Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q179. The division of life into active and contemplative
Source context
- Theme
- Aquinas's formal division of human life into active and contemplative modes as structurally exhaustive of spiritual vocation
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethics (bios praktikos / bios theoretikos)Aristotle's distinction between the practical life directed toward civic virtue and the contemplative life (theoria) as the highest activity of intellect provides the proximate philosophical source for Aquinas's division in Q179.
- Neoplatonic tradition (Plotinus, Enneads)Plotinus distinguishes between the soul's outward activity in the world and its inward return toward the One, a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's identification of contemplation as superior in dignity to action.
- Vedantic distinction (pravritti / nivritti marga)Sanskrit philosophical tradition distinguishes the path of outward engagement (pravritti) from the path of withdrawal and inward realization (nivritti), showing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's active-contemplative axis.
Q179. The division of life into active and contemplative
Article 1
[II-II.q.179.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "in living things to live is to be." Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Anima enim est principium vita per suam essentiam: dicit enim Philosophus in II De anima, text. 37, quod « vivere viventibus est esse. » Actionis autem et contemplationis principium est anima per suas potentias. Ergo videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.arg.2] Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or "speculative" and "practical," are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while "to live" comes before "to understand," since "to live" comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, inconvenienter dividitur prius per differentias posterioris. Activum autem et contemplativum sive speculativum et practicum, sunt differentiæ intellectus, ut patet in III De anima, text. 46 et 49. Vivere autem est prius quam intelligere: nam vivere inest viventibus primo secundum animam vegetabilem, ut patet per Philosophum in II De anima, text. 34 et 59. Ergo inconvenienter dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.arg.3] Further, the word "life" implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in rest, according to (Wisdom 8:1)6: "When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her." Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nomen vitae importat motum, ut patet per Dionysium iv cap. De div. nom., t. 1. Sed contemplatio consistit magis in quiete, secundum illud Sap., xiii, 16: Intrans in domum meam conquiescam cum illa. Ergo videtur quod vita non convenienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.sc] Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): "There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the contemplative."
[II-II.q.179.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius Super Ezech., hom. II, l. II, §7, col. 952, t. 2, dicit: « Duæ vitae sunt, in quibus nos omnipotens Deus per sacrum eloquium erudit, activa videlicet et contemplativa. »
[II-II.q.179.a.1.co] Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish "to associate with his friends" (Ethic. ix, 12).
Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that man's life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illa proprie dicuntur viventia quæ ex seipsis moventur seu operantur. Illud autem maxime convenit alicui per seipsum, quod est proprium ei, et ad quod maxime inclinatur: et ideo unumquodque vivens ostenditur vivere ex operatione sibi maxime propria, ad quam maxime inclinatur; sicut plantarum vita dicitur in hoc consistere quod nutriuntur et generant 2; animalium vero in hoc quod sentiunt et moventur; hominum vero in hoc quod intelligunt et secundum rationem agunt. Unde etiam in hominibus vita uniuscujusque hominis videtur esse id in quo maxime delectatur, et cuimaxime intendit, et in quo præcipue vult quilibet convivere amico, ut dicitur in IX Ethic., cap. iv, ix et xii. Quia ergo quidam homines præcipue intendunt contemplationi veritatis, quidam vero intendunt principaliter exterioribus actionibus, inde est quod vita hominis convenienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.ad.1] Each thing's proper form that makes it actually "to be" is properly that thing's principle of operation. Hence "to live" is, in living things, "to be," because living things through having "being" from their form, act in such and such a way.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod propria forma uniuscujusque faciens ipsum esse in actu, est principium operationis propriæ ipsius; et ideo vivere dicitur esse viventium, ex eo quod viventia per hoc quod habent esse per suam formam, tali modo operantur.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.ad.2] Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod vita universaliter sumpta non dividitur per activam et contemplativam; sed vita hominis, qui speciem sortitur ex hoc quod habet tamen nullum habeatur quinto loco argumentum. 2 intellectum: et ideo eadem est divisio intellectus et vitæ humanæ.
