Q1. The nature and extent of sacred doctrine

Prima Pars · chapter 1 of 117 · ▶ Speed Read

Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q1. The nature and extent of sacred doctrine

Source context

Theme: Epistemological foundations and proper domain of sacred doctrine as a distinct science grounded in divine revelation
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 246, 1908-08-17Steiner identifies the Scholastic method as deploying rigorous rational technique to process empirical and revelatory content, moving thought toward spiritual truth — precisely the dual-source epistemology Aquinas defends in Q1.
GA 35Steiner characterizes the Scholastic approach as treating logical technique as the proper instrument for elaborating material from sense-observation and for pressing toward spiritual knowledge, a structural parallel to Aquinas's account of sacred doctrine's method.
GA 108, 1908-03-14Steiner describes early Scholastic philosophy as a synthesis of Aristotelian thought, noting it is widely maligned but little understood — situating the Thomistic architectonic of which Q1 is the foundation within a broader cultural-spiritual evaluation.
GA 213, 1922-07-15Steiner argues that modern scientific thinking is a direct continuation of Scholastic thinking and commends the sharpness of Scholastic reasoning, implicitly affirming the cognitive discipline that Aquinas exercises in defining sacred doctrine's scope.

Cross-tradition

Vedanta: shruti / smriti epistemologyCross-tradition congruence appears in Vedanta's structural distinction between shruti (revealed, self-validating scripture) and smriti (derived, reason-elaborated texts), which parallels Aquinas's claim that sacred doctrine rests on articles of faith received from divine revelation rather than established by philosophical argument.
Aristotelian subalternation of sciencesAquinas's argument that sacred doctrine is a subalternate science borrowing its principles from divine knowledge applies Aristotle's Posterior Analytics doctrine of subordinate sciences, grounding a revealed theology within a rational-philosophical framework Aristotle himself did not envisage.
Islamic Kalam: naqli / aqli distinctionCross-tradition congruence with Islamic scholastic theology appears in the Kalam distinction between naqli knowledge (transmitted, revelatory) and aqli knowledge (rational, speculative), mapping onto Aquinas's differentiation of sacred doctrine from the philosophical sciences in Q1.

Article 1

[I.q.1.a.1.arg.1] It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: "Seek not the things that are too high for thee" (Sirach 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

[I.q.1.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit necessarium præter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi. Ad ea enim quæ supra rationem sunt homo non debet conari, secundum illud Eccli., III, 22: Altiora te ne quæsieris. Sed ea quæ rationi subduntur sufficienter traduntur in philosophicis disciplinis. Superfluum igitur videtur praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi. 2. Praetera, doctrina non potest esse nisi de ente; nihil enim scitur nisi verum, quod cum ente convertitur. Sed de omnibus partibus entis tractatur in disciplinis philosophicis, etiam de Deo; unde quædam pars philosophiæ dicitur theologia, sive scientia divina, ut patet per philosophum, in VI Metaph., com. 2. Non fuit igitur necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam fieri, sive haberi.

[I.q.1.a.1.arg.2] Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

[I.q.1.a.1.sc] It is written (2 Timothy 3:16): "All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice." Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.

[I.q.1.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur II ad Timoth., III, 16: Omnis scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docendum, ad arguendum, ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum, ad justitiam*. Scriptura autem divinitus inspirata non pertinet ad philosophicas disciplinas, quæ sunt secundum rationem humanam inventæ. Utile igitur est praeter philosophicas disciplinas esse aliam scientiam divinitus inspiratam.

