut et ira proprie sumpta est quædam passio appetitus sensitivi; alio modo potest accipi irascibilis largius, scilicet ut pertineat etiam ad appetitum intellectivum, cui etiam quando attribuitur ira, prout scilicet attribuimus iram Deo et angelis, non quidem secundum passionem, sed secundum judicium justitiæ 4 judicantis: et tamen irascibilis sic communiter dicta non est potentia distincta a concupiscibili, ut patet ex his quæ in primo dicta sunt. Si ergo arduum, quod est objectum superbiæ, esset solum aliquid sensibile, in quod potest tendere appetitus sensitivus, oporteret quod superbia esset in irascibilii, quæ est pars appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia arduum, quod respicit superbia, communiter invenitur et in sensibilibus, et in spiritualibus rebus, necesse est dicere quod subjectum superbiæ sit irascibilis non solum proprie sumpta, prout est pars appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam communius accepta, prout invenitur in appetitu intellectivo. Unde et in dæmonibus superbia ponitur.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.1] Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Matthew 11:25, "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent," i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, "and hast revealed them to little ones," i.e. to the humble.
Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Sirach 6:34): "If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction." The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that "the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written (Proverbs 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cognitio veritatis est duplex: una pure speculativa; et hanc superbia indirecte impedit, subtrahendo causam. Superbus enim neque Deo intellectum suum subjicit ut ab eo veritatis cognitionem percipiat, secundum illud Matth., xi, 25: Abscondisti hæc a sapientibus et prudentibus, id est superbis, qui sibi sapientes et prudentes videntur, et revelasti ea parvulis, id est, humilibus: neque etiam ab hominibus addiscere dignatur, cum tamen dicatur Eccli., vi, 34: Si inclinaveris aurem tuam, scilicet humiliter audiendo, excipies doctrinam. Alia autem est cognitio veritatis, scilicet effectiva: et talem cognitionem veritatis directe impedit superbia, quia superbi, dum delectantur in propria excellentia, excellentiam veritatis fastidiunt; ut Gregorius dicit, XXIII Moral., c. xvii, § 34, col. 269, t. 2, quod « superbi, etsi secreta quædam intelligendo percipiunt, eorum dulcedinem experiri non possunt; et si noverunt quomodo sunt, ignorant quomodo sapiunt. » Unde et Proverb., xi, 2, dicitur: Ubi humilitas, ibi sapientia.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.2] As stated above (161, 2, 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, humilitas attendit ad regulam rationis rectæ, secundum quam aliquis veram æstimationem de se habet. Hanc autem regulam rectæ rationis non attendit superbia, sed de se majora existimat quam sint; quod contingit ex inordinato appetitu propriæ excellentiæ, quia quod aliquis vehementer desiderat, facile credit; et ex hoc etiam ejus appetitus in altiora fertur quam sibi conveniat. Et ideo quæcumque conferunt ad hoc quod aliquis æstimet se supra id quod est, inducunt hominem ad superbiam; quorum unum est, quod aliquis consideret defectus aliorum; sicut e contra Gregorius dicit, XXIV Moral., c. viii, § 20, col. 298, t. 2, quod « sancti viri virtutum consideratione vicissim sibi alios præferunt. » Ex hoc ergo non habetur quod superbia sit in rationali, sed quod aliqua causa ejus in ratione existat.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.3] Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, as stated above.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod superbia non est solum in irascibili, secundum quod est pars appetitus sensitivi, sed prout communius irascibilis accipitur, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.4] According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), "love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause," wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV De civit. Dei, c. VII, etc, col. 410, t. 7, « amor præcedit omnes alias animi affectiones, et est causa earum; » et ideo potest poni pro qualibet aliarum affectionum. Et secundum hoc superbia dicitur esse amor propriæ excelentiæ, inquantum ex amore causatur inordinata præsumptio alios superandi, quod proprie pertinet ad superbiam.
