XIII. The Value of Life (Optimism and Pessimism)
Supposing even Pessimism were in the right with its assertion that the world contains more pain than pleasure, it would nevertheless have no influence upon the will, for living beings would still strive after such pleasure as remains. The empirical proof that pain overbalances pleasure (if such proof could be given) is indeed effective for showing up the futility of that school of philosophy, which sees the value of life in a surplus of pleasure (Eudaemonism), but not for exhibiting the will, as such, as void of reason. For the will is not set upon a surplus of pleasure, but on whatever quantity of pleasure remains after subtracting the pain. This remaining pleasure still appears always as an object worth pursuing.
Read this passage in another edition
Raw JSON: /v1/steiner/en/ga/4/l13/p044.json?edition=RSPC1949
Cite:
Cite:
GA 4/l13/p044 · edition RSPC1949 (Steiner 1918 revised edition)