{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 30/essay/p112-p116","extent":"range","passage_number":112,"through":116,"paragraph_count":5,"first_locus":"GA 30/essay/p112","last_locus":"GA 30/essay/p116","lang":"en","edition":"English","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"title":"Individualism in Philosophy","date":null,"location":null,"alignment_confidence":"high","alignment_reason":"beads:length","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":{"scope":"unit","status":"not_established","translator":null,"identified_edition":"MP1989","book_title":null,"publisher":"Mercury Press","publisher_inferred":true,"match_score":1.0,"source_url":"https://www.rsarchive.org/Articles/GA030/English/MP1989/IndPhi_essay.html","evidence":null,"reason":"no_translator_named","note":"Neither the lecture's own page nor rsarchive's lecture list names a translator for it. No translator is established for this lecture: nothing at the level of the lecture names one. 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Every god, every general world reason, is an image of the “I” and has no characteristics different from the human “I.” And even the concept of the general “I” was extracted from the completely individual “I” of every single person.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":102,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/30/essay/p112","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"essay","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p107","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p107"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false,"length_check":{"de_words":87,"en_words":102,"ratio":1.17,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":113,"locus":"GA 30/essay/p113","text":"Stirner calls upon man to throw off everything general about himself and to acknowledge to himself that he is an *individual*. “You are indeed more than a Jew, more than a Christian, etc., but you are also more than a man. Those are all ideas; you, however, are in the flesh. Do you really believe, therefore, that you can ever become ‘man as such’?” “ *I am man!* I do not first have to produce man in myself, because he already belongs to me as all my characteristics do.” “Only *I* am not an abstraction alone; I am the all in all;... I am no mere thought, but I am at the same time full of thoughts, a thought-world. Hegel condemns what is one's own, what is mine ... ‘Absolute thinking’ is that thinking which forgets that it is *my* thinking, that *I* think, and that thinking exists only through me. As ‘I,’ however, I again swallow what is mine, am master over it; it is only my opinion that I can *change* at every moment, i.e., that I can destroy, that I can take back into myself and can devour.” “The thought is only my own when I can indeed subjugate it, but it can never subjugate me, never fanaticize me and make me the tool of its realization.” All the beings placed over the “I” finally shatter upon the knowledge that they have only been brought into the world by the “I.” “The beginning of my thinking, namely, is not a thought, but rather I, and therefore I am also its goal, just as its whole course is then only the course of my self-enjoyment.”","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":277,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/30/essay/p113","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"essay","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p108","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p108"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false,"length_check":{"de_words":237,"en_words":277,"ratio":1.17,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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One says: Look *into yourself;* there is something for which any concept, any idea, is too poor to encompass in all its incarnate wealth, something that brings forth the ideas out of itself, but that itself has an inexhaustible spring within itself whose content is infinitely more extensive than everything this something brings forth. Stirner's response is: “The individual is a word and with a word one would after all have to be able *to think* something; a word would after all have to have a thought-content. But the individual is a word *without thought;* it has no thought-content. But what is its content then if not thought? Its content is one that cannot be there a second time and that consequently can also not be *expressed,* for if it could be expressed, really and entirely expressed, then it would be there a second time, would be there in the ‘expression’... only when nothing of you is spoken out and you are only named, are you recognized as you. As long as something of you is spoken out, you will be recognized only as this something (man, spirit, Christian, etc.).” The individual “I” is therefore that which is everything it is only through itself, which draws the content of its existence out of itself and continuously expands this content from out of itself.