Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Tertia Pars·Q47. The efficient cause of Christ's passion
Source context
- Theme
- efficient causality of the Passion — divine will, human agency, and diabolical instigation as concurring causes of Christ's suffering
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Patristic theology (Augustine, Ambrose)Patristic sources distinguish the permitted instrumentality of human sinners and the devil from the primary divine will in ordaining the Passion, paralleling Aquinas's analysis of efficient causation distributed across divine, human, and adversarial agents.
- Kabbalistic soteriologyIn certain Kabbalistic readings of the tzimtzum and the breaking of the vessels, the adversarial shattering is simultaneously a permitted act within divine providence, showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that diabolical and human malice operate only within the bounds of divine ordination.
Q47. The efficient cause of Christ's passion
Article 1
[III.q.47.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that Christ was not slain by another, but by Himself. For He says Himself (John 10:18): "No men taketh My life from Me, but I lay it down of Myself." But he is said to kill another who takes away his life. Consequently, Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.
[III.q.47.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nullus consensus possit esse coactus. Coactio enim in liberum arbitrium cadere non potest secundum aliquem statum ejus, ut in II Sent. dictum est. Sed consensus est actus liberi arbitrii. Ergo non potest esse coactus.
[III.q.47.a.1.arg.2] Further, those slain by others sink gradually from exhausted nature, and this is strikingly apparent in the crucified: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "Those who were crucified were tormented with a lingering death." But this did not happen in Christ's case, since "crying out, with a loud voice, He yielded up the ghost" (Matthew 27:50). Therefore Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.
[III.q.47.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, violentum idem est quod coactum. Sed « coactum, » secundum Philosophum, lib. III Ethic., cap. 1, « est cujus principium est extra, non conferente vim passo. » Sed omnis consensus principium est intra. Ergo nullus consensus potest esse coactus.
[III.q.47.a.1.arg.3] Further, those slain by others suffer a violent death, and hence die unwillingly, because violent is opposed to voluntary. But Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "Christ's spirit did not quit the flesh unwillingly, but because He willed it, when He willed it, and as He willed it." Consequently Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.
[III.q.47.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne peccatum consensus perficitur. Sed illud quo perficitur pecca- 1 In responsione ad consulta Bulgarorum, cap. III. 2 Extra De sponsal. et matrimonio, cap. « Is qui tum, cogi non potest, quia, secundum Augustinum, lib. III De lib. arb., cap. xviii, § 50, col. 1295, t. 4, «nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest. » Cum ergo vis a juristis, l. I, ff. «de eo quod vi metusve, » etc., definiatur esse « majoris rei impetus, qui repelli non potest, » videtur quod consensus non possit esse coactus vel violentus.
[III.q.47.a.1.sc] It is written (Luke 18:33): "After they have scourged Him, they will put him to death."
[III.q.47.a.1.sc] Sed contra, illud quod esse non potest, non potest aliquid impedire. Sed coactio consensus impedit matrimonium, ut in Littera dicitur, IV, dist. xxix. Ergo consensus cogi potest. Præterea, in matrimonio est quidam contractus. Sed in contractibus potest esse voluntas coacta; unde legislator in integrum restitutionem adjudicat, ratum non habens «quod vi metusve causa factum est, lib. I, ff. sup. cit. Ergo etiam in matrimonio esse potest consensus coactus.
[III.q.47.a.1.co] A thing may cause an effect in two ways: in the first instance by acting directly so as to produce the effect; and in this manner Christ's persecutors slew Him because they inflicted on Him what was a sufficient cause of death, and with the intention of slaying Him, and the effect followed, since death resulted from that cause. In another way someone causes an effect indirectly--that is, by not preventing it when he can do so; just as one person is said to drench another by not closing the window through which the shower is entering: and in this way Christ was the cause of His own Passion and death. For He could have prevented His Passion and death. Firstly, by holding His enemies in check, so that they would not have been eager to slay Him, or would have been powerless to do so. Secondly, because His spirit had the power of preserving His fleshly nature from the infliction of any injury; and Christ's soul had this power, because it was united in unity of person with the Divine Word, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv). Therefore, since Christ's soul did not repel the injury inflicted on His body, but willed His corporeal nature to succumb to such injury, He is said to have laid down His life, or to have died voluntarily.
