{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 1/l16/p039-p050","extent":"range","passage_number":39,"through":50,"paragraph_count":12,"first_locus":"GA 1/l16/p039","last_locus":"GA 1/l16/p050","lang":"en","edition":"MP1988","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"title":"16. Goethe as Thinker and Investigator","date":null,"location":null,"alignment_confidence":"high","alignment_reason":"beads:length","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":null,"edition_coverage":{"de":["original"],"en":["MP1988"]},"witness_completeness":{"ratio":1.14,"band":"comparable","note":null,"word_count":12330,"original_word_count":10769,"may_be_abridged":false},"site_heading":null,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p039-p050","json_url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p039-p050.json","lecture_url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16#p039","word_count":1186,"quote_safe":true,"passages":[{"passage_number":39,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p039","text":"It could easily seem as though, in our investigations that attribute to thinking only a power whose goal is to connect perceptions, we ourselves were now calling into question the independent significance of concepts and ideas for which we stood so energetically at first.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":44,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p039","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p039"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":40,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p040","text":"Only an inadequate interpretation of this investigation can lead to this view.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":12,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p040","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"not_checkable","note":"This passage or its German counterpart is too short to compare (a heading or a fragment)."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":41,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p041","text":"What does thinking accomplish when it carries out the connecting of perceptions?","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":12,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p041","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"not_checkable","note":"This passage or its German counterpart is too short to compare (a heading or a fragment)."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":42,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p042","text":"Let us look at two perceptions \\(A\\) and \\(B\\). These are given to us at first as entities without concepts. I cannot, through any conceptual reflection, transform into something else the qualities given to my sense perception. I can also find no thought-quality by which I could construct what is given in sense-perceptible reality if I lacked the perception. I can never create a mental picture of the quality “red” for someone blind to red, even though I paraphrase it conceptually for him by every conceivable means. *The sense-perception therefore has a something that never enters into the concept, that must be perceived if it is to become an object of our knowledge at all*. What kind of a role does the concept play, therefore, that we connect with some sense perception or other? The concept must obviously bring to the perception a completely independent element, something new, which does belong to the sense perception, to be sure, but which does not come into view in the sense perception.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":169,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p042","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p042"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":43,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p043","text":"But it is now certain, indeed, that this new “something” which the concept brings to the sense perception is that which first expresses what can meet our need for explanation. We are first able to understand some element or other in the sense world when we have a concept of it. We can always simply point to what sense-perceptible reality offers us, and anyone who has the possibility of perceiving precisely this element to which we are referring knows what it is all about. Through the concept, we are able to say something about the sense world that cannot be perceived.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":101,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p043","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p043"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":44,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p044","text":"From this, however, the following immediately becomes clear. If the essential being of the sense perception consisted only in its sense-perceptible qualities, then something completely new, in the form of the concept, could not join it. The sense perception is therefore not a totality at all, but rather only one side of a totality. And it is that side, in fact, which can be merely looked upon. Through the concept it first becomes clear to us what we are looking at.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":81,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p044","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p044"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":45,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p045","text":"What we developed *methodologically* in the previous chapter can now be expressed in terms of the significance of its *content*. Through our conceptual grasp of something given in the sense world, the “ *what*” of that which is given to our view first comes to manifestation. We cannot express the content of what we look at, because this content consists only in the “ *how*” of what we look at, i.e., in the *form* of its manifestation. Thus, in the *concept*, we find the “what,” the other content of that which is given in the sense world in an observed form.