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":307,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/30/essay/p114","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"essay","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p109","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p109"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"verified","verified":true,"evidence":["length","anchors","reader"],"reader_german":["GA 30/essay/p109"],"reader_part":true,"length_check":{"de_words":880,"en_words":938,"ratio":1.07,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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If it only aims at what I want, if I satisfy only myself in it, then call it whatever you like: it's all the same to me ...” “Perhaps, in the very next moment I will turn against my previous thought; I also might very well change my behavior suddenly; but not because it does not correspond to what is Christian, not because it goes against eternal human rights, not because it hits the idea of mankind, humanity, humaneness in the face, but rather—because I am no longer involved, because I no longer enjoy it fully, because I doubt my earlier thought, or I am no longer happy with my recent behavior.” The way Stirner speaks about love from this point of view is characteristic. “I also love people, not merely some of them but everyone. But I love them with the consciousness of egoism; I love them because love makes me happy; I love because loving is natural for me, because I like it. I know no ‘commandment of love’ ...” To this sovereign individual, all state, social, and church organizations are fetters. For, all organizations presuppose that the individual must be like this or like that so that it can fit into the community. But the individual will not let it be determined for him by the community how he should be. He wants to make himself into this or that. J. H. Mackay, in his book *Max Stirner, His Life and Work*, has expressed what matters to Stirner: “The annihilation, in the first place, of those foreign powers which seek in the most varied ways to suppress and destroy the “I”; and in the second place, the presentation of the relationships of our intercourse with each other, how they result from the conflict and harmony of our interests.” The individual cannot fulfill himself in an organized community, but only in free intercourse or association. He acknowledges no societal structure set over the individual as a power. In him everything occurs *through* the individual. There is nothing fixed within him. What occurs is always to be traced back to the will of the individual. No one and nothing represents a universal will. Stirner does not want society to care for the individual, to protect his rights, to foster his well-being, and so on. When the organization is taken away from people, then their intercourse regulates itself on its own. “I would rather have to rely on people's self-interest than on their ‘service of love,’ their compassion, their pity, etc. Self-interest demands reciprocity (as you are to me, thus I am to you), does nothing ‘for nothing,’ and lets itself be won and—bought.” Let human intercourse have its full freedom and it will unrestrictedly create that reciprocity which you could set up through a community after all, only in a restricted way. “Neither a natural nor a spiritual tie holds a society *(Verein)* together, and it is no natural nor spiritual association *(Bund)*. It is not blood nor a belief (i.e., spirit) that brings it about. In a natural association—such as a family, a tribe, a nation; yes, even mankind—individuals have value only as *specimens* of a species or genus; in a spiritual association—such as a community or church—the individual is significant only as a *part* of the common spirit; in both cases, what you are as an individual must be suppressed. Only in a society can you assert yourself as an individual, because the society does not possess you, but rather you possess it or use it.”","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":631,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/30/essay/p115","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"essay","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p109","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p109"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"verified","verified":true,"evidence":["length","anchors","reader"],"reader_german":["GA 30/essay/p109"],"reader_part":true,"length_check":{"de_words":880,"en_words":938,"ratio":1.07,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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Political liberalism establishes the “good citizen”; social liberalism establishes the worker who is like all the others in what they own in common; humanistic liberalism establishes the “human being as human being.” As he destroys all these powers, Stirner sets up in their ruins the sovereignty of the individual. “What all is not supposed to be my cause! Above all the good cause, then God's cause, the cause of mankind, of truth, of freedom, of humaneness, of justice; furthermore the cause of my folk, of my prince, of my fatherland; finally, of course, the cause of the spirit and a thousand other causes. Only *my* cause is never supposed to be my cause.