[III.q.47.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est coactio vel violentia: una quæ facit necessitatem absolutam, et tale violentum dicitur a Philosopho, loc. sup. cit., «violentum simpliciter;» ut cum quis aliquem corporaliter impellit ad motum. Alia, quæ facit necessitatem conditionatam, et hanc vocat Philosophus «violentum mixture:» sicut cum quis projicit merces in mare, ne periclitetur: et in isto violento quamvis hoc quod fit, non sit per se voluntarium, tamen consideratis circumstantiis hic et nunc, voluntarium est. Et quia actus in particularibus sunt, ideo simpliciter voluntarium est, sed secundum quid involuntarium. Unde hæc violentia, vel coactio potest esse in consensus, qui est actus voluntatis, non autem primi. Et quia hæc coactio fit ex hoc quod timetur aliquod periculum imminens, ideo ista vis idem est quod metus, qui voluntatem cogit quodammodo; sed prima vis cadit in corporalibus actibus. Et quia legislator considerat non solum interiores actus, sed magis exteriores, ideo per «vim» intelligit coactionem simpliciter, propter quod vim contra metum dividit. Sed nunc agitur de consensu interiori, in quem non cadit coactio, sed vis, quæ a metu distinguitur. Et ideo quantum ad propositum pertinet, idem est coactio quod metus. Est autem metus secundum jurisperitos, «instantis vel futuri periculi causa mentis trepidatio,» loc. sup. cit. Et per hoc patet solutio ad objecta; nam primæ rationes procedunt de coactione prima, secundæ de secunda.
[III.q.47.a.1.ad.1] When we hear the words, "No man taketh away My life from Me," we must understand "against My will": for that is properly said to be "taken away" which one takes from someone who is unwilling and unable to resist.
[III.q.47.a.1.ad.2] In order for Christ to show that the Passion inflicted by violence did not take away His life, He preserved the strength of His bodily nature, so that at the last moment He was able to cry out with a loud voice: and hence His death should be computed among His other miracles. Accordingly it is written (Mark 15:39): "And the centurion who stood over against Him, seeing that crying out in this manner, He had given up the ghost, said: Indeed, this man was the Son of God." It was also a subject of wonder in Christ's death that He died sooner than the others who were tormented with the same suffering. Hence John says (19:32) that "they broke the legs of the first, and of the other that was crucified with Him," that they might die more speedily; "but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs." Mark also states (15:44) that "Pilate wondered that He should be already dead." For as of His own will His bodily nature kept its vigor to the end, so likewise, when He willed, He suddenly succumbed to the injury inflicted.
[III.q.47.a.1.ad.3] Christ at the same time suffered violence in order to die, and died, nevertheless, voluntarily; because violence was inflicted on His body, which, however, prevailed over His body only so far as He willed it.
Article 2
[III.q.47.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that Christ did not die out of obedience. For obedience is referred to a command. But we do not read that Christ was commanded to suffer. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.
[III.q.47.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod coactio metus non cadat in constantem virum, quia de ratione constantis est quod non trepidet in periculis. Cum ergo metus sit trepidatio mentis ratione periculi imminentis, videtur quod non cogatur metu.
[III.q.47.a.2.arg.2] Further, a man is said to do from obedience what he does from necessity of precept. But Christ did not suffer necessarily, but voluntarily. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.
[III.q.47.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, «omnium terribilium finis est mors,» secundum Philosophum in III Eth., cap. vi, a med., quasi perfectissimum inter terribilia. Sed constantes non coguntur morte, quia fortis etiam pericula mortis sustinet. Ergo nullus metus cadit in constantem virum.
[III.q.47.a.2.arg.3] Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than obedience. But we read that Christ suffered out of charity, according to Ephesians 5:2: "Walk in love, as Christ also has loved us, and delivered Himself up for us." Therefore Christ's Passion ought to be ascribed rather to charity than to obedience.
[III.q.47.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter alia pericula præcipe a bonis timetur periculum famæ. Sed timor infamiæ non reputatur timor cadens in constantem virum, quia, ut dicit lex, lib. VII, ff. «de eo quod metus,» etc., «timor infamiæ non continetur illo edicto: Quod metus causa factum est.» Ergo nec aliquis alius metus cadit in constantem virum.
[III.q.47.a.2.sc] It is written (Philippians 2:8): "He became obedient" to the Father "unto death."
