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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Tertia Pars·Q24. The predestination of Christ

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Theme
Christ's predestination as the foreordained vehicle for the union of the divine Sun-being with humanity

Steiner

  • GA 246, 1916-12-21Steiner identifies Jesus as the human being predestined after thirty years of preparation to receive the Christ-being into himself, framing predestination as a cosmic developmental necessity rather than arbitrary divine decree.
  • GA 68a, 1909-02-03Steiner argues that the Christ-being could only enter human evolution in the fourth post-Atlantean epoch, when human personality had developed sufficiently to receive it — locating predestination in cosmic-evolutionary timing.
  • GA 93a, 1905-10-03Steiner contextualizes Augustinian predestination doctrine as a historically conditioned substitute for reincarnation teaching, distinguishing it from his own treatment of Christ's foreordained role in evolution.

Cross-tradition

  • Augustinian predestination (Western theological tradition)Augustine's doctrine of predestination locates the election of the redeemer and the redeemed entirely in divine sovereign will prior to creation, a structural parallel to Aquinas's Q24 treatment of Christ as foreknown and foreordained before the foundation of the world.
  • Vedantic doctrine of avataraThe Vedantic concept of the avatara as a divine being who descends into incarnation at a cosmically determined moment of need offers cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that Christ's predestination is the exemplary cause of human predestination.

Q24. The predestination of Christ

Article 1

[III.q.24.a.1.arg.1] It would seem unfitting that Christ should be predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the adoption of sons, according to Ephesians 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children." But it is not befitting to Christ to be an adopted Son, as stated above (Question 23, Article 4). Therefore it is not fitting that Christ be predestinated.

[III.q.24.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ordo in Ecclesia esse non debeat. Ordo enim requirit subjectionem et prælationem. Sed subjectio videtur repugnare libertati, in quam vocati sumus per Christum. Ergo ordo in Ecclesia esse non debeat.

[III.q.24.a.1.arg.2] Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is false--"The human nature is Son of God." In like manner neither by reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as stated in I, 23, 2,5. Therefore Christ was not predestinated to be the Son of God.

[III.q.24.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille qui in ordine constituitur, alio superior fit. Sed in Ecclesia quilibet debet se altero inferiorem repu-tare, Philipp., ii, 3: Superiores invicem arbitrantes. Ergo non debet in Ecclesia esse ordo.

[III.q.24.a.1.arg.3] Further, just as that which has been made was not always, so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, it cannot be said that that Man was "made the Son of God." Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was "predestinated the Son of God."

[III.q.24.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ordo invenitur in angelis propter distinctionem eorum in bonis naturalibus et gratuitis. Sed omnes homines sunt in natura unum: gratiarum etiam dona quis eminentius habeat, ignotum est. Ergo ordo in Ecclesia esse non debeat.

[III.q.24.a.1.sc] The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Romans 1:4): "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power."

[III.q.24.a.1.sc] Sed contra, ad Rom., xiii, 4: Quæ sunt, a Deo ordinata* sunt. Sed Ecclesia a Deo est, quia ipse eam ædificavit sanguine suo. Ergo ordo in Ecclesia esse debeat. Præterea, status Ecclesia est medius inter statum naturæ et gloriæ. Sed in natura inventur ordo, quo quædam aliis superiora sunt; et similiter in gloria, ut patet in Angelis. Ergo in Ecclesia debeat esse ordo.

[III.q.24.a.1.co] As is clear from what has been said in I, 23, 1,2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.

[III.q.24.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus sua opera in sui similitudinem producere voluit, quantumpossible fuit, ut perfecta essent, et per ea cognosci posset. Et ideo ut in suis operibus repræsentaretur, non solum secundum quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod aliis influit, hanc legem naturalem imposuit omnibus, ut ultima per media reducerentur et perfice-rentur, et media per prima, ut Dionysius dicit cap. v Eccles. hierarch., § 4, col. 503, t. 4. Et ideo ut ista pulchritudo Ecclesia non deesset, posuit ordinem ea, ut quidam aliis sacramenta traderent, suo modo Deo in hoc assimilati, quasi Deo cooperantes; sicut et in corpore naturali quædam membra aliis influunt.

[III.q.24.a.1.ad.1] The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular manner is He predestinated.

[III.q.24.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod subjectio servitutis repugnat libertati: quæ servitus est cum aliquis dominatur aliis, ad sui utilitatem subjectis utens.4. Talis autem subjectio non requiritur in ordine, per quem qui præsunt, salutem subditorum quærere debent, non propriam utilitatem.

[III.q.24.a.1.ad.2] As a gloss [From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct. xv] says on Romans 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to the nature and not to the Person--that is to say, that on human nature was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of Person.

But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person's nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for this proposition is false: "The human nature is the Son of God": unless one were to force from it such an exposition as: "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power"--that is, "It was predestinated that the Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person."

Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, "Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh," added, "Who was predestinated the Son of God in power": so as to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the grace of union.