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":101,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p045","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p045"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":46,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p046","text":"The world first gains its full content, therefore, in the concept. But now we have discovered that the concept points us beyond the individual phenomenon to the interrelationship of things. Thus that which appears in the sense world as separated, isolated, presents itself to the concept as a *unified* whole. And so our natural-scientific methodology gives rise to a *monistic natural science* as its final goal; but it is not an abstract monism that already presupposes the unity and then forcibly includes in it the individual facts of *concrete* existence, but rather it is a concrete monism that, piece by piece, shows that the seeming manifoldness of sense existence proves ultimately to be only an ideal unity. The multiplicity is only a form in which the unified world content expresses itself. The senses, which are not in a position to grasp this unified content, hold fast to the multiplicity; they are born pluralists. Thinking, however, overcomes the multiplicity and thus, through a long labour, returns to the unified world principle.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":170,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p046","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p046"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":47,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p047","text":"The manner, now, *in which* the concept (the idea) expresses itself within the sense world constitutes the differences among the realms of nature. If a sense-perceptibly real entity attains only a kind of existence in which it stands totally outside the concept and is only governed in its transformations by the concept as by a *law*, then we call this entity inorganic. Everything that occurs with such an entity is to be traced back to the influences of another entity; and how the two act upon each other can be explained by a law standing outside them. In this sphere we have to do with phenomena and laws which, if they are primary, can be called *archetypal phenomena*. In this case, therefore, the conceptual element that is to be perceived stands outside of a perceived manifoldness.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":136,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p047","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p047"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":48,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p048","text":"But a sense-perceptible unity itself, in fact, can point beyond itself; it can compel us, if we want to grasp it, to go on to further determining factors than to those perceptible to us. Then, what is conceptually graspable appears as a sense-perceptible unity. The two, concept and perception, are, indeed, not identical, but the concept does not appear *outside* the sense-perceptible manifoldness as a law, but rather *within* the manifoldness as a principle. The concept underlies the manifoldness as something that permeates it, as something that is no longer sense-perceptible, as something that we call *typus*. *Organic* natural science has to do with this.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":105,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p048","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p048"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":49,"locus":"GA 1/l16/p049","text":"But here also the concept does not yet appear in the form particular to it as concept, but still only as *typus*. Where, now, the concept appears, not merely as *typus*, as permeating principle, but rather in its own conceptual form, there it appears as *consciousness*, there, there finally comes to manifestation that which is present at the lower stages only in essence. There the concept becomes a perception. We have to do with the self-conscious human being.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":78,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p049","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p049"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. 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The observed and the idea coincide. It is precisely the ideal element that is observed. Therefore, at this level, the ideal cores of existence of nature's lower levels can also come to manifestation. With human consciousness the possibility is given that what, at the lower levels of existence, merely is, but does not manifest, now becomes also manifesting reality.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":177,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p050","witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p050"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. 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Diese sind uns zunächst als begriffsfreie Entitäten gegeben. Die Qualitäten, die meiner Sinneswahrnehmung gegeben sind, kann ich durch kein begriffliches Nachdenken in etwas anderes verwandeln. Ich kann auch keine gedankliche Qualität finden, durch die ich dasjenige, was in der sinnenfälligen Wirklichkeit gegeben ist, konstruieren könnte, wenn mir die Wahrnehmung mangelte. Ich kann nie einem Rotblinden eine Vorstellung der Qualität «Rot» verschaffen, auch wenn ich ihm dieselbe mit allen nur erdenklichen Mitteln begrifflich umschreibe. *Die Sinneswahrnehmung hat somit ein Etwas, das nie in den Begriff eingeht; das wahrgenommen werden muß, wenn es überhaupt Gegenstand unserer Erkenntnis werden soll.* Was für eine Rolle spielt also der Begriff, den wir mit irgendeiner Sinneswahrnehmung verknüpfen? Er muß offenbar ein ganz selbständiges Element, etwas Neues hinzubringen, das wohl zur Sinneswahrnehmung gehört, das aber in der Sinneswahrnehmung nicht zum Vorschein kommt..","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":142,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p042"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p043","passage_number":43,"text":"Nun ist es aber doch gewiß, daß dieses neue «Etwas», das der Begriff zur Sinneswahrnehmung hinzubringt, erst das ausspricht, was unserem Erklärungsbedürfnis entgegenkommt. Wir sind erst imstande, irgendein Element in der Sinnenwelt zu verstehen, wenn wir einen Begriff davon haben. Was die sinnenfällige Wirklichkeit uns bietet, darauf können wir ja immer hinweisen; und jeder, der die Möglichkeit hat, gerade dieses in Rede stehende Element wahrzunehmen, weiß, um was es sich handelt. Durch den Begriff sind wir imstande, etwas von der Sinnenwelt zu sagen, was nicht wahrgenommen werden kann..","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":88,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p043"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p044","passage_number":44,"text":"Daraus erhellt aber unmittelbar das Folgende. Wäre das Wesen der Sinneswahrnehmung in der sinnlichen Qualität erschöpft, dann könnte nicht in Form des Begriffes etwas völlig Neues hinzukommen. Die Sinneswahrnehmung ist also gar keine Totalität, sondern nur eine Seite einer solchen. Und zwar jene, die bloß angeschaut werden kann. Durch den Begriff erst wird uns das klar, *was* wir anschauen.