[III.q.47.a.2.sc] Sed contra, Abraham et Isaac constantes fuerunt. Sed in eis accidit metus, quia 4 Ex Tullio citaverat Albertus Magnus in hunc locum; sed nihil tale expressum apud ipsum: ratione metus dixerunt uxores suas sibi esse sorores, Gen., xii et xxvi. Ergo metus potest cadere in constantem virum. Præterea, ubicumque est violentum mixtum, est aliquis metus cogens. Sed aliquis, quantumcumque constans, potest pati tale violentum, quia si sit in mari, merces projiciet tempore naufragii. Ergo metus potest cadere in constantem virum.
[III.q.47.a.2.co] It was befitting that Christ should suffer out of obedience. First of all, because it was in keeping with human justification, that "as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just," as is written Romans 5:19. Secondly, it was suitable for reconciling man with God: hence it is written (Romans 5:10): "We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son," in so far as Christ's death was a most acceptable sacrifice to God, according to Ephesians 5:2: "He delivered Himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness." Now obedience is preferred to all sacrifices. according to 1 Samuel 15:22: "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Therefore it was fitting that the sacrifice of Christ's Passion and death should proceed from obedience. Thirdly, it was in keeping with His victory whereby He triumphed over death and its author; because a soldier cannot conquer unless he obey his captain. And so the Man-Christ secured the victory through being obedient to God, according to Proverbs 21:28: "An obedient man shall speak of victory."
[III.q.47.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cadere metum in aliquem est cogi ipsum metu. Cogitur autem aliquis metu quando aliquid facit quod alias non vellet, ad evitandum id quod timet. In hoc autem constans ab inconstanti distinguitur quantum ad duo, primo quantum ad qualitatem periculi quod timetur, quia constans sequitur rationem rectam per quam scit quid pro quo 1 dimittendum sit vel faciendum. Semper autem minus malum vel majus bonum eligendum est. Et ideo constans ad minus malum sustinendum cogitur metu majoris mali, non autem cogitur ad majus malum, ut vitet minus malum. Sed inconstans cogitur ad majus malum propter metum minoris mali, scilicet ad peccatum propter metum corporalis poenæ. Sed pertinax e contra non potest cogi etiam ad minus malum sustinendum vel faciendum, ut evitet majus malum. Unde constans est medius inter inconstantem et pertinacem. Secundo differunt quantum adæstimationem periculi imminentis, quia constans non nisi ex forti æstimatione et probabili cogitur; sed inconstans ex levi; Proverb. xxviii, 1: Fugit impius nemine persequente.
[III.q.47.a.2.ad.1] Christ received a command from the Father to suffer. For it is written (John 10:18): "I have power to lay down My life, and I have power to take it up again: (and) this commandment have I received of My Father"--namely, of laying down His life and of resuming it again. "From which," as Chrysostom says (Hom. lix in Joan.), it is not to be understood "that at first He awaited the command, and that He had need to be told, but He showed the proceeding to be a voluntary one, and destroyed suspicion of opposition" to the Father. Yet because the Old Law was ended by Christ's death, according to His dying words, "It is consummated" (John 19:30), it may be understood that by His suffering He fulfilled all the precepts of the Old Law. He fulfilled those of the moral order which are founded on the precepts of charity, inasmuch as He suffered both out of love of the Father, according to John 14:31: "That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given Me commandment, so do I: arise, let us go hence"--namely, to the place of His Passion: and out of love of His neighbor, according to Galatians 2:20: "He loved me, and delivered Himself up for me." Christ likewise by His Passion fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for sacrifices and oblations, in so far as all the ancient sacrifices were figures of that true sacrifice which the dying Christ offered for us. Hence it is written (Colossians 2:16-17): "Let no man judge you in meat or drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's," for the reason that Christ is compared to them as a body is to a shadow. Christ also by His Passion fulfilled the judicial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for making compensation to them who have suffered wrong, since, as is written Psalm 68:5: He "paid that which" He "took not away," suffering Himself to be fastened to a tree on account of the apple which man had plucked from the tree against God's command.
[III.q.47.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod constans, sicut et de forti dicit Philosophus, lib. III Ethic., cap. vi, est intrepidus non quod omnino non timeat, sed quia non timet quæ non oportet, vel ubi, vel quando non oportet.
[III.q.47.a.2.ad.2] Although obedience implies necessity with regard to the thing commanded, nevertheless it implies free-will with regard to the fulfilling of the precept. And, indeed, such was Christ's obedience, for, although His Passion and death, considered in themselves, were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved to fulfill God's will with respect to the same, according to Psalm 39:9: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it." Hence He said (Matthew 26:42): "If this chalice may not pass away, but I must drink it, Thy will be done."
