VI. The Present State of Philosophy and Science

GA 125/1910-08-26/p009 ·1910-08-26 · English HighHigh alignmentThis translation's paragraph count matches the German original — the locus maps cleanly to the same paragraph in DE.
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Now Hegel's opponents have believed that they could easily beat him out of the field by not understanding this weaving and essence of thought on the stage of our cognitive subject, but by believing – which never occurred to Hegel – that he wanted to spin the content of the world, so to speak, out of the immediate content of thought of the cognitive subject. That this cannot be, that one can never spin any substantial content of knowledge out of the respective subject of knowledge, if the latter remains only in concepts, one must be clear about that. Therefore, in terms of the productive progress of intellectual life, Hegelian philosophy had to remain unproductive for the very reason that its basic idea, that thought itself is what works out of itself, can be correct, but it does not follow from this that the subject of knowledge itself must produce the objective content of the world. How is it possible for the cognitive subject to gain cognitive content out of itself? This is possible only if the subject of knowledge fertilizes itself, makes itself capable of producing cognitive content. But this self-empowerment can never take place on the level of mere thinking. Through mere thinking, one gains a kind of overview, a kind of larger retrospective view of what the human spirit has produced in the course of world history. One can survey the thoughts produced from a certain center. But one cannot gain new knowledge. Hegel's opponents sensed this. They based their opposition on false premises. But this means that mere Hegelianism achieves two things: an almost immeasurably magnificent discipline of thought, but not productive knowledge. In other words, Hegelian philosophy cannot continue to be productive through itself. This is where the productive powers of knowledge must begin, where Hegel's subject of knowledge, elevated as it is to the level of thought, must decide to let in what you find presented, for example, as a means of fertilization of the subject of knowledge in my book “How to Know Higher Worlds”. $$c = \frac{a}{b}$$ $$\frac{mv^2}{2}$$

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Cite: GA 125/1910-08-26/p009 · edition English