[III.q.24.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quilibet debet se reputare inferiore merito, sed non officio. Ordines autem officia quædam sunt.

[III.q.24.a.1.ad.3] Origen commenting on Romans 1:4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apostle is: "Who was destined to be the Son of God in power"; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the participle "predestinated," not to the fact of being the Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when they are made known; so that the sense would be--"Christ was predestinated to be made known as the Son of God." But this is an improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge thereof.

It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the participle "predestinated" is to be referred to the Person not in Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power."

Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle "predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition--"Christ was predestinated the Son of God"--is truer than this--"Christ was made the Son of God."

[III.q.24.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ordo in angelis non attenditur secundum distinctionem naturæ, nisi per accidens, inquantum ad distinctionem naturæ sequitur in eis distinctio gratiae. Attenditur autem in eis2 per se secundum distinctionem in gratia: quia eorum ordines respiciunt participationem divinorum, et communicationem in statu gloriæ, quæ est secundum mensuram gratiae, quasi gratiae finis, et effectus quodammodo. Sed ordines Ecclesiæ militantis respiciunt participationem sacramentorum, et communicationem, quæ sunt causa gratiae, et quodammodo gratiam praecedunt: et sic non est de necessitate nostrorum ordinum gratia gratum faciens, sed solum potestas dispensandi sacramenta: et propter hoc etiam ordo non attenditur per distinctionem gratiae gratum facientis, sed per distinctionem potestatis.

Article 2

[III.q.24.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of God." For at some time a man is that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false.

[III.q.24.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur.1. Videtur quod inconvenienter ordo a Magistro, IV Sentent., dist. xxiv, definiatur ubi dicitur: « Ordo est signaculum quoddam Ecclesiæ, quo spiritualis potestas traditur ordinato. » Pars enim non debet poni quasi genus totius. Sed character, qui per5 signaculum exponitur in sequenti definitione4, est pars ordinis, quia dividitur contra id quod est res tantum, vel sacramentum tantum, cum sit res et sacramentum. Ergo signaculum non debet poni quasi genus ordinis.

[III.q.24.a.2.arg.2] Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If, therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false.

[III.q.24.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut in sacramento ordinis imprimitur character, ita in sacramento baptismi. Sed in definitione bap- 1 Ita communiter. Exemplum supra citatum: « Cum aliquis dominatur ad sui utilitatem subjectis utens. » 2 — 4

[III.q.24.a.2.arg.3] Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God." Therefore this proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man," is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of God."

[III.q.24.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in baptismo etiam quædam spiritualis datur potestas accedendi ad sacramenta. Et iterum est quoddam signaculum, cum sit sacramentum. Ergo hæc definitio convenit baptismo: et sic inconvenienter assignatur de ordine.

[III.q.24.a.2.sc] Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was predestinated."

[III.q.24.a.2.co] Two things may be considered in predestination. One on the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "This human nature of ours was predestinated to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it would be impossible to raise it higher." Now that is said to belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature. Consequently, we must say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God."

[III.q.24.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod definitio quam Magister de ordine ponit, convenit ordini, secundum quod est Ecclesiæ sacramentum. Et ideo duo ponit, scilicet signum exterius, ibi « signaculum quoddam, » id est, signum quoddam; et effectum interiorem, ibi « quo spiritualis potestas, etc. »

[III.q.24.a.2.ad.1] When we say, "Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God," this qualification, "as Man," can be referred in two ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.

Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself: that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be predestinated as Man.

[III.q.24.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod signaculum non ponitur hic pro charactere interiori, sed pro eo quod exterius geritur, quod est signum interioris potestatis et causa: et sic etiam sumitur character in alia definitione. Si tamen pro interiori charactere sumeretur, non esset inconveniens; quia divisio sacramenti in illa tria non est in partes integrales, proprie loquendo: quia illud quod est res tantum, non est de essentia sacramenti; quod est etiam sacramentum tantum, transit; et sacramentum5 manere dicitur. Unde relinquitur quod ipse character interior sit essentialiter et principaliter ipsum sacramentum ordinis.

[III.q.24.a.2.ad.2] Something may be befitting to a man by reason of human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.

[III.q.24.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis in baptismo conferatur aliqua spiritualis potestas recipiendi alia sacramenta, ratione cujus characterem imprimit; non tamen hic est principalis effectus ejus, sed ablutio interior, propter quam baptismus fieret, etiam priori causa non existente. Sed ordo potestatem principaliter importat. Et ideo character, qui est spiritualis potestas, in definitione ordinis Negat Scotus sacramentum ordinis esse potestatem spiritualem ad aliquem actum in ecclesiastica hierarchia. ponitur, non autem in definitione baptismi.

[III.q.24.a.2.ad.3] As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God, because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature." Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as Son of God, was predestinated to be Man."

[III.q.24.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in baptismo datur quædam potentia spiritualis ad recipiendum, et ita quodammodo passiva. Potestas autem proprie nominat potentiam activam cum aliqua præeminentia. Et ideo hæc definitio non convenit baptismo.

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