[III.q.47.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod peccata sunt maxima malorum: et ideo ad hæc nullo modo potest homo constans cogi; imo magis debet homo mori quam talia sustinere, ut etiam Philosophus in III Ethic. dicit, cap. vi et ix. Sed quædam damna corporalia sunt minora quibusdam aliis; inter quæ sunt præcipua, quæ ad personam pertinent; sicut mors, verbera, dehonestatio per stuprum et servitus. Et ideo ex istis constans cogitur ad alia damna corporalia sustinenda. Et hæc continentur in hoc versu: « Stupri, sive status, verberis, atque necis. » Nec differt utrum hæc pertineant ad personam propriam vel uxoris, vel filio-rum, vel aliorum hujusmodi.
[III.q.47.a.2.ad.3] For the same reason Christ suffered out of charity and out of obedience; because He fulfilled even the precepts of charity out of obedience only; and was obedient, out of love, to the Father's command.
[III.q.47.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis infamia sit majus damnum, tamen de facili occurri potest. Et ideo non reputatur cadere in constantem virum metus infamiæ, secundum jura.
Article 3
[III.q.47.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to the Passion. For it is a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and death. But, as it is written (Deuteronomy 32:4): "God is faithful, and without any iniquity." Therefore He did not hand over the innocent Christ to His Passion and death.
[III.q.47.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consensus coactus non tollat matrimonium, quia sicut ad matrimonium requiritur consensus, ita ad baptismum requiritur intentio. Sed coactus timore ad recipiendum baptismum, recipit sacramentum. Ergo coactus ad consentien-dum aliquo timore, matrimonio obligatur.
[III.q.47.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is not likely that a man be given over to death by himself and by another also. But Christ gave Himself up for us, as it is written (Isaiah 53:12): "He hath delivered His soul unto death." Consequently it does not appear that God the Father delivered Him up.
[III.q.47.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, violentum mixtum, secundum Philosophum, lib. III Eth., cap. 1, plus habet de voluntario quam de involuntario. Sed non potest aliter consensus esse coactus nisi per violentum mixtum. Ergo non omnino excluditur voluntarium: et ita adhuc est matrimonium.
[III.q.47.a.3.arg.3] Further, Judas is held to be guilty because he betrayed Christ to the Jews, according to John 6:71: "One of you is a devil," alluding to Judas, who was to betray Him. The Jews are likewise reviled for delivering Him up to Pilate; as we read in John 18:35: "Thy own nation, and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me." Moreover, as is related in John 19:16: Pilate "delivered Him to them to be crucified"; and according to 2 Corinthians 6:14: there is no "participation of justice with injustice." It seems, therefore, that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to His Passion.
[III.q.47.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ei qui consentit in matrimonium coactus, consulendum videtur quod in matrimonio illo stet, quia speciem mali habet promittere, et non solvere, a quo Apostolus vult nos abstinere; I Thessal., v. Hoc autem non esset, si consensus coactus omnino matrimonium tolleret. Ergo, etc.
[III.q.47.a.3.sc] It is written (Romans 8:32): "God hath not spared His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all."
[III.q.47.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Decretalis dicit, c. «Cum locum, » De sponsalib. et matrim.: «Cum consensus locum non habeat, ubi metus vel coactio intercedit, necesse est ut ubi assensus cujusquam requiritur, coactionis materia repellatur.» Sed in matrimonio requiritur communis consensus. Ergo, etc. Præterea, matrimonium significat conjunctionnem Christi ad Ecclesiam, quæ fit secundum libertatem amoris. Ergo non potest fieri per consensum coactum.
[III.q.47.a.3.co] As observed above (Article 2), Christ suffered voluntarily out of obedience to the Father. Hence in three respects God the Father did deliver up Christ to the Passion. In the first way, because by His eternal will He preordained Christ's Passion for the deliverance of the human race, according to the words of Isaias (53:6): "The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all"; and again (Isaiah 53:10): "The Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity." Secondly, inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us; hence we read in the same passage: "He was offered because it was His own will" (Isaiah 53:7). Thirdly, by not shielding Him from the Passion, but abandoning Him to His persecutors: thus we read (Matthew 27:46) that Christ, while hanging upon the cross, cried out: "My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" because, to wit, He left Him to the power of His persecutors, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl).