[I.q.1.a.1.co] It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Isaiah 64:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

[I.q.1.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem esse doctrinam quamdam secundum revelationem divinam praeter philosophicas disciplinas, quæ ratione humana investigantur. Primo qui dem quia homo ordinatur a Deo ad quemdam finem, qui comprehensionem rationis excedit, secundum illud Isa., LXIV, 4: Oculus non vidit Deus, absque te, quæ praæparasti diligentibus* te. Finem autem oportet esse praæcognitum hominibus qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem quod ei nota fierent quædam per revelationem divinam quæ rationem humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quæ de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt necessarium fuit homi- * In justitia. * Expectantibus. 2 Ita edit. Rom. et Paris. Nicolai. Patav., physicas; sic etiam infra saepius; physicas habent et quædam ed. Gothicæ. 6 Naturalis, id est physicus: vox medii aevi latinitatis. Noli sic intelligere quod Deus sub aliquo genere contineatur; sed intelligere sic quod ens a philosophis quadrupliciter dividatur; est enim vel physicum, vel morale, vel metaphysicum, vel ens rationis; porro distributiones illæ partes entis vocantur, nem instrui revelatione divina; quia veritas de Deo, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret; a cujus tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quæ in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus et convenientius et securius proveniat, necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur. Necessarium igitur fuit, praeter philosophicas disciplinas quæ per rationem investigantur, sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi.

[I.q.1.a.1.ad.1] Although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, "For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man" (Sirach 3:25). And in this, the sacred science consists.

[I.q.1.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet ea quæ sunt altiora hominis cognitione non sint ab homine per rationem inquirenda, sunt tamen, a Deo revelata, suscipienda per fidem: unde et ibidem, Eccli., III, 25, subditur: Plurima supra* sensum hominum ostensa sunt tibi. Et in his sacra doctrina consistit.

[I.q.1.a.1.ad.2] Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e. abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.

[I.q.1.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod diversa ratio cognoscibilis diversitatem scientiarum inducit. Eamdem enim conclusionem demonstrant astrologus et naturalis, puta quod terra est rotunda; sed astrologus per medium mathematicum, id est, a materia abstractum; naturalis autem per medium circa materiam consideratum. Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem de quibus philosophicæ disciplinæ tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, etiam aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinæ revelationis. Unde theologia quæ ad sacram doctrinam pertinet differt, secundum genus, ab illa theologia quæ pars philosophiæ ponitur.

Article 2

[I.q.1.a.2.arg.1] It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: "For all men have not faith" (2 Thessalonians 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

[I.q.1.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sacra doctrina non sit scientia. Omnis enim scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis. Sed sacra doctrina procedit ex articulis fidei, qui non sunt per se noti, cum non ab omnibus concedantur; non enim omnium est fides, ut dicitur II Thessal., III, 2. Non igitur sacra doctrina est scientia.

[I.q.1.a.2.arg.2] Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

[I.q.1.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, scientia non est singularium. Sed sacra doctrina tractat de singularibus, puta de gestis Abrahæ, Isaac et Jacob, et similibus. Ergo sacra doctrina non est scientia.

[I.q.1.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) "to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened." But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.

[I.q.1.a.2.sc] Sed contra est. Augustinus dicit, XIV De Trin., c. 1, col. 1037, § 3, t. 8: « Huic scientiæ attribuitur illud tantummodo quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. » Hoc autem ad nullam scientiam pertinet nisi ad sacram doctrinam; ergo sacra doctrina est scientia.

[I.q.1.a.2.co] Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

[I.q.1.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, sacram doctrinam scientiam esse. Sed sciendum quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quædam enim sunt quæ procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geometria, et hujusmodi; quædam vero sunt quæ procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientia, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per geometria, et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientia, quæ scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde, sicut musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata a Deo.

[I.q.1.a.2.ad.1] The principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred doctrine.

[I.q.1.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod principia cujuslibet scientiae vel sunt nota per se vel reducuntur in notitiam superioris scientiae; et talia sunt principia sacræ doctrinæ, ut dictum est.

[I.q.1.a.2.ad.2] Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.

[I.q.1.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina non quia de eis principaliter tractetur, sed introducuntur tum in exemplum vitæ, sicut in scientiis moralibus, tum ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit, super quam fundatur sacra Scriptura, seu doctrina.

