VI. Our Knowledge of the World

GA 4/l06/p013 · GPP1916 LowLow alignmentMost translators re-paragraphed Steiner substantially. The locus identifies the same chapter or section, but paragraph-N to paragraph-N mapping is loose. For exact-quotation precision, compare with the German.

To regard the sum of perceptual appearances as the thing is no more legitimate. It might be quite possible for a mind to receive the concept at the same time as, and together with, the percept. To such a mind it would never occur that the concept did not belong to the thing. It would have to ascribe to the concept an existence indivisibly bound up with the thing.

Read this passage in another edition
DEoriginalENRSP1964ENAP1986ENGPP1916ENRSPC1949ENRSPI1963
Raw JSON: /v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l06/p013.json?edition=GPP1916
Cite: GA 4/l06/p013 · edition GPP1916 (Steiner 1894 first edition)