[III.q.47.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod vinculum matrimonii est perpetuum. Unde illud quod perpetuitati repugnat, matrimonium tollit. Metus autem qui cadit in constantem virum, perpetuitatem contractus tollit, quia potest peti restitutio in integrum. Et ideo hæc coactio metus quæ cadit in constantem virum, tollit matrimonium, et non alia. Constans autem vir judicatur virtuosus, cui est mensura in omnibus operibus humanis, ut Philosophus dicit in III Eth., cap. iv, ad fin. Quidam autem dicunt quod si adsit consensus, quamvis coactus, interius est matrimonium quantum ad Deum, sed non quantum ad statum Ecclesiæ, quæ præsumit ibi non fuisse consensum interiores propter metum. Sed hoc nihil est: quia Ecclesia non debet præsumere de aliquo peccatum, quousque probetur. Peccavit autem si dixit se consentire, et non consentit. Unde Ecclesia præsumit eum consensisse, sed judicat consensum illum extortum non esse sufficientem ad faciendum matrimonium.
[III.q.47.a.3.ad.1] It is indeed a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and to death against his will. Yet God the Father did not so deliver up Christ, but inspired Him with the will to suffer for us. God's "severity" (cf. Romans 11:22) is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without penalty: and the Apostle indicates this when (Romans 8:32) he says: "God spared not even His own Son." Likewise His "goodness" (Romans 11:22) shines forth, since by no penalty endured could man pay Him enough satisfaction: and the Apostle denotes this when he says: "He delivered Him up for us all": and, again (Romans 3:25): "Whom"--that is to say, Christ--God "hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood."
[III.q.47.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intentio non est causa efficiens sacramenti in baptismo, sed solum eliciens actionem agentis: sed consensus est causa efficiens in matrimonio, et ideo non est simile.
[III.q.47.a.3.ad.2] Christ as God delivered Himself up to death by the same will and action as that by which the Father delivered Him up; but as man He gave Himself up by a will inspired of the Father. Consequently there is no contrariety in the Father delivering Him up and in Christ delivering Himself up.
[III.q.47.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad matrimonium non sufficit quodcumque voluntarium, sed voluntarium complete, quia debet esse perpetuum: et ideo per violentum mixtum impeditur.
[III.q.47.a.3.ad.3] The same act, for good or evil, is judged differently, accordingly as it proceeds from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and consequently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear, for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly are held guilty.
[III.q.47.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non semper debet induci ad hoc quod in matrimonio illo stet, sed solum quando timetur periculum ex dissolutione: alias autem non peccat, quia non solvere promissa quæ nolens facit, non est species mali.
Article 4
[III.q.47.a.4.arg.1] It would seem unfitting that Christ should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles. For since men were to be freed from sin by Christ's death, it would seem fitting that very few should sin in His death. But the Jews sinned in His death, on whose behalf it is said (Matthew 21:38): "This is the heir; come, let us kill him." It seems fitting, therefore, that the Gentiles should not be implicated in the sin of Christ's slaying.
[III.q.47.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod consensus coactus saltem ex parte cogentis faciat matrimonium, quia matrimonium est signum spiritualis conjunctionis. Sed spiritualis conjunctio, quæ est per charitatem, potest esse ad eum qui non habet charitatem. Ergo et matrimonium ad eum qui non vult.
[III.q.47.a.4.arg.2] Further, the truth should respond to the figure. Now it was not the Gentiles but the Jews who offered the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law. Therefore neither ought Christ's Passion, which was a true sacrifice, to be fulfilled at the hands of the Gentiles.
[III.q.47.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si illa quæ fuit coacta, postmodum consentiat, erit verum matrimonium. Sed iste qui coegit primo, ex consensu illius non ligatur. Ergo ex primo consensu ligabatur matrimonio.
[III.q.47.a.4.arg.3] Further, as related John 5:18, "the Jews sought to kill" Christ because "He did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God." But these things seemed to be only against the Law of the Jews: hence they themselves said (John 19:7): "According to the Law He ought to die because He made Himself the Son of God." It seems fitting, therefore, that Christ should suffer, at the hands not of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, and that what they said was untrue: "It is not lawful for us to put any man to death," since many sins are punishable with death according to the Law, as is evident from Leviticus 20.