Article 3

[I.q.1.a.3.arg.1] It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) "that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects." But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.

[I.q.1.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sacra doctrina non sit una scientia. Quia, secundum Philosophum, in I Posteriorum, text. 43: « Una scientia est quæ est unius generis subjecti. » Creator autem et creatura, de quibus in sacra doctrina tractatur, non continentur sub uno genere subjecti. Ergo sacra doctrina non est una scientia.

[I.q.1.a.3.arg.2] Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science.

[I.q.1.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in sacra doctrina tractatur de Angelis, de creaturis corporalibus, de moribus hominum. Hujusmodi autem ad diversas scientias philosophicas pertinent. Igitur sacra doctrina non est una scientia.

[I.q.1.a.3.sc] Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: "Wisdom gave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things" (Wisdom 10:10).

[I.q.1.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod sacra Scriptura de ea loquitur sicut de una scientia; dicitur enim Sap., x, 40: Dedit illi scientiam sanctorum.

[I.q.1.a.3.co] Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.

[I.q.1.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, sacram doctrinam unam scientiam esse. Est enim unitas potentiæ et habitus sic consideranda secundum objectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem objecti; puta, homo, asinus et lapis conveniunt in una formali ratione colorati, quod est objectum visus. Quia igitur sacra doctrina, considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divinitus revelata, secundum quod dictum est, omnia quæcumque sunt divinitus revelabilia, communicant in una ratione formali objecti hujus scientiæ: et ideo comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sicut sub scientia una.

[I.q.1.a.3.ad.1] Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.

[I.q.1.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex æquo; sed de Deo principaliter, et de creaturis secundum quod referuntur ad Deum ut ad principium vel finem. Unde unitas scientiæ non impeditur.

[I.q.1.a.3.ad.2] Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the "common sense" is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the "common sense", although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.

[I.q.1.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet inferiores potentias, vel habitus diversificari circa aliquas materias quæ communiter cadunt sub una potentia vel habitu superiori, quia superior potentia vel habitus respicit objectum sub universaliori ratione formali: sicut objectum sensus communis est sensibile, quod comprehendit sub se visibile et audibile, unde sensus communis, cum sit una potentia, extendit se ad omnia objecta quinque sensuum. Et similiter ea quæ in diversis scientiis philosophicis tractantur potest sacra doctrina una existens considerare sub una ratione, in quantum scilicet cursiva seu vespertina theologia; aliam theologiam, matutinam scilicet, non discurrendo formaliter, beati possident.

Article 4

[I.q.1.a.4.arg.1] It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22). Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

[I.q.1.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sacra doctrina sit practica. « Finis enim practicæ est operatio, » secundum Philosophum, in II Metaphys., text. 3. Sacra autem doctrina ad operationem ordinatur, secundum illud Jacob., 1, 22: Estote factores verbi, et non auditores tantum. Ergo sacra doctrina est practica scientia.

[I.q.1.a.4.arg.2] Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

[I.q.1.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sacra doctrina dividitur per legem veterem et novam. Lex autem pertinet ad scientiam moralem, quæ est scientia practica. Ergo sacra doctrina est scientia practica.

[I.q.1.a.4.sc] Every practical science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science.

[I.q.1.a.4.sc] Sed contra, omnis scientia practica est de rebus operabilibus ab homine, ut moralis de actibus hominum, et aedificativa de aedificiis. Sacra autem doctrina est principaliter de Deo, cujus magis homines sunt opera. Non ergo est scientia practica, sed magis speculativa.

[I.q.1.a.4.co] Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.

[I.q.1.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est, una existens se extendit ad ea quæ pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas, propter rationem communem quam in diversis attendit, prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia; unde, licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit et ea quæ facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua aeterna beatitudo consistit. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

Article 5

[I.q.1.a.5.arg.1] It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles — namely, articles of faith — can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.

