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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q175. Rapture

Source context
Theme
Rapture as a supernatural elevation of the human mind beyond its ordinary operations toward direct contact with divine truth
Soul-faculty
Consciousness Soul

Steiner

not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

  • Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads VI.9)Plotinus describes the soul's ecstatic union with the One as a temporary transcendence of discursive intellect, structurally parallel to Aquinas's account of rapture as an elevation beyond ordinary cognitive faculty toward direct apprehension of the divine.
  • Jewish mysticism (Merkabah tradition)Merkabah ascent literature narrates the soul's transport through celestial palaces to the divine throne, presenting a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's treatment of rapture as an involuntary elevation of the mind to supranatural realities.
  • Sufi tradition (fana, annihilation in God)The Sufi concept of fana, the temporary self-annihilation of the mystic in the divine presence, shares structural congruence with the Thomistic rapture insofar as both describe a transient state in which ordinary ego-operation is suspended by a higher divine action.

Q175. Rapture

Article 1

[II-II.q.175.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature" [Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate xiii, 1. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima hominis non rapiatur ad divina. Definitur enim a quibusdam raptus, « ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est supra naturam, vi superioris naturæ elevatio. » Est autem secundum naturam hominis ut ad divina elevetur: dicit enim Augustinus in princ. Confess., col. 664, t. 4: « Fecisti nos, Domine, ad te; et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. » Non ergo hominis anima rapiatur ad divina.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.arg.2] Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would seem that man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Dionysius dicit, vii cap. De divin nom., § 7, col. 894, etc., t. 1, quod justitia Dei in hoc attenditur quod omnibus rebus distribuit secundum suum modum et dignitatem. Sed quod aliquis elevetur supra id quod est secundum naturam, non pertinet ad modum hominis vel dignitatem. Ergo videtur quod non rapiatur mens hominis a Deo in divina.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.arg.3] Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [De Fide Orth. ii, 30]. Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, raptus quamdam violentiam importat. Sed Deus non regit nos per violentiam et coacte, ut Damascenus dicit lib. II De orth. fid., c. xxx, col. 973, etc., t. 1. Non ergo mens hominis rapiatur ad divina.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.sc] The Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:2): "I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven." On which words a gloss says: "Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature."

[II-II.q.175.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod II ad Corinth., xii, dicit Apostolus: Scio hominem in Christo raptum usque ad tertium cælum: ubi dicit Glossa ordin., col. 568, t. 2, « raptum, id est, contra naturam elevatum. »

[II-II.q.175.a.1.co] Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (Objection 3); and "the violent is that which has its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all" (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination--for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending--for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.

Accordingly man's soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards the term of transport--as when it is carried away to punishment, according to Psalm 49:22, "Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you"; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.

This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezekiel 8:3, "The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem."

