{"corpus":"steiner","locus":"GA 4/l03/p036-p037","extent":"range","passage_number":36,"through":37,"paragraph_count":2,"first_locus":"GA 4/l03/p036","last_locus":"GA 4/l03/p037","lang":"en","edition":"RSP1964","edition_basis":"Steiner 1918 revised edition","is_original":false,"is_default_edition":true,"title":"3. Thinking in the service of Knowledge","date":null,"location":null,"alignment_confidence":"high","alignment_reason":"beads:length","two_voice_volume":false,"translation_credit":null,"edition_coverage":{"de":["original"],"en":["AP1986","GPP1916","RSP1964","RSPC1949","RSPI1963"]},"witness_completeness":{"ratio":1.1,"band":"comparable","note":null,"word_count":5996,"original_word_count":5463,"may_be_abridged":false},"site_heading":null,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l03/p036-p037","json_url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l03/p036-p037.json","lecture_url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l03#p036","word_count":776,"quote_safe":true,"passages":[{"passage_number":36,"locus":"GA 4/l03/p036","text":"In the preceding discussion I have pointed out the significant difference between thinking and all other activities of the soul, as a fact which presents itself to genuinely unprejudiced observation. Anyone who does not strive towards this unprejudiced observation will be tempted to bring against my arguments such objections as these: When I think about a rose, this after all only expresses a relation of my “I” to the rose, just as when I feel the beauty of the rose. There is a relation between “I” and object in the case of thinking just as much as in the case of feeling or perceiving. Such an objection leaves out of account the fact that *only* in the thinking activity does the “I” know itself to be *one and the same being with that which is active*, right into all the ramifications of this activity. With no other soul activity is this so completely the case. For example, in a feeling of pleasure it is perfectly possible for a more delicate observation to discriminate between the extent to which the “I” knows itself to be *one and the same being with what is active*, and the extent to which there is something passive in the “I” to which the pleasure merely presents itself. The same applies to the other soul activities. Above all one should not confuse the “having of thought-images” with the elaboration of thought by thinking. Thought-images may appear in the soul after the fashion of dreams, like vague intimations. But this is not *thinking*. True, someone might now say: If this is what you mean by “thinking”, then your thinking involves willing and you have to do not merely with thinking but also with the will in the thinking. However, this would simply justify us in saying: Genuine thinking must always be willed. But this is quite irrelevant to the characterization of thinking as this has been given in the preceding discussion. Granted that the nature of thinking necessarily implies its being *willed*, the point that matters is that nothing is willed which, in being carried out, does not appear to the “I” as an activity completely its own and under its own supervision. Indeed, we must say that owing to the very nature of thinking as here defined, it *must* appear to the observer as willed through and through. If we really make the effort to grasp everything that is relevant to a judgment about the nature of thinking, we cannot fail to see that this soul activity does have the unique character we have here described.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":430,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l03/p036","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"l03","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 4/l03/p034","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/4/l03/p034"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false,"length_check":{"de_words":373,"en_words":430,"ratio":1.15,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. The German original passage(s) above are the edition-invariant anchor — fetch them (lang='de') to verify wording before quoting across editions."},"witness_quality":{"translator":{"status":"unknown","warning":"No translator is recorded for this edition. An unattributed translation cannot be weighed as a witness: you cannot tell which hand made the choices in it. Cite the German for anything load-bearing."},"entity_parity":{"status":"ok","checked_against":["GA 4/l03/p034"],"missing_from_translation":[],"present_only_in_translation":[],"bead_confidence":"high","note":"Every load-bearing name in the German counterpart appears in this English passage. That is a check on NAMES only: a translation can keep every name and still reverse who acts on whom, change a number, or soften a claim. Read the German for anything you intend to rest an argument on."},"note":"quote_safe certifies the bytes of this text. This block is about the translation as a WITNESS: who made it, and whether it carries the same names as the original. See witness_completeness for how much of the original this witness holds."}},{"passage_number":37,"locus":"GA 4/l03/p037","text":"A person whom the author of this book rates very highly as a thinker has objected that it is impossible to speak about thinking as we are doing here, because what one believes oneself to have observed as active thinking is nothing but an illusion. In reality one is observing only the results of an unconscious activity which lies at the basis of thinking. Only because this unconscious activity is not observed does the illusion arise that the observed thinking exists in its own right, just as when in an illumination by means of a rapid succession of electric sparks we believe that we are seeing a continuous movement. This objection, too, rests only on an inaccurate view of the facts. In making it, one forgets that it is the “I” itself which, from its standpoint *inside* the thinking, observes its *own* activity. The “I” would have to stand outside the thinking in order to suffer the sort of deception which is caused by an illumination with a rapid succession of electric sparks. It would be much truer to say that precisely in using such an analogy one is forcibly deceiving oneself, just as if someone seeing a moving light were to insist that it is being freshly lit by an unknown hand at every point where it appears. No, whoever is determined to see in thinking anything other than a clearly surveyable activity produced by the “I” itself, must first shut his eyes to the plain facts that are there for the seeing, in order then to invent a hypothetical activity as the basis of thinking. If he does not thus blind himself, he will have to recognize that everything which he “thinks up” in this way as an addition to the thinking only leads him away from its real nature. Unprejudiced observation shows that nothing is to be counted as belonging to the nature of thinking except what is found *in* thinking itself. One will never arrive at something which is the *cause* of thinking if one steps outside the realm of thinking itself.