—Let us look then at how those people handle *their* cause for whose cause we are supposed to work, to devote ourselves, and to wax enthusiastic. You know how to proclaim many basic things about God, and for thousands of years have investigated ‘the depths of the Divinity’ and looked into His heart, so that you are very well able to tell us how God Himself conducts ‘the cause of God’ that we are called to serve. And you also do not keep the Lord's conduct secret. What is His cause then? Has He, as is expected of *us,* made a foreign cause, the cause of truth and love, into His own? Such lack of understanding enrages you and you teach us that God's cause is, to be sure, the cause of truth and love, but that this cause cannot be called foreign to Him because God is Himself, in fact, truth and love; you are enraged by the assumption that God could be like us poor worms in promoting a foreign cause as His own. ‘God is supposed to take on the cause of truth when He is not Himself the truth?’ He takes care only of *His* cause, but because He is the all in all, everything is also *His* cause; we, however, we are not the all in all, and our cause is small and contemptible indeed; therefore we must ‘serve a higher cause.’—Now, it is clear that God concerns Himself only with what is His, occupies Himself only with Himself, thinks only about Himself, and has His eye on Himself; woe to anything that is not well pleasing to Him. He serves nothing higher and satisfies only Himself. His cause is a purely egoistical cause. How do matters stand with mankind, whose cause we are supposed to make into our own? Is its cause perhaps that of another, and does mankind serve a higher cause? No, mankind looks only at itself, mankind wants to help only mankind, mankind is itself its cause. In order to develop itself, mankind lets peoples and individuals torment themselves in its service, and when they have accomplished what mankind needs, then, out of gratitude, they are thrown by it onto the manure pile of history. Is the cause of mankind not a purely egoistical cause?” Out of this kind of a critique of everything that man is supposed to make into his cause, there results for Stirner that “God and mankind have founded their cause on nothing but themselves. I will then likewise found my cause upon *myself,* I, who like God am nothing from anything else, I, who am my all, I who am the single one.”","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":608,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/30/essay/p116","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"essay","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p110","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p110"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false,"length_check":{"de_words":561,"en_words":608,"ratio":1.08,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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Jeder Gott, jede allgemeine Weltvernunft ist ein Ebenbild des Ich und hat keine anderen Eigenschaften als das menschliche Ich. Und auch der Begriff des allgemeinen Ich ist aus dem ganz individuellen Ich jedes Einzelnen herausgeschält.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":87,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p107"},{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p108","passage_number":108,"text":"Stirner fordert den Menschen auf, alles Allgemeine von sich abzuwerfen und sich zu gestehen, daß er ein Einzelner ist. «Du bist zwar mehr als Jude, mehr als Christ usw., aber Du bist auch mehr als Mensch. Das sind alles Ideen, Du aber bist leibhaftig. Meinst Du denn, jemals «Mensch als solcher» werden zu können?» « *Ich bin Mensch!* Ich brauche den Menschen nicht erst in Mir herzustellen, denn er gehört mir schon wie alle meine Eigenschaften.» «Nur Ich bin nicht Abstraktion allein, Ich bin Alles in Allem; ...Ich bin kein bloßer Gedanke, aber Ich bin zugleich voller Gedanken, eine Gedankenwelt. Hegel verurteilt das Eigene, das Meinige...Das «absolute Denken ist dasjenige Denken, welches vergißt, daß es *mein* Denken ist, daß *Ich* denke, und daß es nur durch Mich ist. Als Ich aber verschlinge Ich das Meinige wieder, bin Herr desselben, es ist nur meine Meinung, die Ich in jedem Augenblicke *ändern*, das heißt vernichten, in Mich zurücknehmen und aufzehren kann.» «Mein eigen ist der Gedanke erst dann, wenn Ich zwar ihn, er aber niemals Mich unterjochen kann, nie Mich fanatisiert, zum Werkzeug seiner Realisation macht.» Alle über das Ich gestellten Wesen zerschellen zuletzt an der Erkenntnis, daß sie nur durch das Ich in die Welt gebracht worden sind. «Für mein Denken ist nämlich der Anfang nicht ein Gedanke, sondern Ich, und darum bin Ich auch sein Ziel, wie denn sein ganzer Verlauf nur ein Verlauf meines Selbstgenusses