Article 4
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.1] It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur quatuor superbiæ species, quas Gregorius assignat, XXIII Moral., c. VI, § 13, col. 258, t. 2, dicens: « Quatuor quipe sunt species, quibus omnis tumor arrogantium demonstratur: cum bonum aut a semetipsis habere se æstimant; aut si sibi datum desuper credunt, pro suis se hoc accepisse meritis putant; aut certe cum jactant se habere quod non habent; aut despectis cæteris, singulariter videri appetunt habere quod habent. » Superbia enim est vitium distinctum ab infidelitate, sicut etiam humilitas est virtus distincta a fide. Sed quod aliquis æstimet bonum se non habere a Deo vel quod bonum gratia habeat ex meritis propriis, ad infidelitatem pertinet. Ergo non debet poni species superbiæ.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.2] Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated above (110, 2; 112). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, idem non debet poni species diversorum generum. Sed jactantia ponitur species mendacii, ut supra habi-tum est. Ergo non debet poni species superbiæ.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.3] Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [Reference unknown] says that "nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quædam alia videntur ad superbiam pertinere, quæ hic non con-numerantur: dicit enim Hieronymus, quod « nihil est tam superbum quam ingratum videri; » et Augustinus dicit, XIV De civit. Dei, cap. xiv, col. 422, t. 7, quod excusare se de peccato commisso ad superbiam pertinet. Præsumptio etiam, qua quis tendit ad assequendum aliquid quod supra se est, maxime ad superbiam pertinere videtur. Non ergo sufficienter prædicta divisio comprehendit superbiæ species.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.4] Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed." Bernard [De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, inveniuntur aliæ divisiones superbiæ. Dividit enim Anselmus in lib. De similitudinib., c. xxI, etc, col. 642, tom. 2, exaltationem superbiæ, dicens quod « quædam est in voluntate, quædam in sermone, quædam in operatione. » Bernardus etiam tract. De grad. humilit., c. x, etc, pag. 352, t. 2 ponit duodecim gradus superbiæ; qui sunt « curiositas, mentis levitas, inepta lætitia, jactantia, singularitas, arrogantia, præsumptio, defensio peccatorum, simulata confessio, rebellio, libertas, peccandi consuetudo; » quæ non videntur comprehendi sub speciebus a Gregorio assignatis. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter assignentur. In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Gregorii.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.sc] The authority of Gregory suffices.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.co] As stated above (1 and 2,3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one has not."
Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one's own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely "when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God," or "when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits."
Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is "when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous."
[II-II.q.162.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, superbia importat immode-ratum excellentiæ appetitum, qui scilicet non est secundum rationem rectam. Est autem considerandum quod quælibet excellentia consequitur aliquod bonum habitum. Quod quidem potest tripliciter considerari. Uno modo secundum se. Manifestum est enim quod quanto majus est bonum quod quis habet, tanto per hoc excellentiam majorem consequitur. Et ideo cum aliquis attribuit sibi majus bonum quam habeat, consequens est quod ejus appetitus tendat in excellentiam propriam ultra modum sibi convenien-tem: et sic est tertia species superbiæ, cum scilicet aliquis jactat se habere quod non habet. Alio modo ex parte causæ, prout sci-licet excellentius est quod aliquod bonum insit alicui a seipso quam quod insit ei ab alio. Et ideo cum aliquis æstimat Liber De similitudinibus Anselmi auctorem genuinum habet Eadmerum, Anselmi discipulum. Edit. Vives. bonum quod habet ab alio ac si haberet a seipso, fertur per consequens appetitus ejus in propriam excellentiam supra suum modum. Est autem dupliciter aliquis causa sui boni, uno modo efficienter, alio modo meritorie: et secundum hoc sumuntur duæ primæ superbiæ species, scilicet cum quis a semetipso habere æstimat quod a Deo habet, vel cum propriis meritis sibi datum desuper credit. Tertio modo ex parte modi habendi, prout excellentior aliquis redditur ex hoc quod bonum aliquod excellentius cæteris possidet: unde ex hoc etiam fertur inordinate appetitus illius in propriam excellentiam: et secundum hoc sumitur quarta superbiæ species, quæ est cum aliquis, aliis despectis, singulariter vult videri.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.1] A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one's own excellence, to boast of one's goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one's own merits.