It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person's mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod raptus violentiam quamdam importat, ut dictum est. « Violentum, » autem « dicitur cujus principium est extra, nil conferente eo quod vim patitur, » ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. 1, a princ. Confert autem unumquodque ad id in quod tendit secundum propriam inclinationem vel voluntariam vel naturalem. Et ideo oportet quod ille qui rapitur ab aliquo exteriori, rapiatur in aliquid quod est diversum ab eo in quod ejus inclinatione tendit. Quæ quidem diversitas potest attendi dupliciter: uno quidem modo quantum ad finem inclinationis; puta si lapis, qui naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod feratur deorsum, projiciatur sur sum; alio modo quantum ad modum tendendi, puta si lapis velocius projiciatur deorsum quam sit motus ejus naturalis. Sic igitur et anima hominis dupliciter dicitur rapi in id quod est præter naturam: uno modo quantum ad terminum raptus, puta quando rapitur ad pœnas, secundum illud psal. xlix, 22: Ne quando rapiat, et non sit qui eripiat; alio modo quantum ad modum homini connaturalem, qui est ut per sensibilia intelligat veritatem. Et ideo quando abstrahitur a sensibilium apprehensione, dicitur rapi, etiamsi elevetur ad ea ad quæ naturaliter ordinatur, dum tamen hoc non fiat ex propria intentione; sicut accidit in somno, qui est secundum naturam, unde non potest proprie raptus dici. Hujusmodi autem abstractio, ad quæ-cumque fiat, potest ex triplici causa contingere: uno modo ex causa corporali, sicut accidit in his qui propter aliquam infirmitatem alienationem patiuntur; secundo modo ex virtute dæmonum, sicut patet in arreptitiis; tertio modo ex virtute divina, et sic loquimur nunc de raptu, prout scilicet aliquis spiritu divino elevatur ad aliqua supernaturalia cum abstractione a sensibus, secundum illud Ezech., viii, 3: Elevavit me spiritus inter terram et cælum, et adduxitme in Jerusalem in visione Dei. Sciendum tamen quod rapi quandoque dicitur aliquis non solum propter alienationem a sensibus, sed etiam propter alienationem ab his quibus intendebat; sicut cum aliquis patitur evagationem mentis præter propositum. Sed hoc non ita proprie dicitur.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.ad.1] It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Romans 1:20, "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod naturale est homini ut in divina tendat per sensibilium apprehensione, secundum illud Rom., i, 20: Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Sed iste modus, quod aliquis elevetur ad divina cum abstractione a sensibus, non est homini naturalis.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.ad.2] It belongs to man's mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God's image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man's mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad modum et dignitatem hominis pertinet quod ad divina elevetur, ex hoc ipso quod homo factus est ad imaginem Dei. Et quia bonum divinum in infinitum excedit humanam facultatem, indiget homo ut supernaturaliter ad illud bonum capessendum adjuvetur: quod fit per quodcumque beneficium gratiae. Unde quod sic elevetur mens a Deo per raptum, non est contra naturam, sed supra facultatem naturæ.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.ad.3] The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.

[II-II.q.175.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum Damasceni est intelligendum quantum ad ea quæ sunt per hominem facienda; quantum vero ad ea quæ excedunt liberi arbitrii facultatem, necesse est quod homo quadam fortiori operatione elevetur; quæ quidem quantum ad aliquid potest dici coactio, si scilicet attendatur modus operationis, non autem si attendatur terminus operationis, in quem natura hominis et ejus intentio ordinatur.

Article 2

[II-II.q.175.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The Divine love causes ecstasy." Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod raptus magis pertineat ad vim appetitivam quam ad vim cognoscitivam. Dicit enim Dionysius iv cap. De div. nom., § 13, col. 711, t. 4: «Est autem extasim faciens divinus amor. » Sed amor pertinet ad vim appetitivam. Ergo et extasis sive raptus.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.arg.2] Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that "he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself." Now the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit in II Dialog., c. 111, quod « ille qui porcos pavit, vagatione mentis et immunditiæ sub semetipso cecidit; Petrus vero, quem angelus solvit ejusque mentem in extasi rapuit, non extra se quidem, sed supra semetipsum fuit. » Sed ille filius prodigus per affectum in inferiora dilapsus est. Ergo etiam illi qui rapiuntur in superiora per affectum hoc patiuntur.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.arg.3] Further, a gloss on Psalm 30:1, "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded," says in explaining the title [Unto the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: "Ekstasis in Greek signifies in Latin 'excessus mentis,' an aberration of the mind. This happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower world." Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, super illud psal. xxx: In te Domine, speravi, non confundar in aternum, dicit Glossa in expositione tituli: « Extasis græce, latine dicitur excessus mentis, qui fit duobus modis, vel pavore terrenorum, vel mente rapta ad superna, et inferiorum oblita. » Sed pavor terrenorum ad affectum pertinet. Ergo etiam raptus mentis ad superna, qui ex oppo-sito ponitur, pertinet ad affectum.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.sc] A gloss on Psalm 115:2, "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar," says: "We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation." Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Psal. cxv: Ego dixi in excessu meo: Omnis homo mendax, dicit Glossa: « Dicitur extasis, cum mens non pavore alienatur, sed aliqua 1 Corder.: « Est præterea divinus amor extaticus. » Sed revelatio pertinet ad vim intellectivam. Ergo et extasis sive raptus.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.co] We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated (1) that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.

Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only "to the third heaven"--which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect--but also into "paradise," which pertains to the appetite.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod de raptu dupliciter loqui possumus: uno modo quantum ad id in quod aliquis rapitur, et sic proprie loquendo, raptus non po-test pertinere ad vim appetitivam, sed solum ad cognoscitivam. Dictum est enim quod raptus est præter propriam inclinationem ejus quod rapitur; ipse autem motus appetitivæ virtutis est quædam inclination ad bonum appetibile. Unde, proprie loquendo, ex hoc quod homo appetit aliquid, non rapitur, sed per se movetur. Alio modo potest considerari raptus quantum ad suam causam: et sic potest habere causam ex parte appetitivæ virtutis. Ex hoc enim ipso quod appetitus ad aliquid vehementer afficitur, potest contingere quod ex violentia affectus homo ab omnibus aliis alienetur. Habet etiam effectum in appetitiva virtute, cum scilicet aliquis delectatur in his ad quæ rapitur. Unde et Apostolus dixit, se raptum non solum ad tertium cælum, quod pertinet ad contemplationem intellectus, sed etiam in paradisum, quod pertinet ad effectum.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.ad.1] Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one's proper order [Cf. I-II, 28, 3]; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a man's appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that "the Divine love causes ecstasy," inasmuch as it makes man's appetite tend to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that "even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings." But even if this were said expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod raptus addit aliquid supra extasim. Nam extasis importat simpliciter excessum a seipso, secundum quem scilicet aliquis extra suam ordinationem ponitur; sed raptus super hoc addit violentiam quam-dam. Potest igitur extasis ad vim appetitivam pertinere, puta cum alicujus appetitus tendit in ea quæ extra ipsum sunt: et secundum hoc Dionysius dicit quod « divinus amor facit extasim, » in quantum scilicet facit appetitum hominis tendere in res amatas: unde postea subdit quod, « etiam ipse Deus, qui est omnium causa, per abundantiam amatoriæ bonitatis extra seipsum fit per providentiam ad omnia existentia. » Quamvis etiam si expresse hoc diceretur de raptu, non designaretur, nisi quod amor esset causa raptus.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.ad.2] There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. On one way, when a man's intellective appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love" exclaimed: "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me."

In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that "he who fed the swine debased himself"; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.

It must be observed. however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in homine est duplex appetitus; scilicet intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas; et sensitivus, qui dicitur sensualitas. Est autem proprium homini ut appetitus inferior subdatur appetitui superiori, et superior moveat inferiorem. Dupliciter ergo homo tiam summam amatoriæ bonitatis extra se per providentias omnium rerum exsistit. » Cord. secundum appetitum potest fieri extra seipsum. Uno modo quando appetitus intellectivus totaliter in divina tendit, praetermissis his ad quae inclinat appetitus sensitivus; et sic Dionysius dicit in iv De div. Nom., ubi supra, quod « Paulus ex virtute divini amoris extasim faciente dicit: Vivo ego jam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. » Alio modo quando praetermisso appetitu superiori, homo totaliter fertur in ea quae pertinent ad appetitum inferiorem, et sic « ille qui porcos pavit, sub semetipso cecidit; » et iste excessus vel extasis plus appro-pinquat ad rationem raptus quam primus, quia scilicet appetitus superior est magis homini proprius. Unde quando homo ex violentia appetitus inferioris abstrahitur a motu appetitus superioris, magis abstrahitur ab eo quod est sibi proprium. Quia tamen non est ibi violentia, eo quod voluntas potest resistere passioni, deficit a vera ratione raptus; nisi forte tam vehemens passio sit quod usum rationis totaliter tollat, sicut contingit in his qui propter vehementiam iræ vel amoris insaniunt. Considerandum tamen, quod uterque excessus secundum appetitum existens potest causare excessum cognoscitivæ virtutis: vel quia mens ad quædam intelligibilia rapiatur, alienata a sensibus; vel quia rapiatur ad aliquam imaginariam visionem, seu phantasticam apparitionem.

[II-II.q.175.a.2.ad.3] Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).

[II-II.q.175.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut amor est motus appetitus respectu boni, ita timor est motus appetitus respectu mali. Unde eadem ratione ex utroque potest causari excessus mentis; praeertim cum timor ex amore causetur, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV De civit. Dei, cap. VII, col. 410, t. 7.

