The First Memoranda of July 1917

f) that German diplomacy was completely mistaken with regard to England's forthcoming policy, and that under the impression of this deception the march through Belgium was set in motion, which would have been refrained from if England had given the implied guarantee. It should be announced to the world in no uncertain terms that the invasion of Belgium was only set in motion when German diplomacy was surprised by the King of England's announcement that it was mistaken in waiting for such a guarantee from England. It is incomprehensible why the German government did not do what it unambiguously could: namely, prove that it would not have undertaken the invasion of Belgium if the decisive telegram from the King of England had stated otherwise. The whole further course of the war really depended on this decisive turn of events, and nothing was done by Germany to bring this decisive fact to the general knowledge of the world. If one knew this fact correctly, one would have to say that English policy had been misjudged at the decisive points in Germany, but one could not fail to recognize that England was the decisive factor in the Belgian question. Such language on the part of Germany would, however, present a difficulty to Russia, because Russia would see from it what it owed to England for this war. This difficulty could only be overcome if it were possible to show Russia that she had less to expect from England's friendship than from Germany's. This, of course, cannot happen without Germany undertaking at the present moment, in conjunction with Austria-Hungary, to develop a generous policy by which Wilson's program, launched without knowledge of European conditions, will be defeated from the field.