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vera æstimatio potest corrumpi dupliciter: uno modo in universali; et sic in his quæ ad fidem pertinent, corrumpitur vera æstimatio per infidelitatem; alio modo in aliquo particulari eligibili; et hoc non facit infidelitatem; sicut ille qui fornicatur, æstimat pro tempore illo bonum esse sibi fornicari; nec tamen est infidelis, sicut esset, si in universali diceret, fornicationem esse bonam. Et ita etiam est in proposito: nam dicere in universali aliquod bonum esse quod non est a Deo, vel gratiam hominibus pro meritis dari, pertinet ad infidelitatem; sed quod aliquis ex inordinato appetitu propriæ excellentiæ ita de bonis suis glorietur ac si ea a se haberet, vel ex meritis propriis, pertinet ad superbiam et non ad infidelitatem, proprie loquendo.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.2] Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod jactantia ponitur species mendacii quantum ad exteriorem actum, quo quis falso sibi attribuit quod non habet; sed quantum ad interiorem cordis arrogantiam ponitur a Gregorio species superbiæ.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.3] The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ingratus est qui sibi attribuit quod ab alio habet: unde duæ primæ superbiæ species ad ingratitudinem pertinent. Quod autem aliquis se excuset de peccato quod habet, pertinet ad tertiam speciem; quia per hoc aliquis attribuit sibi bonum innocentiæ quod non habet. Quod autem aliquis præsumptuose tendat in id quod supra ipsum est, præcipue videtur ad quartam speciem pertinere, secundum quam aliquis vult aliis præferri.
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.4] The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.
The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above (Question 161, Article 6). For the first degree of humility is to "be humble in heart, and to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground": and to this is opposed "curiosity," which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is "to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice": to this is opposed "frivolity of mind," by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is "not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter," to which is opposed "senseless mirth." The fourth degree of humility is "to maintain silence until one is asked," to which is opposed "boasting". The fifth degree of humility is "to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery," to which is opposed "singularity," whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is "to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all," to which is opposed "arrogance," whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is "to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes," to which is opposed "presumption," whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is "to confess one's sins," to which is opposed "defense of one's sins." The ninth degree is "to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances," to which is opposed "deceitful confession," whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is "obedience," to which is opposed "rebelliousness." The eleventh degree of humility is "not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires"; to this is opposed "license," whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is "fear of God": to this is opposed "the habit of sinning," which implies contempt of God.
In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated above with regard to humility (161, 6).
[II-II.q.162.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod illa tria IV. quæ ponit Anselmus accipiuntur secundum progressum peccati cujuslibet; quod primo corde concipitur, secundo ore profertur, tertio opere perficitur. Illa autem duodecim quæ ponitBernardus, sumuntur per oppositum ad duodecim gradus humilitatis, de quibus supra habitum est. Nam primus gradus humilitatis est « corde et corpore semper humilitatem ostendere, defixis in terram aspectibus; » cui opponitur « curiositas, » per quam aliquis curiose ubique et inordinate circumspicit. Secundus gradus humilitatis est « ut pauca verba et rationabilia loquatur aliquis non clamosa voce; » contra quam opponitur « levitas mentis, » per quam scilicet homo superbe se habet in verbo. Tertius gradus humilitatis est « ut non sit facilis et promptus in risu; » cui opponitur « inepta laetitia. » Quartus gradus humilitatis est « taciturnitas usque ad interrogationem; » cui opponitur « jactantia. » Quintus gradus humilitatis est « tenere quod communis regula monasterii habet; » cui opponitur « singularitas, » per quam scilicet aliquis sanctior vult apparere. Sextus gradus humilitatis est « credere et pronuntiare se omnibus viliorem; » cui opponitur « arrogantia; » per quam scilicet homo se aliis præfert. Septimus gradus humilitatis est « ad omnia inutilem et indignum se confiteri et credere; » cui opponitur « præsumptio, » per quam scilicet aliquis reputat se sufficientem ad majora. Octavus gradus humilitatis est « confessio peccatorum; » cui opponitur « defensio eorumdem. » Nonus gradus humilitatis est « in duris et asperis patientiam amplecti; » cui opponitur « simulata confessio, » per quam scilicet aliquis non vult subire pœnam pro peccatis, quæ simulate confitetur. Decimus gradus humilitatis est « obedientia, » cui opponitur « rebellio. » Undecimus gradus humilitatis est « ut homo non delectetur facere propriam voluntatem; » cui opponitur « libertas, » per quam scilicet homo delectatur libere facere quod vult. Ultimus autem gradus humilitatis est « timor Dei; » cui opponitur « peccandi consuetudo, » quæ implicat Dei contemptum. In his autem duodecim gradibus tanguntur non solum superbiæ species, sed etiam quædam antecedentia et consequentia, sicut etiam supra de humilitate dictum est.