Article 3

[II-II.q.175.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to the third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that "there came upon him an ecstasy of mind." Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God's essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that neither did Paul see the essence of God.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Paulus in raptu non viderit Dei es- Corder. 2 Habetur etiam in Glossa ord., II ad Corinth. xii. v. 2, col. 568, t. 2. * Vidit... 4: Oculus non videt *, Deus, absque te, expectantiibus.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.arg.2] Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in rapture saw not the essence of God.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.arg.3] Further, according to 1 Corinthians 13:10-12, faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of God.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.arg.4] Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7), "pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision." Now Paul is stated (2 Corinthians 12:2-4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the "third heaven" and of "paradise." Therefore he would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the vision of the Divine essence.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.sc] Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that "possibly God's very substance was seen by some while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to utter."

[II-II.q.175.a.3.co] Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw "not the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity." But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:2). Ondeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate this. For he says that "he heard secret words, which it is not granted unto man to utter": and such would seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to Isaiah 64:4, "Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulgate: 'wait for'] Thee" [1 Corinthians 2:9. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.1] Man's mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Psalm 115:11): "I said in my excess: Every man is a liar." Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as also of Moses [Cf. 174, 4]; and not without reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first "Teacher of the gentiles" [Cf. I, 68, 4].

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod mens humana divinitus rapitur ad contemplandam veritatem divinam tripliciter: uno modo ut contempletur eam per similitudines quasdam imaginarias, et talis fuit excessus mentis qui cecidit supra Petrum; alio modo ut contempletur veritatem divinam per intelligibiles effectus; sicut fuit excessus David dicentis, psal. cxv, 2: Ego dixi in excessu meo: Omnis homo mendax. Tertio modo ut contempletur eam in sua essentia; et talis fuit raptus Pauli, et etiam Moysis: et satis congruenter, nam sicut Moyses fuit primus doctor Judæorum, ita Paulus fuit primus doctor gentium.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.2] The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (Psalm 35:10): "In Thy light we shall see light." But this light can be shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as stated above (171, 2) of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod divina essentia videri ab intellectu creato non potest nisi per lumen gloriæ, de quo dicitur in psal. xxxv, 10: In lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Quod tamen dupliciter participari potest. Uno modo per modum formæ immanentis: et sic beatos facit sanctos in patria. Alio modo per modum cujusdam passionis transeuntis, sicut dictum est, de lumine prophetiæ: et hoc modo lumen illud fuit in Paulo quando raptus fuit. Et ideo ex tali visione non fuit simpliciter beatus ut fieret redundantia ad corpus, sed solum secundum quid. Et ideo talis raptus aliquo modo ad prophetiam pertinet.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.3] Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia Paulus in raptu non fuit beatus habitualiter, sed solum habuit actum beatorum, consequens est ut simul tunc in eo non fuerit actus fidei; fuit tamen simul tunc in eo fidei habitus.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.4] In one way by the third heaven we may understand something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean [1 Timothy 2:7; Cf. I, 12, 11, ad 2, which is described as the "third," in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the "third heaven," not as though his rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss on 2 Corinthians 12 says that the "third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore."

In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First, according to the order of the cognitive powers. On this way the first heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Daniel 5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,28,34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being "the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly, the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy [Cf. I, 108, 1], the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Corinthians 12.

And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason of his contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent delight.

[II-II.q.175.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod nomine tertii cæli potest uno modo intelligi aliquid corporeum, et sic tertium cælum dicitur cælum empyreum, quod dicitur tertium respectu cæli aerei et cæli siderei, vel potius respectu cæli siderei, et respectu cæli aquei sive christallini. Et dicitur raptus ad tertium cælum, non quia raptus sit ad videndum similitudinem alicujus rei corporeæ, sed propter hoc quod locus ille est contemplationis beatorum. Unde Glossa dicit, II ad Corinth., xii, v. 2, col. 568, t. 2, quod « cælum tertium est spirituale cælum, ubi angeli et sanctæ animæ fruuntur Dei contemplatione; » ad quod cum dicit se raptum, signat quod Deus ostendit ei vitam, in qua videndus est in æternum. Alio modo per tertium cælum potest intelligi aliqua visio supermundana: quæ potest dici tertium cælum triplici ratione. Uno modo secundum ordinem potentiarum cognoscitivarum; ut primum cælum dicatur visio supermundana corporalis, quæ fit persensum, sicut visa est manus scribentis in pariete, Daniel., v; secundum autem cælum sit visio imaginaria, puta quam vidit Isaias et Joannes in Apocalypsi; tertium vero cælum dicatur visio intellectualis, ut Augustinus exponit, XII Super Genes. ad litt., cap. xxviii, col. 478, t. 3. Secundo modo potest dici tertium cælum secundum ordinem cognoscibilium; ut primum cælum dicatur cognitio cælestium corporum; secundum cognitio cælestium spirituum: tertium cognitio ipsius Dei. Tertio modo potest dici tertium cælum contemplatio Dei secundum gradus cognitionis qua Deus videtur: quarum primus pertinet ad angelos infimæ hierarchiæ; secundus ad angelos mediæ; tertius ad angelos supremæ, ut dicit Glossa II ad Corinth., xii. Et quia visio Dei non potest esse sine delectatione, propterea non solum se dicit raptum ad tertium cælum ratione contemplationis, sed etiam in paradisum ratione delectationis consequentis.

