12. Philosophy and Theosophy

GA 246/1908-08-17/p029 ·1908-08-17 · English HighHigh alignmentThis translation's paragraph count matches the German original — the locus maps cleanly to the same paragraph in DE.
Record: listeners' notes. Written from listeners' notes, summaries, or memory rather than a shorthand transcript. The wording is the note-taker's as much as Steiner's: weigh a single striking phrase here far more cautiously than the same phrase in a stenographic volume, and do not rest an argument on one word. Evidence: «Nach zum Teil bruchstückhaften Mitschriften» (From transcripts that are in part fragmentary). The publisher's description of the volume, as mirrored on AnthroWiki (GA 246), which also speaks of "fragmentarischen Hörernotizen und Vortragszusammenfassungen". The translation is the maintainer's, not a published one.

This whole conclusion was carried over into the entire thinking of the nineteenth century; not only into epistemology, but also, for example, into the theoretical foundations of physiology. Certain experiences came to the rescue. If we look, for example, at the doctrine of specific sensory energies, it seems to confirm Kant's opinion. At least this is how the matter was viewed in the course of the nineteenth century. It is said thus: The eye perceives light. But if the eye is affected in other ways, for example by pressure, by electrical impulse and so on, it also shows light perception. This is why it is said that the perception of light is generated from the specific energy of the eye and is superimposed on the thing itself. Helmholtz in particular expressed this in a blatant way as a physiological-philosophical doctrine by saying: "Everything that we perceive cannot even be thought of as pictorially similar to the things that are outside of us. The image has a resemblance to that which it represents; but that which we call sense-perception cannot even have such a resemblance to the original as the image has to its original. Therefore, he goes on to say, one cannot address what man experiences within himself in any other way than as a “sign” of the thing in itself. A sign need have nothing in common with what it expresses.

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Cite: GA 246/1908-08-17/p029 · edition English