Article 5
[II-II.q.162.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on Psalm 7:4, "O Lord my God, if I have done this thing," says: "Namely, the universal sin which is pride." Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would every sin be.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod superbia non sit peccatum mortale: Quia super illud ps. VII: Domine, Deus meus, si feci istud, dicit Glossa ordin., Aug., col. 853, t. 1, « scilicet universale peccatum, quod est superbia. » Si igitur superbia esset peccatum mortale, omne peccatum esset mortale.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.arg.2] Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one's neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God's honor, or our neighbor's good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne peccatum contrariatur charitati. Sed superbia non videtur contrariari charitati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei, neque quantum ad dilectionem proximi; quia excellentia, quam quis inordinate per superbiam appetit, non semper contrariatur honori Dei, aut utilitati proximi. Ergo superbia non est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.arg.3] Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), "sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues." Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed superbia non contrariatur virtuti, sed potius ex ea oritur, quia, ut Gregorius dicit, XXXIV Moral., c. xxiii, §49, col. 745, t. 2, « aliquando homo ex summis cælestibusque virtutibus intumescit. » Ergo superbia non est peccatum mortale,
[II-II.q.162.a.5.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that "pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect." But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius in eodem lib., § 56, col. 750, dicit quod « evidentissimum reproborum signum superbia est, ac contra humilitas electorum. » Sed homines non fiunt reprobi pro peccatis venialibus. Ergo superbia non est peccatum veniale, sed mortale.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.co] Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above (161, 1, ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Corinthians 10:13), "But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us." Wherefore it is written (Sirach 10:14): "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God" because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod superbia humilitati opponitur. Humilitas autem proprie respicit subjectionem hominis ad Deum, ut supra dictum est. Unde e contrario superbia proprie respicit defectum hujus subjectionis, secundum scilicet quod aliquis se extollit supra id quod est sibi præfixum secundum divinam regulam vel mensuram, contra id quod Apostolus dicit II ad Cor., x; 43: Nos autem non in immensum gloriabimur, sed secundum mensuram, qua mensus est nobis Deus. Et ideo dicitur Eccli., x, 14, quod initium superbiæ hominis est apostatare a Deo, quia scilicet in hoc radix superbiæ consideratur quod homo aliqualiter non subjicitur Deo et regulæ ipsius. Manifestum est autem quod hoc ipsum quod est non subjici Deo, habet rationem peccati mortalis, hoc enim est averti a Deo: unde consequens est quod superbia secundum genus suum sit peccatum mortale. Sicut tamen in aliis quæ ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia, puta in fornicatione et adulterio, sunt aliqui motus qui sunt peccata venialia propter eorum imperfectionem, quia scilicet præveniunt rationis judicium, et sunt præter ejus consensum: ita et circa superbiam accidit quod aliqui motus superbiæ sunt peccata venialia, dum eis ratio non consentit.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.ad.1] As stated above (Article 2) pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, superbia non est universale peccatum per suam essentiam, sed per quamdam redundantiam, inquantum scilicet ex superbia omnia peccata oriri possunt. Unde non sequitur quod omnia peccata sint mortalia, sed solum quando oriuntur ex superbia completa, quam diximus esse peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.ad.2] Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod superbia semper quidem contrariatur dilectioni divinæ, inquantum scilicet superbus non se subjicit divinæ regulæ, prout debet; et quandoque etiam contrariatur dilectioni proximi, inquantum scilicet aliquis inordinate se præfert proximo, aut ab ejus subjectione se subtrahit: in quo etiam derogatur divinæ regulæ ex qua sunt hominum ordines instituti, prout scilicet unus eorum sub alio esse debet.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.ad.3] Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some are even proud of their humility.