Article 4

[II-II.q.175.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): "Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the place of the present life?" Now in that future life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place in Paul.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.arg.2] Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Christus vere viator fuit, et continue visione divinæ essentiæ fruebatur; nec tamen fiebat abstractio a sensibus. Ergo nec fuit necessarium quod in Paulo fieret abstractio a sensibus, ad hoc quod essentiam Dei videret.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.arg.3] Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Corinthians 12:4): "He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter." Now the memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Paulus, postquam Deum per essentiam viderat, memor fuit illorum quæ in illa visione conspexerat; unde dicebat II ad Cor., xii, 4: Audivi arcana verba, quæ non licet homini loqui. Sed memoria ad partem sensitivam pertinet, ut patet per Philosophum in lib. De memoria et reminiscentia, cap. I, circa med. Ergo videtur quod etiam Paulus videndo Dei essentiam non fuerit alienatus a sensibus.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.sc] Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): "Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that vision.*" [The text of St. Augustine reads: "when he is rapt," etc.]

[II-II.q.175.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit XII Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxvii, t. 3: « Nisi ab hac vita quisque quodammodo moriatur, sive omnino exiens de corpore, sive ita aversus et alienatus a carnalibus sensibus, ut merito nesciat, sicut Apostolus ait, utrum in corpore an extra corpus sit, cum in illam rapitur et subvehitur visionem. »

[II-II.q.175.a.4.co] The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the phantasms [Cf. I, 84, 07] which it takes from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these phantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for man's intellect, if it see God's essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God's essence cannot be seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [Cf. I, 12, 2], since God's essence infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man's intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God's essence, it is necessary that his mind's whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod divina essentia non potest ab homine videri per aliam vim cognoscitivam quam per intellectum. Intellectus autem humanus non convertitur ad intelligibilia nisi mediantibus phantasmatibus, quæ per species intelligibiles a sensibus accipit, et in quibus considerans de sensibilibus judicat et ea disponit. Et ideo in omni operatione qua intellectus noster abstrahitur a phantasmatibus, necesse est quod abstrahatur a sensibus. Intellectus autem hominis in statu viæ necesse est quod a phantasmatibus abstrahatur, si videat Dei essentiam. Non enim per aliquod phantasma potest Dei essentia videri, quinimo nec per aliquam speciem intelligibilem creatam; quia essentia Dei in infinitum excedit non solum omnia corpora, quorum sunt phantasmata, sed etiam omnem intelligibilem creaturam. Oportet autem cum intellectus hominis elevatur ad altissimam Dei essentia viisionem, ut tota mentis intentio illuc ad vocetur, ita scilicet quod nihil intelligat aliud ex phantasmatibus, sed totaliter feratur in Deum. Unde impossibile est quod homo in statu viæ videat Deum per essentiam sine abstractione a sensibus.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.ad.1] As stated above (3, Objection 2), after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (3, Objection 2, ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, post resurrectionem in beatis Dei essentiam videntibus fiet redundantia ab intellectu ad inferiores vires, et usque ad corpus: unde secundum ipsam regulam divinæ visionis anima intendet phantasmatibus et sensibilibus. Talis autem redundantia non fit in his qui rapiuntur, sicut dictum est. Et ideo non est similis ratio.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.ad.2] The intellect of Christ's soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was "made a little lower than the angels" (Hebrews 2:9), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intellectus animæ Christi erat glorificatus per habituale lumen gloriæ, quo divinam essentiam videbat multo amplius quam aliquis angelus vel homo. Erat autem viator propter corporis passibilitatem, secundum quam paulo minus ab angelis minorabatur, ut dicitur ad Hebræos, II, dispensative, et non propter aliquem defectum ex parte intellectus. Unde non est similis ratio de eo et de aliis viatoribus.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.ad.3] Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express in words.

