{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 188/1919-01-03/p014","lang":"en","edition":"English","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"text":"But now let us look at the matter from the point of view of Spiritual Science, there the whole affair will meet you in its true meaning. For you see when we start from Spiritual Science, from the conceptions and experiences in connection with it which can be acquired in the spiritual world, we see, on the one side that without the considerations of Spiritual Science we may arrive at the delusive statement or which I have just spoken, and that it must actually hold good for anyone who will not become a spiritual scientist just because he has had a good training in philosophy. This is seen on the one hand. On the other hand one sees the following—sees it simply by observing things in the world—that when with the hypotheses of Spiritual Science man and animal are compared, it becomes apparent that man confronts the objects in the world in a series of single observations afterwards forming abstract concepts by all manner of thought processes in which he reunites what he has seen as separate entities. It may also be admitted that the animal does not possess this kind of abstraction, it does not practise this activity of abstraction. The curious thing is, however, that the abstract concept is not lacking in the animal, that, in its soul the animal is actually living in the most abstract concepts which we men only form with much difficulty, and that the animal does not see things separately as we do. Where we excel is just in our freer use of the senses and in a quite definite kind of co-operation between senses and inner emotions and will-impulses. We have that advantage over the animal. The sureness of instinct possessed by animals rests on the very fact that the animal from the start lives with those abstract concepts that we have first to form. We differ from animals in the emancipation of our senses and in their freer use where the outer world is concerned, also in being able to pour will into our senses which the animal is unable to do. What we men do not have but must first acquire, namely, the abstract concept, is just what the animal does have, strange as it may seem. It is true every animal has only a limited sphere but in this sphere it has this kind of concept, however odd this appears. Man's attention is directed to one dog, two, three dogs, and he then forms the abstract concept “dog”. The animal in this sphere has the same abstract concept “dog” that me have, it has the quite exact concept without needing to form it. We have first to form it which the animal has no need to do. The animal, however, has no capacity for distinguishing with precision one dog from another or for giving it any precise individuality through sense-perception.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"title":"I. The Difference Between Man and Animal","site_heading":null,"date":"1919-01-03","location":null,"word_count":481,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/188/1919-01-03/p014","alignment_confidence":"high","alignment_reason":"beads:length","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":{"scope":"unit","status":"established","translator":"Violet E. Watkin","identified_edition":"UNK1960","book_title":"Goetheanism as an Impulse for Man's Transformation","publisher":null,"publisher_inferred":false,"match_score":1.0,"source_url":"https://www.rsarchive.org/Lectures/GA188/English/UNK1960/19190103p01.html","evidence":"lecture_list_row"},"edition_coverage":{"de":["original"],"en":["English"]},"available_versions":[{"lang":"de","edition":"original","edition_basis":null,"is_original":true,"is_default_edition":true,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/188/1919-01-03/p014"},{"lang":"en","edition":"English","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/188/1919-01-03/p014","paragraph_aligned":true}],"record":{"record_type":"unknown","scope":"volume","note":"How this text was taken down (shorthand transcript, listeners' notes or manuscript) is not on record here. Unknown is not an assurance of a stenogram: check the edition's own notes before resting an argument on one word.","evidence":null,"evidence_translation":null,"evidence_source":null},"german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"1919-01-03","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 188/1919-01-03/p015","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/188/1919-01-03/p015"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"verified","verified":true,"evidence":["length","reader"],"reader_german":["GA 188/1919-01-03/p015"],"length_check":{"de_words":449,"en_words":481,"ratio":1.07,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. The German original passage(s) above are the edition-invariant anchor — fetch them (lang='de') to verify wording before quoting across editions."