ist.»","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":237,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p108"},{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p109","passage_number":109,"text":"Das einzelne Ich im Sinne Stirners soll man nicht durch einen Gedanken, eine Idee definieren wollen. Denn Ideen sind etwas Aligemeines; und durch eine solche Definition würde somit der Einzelne — wenigstens logisch — sofort wieder einem Allgemeinen untergeordnet. Alle übrigen Dinge der Welt kann man durch Ideen definieren, das eigene Ich aber müssen wir als Einzelnes in uns *erleben*. Alles, was über den Einzelnen in Gedanken ausgesprochen wird, kann seinen Inhalt nicht in sich aufnehmen; es kann nur auf denselben hindeuten. Man sagt: sehe hin in *dich*; da ist etwas, für das jeder Begriff, jede Idee zu arm ist, um es in seinem leibhaftigen Reichtum zu umspannen, das aus sich heraus die Ideen hervorbringt, selbst aber einen unerschöpflichen Brunnen in sich hat, dessen Inhalt unendlich umfangreicher ist als alles, was es hervorbringt. In einer von Stirner verfaßten Entgegnung sagt dieser: «Der Einzige ist ein Wort, und bei einem Worte müßte man sich doch etwas *denken* können, ein Wort müßte doch einen Gedankeninhalt haben. Aber der Einzige ist ein *gedankenloses* Wort, es hat keinen Gedankeninhalt. Was ist aber dann sein Inhalt, wenn der Gedanke es nicht ist? Einer, der nicht zum zweiten Male da sein, folglich auch nicht awsgedrückt werden kann, denn könnte er *ausgedrückt*, wirklich und ganz ausgedrückt werden, so wäre er zum zweiten Male da, wäre im «Ausdruck» da...Erst dann, wenn Nichts von Dir ausgesagt und Du nur *genannt* wirst, wirst Du anerkannt als *Du*. Solange Etwas von Dir ausgesagt wird, wirst Du nur als dieses Etwas (Mensch, Geist, Christ usf.) anerkannt.» Das einzelne Ich ist also dasjenige, das alles, was es ist, nur durch sich selber ist, das den Inhalt seines Daseins aus sich selbst holt und ihn fortwährend aus sich heraus erweitert. — Dieses einzelne Ich kann keine ethische Verbindlichkeit anerkennen, die es sich nicht selbst auferlegt. «Ob, was Ich denke und tue, christlich sei, was kümmert’s Mich? Ob es menschlich, liberal, human, ob unmenschlich, illiberal, inhuman, was frag’ Ich darnach? Wenn es nur bezweckt, was Ich will, wenn Ich nur Mich darin befriedige, dann belegt es mit Prädikaten wie Ihr wollt: es gilt Mir gleich...» «Auch Ich wehre Mich vielleicht schon im nächsten Augenblicke gegen meine vorigen Gedanken, auch Ich ändere wohl plötzlich meine Handlungsweise; aber nicht darum, weil sie der Christlichkeit nicht entspricht, nicht darum, weil sie gegen die ewigen Menschenrechte läuft, nicht darum, weil sie der Idee der Menschheit, Menschlichkeit und Humanität ins Gesicht schlägt, sondern — weil *Ich* nicht mehr ganz dabei bin, weil sie Mir keinen vollen Genuß mehr bereitet, weil Ich an dem früheren Gedanken zweifle oder in der eben geübten Handlungsweise Mir nicht mehr gefalle.» Charakteristisch ist, wie sich Stirner von diesem seinem Gesichtspunkte aus über die *Liebe* ausspricht. «Ich liebe die Menschen auch, nicht bloß einzelne, sondern jeden. Aber Ich liebe sie mit dem Bewußtsein des Egoismus; Ich liebe sie, weil die Liebe Mich glücklich macht, Ich liebe, weil Mir das Lieben natürlich ist, weil Mir’'s gefällt. Ich kenne kein «Gebot der Liebe...» Diesem souveränen Individuum gegenüber sind alle staatlichen, gesellschaftlichen, kirchlichen *Organisationen* eine Fessel. Denn alle Organisationen setzen voraus, daß das Individuum so oder so sein müsse, damit es sich in die Gemeinschaft eingliedern lasse. Aber das Individuum will sich nicht von der Gemeinschaft bestimmen lassen, wie es sein soll; es will sich selbst so oder so machen. Worauf es Stirner ankommt, hat J. H. *Mackay* in seinem Buche «Max Stirner, sein Leben und sein Werk» ausgesprochen, auf die «Vernichtung jener fremden Mächte, die das Ich in den verschiedensten Formen zu unterdrücken und zu vernichten suchen, in erster Linie; und der Darlegung der Beziehungen unseres Verkehrs untereinander, wie sie sich aus dem Widerstreit und der Harmonie unserer Interessen ergeben, in zweiter». Sich selbst genügen kann der Einzelne nicht in einer organisierten Gemeinschaft, sondern nur in dem freien *Verkehr* oder *Verein*. Dieser kennt keine als Macht über den Einzelnen gesetzte gesellschaftliche Struktur. In ihm geschieht alles *durch* den Einzelnen. Es ist in ihm nichts festgelegt. Was geschieht, ist immer auf den Willen des Einzelnen zurückzuführen. Einen Gesamtwillen repräsentiert niemand und nichts. Stirner will nicht, daß die Gesellschaft für den Einzelnen sorgt, seine Rechte schützt, sein Wohl fördert und so weiter. Wenn von den Menschen die Organisation genommen ist, dann regelt sich ihr Verkehr von selbst. «Ich will lieber auf den Eigennutz der Menschen angewiesen sein, als auf ihre «Liebesdienste, ihre Barmherzigkeit, Erbarmen usw. Jener fordert Gegenseitigkeit (wie Du Mir, so Ich Dir), tut nichts «umsonst, und läßt sich gewinnen und — erkaufen.» Lasset dem Verkehr seine völlige Freiheit, und er schafft unbeschränkt jene