[II-II.q.175.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Paulus, postquam cessavit videre Deum per essentiam, memor fuit illorum quæ in illa visione cognoverat per aliquas species intelligibiles habitualiter ex hoc in ejus intellectu relictas: sicut etiam, abeunte sensibilili, remanent aliquæ impressiones in anima quas postea conferens ad phantasmata memoratur. Unde nec totam illam cognitionem aut cogitare poterat aut verbis exprimere.

Article 5

[II-II.q.175.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that, while in this state, Paul's soul was wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 5:6-7): "While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and not by sight" ['Per speciem,' i.e. by an intelligible species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above (Article 3). Therefore he was not in the body.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod anima Pauli in statu illo fuerit totaliter a corpore separata. Dicit enim Apostolus II ad Cor., v: Quamdiu *sumus* Dum. in corpore, peregrinamur a Domino; per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem. Sed Paulus in statu illo non peregrinabatur a Domino, quia videbat Deum per speciem, ut dictum est. Ergo non erat in corpore.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.arg.2] Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the soul's essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, potentia animæ non potest elevari super ejus essentiam, in qua radicatur. Sed intellectus, qui est potentia animæ, in raptu fuit a corporalibus abstractus per elevationem ad divinam contemplationem. Ergo multo magis essentia animæ fuit separata a corpore.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.arg.3] Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above (Article 4). Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would seem that in Paul's rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea vires animæ vegetabilis sunt magis materiales quam vires animæ sensitivæ. Sed oportebat intellectum abstrahi a viribus animæ sensitivæ, ut dictum est, ad hoc ut raperetur ad videndam divinam essentiam. Ergo multo magis oportebat quod abstraheretur a viribus animæ vegetabilis, quarum operatione cessante, jam nullo modo remanet anima corpori conjuncta. Ergo videtur quod oportuit in raptu Pauli animam totaliter a corpore esse separatam.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.sc] Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de videndo Deum): "It is not incredible that this sublime revelation" (namely, that they should see God in His essence) "was vouchsafed certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to leave nothing but a corpse for burial." Therefore it was not necessary for Paul's soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from his body.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Epist. cxLVII ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, cap. xIII, col. 640, t. 2: «Non incredibile est, quibusdam sanctis nondum ita defunctis, ut sepelienda cadavera remane rent, etiam istam excellentiam revelationis fuisse concessam, ut scilicet viderent Deum per essentiam. Non ergo fuit necessarium ut in raptu Pauli anima ejus totaliter separaretur a corpore.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.co] As stated above (1, Objection 1), in the rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God's power, "from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature." Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no change, as stated above (3, ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends all phantasms, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible objects.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, in raptu, de quo nunc loquimur, virtute divina elevatur homo ab eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est supra naturam, et ideo duo considerare oportet: primo quidem quid sit homini secundum naturam; secundo quid divina virtute in homine sit fiendum supra naturam. Ex hoc autem quod anima corpori unituramquam naturalis forma ipsius, convenit animæ naturalis habitudo ad hoc quod per conversionem ad phantasmata intelligat; quod quidem ab ea non aufertur divina virtute in raptu, quia non mutatur status ejus, ut dictum est. Manente autem hoc statu, aufertur ab anima actualis conversio ad phantasmata et sensibilia, ne impediatur ejus elevatio in id quod excedit omnia phantasmata, ut dictum est. Et ideo in raptu non fuit necessarium quod anima sic separaretur a corpore ut ei non uniretur quasi forma; fuit autem necessarium intellectum ejus abstrahi a phantasmatibus et sensibilium perceptione.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.ad.1] In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated above (3, ad 2,3).