[III.q.47.a.4.sc] our Lord Himself says (Matthew 20:19): "They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified."
[III.q.47.a.4.sc] Sed contra, matrimonium est relatio aequiparantiæ. Sed talis relatio aequaliter est in utroque. Ergo si sit impedimentum ex parte unius, non erit matrimonium ex parte alterius.
[III.q.47.a.4.co] The effect of Christ's Passion was foreshown by the very manner of His death. For Christ's Passion wrought its effect of salvation first of all among the Jews, very many of whom were baptized in His death, as is evident from Acts 2:41 and Acts 4:4. Afterwards, by the preaching of Jews, Christ's Passion passed on to the Gentiles. Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin His sufferings at the hands of the Jews, and, after they had delivered Him up, finish His Passion at the hands of the Gentiles.
[III.q.47.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum matrimonium sit quædam relatio, et non possit innasci relatio in uno extremorum sine hoc quod fiat in alio; ideo quicquid impedit matrimonium in uno, impedit ipsum in altero, quia non potest esse quod aliquis sit vir non uxoris, vel quod aliqua sit uxor non habens virum, sic nec mater non habens filium: et ideo dicitur communiter quod matrimonium non claudicat.
[III.q.47.a.4.ad.1] In order to demonstrate the fulness of His love, on account of which He suffered, Christ upon the cross prayed for His persecutors. Therefore, that the fruits of His petition might accrue to Jews and Gentiles, Christ willed to suffer from both.
[III.q.47.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis actus amantis possit transire in non amantem, tamen unio inter eos non potest esse, nisi sit mutua amatio. Et ideo dicit Philosophus, in VIII Ethic., cap. 1, quod ad amicitiam, quæ in quadam unione consistit, requiritur redamatio.
[III.q.47.a.4.ad.2] Christ's Passion was the offering of a sacrifice, inasmuch as He endured death of His own free-will out of charity: but in so far as He suffered from His persecutors it was not a sacrifice, but a most grievous sin.
[III.q.47.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex consensu libero illius qui primo coactus est, non fit matrimonium, nisi in quantum consensus pracedens in altero adhuc manet in suo vigore: unde si dissentiret, non fieret matrimonium.
[III.q.47.a.4.ad.3] As Augustine says (Tract. cxiv in Joan.): "The Jews said that 'it is not lawful for us to put any man to death,' because they understood that it was not lawful for them to put any man to death" owing to the sacredness of the feast-day, which they had already begun to celebrate. or, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxiii in Joan.), because they wanted Him to be slain, not as a transgressor of the Law, but as a public enemy, since He had made Himself out to be a king, of which it was not their place to judge. Or, again, because it was not lawful for them to crucify Him (as they wanted to), but to stone Him, as they did to Stephen. Better still is it to say that the power of putting to death was taken from them by the Romans, whose subjects they were.
Article 5
[III.q.47.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that Christ's persecutors did know who He was. For it is written (Matthew 21:38) that the husbandmen seeing the son said within themselves: "This is the heir; come, let us kill him." On this Jerome remarks: "Our Lord proves most manifestly by these words that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not from ignorance, but out of envy: for they understood that it was He to whom the Father says by the Prophet: 'Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance.'" It seems, therefore, that they knew Him to be Christ or the Son of God.
[III.q.47.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod nec per consensum conditionatum fiat matrimonium, quia quod sub conditione ponitur, non simpliciter enuntiatur. Sed in matrimonio oportet esse verba simpliciter exprimentia consensum. Ergo conditio alicujus consensus non facit matrimonium.
[III.q.47.a.5.arg.2] Further, our Lord says (John 15:24): "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Now what is seen is known manifestly. Therefore the Jews, knowing Christ, inflicted the Passion on Him out of hatred.
[III.q.47.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, matrimonium debet esse certum. Sed ubi dicitur aliquid sub conditione, ponitur illud sub dubio. Ergo talis consensus non facit matrimonium.
[III.q.47.a.5.arg.3] Further, it is said in a sermon delivered in the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, cap. x): "Just as he who tears up the imperial message is doomed to die, as despising the prince's word; so the Jew, who crucified Him whom he had seen, will pay the penalty for daring to lay his hands on God the Word Himself." Now this would not be so had they not known Him to be the Son of God, because their ignorance would have excused them. Therefore it seems that the Jews in crucifying Christ knew Him to be the Son of God.