[II-II.q.162.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod superbia non oritur ex virtutibus sicut ex causa per se, sed sicut ex causa per accidens, inquantum scilicet aliquis ex virtutibus occasionem superbiæ sumit. Nihil autem prohibet quin unum contrariorum sitalterius causa per accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic., text. 8. Unde etiam de ipsa humilitate aliqui superbiunt.
Article 6
[II-II.q.162.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), "Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod superbia non sit gravissimum peccatorum. Quanto enim aliquod peccatum difficilius cavetur, tanto videtur esse levius. Sed superbia difficilius cavetur, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in Regula, §2, col. 1379, t. 4, « cætera peccata in malis operibus exercentur, ut fiant; superbia autem bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. » Ergo superbia non est gravissimum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.arg.2] Further, "The greater evil is opposed to the greater good," as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Question 61, Article 5). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, majus malum majori bono opponitur, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. x, circa princ. Sed humilitas, cui opponitur superbia, non est maxima virtutum, ut supra habitum est. Ergo et vitia quæ opponuntur majoribus virtutibus, puta infidelitas, desperatio, odium Dei, homicidium et alia hujusmodi, sunt graviora peccata quam superbia.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.arg.3] Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Romans 1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered "to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient." Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, majus malum non punitur per minus malum. Sed interdum superbia punitur per alia peccata, ut patet ad Rom., 1, 28, ubi dicitur quod philosophi per elationem cordis traditi sunt in reprobum sensum, ut faciant quæ non conveniunt. Ergo superbia non est gravissimum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.sc] A gloss on Psalm 118:51, "The proud did iniquitously," says: "The greatest sin in man is pride."
[II-II.q.162.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud psal. cxviii, 51: Superbi iniqui agebant usquequaque, dicit Glossa: « Maximum peccatum in homine est superbia. »
[II-II.q.162.a.6.co] Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Onst. xii, 7 says that "while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God"; for which reason it is specially stated (James 4:6) that "God resisteth the proud." Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in peccato duo attenduntur; scilicet conversio ad commutabile bonum, quæ materialiter se habet in peccato; et aversio a bono incommutabili, quæ est formalis et completiva ratio peccati. Ex parte autem conversionis non habet superbia quod sit maximum peccatorum, quia celsitudo quam superbus inordinate appetit, secundum suam rationem non habet maximam repugnantiam ad bonum virtutis. Sed ex parte aversionis superbia habet maximam gravitatem: quia in aliis peccatis homo a Deo avertitur, vel propter ignorantiam, vel propter infirmitatem sive propter desiderium cujuscumque alterius boni; sed superbia habet aversionem a Deo ex hoc ipso quod non vult Deo et ejus regulæ subjici. Unde Boetius dicit quod « cum omnia vitia fugiant a Deo, sola superbia se Deo opponit. » Propter quod etiam specialiter dicitur Jacobi, iv, 6, quod Deus superbis resistit. Et ideo averti a Deo et ejus præceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis, per se ad superbiam pertinet, cujus actus est Dei contemptus. Et quia id quod est per se, semper potius est eo quod est per aliud, consequens est quod superbia sit gravissimum peccatorum secundum suum genus, quia excedit in aversione, quæ formaliter complet peccatum.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.ad.1] A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and "still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).
Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. On this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (5, ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it "lies in wait for good deeds"; and it is written (Psalm 141:4): "In the way wherein I walked, the proud [Cf. Psalm 139:6, 'The proud have hidden a net for me.'] [Vulgate: 'they'] have hidden a snare for me." Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one's own infirmity, according to Sirach 10:9, "Why is earth and ashes proud?" and by considering God's greatness, according to Job 15:13, "Why doth thy spirit swell against God?" as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according to Isaiah 40:6, "All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field"; and farther on (Isaiah 64:6), "all our justices" are become "like the rag of a menstruous woman."
[II-II.q.162.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquod peccatum difficile cavetur dupliciter: uno modo propter vehementiam impugnationis; sicut ira vehementer impugnat propter suum impetum; et adhuc difficilius est resistere concupiscentiæ propter ejus connaturalitatem, ut dicitur in II Ethic., cap. ix, non procul a fine. Et talis difficultas vitandi peccatum, gravitatem peccati diminuit, quia quanto aliquis minoris tentationis impetu cadit, tanto gravius peccat, ut Augustinus dicit. Alio modo difficile est vitare aliquod peccatum propter ejus latentiam; et hoc modo superbiam difficile est vitare, quia etiam ex ipsis bonis occasionem sumit, ut dictum est. Et ideo signanter Augustinus dicit quod « bonis operibus insidiatur; » et in psal. cxli, 4, dicitur: In via hac, qua ambulabam absconderunt superbi laqueum mihi. Et ideo motus superbiæ occulte subrepens non habet maximam gravitatem antequam per judicium rationis deprehendatur; sed postquam deprehensus fuerit per rationem, tunc facile evitatur tum ex consideratione propriæ infirmitatis, secundum illud Eccli., x, 9: Quid superbit terra et cinis? tum etiam ex consideratione magnitudinis divinæ, secundum illud Job, xv, 13: Quid tumet contra Deum spiritus tuus? tum etiam ex imperfectione bonorum de quibus superbit homo, secundum illud Isaiæ, xL, 6: Omnis caro fenum, et omnis gloria ejus quasi flos agri; et infra cap. lxiv, 6: Quasi pannus menstruatæ universæ justitiæ nostræ.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.ad.2] Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. On this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod oppositio vitii ad virtutem attenditur secundum objectum, quod consideratur ex parte conversionis: et secundum hoc superbia non habet quod sit maximum peccatorum, sicut nec humilitas quod sit maxima virtutum. Sed ex parte aversionis est maximum, utpote aliis peccatis magnitudinem præstans: nam per hoc ipsum infidelitatis peccatum gravius redditur si ex superbiæ contemptu procedat, quam si ex ignorantia vel infirmitate proveniat. Et idem dicendum est de desperatione et aliis hujusmodi.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.ad.3] Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that "pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God's dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement."
From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.
[II-II.q.162.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut in syllogismis ducentibus ad impossibile quandoque aliquis convincitur per hoc quod ducitur ad inconveniens magis manifestum; ita etiam ad convincendum superbiam hominum Deus aliquos punit, permittens eos ruere in peccata carnalia; quæ etsi sint minora, tamen manifestiorem turpitudinem continent. Unde Isidorus dicit in libro II De summ. bono, cap. xxxviii, col. 639, t. 6: « Omni vitio deteriorem esse superbiam, seu propter hoc quod a summis personis et primis assumitur, seu quod de opere justitiæ et virtutis exoritur, minusque culpa ejus sentitur. Luxuria vero carnis ideo notabilis omnibus est, quoniam statim per se turpis est; et tamen, pensante Deo, superbia minor est. Sed qui detinetur superbia, et non sentit, labitur in carnis luxuria, ut per hanc humiliatus a confusione exurgat. » Ex quo etiam patet gravitas ipsius superbiæ. Sicut enim medicus sapiens in remedium majoris morbi patitur infirmum in leviorem morbum incidere; ita etiam peccatum superbiæ gravius esse ostenditur ex hoc ipso quod pro ejus remedio Deus permittit homines ruere in alia peccata.