[II-II.q.175.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Paulus in raptu illo peregrinabatur a Domino quantum ad statum, quia adhuc erat in statu viatoris; non autem quoad actum quo videbat Deum per speciem, ut ex prædictis patet.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.ad.2] A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place befitting it according to its specific nature.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia animæ virtute naturali non elevatur supra modum convenientem essentiae ejus; virtute tamen divina potest in aliquid altius elevari, sicut corpus per violentiam fortioris virtutis elevatur supra locum convenientem sibi secundum speciem suæ naturæ.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.ad.3] The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective knowledge.

[II-II.q.175.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vires animæ vegetabilis non operantur ex intentione animæ, sicut vires sensitivæ, sed per modum naturæ: et ideo non requiritur ad raptum ab eis abstractio, sicut a potentiis sensitivis, per quarum operationes minueretur intentio animæ circa intellectivam cognitionem.

Article 6

[II-II.q.175.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Corinthians 12:2): "I know a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven." Now man denotes something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Paulus non ignoraverit an ejus anima fuerit a corpore separata. Dicit enim ipse II ad Corinth., xII, 2: Scio hominem in Christo raptum usque ad tertium cælum. Sed homo nominat compositum ex anima et corpore, raptus etiam differt a morte. Videtur ergo quod ipse sciverit animam non fuisse per mortem a corpore separatam, præsertim quia hoc communiter a Doctoribus ponitur.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.arg.2] Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was "to the third heaven." Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ex eisdem Apostoli verbis patet quod ipse scivit quo raptus fuerit, quia in tertium cælum. Sed ex hoc sequitur quod sciverit utrum in corpore fuerit vel non; quia si scivit tertium cælum esse aliquid corporeum, consequens est quod sciverit animam suam non esse a corpore separatam, quia visio rei corporeæ non potest fieri nisi per corpus. Ergo videtur quod non omnino ignoraverit an anima fuerit a corpore separata.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that "when in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in heaven." Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too knew this.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xxvIII, col. 478, t. 3, «ipse in raptu vidit illa visione Deum qua vident sancti in patria. » Sed sancti ex hoc ipso quod vident Deum, sciunt an animæ eorum sint a corporibus separatæ. Ergo et Paulus hoc scivit.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.sc] It is written (2 Corinthians 12:3): "Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth."

[II-II.q.175.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur II ad Cor., xII, 3: Sive in corpore, sive extra corpus nescio, Deus scit.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.co] The true answer to this question must be gathered from the Apostle's very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely that he was "rapt even to the third heaven," and that something he knew not, namely "whether" he were "in the body or out of the body." This may be understood in two ways. First, the words "whether in the body or out of the body" may refer not to the very being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezekiel 8:3) to have been "brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem." This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that "lastly our Apostle" (thus said the Jew) "durst not assert that he was rapt in his body, but said: 'Whether in the body or out of the body, I know not.'"

Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as appears in one's dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied by his body or not.

Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt "fourteen years ago," and that at the present time he knows not "whether he was in the body or out of the body."

Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length, concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead."

