{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 1/l16/p069","lang":"en","edition":"MP1988","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"text":"Let us now investigate what else follows from this establishing of an outer relationship between two separate entities. I can think of two elements in only *one* way in this kind of relationship. I think of \\(A\\) as beside \\(B\\). I can now do the same thing with two other elements of the sense world, \\(C\\) and \\(D\\). I have thereby determined a concrete relationship between \\(A\\) and \\(B\\), and the same one between \\(C\\) and \\(D\\). Let us now entirely disregard the elements \\(A\\), \\(B\\), \\(C\\), and \\(D\\) and only relate the two concrete relationships to each other again. It is clear that I can relate these, as two particular entities, to each other in exactly the same way as I did with \\(A\\) and \\(B\\) themselves. What I am here relating to each other are concrete relationships. I can call them \\(a\\) and \\(b\\). If I now go a step further, I can again relate \\(a\\) and \\(b\\). But now I have already lost all particularity. When I look at \\(a\\), I no longer find any particular \\(A\\) and \\(B\\) that are being related to each other; and just as little when I look at \\(b\\). In both, I find nothing else at all except that a relationship was made. But this conclusion is exactly the same for \\(a\\) and for \\(b\\). What made it possible for me still to keep \\(a\\) and \\(b\\) apart was the fact that they pointed to \\(A\\), \\(B\\), \\(C\\), and \\(D\\). If I leave out its remaining elements of particularity and then relate only \\(a\\) and \\(b\\) to each other—i.e., relate together only the facts that relationships were being made at all (not the fact that something specific was being related)—then I have again arrived quite generally at the spatial relationship from which I took my start. I can go no further. I have achieved what I was striving for previously: *space* itself stands before my soul.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"title":"16. Goethe as Thinker and Investigator","site_heading":null,"date":null,"location":null,"word_count":325,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p069","alignment_confidence":"high","alignment_reason":"beads:length","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":null,"edition_coverage":{"de":["original"],"en":["MP1988"]},"available_versions":[{"lang":"de","edition":"original","edition_basis":null,"is_original":true,"is_default_edition":true,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p069"},{"lang":"en","edition":"MP1988","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/1/l16/p069","paragraph_aligned":true}],"paired_german":{"status":"paired","german":[{"locus":"GA 1/l16/p069","passage_number":69,"text":"Wir wollen nun untersuchen, was weiteres aus dieser Herstellung einer äußeren Beziehung zweier Besonderheiten folgt. Zwei Elemente kann ich nur auf *eine* Art in solcher Beziehung denken. Ich denke A *neben* B. Dasselbe kann ich nun mit zwei anderen Elementen der Sinnenwelt C und D machen. Ich habe dadurch einen konkreten Bezug zwischen A und B und einen solchen zwischen C und D festgesetzt. Ich will nun von den Elementen A, B, C und D ganz absehen und nur die konkreten zwei Bezüge wieder aufeinander beziehen. Es ist klar, daß ich diese als zwei besondere Entitäten geradeso aufeinander beziehen kann, wie A und B selbst. Was ich hier aufeinander beziehe, sind konkrete Beziehungen. Ich kann sie a und b nennen. Wenn ich nun noch um einen Schritt weiter gehe, so kann ich a wieder auf b beziehen. Aber jetzt habe ich alle Besonderheit bereits verloren. Ich finde, wenn ich a betrachte, kein besonderes A und B mehr, welche aufeinander bezogen werden; ebensowenig bei b. Ich finde in beiden nichts anderes, als daß überhaupt bezogen wurde. Diese Bestimmung ist aber in a und b ganz die gleiche. Was es mir möglich machte, a und b noch auseinander zu halten, das war, daß sie auf A, B, C und D hinwiesen. Lasse ich diesen Rest von Besonderheiten weg und beziehe ich nur a und b noch aufeinander, d. h. den Umstand, daß überhaupt bezogen wurde (nicht daß etwas Bestimmtes bezogen wurde), dann bin ich wieder ganz allgemein bei der räumlichen Beziehung angekommen, von der ich ausgegangen bin. Weiter kann ich nicht mehr gehen. Ich habe das erreicht, was ich vorher angestrebt habe: der *Raum* selbst steht vor meiner Seele..","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":277,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/1/l16/p069"}],"english":["GA 1/l16/p069"],"method":"length","confidence":"high","correspondence":"established","length_check":{"de_words":277,"en_words":325,"ratio":1.17,"partial":false},"pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false},"witness_completeness":{"ratio":1.14,"band":"comparable","note":null,"word_count":12330,"original_word_count":10769,"may_be_abridged":false},"witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 1/l16/p069"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}}