[III.q.47.a.5.sc] It is written (1 Corinthians 2:8): "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." And (Acts 3:17), Peter, addressing the Jews, says: "I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers." Likewise the Lord hanging upon the cross said: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34).
[III.q.47.a.5.sc] Sed contra, in aliis contractibus fit obligatio sub conditione, et stat stante conditione. Ergo cum matrimonium sit contractus quidam, videtur quod possit fieri per conditionatum consensum.
[III.q.47.a.5.co] Among the Jews some were elders, and others of lesser degree. Now according to the author of De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. lxvi, the elders, who were called "rulers, knew," as did also the devils, "that He was the Christ promised in the Law: for they saw all the signs in Him which the prophets said would come to pass: but they did not know the mystery of His Godhead." Consequently the Apostle says: "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." It must, however, be understood that their ignorance did not excuse them from crime, because it was, as it were, affected ignorance. For they saw manifest signs of His Godhead; yet they perverted them out of hatred and envy of Christ; neither would they believe His words, whereby He avowed that He was the Son of God. Hence He Himself says of them (John 15:22): "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." And afterwards He adds (John 15:24): "If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin." And so the expression employed by Job (21:14) can be accepted on their behalf: "(Who) said to God: depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways."
But those of lesser degree--namely, the common folk--who had not grasped the mysteries of the Scriptures, did not fully comprehend that He was the Christ or the Son of God. For although some of them believed in Him, yet the multitude did not; and if they doubted sometimes whether He was the Christ, on account of the manifold signs and force of His teaching, as is stated John 7:31-41, nevertheless they were deceived afterwards by their rulers, so that they did not believe Him to be the Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter said to them: "I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers"--namely, because they were seduced by the rulers.
[III.q.47.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conditio apposita aut est de præsenti, aut de futuro. Si de præsenti, et non est contraria matrimonio, sive sit honesta, sive non honesta, stat matrimonium stante conditione, et ea non stante non stat. Sed si sit contraria bonis matrimonii, non efficitur matrimonium; sicut etiam de sponsalibus dictum est. Si autem sit conditio de futuro, aut est necessaria, sicut solem oriri cras; et tunc est matrimonium, quia talia futura sunt præsentia in causis suis: aut est contingens, ut datio pecuniæ, vel acceptatio parentum: et tunc idem est judicium de tali consensu, sicut de consensu qui fit per verba de futuro: unde non facit matrimonium. Et per hæc patet solutio ad objecta.
[III.q.47.a.5.ad.1] Those words are spoken by the husbandmen of the vineyard; and these signify the rulers of the people, who knew Him to be the heir, inasmuch as they knew Him to be the Christ promised in the Law, but the words of Psalm 2:8 seem to militate against this answer: "Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance"; which are addressed to Him of whom it is said: "Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee." If, then, they knew Him to be the one to whom the words were addressed: "Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance," it follows that they knew Him to be the Son of God. Chrysostom, too, says upon the same passage that "they knew Him to be the Son of God." Bede likewise, commenting on the words, "For they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34), says: "It is to be observed that He does not pray for them who, understanding Him to be the Son of God, preferred to crucify Him rather than acknowledge Him." But to this it may be replied that they knew Him to be the Son of God, not from His Nature, but from the excellence of His singular grace.
Yet we may hold that they are said to have known also that He was verily the Son of God, in that they had evident signs thereof: yet out of hatred and envy, they refused credence to these signs, by which they might have known that He was the Son of God.
[III.q.47.a.5.ad.2] The words quoted are preceded by the following: "If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin"; and then follow the words: "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Now all this shows that while they beheld Christ's marvelous works, it was owing to their hatred that they did not know Him to be the Son of God.
[III.q.47.a.5.ad.3] Affected ignorance does not excuse from guilt, but seems, rather, to aggravate it: for it shows that a man is so strongly attached to sin that he wishes to incur ignorance lest he avoid sinning. The Jews therefore sinned, as crucifiers not only of the Man-Christ, but also as of God.
Article 6
[III.q.47.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of Christ's crucifiers was not the most grievous. Because the sin which has some excuse cannot be most grievous. But our Lord Himself excused the sin of His crucifiers when He said: "Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:34). Therefore theirs was not the most grievous sin.
[III.q.47.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod aliquis præcepto patris possit compelli ad matrimonium contrahendum. Dicitur enim Coloss., III, 20: Filii, obe-dite parentibus per omnia. Ergo et in hoc etiam obedire tenentur.