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":59,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p044"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p045","passage_number":45,"text":"Jetzt können wir die *inhaltliche* Bedeutung dessen, was wir im vorigen Kapitel *methodisch* entwickelt haben, aussprechen: Durch die begriffliche Erfassung eines in der Sinnenwelt Gegebenen gelangt erst das Ws des im Anschauen Gegebenen zur Erscheinung. Wir können den Inhalt des Angeschauten nicht aussprechen, weil dieser Inhalt sich in dem *Wie* des Angeschauten, d. h. in der *Form* des Auftretens erschöpft. Somit finden wir im *Begriffe* das Was, den andern Inhalt des in der Sinnenwelt in Form der Anschauung Gegebenen..","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":79,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p045"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p046","passage_number":46,"text":"Erst im Begriffe also bekommt die Welt ihren vollen Inhalt. Nun haben wir aber gefunden, daß uns der Begriff über die einzelne Erscheinung hinaus auf den Zusammenhang der Dinge verweist. Somit stellt sich das, was in der Sinnenwelt getrennt, vereinzelt auftritt, für den Begriff als *einheitliches* Ganzes dar. So entsteht durch unsere naturwissenschaftliche Methodik als Endziel die *monistische Naturwissenschaft;* aber sie ist nicht abstrakter Monismus, der die Einheit schon vorausnimmt, und dann die einzelnen Tatsachen des *konkreten* Daseins in gezwungener Weise darunter subsumiert, sondern der konkrete Monismus, der Stück für Stück zeigt, daß die scheinbare Mannigfaltigkeit des Sinnendaseins sich zuletzt nur als eine ideelle Einheit erweist. Die Vielheit ist nur eine Form, in der sich der einheitliche Weltinhalt ausspricht. Die Sinne, die nicht in der Lage sind, diesen einheitlichen Inhalt zu erfassen, halten sich an die Vielheit; sie sind geborene Pluralisten. Das Denken aber überwindet die Vielheit und kommt so durch eine lange Arbeit auf das einheitliche Weltprinzip zurück..","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":159,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p046"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p047","passage_number":47,"text":"Die Art nun, *wie* der Begriff (die Idee) in der Sinnenwelt sich auslebt, macht den Unterschied der Naturreiche. Gelangt das sinnenfällig wirkliche Wesen nur zu einem solchen Dasein, daß es völlig außerhalb des Begriffes steht, nur von ihm als einem *Gesetze* in seinen Veränderungen beherrscht wird, dann nennen wir dieses Wesen *unorganisch.* Alles, was mit einem solchen vorgeht, ist auf die Einflüsse eines anderen Wesens zurückzuführen; und wie die beiden aufeinander wirken, das läßt sich durch ein außer ihnen stehendes Gesetz erklären. In dieser Sphäre haben wir es mit Phänomenen und Gesetzen zu tun, die, wenn sie ursprünglich sind, *Urphänomene* heißen können. In diesem Falle steht also das wahrzunehmende Begriffliche außerhalb einer wahrgenommenen Mannigfaltigkeit.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":114,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p047"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p048","passage_number":48,"text":"Es kann aber eine sinnenfällige Einheit selbst schon über sich hinausweisen; sie kann, wenn wir sie erfassen wollen, uns nötigen, zu weiteren Bestimmungen als zu den uns wahrnehmbaren fortzugehen. Dann erscheint das begrifflich Erfaßbare als sinnenfällige Einheit. Die beiden, Begriff und Wahrnehmung, sind zwar nicht identisch, aber der Begriff erscheint nicht *außer* der sinnlichen Mannigfaltigkeit als Gesetz, sondern *in* derselben als Prinzip. Er liegt ihr als das sie Durchsetzende, nicht mehr sinnlich Wahrnehmbare zugrunde, das wir *Typus* nennen. Damit hat es die *organische* Naturwissenschaft zu tun..","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":86,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p048"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p049","passage_number":49,"text":"Aber auch hier erscheint der Begriff noch nicht in seiner ihm eigenen Form als Begriff, sondern erst als *Typus. Wo* nun derselbe nicht mehr bloß als solcher, als durchsetzendes Prinzip, sondern in seiner Begriffsform selbst auftritt, da erscheint er als *Bewußtsein,* da kommt endlich das zur Erscheinung, was auf den unteren Stufen nur dem Wesen nach vorhanden ist. Der Begriff wird hier selbst zur Wahrnehmung. Wir haben es mit dem selbstbewußten Menschen zu tun.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":74,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p049"},{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p050","passage_number":50,"text":"*Naturgesetz, Typus, Begriff* sind die drei Formen, in denen sich das Ideelle auslebt. Das Naturgesetz ist abstrakt, über der sinnenfälligen Mannigfaltigkeit stehend, es beherrscht die unorganische Naturwissenschaft. Hier fallen Idee und Wirklichkeit ganz auseinander. Der Typus vereinigt schon beide in einem Wesen. Das Geistige wird wirkendes Wesen, aber es wirkt noch nicht als solches, es ist nicht als solches da, sondern muß, wenn es seinem Dasein nach betrachtet werden will, als sinnenfälliges *angeschaut* werden. So ist es im Reiche der organischen Natur. Der Begriff ist auf wahrnehmbare Weise vorhanden. Im menschlichen Bewußtsein ist der Begriff selbst das Wahrnehmbare. Anschauung und Idee decken sich. Es ist eben das Ideelle, welches angeschaut wird. Deshalb können auf dieser Stufe auch die ideellen Daseinskerne der unteren Naturstufen zur Erscheinung kommen. Mit dem menschlichen Bewußtsein ist die Möglichkeit gegeben, daß das, was auf den unteren Stufen des Daseins bloß ist, aber nicht erscheint, nun auch erscheinende Wirklichkeit wird..*","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":153,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p050"}],"beads":[{"from":[39],"to":[39],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[40],"to":[40],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[41],"to":[41],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[42],"to":[42],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[43],"to":[43],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[44],"to":[44],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[45],"to":[45],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[46],"to":[46],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[47],"to":[47],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[48],"to":[48],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[49],"to":[49],"confidence":"high"},{"from":[50],"to":[50],"confidence":"high"}],"note":"Paired by the paragraph aligner; each language numbers its own paragraphs. 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