Article 7
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.2] Further, it is written (Sirach 10:14) that the "beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God precedes pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Eccli., x, 14, dicitur quod initium superbiæ est apostatare a Deo. Ergo apostasia a Deo est prius quam superbia.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.3] Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ordo peccatorum esse videtur secundum ordinem virtutum. Sed humilitas non est prima virtutum, sed magis fides. Ergo superbia non est primum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.4] Further, it is written (2 Timothy 3:13): "Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, II ad Tim., 111, 13, dicitur: Mali homines et seductores proficiunt in pejus; et ita videtur quod principium malitiæ hominis non sit a maximo peccatorum. Sed superbia est maximum peccatorum, ut dictum est. Non est igitur primum peccatorum.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.5] Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.arg.5] 5. Præterea, id quod est secundum apparentiam et fictionem, est posterius eo quod est secundum veritatem. Sed Philosophus dicit in III Ethic., cap vii, circa med., quod « superbus est fictor fortitudinis et audacia. » Ergo vitium audacia est prius vitio superbiæ.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.sc] It is written (Sirach 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."
[II-II.q.162.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., x, 15: Initium omnis peccati est superbia.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.co] The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above (Article 6) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all sins," as stated above (I-II, 84, 2), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illud quod est per se, est primum in quolibet genere. Dictum est autem supra, quod aversio a Deo quæ formaliter complet rationem peccati, pertinet ad superbiam, per se, ad alia autem peccata ex consequenti: et inde est quod superbia habet rationem primi peccati, et est etiam principium omnium peccatorum, ut supra dictum est cum de causis peccati ageretur, ex parte aversionis, quæ est principalior in peccato.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.1] Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod superbia dicitur esse omnis peccati initium, non quia quodlibet peccatum singulariter ex superbia oriatur, sed quia quodlibet genus peccati natum est ex superbia oriri.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.2] To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above (Article 5) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God's sake.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse superbiæ humanæ initium, non quasi aliquod aliud peccatum a superbia existens, sed quia est prima superbiæ pars. Dictum est enim, quod superbia principaliter respicit subjectionem divinam, quam contemnit; ex consequenti autem contemnit subjici creaturæ propter Deum.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.3] There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Psalm 136:7, "Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof," says that "by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief," and the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:19) that "some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith."
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non oportet esse eumdem ordinem virtutum et vitiorum. Nam vitium est corruptivum virtutis. Id autem quod est primum in generatione est postremum in corruptione. Et ideo sicut fides est prima virtutum, ita infidelitas est ultimum peccatorum, ad quam homo quando per alia peccata perducitur. Unde super illud psal. c. xxxvi: Exinanite, exinanite usque ad fundamentum in ea, dicit Glossa, quod coacervatione vitiorum subrepit diffidentia; et Apostolus dicit, Iad Timoth., i, 19, quod quidam repellentes conscientiam bonam, circa fidem naufragaverunt.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.4] Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Psalm 18:13, "I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin," says: "Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God."
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod superbia dicitur esse gravissimum peccatorum ex eo quod per se competit principio, ex quo attenditur gravitas in peccato. Et ideo superbia causat gravitatem aliorum peccatorum. Contingit ergo ante superbiam esse aliqua peccata leviora, quæ etiam ex ignorantia vel infirmitate committuntur. Sed inter graviora peccata primum est superbia, sicut causa, per quam alia peccata aggravantur. Et quia id quod est primum in causando peccata, est etiam ultimum in recedendo, ideo super illud psal. xviii: Emundabor a delicto maximo, dicit Glossa interl: « Hoc est a delicto superbiæ, quod est ultimum redeuntibus ad Deum, et primum recedentibus a Deo. »
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.5] The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.
[II-II.q.162.a.7.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod Philosophus ponit superbiam circa fictionem fortitudinis, non quia solum in hoc consistat, sed quia per hoc homo reputat magis se posse excellentiam apud homines consequi, si audax vel fortis videatur.
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