[III.q.47.a.6.arg.2] Further, our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): "He that hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin." But it was Pilate who caused Christ to be crucified by his minions. Therefore the sin of Judas the traitor seems to be greater than that of those who crucified Him.
[III.q.47.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Genes., xxviii, Isaac præcepit Jacob quod non acciperet uxorem de filiabus Chanaan. Non autem præcepisset, nisi de jure præcipere potuisset. Ergo filius in hoc tenetur obedire patri.
[III.q.47.a.6.arg.3] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v): "No one suffers injustice willingly"; and in the same place he adds: "Where no one suffers injustice, nobody works injustice." Consequently nobody wreaks injustice upon a willing subject. But Christ suffered willingly, as was shown above (1,2). Therefore those who crucified Christ did Him no injustice; and hence their sin was not the most grievous.
[III.q.47.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus debet promittere, præcipue per juramentum pro illo quem non potest cogere ad servandum. Sed parentes promittunt futura matrimonia pro filiis, et etiam juramento firmant. Ergo possunt præcepto cogere filios ad implendum.
[III.q.47.a.6.sc] Chrysostom, commenting on the words, "Fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers" (Matthew 23:32), says: "In very truth they exceeded the measure of their fathers; for these latter slew men, but they crucified God."
[III.q.47.a.6.sc] Sed contra, patre imperante matrimonium, filius potest sine peccato religionem intrare. Ergo non tenetur ei in hoc obedire. Præterea, si teneretur obedire, sponsalia per parentes contracta absque consensu filiorum essent stabilia. Sed hoc est contra jura, cap. « Ex litteris, » De desponsat. impub. Ergo, etc.
[III.q.47.a.6.co] As stated above (Article 5), the rulers of the Jews knew that He was the Christ: and if there was any ignorance in them, it was affected ignorance, which could not excuse them. Therefore their sin was the most grievous, both on account of the kind of sin, as well as from the malice of their will. The Jews also of the common order sinned most grievously as to the kind of their sin: yet in one respect their crime was lessened by reason of their ignorance. Hence Bede, commenting on Luke 23:34, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," says: "He prays for them who know not what they are doing, as having the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge." But the sin of the Gentiles, by whose hands He was crucified, was much more excusable, since they had no knowledge of the Law.
[III.q.47.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum in matrimonio sit quasi quædam servitus perpetua, pater non potest cogere filium ad matrimonium per præceptum, cum sit liberæ conditionis; sed potest eum inducere ex rationabili causa: et tunc sicut se habet filius ad causam illam, ita se habet ad præceptum patris; ut scilicet si causa illa cogat de necessitate, vel de honestate, et præceptum patris similiter cogat; alias non.
[III.q.47.a.6.ad.1] As stated above, the excuse made by our Lord is not to be referred to the rulers among the Jews, but to the common people.
[III.q.47.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verbum Apostoli non intelligitur in illis in quibus est liber sui, sicut pater. Et hujusmodi est matrimonium, per quod etiam filius fit pater.
[III.q.47.a.6.ad.2] Judas did not deliver up Christ to Pilate, but to the chief priests who gave Him up to Pilate, according to John 18:35: "Thy own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me." But the sin of all these was greater than that of Pilate, who slew Christ from fear of Caesar; and even greater than the sin of the soldiers who crucified Him at the governor's bidding, not out of cupidity like Judas, nor from envy and hate like the chief priests.
[III.q.47.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Jacob alias tenebatur ad faciendum hoc quod mandabat Isaac, tum propter malitiam illarum mulierum, tum etiam propter hoc quod semen Chanaan de terra quæ semini patriarcharum promittebatur, erat disperdendum: et ideo Isaac præcipere poterat.
[III.q.47.a.6.ad.3] Christ, indeed willed His Passion just as the Father willed it; yet He did not will the unjust action of the Jews. Consequently Christ's slayers are not excused of their injustice. Nevertheless, whoever slays a man not only does a wrong to the one slain, but likewise to God and to the State; just as he who kills himself, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v). Hence it was that David condemned to death the man who "did not fear to lay hands upon the Lord's anointed," even though he (Saul) had requested it, as related in 2 Samuel 1:5-14.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[III.q.47.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non jurant, nisi alia conditione subintellecta, si illis placuerit: et ipsi obligantur ad eos bona fide inducendum.
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