[II-II.q.179.a.1.ad.3] It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is defined "the act of a perfect thing." On this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely, "straight," "circular," and "oblique" [Cf. 180, 6].
[II-II.q.179.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod contemplatio habet quidem quietem ab exterioribus motibus: nihilominus tamen ipsum contemplari est quidam motus intellectus, prout quælibet operatio dicitur motus; secundum quod dicit Philosophus in III De anima, text. 28, quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus quidam, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti. Et hoc modo Dionysius iv cap. De div. nom., § 9, col. 706, t. 4, ponit tres motus animæ contemplantis, scilicet « rectum, circularem et obliquum. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.179.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of "pleasure," the "civil" which would seem to be the same as the active, and the "contemplative" life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod vita non sufficienter dividatur per activam et contemplativam. Philosophus enim in I Ethic., cap. v, a princ., dicit quod tres sunt vitæ maxime excellentes, scilicet, « voluptuosa, civilis, » quæ videtur esse eadem activæ, et « contemplativa. » Insufficienter ergo videtur dividii vita per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.arg.2] Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of "leisure" which pertains to the contemplative, the "busy" life which pertains to the active, and a third "composed of both." Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus XIX De civit. Dei, cap. 11 et xix, col. 624 et 647, t. 7, ponit tria vitæ genera; scilicet « otiosum, » quod pertinet ad contemplationem; « actuosum, » quod pertinet ad vitam activam; et addit tertium ex utroque compositum. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter dividatur vita per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.arg.3] Further, man's life is diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, vita hominis diversificatur, secundum quod homines diversis actionibus student. Sed plura quam duo sunt humanarum actionum studia. Ergo videtur quod vita debeat in plura membra dividi quam in activum et contemplativum.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.sc] These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [Hom. xiv in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod istæ duæ vitæ significantur per duas uxores Jacob; activa quidem per Liam, contemplativa vero per Rachelem; et per duas mulieres quæ Dominum hospitio receperunt; contemplativa quidem per Mariam, activa vero per Martham, ut Gregorius dicit in VI Moral., cap. xxxvii, § 61, col. 764, t. 4. Non autem esset hæc congrua significatio, si essent plures quam duæ vitæ. Ergo sufficienter dividitur vita per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.co] As stated above (1, ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, divisio ista datur de vita humana, quæ quidem attenditur secundum intellectum. Intellectus autem dividitur per activum et contemplativum, quia finis intellectivæ cognitionis vel est ipsa cognitio veritatis, quod pertinet ad intellectum contemplativum; vel est aliqua exterior actio, quod pertinet ad intellectum practicum sive activum. Et ideo vita etiam sufficienter dividitur per activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.ad.1] The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast." Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod vita voluptuosa ponit finem in delectatione corporali, quæ communis est nobis et brutis. Unde, sicut Philosophus ibidem dicit, est vita bestialis. Propter quod non comprehenditur sub præsenti divisione, prout vita humana dividitur in activam et contemplativam.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.ad.2] A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. On like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod media conficiuntur ex extremis, et ideo virtute continentur in eis, sicut tepidum in calido et frigido, et pallidum in albo et nigro. Et similiter sub activo et contemplativo comprehenditur id quod est ex utroque compositum. Et tamen sicut in quolibet mixto prædominatur aliquod simplex, ita etiam in medio genere vitæ superabundat quandoque quidem contemplativum, quandoque vero activum.
[II-II.q.179.a.2.ad.3] All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to the contemplative life.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.179.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia studia humanarum actionum si ordinentur ad necessitatem præsentis vitæ secundum rationem rectam, pertinent ad vitam activam, quæ per ordinatas actiones consulit necessitatii vitæ præsentis; si autem deserviant concupiscentiae cuicumque, pertinent ad vitam voluptuosam, quæ non continetur sub vita activa. Humana vero studia, quæ ordinantur ad considerationem veritatis, pertinent ad vitam contemplativam.
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