[II-II.q.175.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hujusmodi quæstionis veritatem accipere oportet ex ipsis Apostoli verbis, quibus dicit se aliquid scire, scilicet se raptum esse usque ad tertium cælum; et aliquid nescire, scilicet utrum in corpore, an extra corpus. Quod quidem potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo ut hoc quod dicitur, Sive in corpore, sive extra corpus, non referatur ad ipsum esse hominis rapti, quasi ignoraverit an anima ejus esset in corpore vel non, sed ad modum raptus, ut scilicet ignoraverit an corpus ejus fuerit simul raptum cum anima in tertium cælum vel non, sed solum anima; sicut Ezech., viii, dicitur quod adductus est in visionibus Dei in Jerusalem. Et hunc intellectum fuisse cujusdam Judæi exprimit Hieronymus in prologo Super Daniel., vers. fin., ubi dicit: « Denique et Apostolum nostrum, scilicet dicebat Judæus, non fuisse au-sum affirmare se in corpore raptum, sed dixisse, sive in corpore, sive extra corpus, nescio. » Sed hunc sensum reprobat Augustinus XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. ii, etc., col. 455, t. 3, per hoc quod Apostolus dicit scivisse se esse raptum usque ad tertium cælum. Sciebat ergo verum esse tertium cælum id in quod raptus fuit, et non similitudinem imaginariam tertii cæli: alioquin si tertium cælum nominavit phantasma tertii cæli, pari ratione dicere potuit se in corpore raptum, nominans corpus proprii corporis phantasma, quale apparet in somniis. Si autem sciebat esse vere tertium cælum, sciebat ergo aut esse aliquid spirituale et incorporeum; et sic non poterat corpus ejus illuc rapi; aut esse aliquid corporeum, et sic anima non posset illuc sine corpore rapi, nisi separaretur a corpore. Et ideo oportet secundum alium sensum intelligere, ut scilicet Apostolus sciverit quod fuerit raptus secundum animam et non secundum corpus, nesciverit tamen qualiter se haberet anima ad corpus, utrum scilicet fuerit sine corpore vel non. Sed circa hoc diversimode aliqui lo-quuntur. Quidam enim dicunt quod Apostolus scivit quod anima sua erat corpori unita ut forma, sed nescivit utrum esset passus alienationem a sensibus, vel etiam utrum esset facta abstractio ab operibus animæ vegetabilis. Sed quod fuerit facta abstractio a sensibus, hoc non potuit ignorare, ex quo scivit se raptum: quod autem fuerit facta abstractio ab operibus animæ vegetabilis, non erat tantum ali-quid ut de hoc oporteret tam sollicitam fieri mentionem. Unde relinquitur quod nescivit Apostolus utrum anima ejus fuerit conjuncta corpori ut forma, vel a corpore separata per mortem. Quidam autem hoc concedentes dicunt quod Apostolus tunc non perpendit quando rapiebatur, quia tota ejus intentio conversa erat in Deum, sed postmodum percepit, considerans ea quæ viderat. Sed hoc etiam contrariatur verbis Apostoli, qui distinguit in verbis suis præteritum a futuro: dicit enim in præsenti se scire quod fuit raptus ante annos quatuordecim, et se in præsenti nescire utrum in corpore fuerit vel extra corpus. Et ideo dicendum est quod et prius et postea nescivit utrum ejus anima fuerit a corpore separata. Unde Augustinus dicit XII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. v, col. 458, t. 3, post longam inquisitionem conclusens: « Restat ergo fortasse, ut hoc ipsum eum intelligamus ignorasse, utrum quando in tertium cælum raptus est, in corpore fuerit anima, quomodo est anima in corpore, cum corpus vivere dicitur, sive vigilantis, sive dormientis, sive in extasi a sensibus corporis alienata; an omnino de corpore exierit, ut mortuum corpus jaceret. »

[II-II.q.175.a.6.ad.1] Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. or again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man." Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak with more conjecture than certainty.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per synecdochen quandoque pars hominis homo nominatur; et præcipue anima, quæ est pars hominis eminentior. Quamvis etiam possit intelligi eum quem raptum dicit, non tunc fuisse hominem quando raptus fuit, sed post annos quatuordecim. Unde dicit: Scio hominem, non dicit: Scio raptum hominem. Nihil etiam prohiberet mortem divinitus procuratam raptum dici: et sic Augustinus dicit XII Super Gen. ad litt., c. iii, col. 456, t. 3: « Dubitante inde Apostolo, quis nostrum inde certus esse audeat? » Unde qui super hoc loquuntur, magis conjecturaliter quam per certitudinem loquuntur.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.ad.2] The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul being separated from his body.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Apostolus scivit vel illud cælum esse quid incorporeum, vel aliquid incorporeum a se visum in illo cælo; cum hoc potuerit fieri per intellectum ejus, etiamsi anima ejus non esset a corpore separata.

[II-II.q.175.a.6.ad.3] Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.175.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod visio Pauli in raptu quantum ad aliquid fuit similis visioni beatorum, scilicet quantum ad id quod videbatur; et quantum ad aliquid dissimilis, scilicet quantum ad modum videndi, quia non ita perfecte vidit sicut sancti qui sunt in patria. Unde Augustinus dicit XII Super Gen. ad litt., c. xxxvi, col. 484, t. 3: « Quamvis Apostolo arrepto a carnis sensibus in tertium cælum hoc defuit ad plenam perfectamque cognitionem rerum, quæ angelis inest, quod sive in corpore, sive extra corpus esset, nesciebat: hoc utique non deerit, cum receptis corporibus in resurrectione mortuorum corruptibile hoc induetur incorruptione. »

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