{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 18/p01c06/p025","lang":"en","edition":"AP1973","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"text":"> Now let us assume that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in its strictest sense) as a property of our will, pleading practical principles inherent in our reason that would be positively impossible without the presupposition of freedom. Speculative reason, however, having proven that this is not even thinkable, the former assumption, made on behalf of morality, would have to give way to the latter, whose opposite contains an obvious self-contradiction and therefore freedom, and with it morality, would have to give way to the *mechanism of nature*. But since, as the case lies, for the possibility of morality nothing more is required than that the idea of freedom be not contradictory in itself, and may at least be considered as thinkable *without the future necessity of being understood,* such that granting the freedom of a given action would not place any obstacle into the attempt of considering the same action (see in other relation) as a mechanism of nature. In this way, the doctrine of morality maintains its place . . . which could, however, not have happened if our critical philosophy had not previously enlightened us about *our inevitable ignorance with respect to things in themselves,* restricting all that we can know theoretically to mere phenomena. In the same way, the positive value of the critical principles of pure reason can be brought to light with regard to the concepts of God and of the *simple nature of our soul,* which I do, however, leave undiscussed here for the sake of brevity. I cannot even *assume God, freedom and immortality* for the use of practical reason if I do not at the same time *deprive* speculative reason of its pretensions to excessive insight. . . . *I, therefore, had to suspend knowledge in order to make room for belief. . . .*","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"title":"VI. The Age of Kant and Goethe","site_heading":null,"date":null,"location":null,"word_count":303,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/18/p01c06/p025","alignment_confidence":"low","alignment_reason":"no_original_to_compare","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":null,"edition_coverage":{"de":["original"],"en":["AP1973"]},"available_versions":[{"lang":"en","edition":"AP1973","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/18/p01c06/p025"},{"lang":"de","edition":"original","edition_basis":null,"is_original":true,"is_default_edition":true,"locus":"GA 18/l06/p025","anchor_mapped":true,"anchor_method":"part_chapter","anchor_confidence":"high","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/18/l06/p025"}],"witness_completeness":{"ratio":null,"band":"no_original","note":null,"word_count":22399,"original_word_count":null,"may_be_abridged":false},"witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"not_checkable","note":"No verified paragraph alignment covers this passage, so its names cannot be compared with the German."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}}