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":346,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l03/p037","german_anchor":{"de_prefix":"l03","de_passages":[{"locus":"GA 4/l03/p035","url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/4/l03/p035"}],"bead_confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed","verified":false,"length_check":{"de_words":294,"en_words":346,"ratio":1.18,"partial":false},"correspondence":"established","note":"English passage numbering is edition-relative, so the same number need not name the same paragraph in the German. 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Wer diese unbefangene Beobachtung nicht anstrebt, der wird gegen diese Ausführungen versucht sein, Einwendungen zu machen wie diese: wenn ich über eine Rose denke, so ist damit doch auch nur ein Verhältnis meines «Ich» zur Rose ausgedrückt, wie wenn ich die Schönheit der Rose fühle. Es bestehe geradeso ein Verhältnis zwischen «Ich» und Gegenstand beim Denken, wie zum Beispiel beim Fühlen oder Wahrnehmen. Wer diesen Einwand macht, der zieht nicht in Erwägung, daß *nur* in der Betätigung des Denkens das «Ich» bis in alle Verzweigungen der Tätigkeit sich mit dem Tätigen als *ein* Wesen weiß. Bei keiner andern Seelentätigkeit ist dies restlos der Fall. Wenn zum Beispiel eine Lust gefühlt wird, kann eine feinere Beobachtung sehr wohl unterscheiden, inwieferne das «Ich» sich mit einem Tätigen eins weiß und inwiefern in ihm ein Passives vorhanden ist, so daß die Lust für das «Ich» bloß auftritt. Und so ist es auch bei den andern Seelenbetätigungen. Man sollte nur nicht verwechseln: «Gedankenbilder haben» und Gedanken durch das Denken verarbeiten. Gedankenbilder können traumhaft, wie vage Eingebungen in der Seele auftreten. Ein *Denken* ist dieses nicht. — Allerdings könnte nun jemand sagen: wenn das Denken so gemeint ist, steckt das Wollen in dem Denken drinnen, und man habe es dann nicht bloß mit dem Denken, sondern auch mit dem Wollen des Denkens zu tun. Doch würde dies nur berechtigen zu sagen: das wirkliche Denken muß immer gewollt sein. Nur hat dies mit der Kennzeichnung des Denkens, wie sie in diesen Ausführungen gemacht ist, nichts zu schaffen. Mag es das Wesen des Denkens immerhin notwendig machen, daß dieses *gewollt* wird: es kommt darauf an, daß nichts gewollt wird, was, indem es sich vollzieht, vor dem «Ich» nicht restlos als seine eigene, von ihm überschaubare Tätigkeit erscheint. Man muß sogar sagen, *wegen* der hier geltend gemachten Wesenheit des Denkens erscheint dieses dem Beobachter als durch und durch *gewollt*. Wer alles, was für die Beurteilung des Denkens in Betracht kommt, wirklich zu durchschauen sich bemüht, der wird nicht umhin können, zu bemerken, daß dieser Seelenbetätigung die Eigenheit zukommt, von der hier gesprochen ist.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":373,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/4/l03/p034"},{"locus":"GA 4/l03/p035","passage_number":35,"text":"Von einer Persönlichkeit, welche der Verfasser dieses Buches als Denker sehr hochschätzt, ist ihm eingewendet worden, daß so, wie es hier geschieht, nicht über das Denken gesprochen werden könne, weil es nur ein Schein sei, was man als tätiges Denken zu beobachten glaube. In Wirklichkeit beobachte man nur die Ergebnisse einer nicht bewußten Tätigkeit, die dem Denken zugrunde liegt. Nur weil diese nicht bewußte Tätigkeit eben nicht beobachtet werde, entstehe die Täuschung, es bestehe das beobachtete Denken durch sich selbst, wie wenn man bei rasch aufeinanderfolgender Beleuchtung durch elektrische Funken eine Bewegung zu sehen glaubt. Auch dieser Einwand beruht nur auf einer ungenauen Anschauung der Sachlage. Wer ihn macht, berücksichtigt nicht, daß es das «Ich» selbst ist, das *im* Denken drinnen stehend *seine* Tätigkeit beobachtet. Es müßte das «Ich» außer dem Denken stehen, wenn es so getäuscht werden könnte, wie bei rasch aufeinanderfolgender Beleuchtung durch elektrische Funken. Man könnte vielmehr sagen: wer einen solchen Vergleich macht, der täuscht sich gewaltsam etwa wie jemand, der von einem in Bewegung begriffenen Licht durchaus sagen wollte: es wird an jedem Orte, an dem es erscheint, von unbekannter Hand neu angezündet. — Nein, wer in dem Denken etwas anderes sehen will als das im « Ich» selbst als überschaubare Tätigkeit Hervorgebrachte, der muß sich erst für den einfachen, der Beobachtung vorliegenden Tatbestand blind machen, um dann eine hypothetische Tätigkeit dem Denken zugrunde legen zu können. Wer sich nicht so blind macht, der muß erkennen, daß alles, was er in dieser Art zu dem Denken «hinzudenkt», aus dem Wesen des Denkens herausführt. Die unbefangene Beobachtung ergibt, daß nichts zum Wesen des Denkens gerechnet werden kann, was nicht *im* Denken selbst gefunden wird. Man kann nicht zu etwas kommen, was das Denken *bewirkt*, wenn man den Bereich des Denkens verläßt.","text_trust":"verbatim","quote_safe":true,"word_count":294,"url":"https://anthroposophy.ai/v1/steiner/de/ga/4/l03/p035"}],"beads":[{"from":[36],"to":[34],"confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed"},{"from":[37],"to":[35],"confidence":"high","pairing_state":"proposed"}],"note":"Paired by the paragraph aligner; each language numbers its own paragraphs. A bead at either end of the span can carry text beyond it (the `from` numbers show what each bead covers)."}}