},"paired_german":{"status":"paired","german":[{"locus":"GA 188/1919-01-03/p015","passage_number":15,"text":"Aber nun sehen wir die Sache einmal geisteswissenschaftlich an, da wird Ihnen erst die ganze Geschichte in ihrer Bedeutung vor Augen treten. Wenn wir geisteswissenschaftlich ausgehen von den Anschauungen, von den Erfahrungen, die man darüber gewinnen kann in der spirituellen Welt, dann begreift man auf der einen Seite, daß ohne die geisteswissenschaftlichen Betrachtungen diese blendende Behauptung zustande kommen kann, von der ich eben gesprochen habe, daß sie auch eigentlich für jeden, der nicht Geisteswissenschafter werden will, gelten muß, gerade wenn er gut philosophisch geschult ist; das sieht man auf der einen Seite ein. Auf der andern Seite sieht man aber folgendes, man sieht es einfach, indem man die Dinge in der Welt betrachtet: Wenn man mit geisteswissenschaftlichen Voraussetzungen den Menschen mit dem Tiere vergleicht, dann zeigt sich, daß der Mensch zwar den Dingen der Welt gegenübertritt in einzelnen Beobachtungen und sich dann abstrakte Begriffe bildet durch allerlei Denkoperationen, in denen er zusammenfaßt, was er vereinzelt sieht. Man kann auch zugeben, daß das Tier diese Abstraktion nicht hat, daß das Tier diese Tätigkeit der Abstraktion nicht ausübt. Aber das Kuriose ist, daß die abstrakten Begriffe dem Tiere nicht fehlen, daß das Tier mit seiner Seele gerade in den allerabstraktesten Begriffen lebt, die wir Menschen uns mühevoll bilden, und daß das Tier die einzelne Anschauung nicht so hat wie wir. Was wir voraushaben, ist gerade, daß wir einen viel freieren Gebrauch der Sinne, eine ganz bestimmte Art von Zusammenwirken von Sinnen und inneren Emotionen und Willensimpulsen haben. Das haben wir vor dem Tier voraus. Aber die Sicherheit des Instinktes, welche die Tiere haben, die beruht gerade darauf, daß das Tier von vornherein mit solchen abstrakten Begriffen lebt, die wir uns erst bilden müssen. Worin wir uns von dem Tier u nterscheiden, das ist, daß sich unsere Sinne emanzipieren und freier werden im Gebrauch nach der Außenwelt zu, und daß wir auch in unsere Sinne den Willen hineingießen können, den das Tier nicht hineingießen kann. Aber das, was wir Menschen nicht haben, sondern uns erst erwerben müssen, die abstrakten Begriffe, die hat gerade das Tier, so sonderbar es einem erscheinen mag. Gewiß, es hat jedes Tier nur ein bestimmtes Gebiet, aber auf diesem Gebiete hat das Tier solche abstrakten Begriffe, so sonderbar es einem erscheinen mag. Der Mensch ist darauf angewiesen, einen, zwei, drei Hunde zu sehen; er bildet sich daraus den abstrakten Begriff «Hund». Das Tier hat auf diesem Gebiete, und zwar ganz genau, denselben abstrakten Begriff «Hund», den wir haben, es braucht sich ihn nicht zu bilden. Wir müssen uns ihn erst bilden, das Tier braucht das nicht. Aber das Tier hat nicht die Fähigkeit, den einen Hund von dem andern genau zu unterscheiden, genau zu individualisieren durch die Sinneswahrnehmungen.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":449,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/188/1919-01-03/p015"}],"english":["GA 188/1919-01-03/p014"],"method":"length","confidence":"high","correspondence":"established","length_check":{"de_words":449,"en_words":481,"ratio":1.07,"partial":false},"pairing_state":"verified","verified":true,"evidence":["length","reader"],"reader_german":["GA 188/1919-01-03/p015"]},"witness_completeness":{"ratio":1.05,"band":"comparable","note":null,"word_count":8259,"original_word_count":7890,"may_be_abridged":false},"witness_quality":{"translator":{"scope":"unit","status":"recorded","translator":"Violet E. Watkin","identified_edition":"UNK1960","book_title":"Goetheanism as an Impulse for Man's Transformation","publisher":null,"publisher_inferred":false,"match_score":1.0,"source_url":"https://www.rsarchive.org/Lectures/GA188/English/UNK1960/19190103p01.html","evidence":"lecture_list_row"},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 188/1919-01-03/p015"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}}