{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 322/1920-09-28/p021","lang":"en","edition":"English","edition_basis":null,"is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"text":"It certainly cannot be denied that light, tones, colors, and sensations of taste are related to us differently from that which we could represent as subject to mathematical-mechanical laws. For it really is a remarkable fact,a fact worthy of our consideration: you know that honey tastes sweet, but to a man with jaundice it tastes bitter—so we can say that we stand in a curious relationship to the qualities within this realm—while on the other hand we could hardly maintain that any normal man would see a triangle as a triangle, but a man with jaundice would see it as a square! Certain differentiations thus do exist, and one must be cognizant of them; on the other hand, one must not draw absurd conclusions from them. And to this very day philosophical thinking has failed in the most extraordinary way to come to grips with this most fundamental epistemological question. We thus see how a contemporary philosopher, Koppelmann, overtrumps even Kant by saying, for example—you can read this on page 33 of his *Philosophical Inquiries* [ *Weltanschauungsfragen*]: everything that relates to space and time we must first construct within by means of the understanding, whereas we are able to assimilate colors and tastes directly. We construct the icosahedron, the dodecahedron, etc.: we are able to construct the standard regular solids only because of the organization of our understanding. No wonder, then, claims Koppelmann, that we find in the world only those regular solids we can construct with our understanding. One thus can find Koppelmann saying almost literally that it is impossible for a geologist to come to a geometer with a crystal bounded by seven equilateral triangles precisely because—so Koppelmann claims—such a crystal would have a form that simply would not fit into our heads. That is out-Kanting Kant. And thus he would say that in the realm of the thing-in-itself crystals could exist that are bounded by seven regular triangles, but they cannot enter our head, and thus we pass them by; they do not exist for us.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"title":"Lecture II","site_heading":"Hegel, Marx, and the Limits of Conceptual Thinking","site_heading_note":"A heading the site wrote for this unit from a summary of it; not in the edition, and not the words of Rudolf Steiner or of the translator. Cite the unit by its title and locus, never by this heading, and do not quote it.","date":"1920-09-28","location":null,"word_count":339,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/322/1920-09-28/p021","alignment_confidence":"high","alignment_reason":"beads:length","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":{"scope":"unit","status":"established","translator":"Frederick Amrine and Konrad Oberhuber","identified_edition":"AP1983","book_title":"The Boundaries of Natural Science","publisher":"Anthroposophic Press","publisher_inferred":true,"match_score":1.0,"source_url":"https://www.rsarchive.org/Lectures/GA322/English/AP1983/19200928p01.html","evidence":"lecture_list_row","publisher_note":"The publisher is inferred from the edition code in this lecture's source URL, not stated by the source page. 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Unknown is not an assurance of a stenogram: check the edition's own notes before resting an argument on one word.","evidence":null,"evidence_translation":null,"evidence_source":null},"german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"1920-09-28","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 322/1920-09-28/p020","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/322/1920-09-28/p020"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false,"length_check":{"de_words":375,"en_words":339,"ratio":0.9,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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Also Unterscheidungen sind schon da, und an diesen Unterscheidungen muß gelernt werden, aber es müssen nicht absurde Folgerungen daraus gezogen werden. Und in einer merkwürdig ungeklärten Weise steht bis zum heutigen Tage philosophisches Denken diesen Fundamentaltatsachen aller Erkenntnisentwickelung gegenüber. Da gewahren wir zum Beispiel, wie ein neuerer Philosoph, der Professor Koppelmann, in seinen «Weltanschauungsfragen» den Kant noch überkantet, indem er zum Beispiel sagt — Sie können das auf Seite 33 von Koppelmanns «Weltanschauungsfragen» lesen —: Alles dasjenige, was sich auf den Raum und die Zeit bezieht, wir müssen es innerlich erst mit dem Verstand konstruieren, während wir Farben und Geschmäcke unmittelbar in uns aufnehmen. Wir konstruieren das Tetraeder, das Oktaeder, das Dodekaeder und so weiter, wir können nur vermöge unserer Verstandeseinrichtung die gewöhnlichen regulären Körper konstruieren. Was Wunder — meint Koppelmann -, daß uns in der Welt nur diejenigen regulären Körper entgegentreten können, die wir durch unseren Verstand konstruieren können. — Und so finden Sie fast wörtlich bei Koppelmann den Satz: Es ist ausgeschlossen, daß einmal ein Geologe kommt und einen Kristall dem Geometer gibt, welcher von sieben gleichseitigen Dreiecken begrenzt ist, einfach aus dem Grunde — meint Koppelmann -, weil ein solcher Kristall eine Gestalt hätte, die in unseren Kopf nicht hineinginge. — Das ist «überkanten» des Kantianismus. Und da würde man sagen können, in der Welt des Dinges an sich könnten also unter Umständen allerdings solche Kristalle eventuell existieren, die von sieben regulären Dreiecken begrenzt wären, aber in unseren Kopf gehen sie nicht herein, daher gehen wir an ihnen vorbei, sie sind für uns nicht da.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":375,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/322/1920-09-28/p020"}],"english":["GA 322/1920-09-28/p021"],"method":"length","confidence":"high","correspondence":"established","length_check":{"de_words":375,"en_words":339,"ratio":0.9,"partial":false},"pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false},"witness_completeness":{"ratio":0.99,"band":"comparable","note":null,"word_count":3924,"original_word_count":3967,"may_be_abridged":false},"witness_quality":{"translator":{"scope":"unit","status":"recorded","translator":"Frederick Amrine and Konrad Oberhuber","identified_edition":"AP1983","book_title":"The Boundaries of Natural Science","publisher":"Anthroposophic Press","publisher_inferred":true,"match_score":1.0,"source_url":"https://www.rsarchive.org/Lectures/GA322/English/AP1983/19200928p01.html","evidence":"lecture_list_row","publisher_note":"The publisher is inferred from the edition code in this lecture's source URL, not stated by the source page. 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