Gegenseitigkeit, die ihr durch eine Gemeinschaft doch nur beschränkt herstellen könnt. «Den Verein hält weder ein natürliches noch ein geistiges Band zusammen, und er ist kein natürlicher, kein geistiger Bund, Nicht Ein Blut, nicht Ein Glaube (das heißt Geist) bringt ihn zustande. In einem natürlichen Bunde — wie einer Familie, einem Stamme, einer Nation, ja der Menschheit — haben die Einzelnen nur den Wert von *Exemplaren* derselben Art oder Gattung; in einem geistigen Bunde — wie einer Gemeinde, einer Kirche — bedeutet der Einzelne nur ein *Glied* desselbigen Geistes; was Du in beiden Fällen als Einziger bist, das muß — unterdrückt werden. Als Einzigen kannst Du Dich bloß im Vereine behaupten, weil der Verein nicht Dich besitzt, sondern Du ihn besitzest oder Dir zumutze machest.»","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":880,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p109"},{"locus":"GA 30/essay/p110","passage_number":110,"text":"Der Weg, auf dem Stirner zu seiner Anschauung des Einzelnen gelangt ist, kann als universale Kritik aller das Ich unterdrückenden allgemeinen Mächte bezeichnet werden. Die Kirchen, die politischen Systeme (der politische Liberalismus, der soziale Liberalismus, der humane Liberalismus), die Philosophien, sie alle haben solche allgemeine Mächte über den Einzelnen gesetzt. Der politische Liberalismus fixiert den «guten Bürger», der soziale Liberalismus den an Gemeinbesitz mit allen andern gleichen Arbeiter, der humane Liberalismus den «Menschen als Menschen». Indem er alle diese Mächte zerstört, richtet Stirner auf den Trümmern die Souveränität des Einzelnen auf. «Was soll nicht alles Meine Sache sein! Vor allem die gute Sache, dann die Sache Gottes, die Sache der Menschheit, der Wahrheit, der Freiheit, der Humanität, der Gerechtigkeit; ferner die Sache Meines Volkes, Meines Fürsten, Meines Vaterlandes; endlich gar die Sache des Geistes und tausend andere Sachen. Nur *Meine* Sache soll niemals Meine Sache sein. — Sehen Wir denn zu, wie diejenigen es mit *ihrer* Sache machen, für deren Sache Wir arbeiten, Uns hingeben und begeistern sollen. Ihr wißt von Gott viel Gründliches zu verkünden und habt jahrtausendelang «die Tiefen der Gottheit erforsch und ihr ins Herz geschaut, so daß Ihr Uns wohl sagen könnt, wie Gott die «Sache Gottes, der wir zu dienen berufen sind, selber betreibt. Und ihr verhehlt es auch nicht, das Treiben des Herrn. Was ist nun seine Sache? Hat er, wie es *Uns* zugemutet wird, eine fremde Sache, hat er die Sache der Wahrheit, der Liebe zur seinigen gemacht? Euch empört dies Mißverständnis und ihr belehrt uns, daß Gottes Sache allerdings die Sache der Wahrheit und Liebe sei, daß aber diese Sache keine ihm fremde genannt werden könne, weil Gott ja selbst die Wahrheit und Liebe sei; Euch empört die Annahme, daß Gott Uns armen Würmern gleichen könnte, indem er eine fremde Sache als eigene beförderte. «Gott sollte der Sache der Wahrheit sich annehmen, wenn er nicht selbst die Wahrheit wäre?» Er sorgt nur für *seine* Sache, aber weil er alles in allem ist, darum ist auch alles *seine* Sache; *Wir* aber, Wir sind nicht alles in allem, und unsere Sache ist gar klein und verächtlich; darum müssen wir einer «höheren Sache dienen. — Nun, ist es klar, Gott bekümmert sich nur ums Seine, beschäftigt sich nur mit sich, denkt nur an sich und hat sich im Auge; wehe allem, was ihm nicht wohlgefällig ist. Er dient keinem Höhern und befriedigt nur sich. Seine Sache ist eine — rein egoistische Sache. Wie steht es mit der Menschheit, deren Sache Wir zur unsrigen machen sollen? Ist ihre Sache etwa die eines andern und dient die Menschheit einer höhern Sache? Nein, die Menschheit sieht nur auf sich, die Menschheit will nur die Menschheit fördern, die Menschheit ist sich selber ihre Sache. Damit sie sich entwickle, läßt sie Völker und Individuen in ihrem Dienste sich abquälen, und wenn diese geleistet haben, was die Menschheit braucht, dann werden sie von ihr aus Dankbarkeit auf den Mist der Geschichte geworfen. Ist die Sache der Menschheit nicht eine — rein egoistische Sache?» Aus einer solchen Kritik alles dessen, was der Mensch zu seiner Sache machen soll, ergibt sich für Stirner: «Gott und die Menschheit haben ihre Sache auf Nichts gestellt als auf sich. Stelle Ich denn meine Sache gleichfalls auf *Mich*, der Ich so gut wie Gott das Nichts von allem andern, der Ich mein Alles, der Ich der Einzige bin.»","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":561,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/30/essay/p110"}],"beads":[{"from":[112],"to":[107],"confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed"},{"from":[113],"to":[108],"confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed"},{"from":[114,115],"to":[109],"confidence":"high","pairing_state":"verified"},{"from":[116],"to":[110],"confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed"}],"note":"Paired by the paragraph aligner; each language numbers its own paragraphs. A bead at either end of the span can carry text beyond it (the `from` numbers show what each bead covers)."}}