[I.q.1.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sacra doctrina non sit dignior aliis scientiis. Certitudo enim pertinet ad dignitatem scientiæ. Sed aliæ scientiæ, de quarum principiis dubitari non potest, videntur esse certiores sacra doctrina, cujus principia, scilicet articuli fidei, dubitationem recipiunt. Aliæ igitur scientiæ videntur ista digniores.

[I.q.1.a.5.arg.2] Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that "the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural learning." Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

[I.q.1.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, inferioris scientiæ est a superiori accipere, sicut musicus ab arithmetico. Sed sacra doctrina accipit aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis; dicit enim Hieron., in Ep. lxx ad Magnum, oratorem urbis Romæ, col. 667, § 4, t. 1, quod « doctores antiqui in tantum philosophorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos resarciunt libros, ut nescias quid in illis prius admirari debeas, eruditionem sæculi, an scientiam Scriptura-rum. » Ergo sacra doctrina est inferior aliis scientiis.

[I.q.1.a.5.sc] Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one: "Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower" (Proverbs 9:3).

[I.q.1.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod aliæ scientiæ dicuntur ancillæ hujus, Prov., 1x, 3: Misit ancillas suas vocare* ad arcem.

[I.q.1.a.5.co] Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.

[I.q.1.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum ista scientia quantum ad aliquid sit speculativa et practica, omnes alias transcendit tam speculativas, quam practicas. Speculativarum enim scientiarum una altera dignior dicitur tum propter certitudinem, tum propter dignitatem materiæ. Et quantum ad utrum que hæc scientia alias speculativas scientias excedit. Secundum certitudinem quidem, quia aliæ scientia certitudinem habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanæ, quæ po-test errare; hæc autem certitudinem habet ex lumine divinæ scientiæ, quæ decipi non potest. Secundum dignitatem vero materiæ, quia ista scientia est principaliter de his quæ sua altitudine rationem transcendunt. Aliæ vero scientiæ considerant ea tantum quæ rationi subduntur. Practicarum vero scien-tiarum illa dignior est quæ ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, sicut civilis militari. Nam bonum exercitus ad bonum civitatis ordina-tur. Finis autem hujus doctrinæ, in quantum est practica, est beatitudo æterna, ad quam sicut ad ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines scientiarum practicarum. Unde manifestum est secundum omnem modum eam digniorem esse aliis.

[I.q.1.a.5.ad.1] It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence, "which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun" (Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi.

[I.q.1.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nihil prohibet id quod est certius secundum naturam esse quoad nos minus certum propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, « qui se habet ad manifestissima naturæ sicut oculus noctuæ ad lumen solis, » sicut dicitur in II Metaphys. Unde dubitatio quæ accidit in aliquibus circa articulos fidei, non est propter incertitudinem rei, sed propter debilitatem intellectus humani. Et tamen minimum quod potest haberi de cognitione rerum altissimarum desiderabilius est quam certissima cognitio quæ habetur de minimis rebus, ut dicitur in XI De animal., lib. 1, de Partibus animalium, cap. v, in princ.

[I.q.1.a.5.ad.2] This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.

[I.q.1.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hæc scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad majorem manifestationem eorum quæ in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis, sed immediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut architectonicæ utuntur subministrantibus, et civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam ejus, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri, qui ex his quæ per naturalem rationem, ex qua procedunt aliæ scientiæ, cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea quæ sunt supra rationem, quæ in hac scientia traduntur.

Article 6

[I.q.1.a.6.arg.1] It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not wisdom.

[I.q.1.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod hæc doctrina non sit sapientia. Nulla enim doctrina quæ supponit sua principia aliunde, digna est nomine sapientiae, quia « sapientis est ordinare, » et non ordinari, I Metaph., c. xi, in procem. Sed hæc doctrina supponit principia sua aliunde, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo hæc doctrina non est sapientia.

[I.q.1.a.6.arg.2] Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

[I.q.1.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad sapientiam pertinet probare principia aliarum scientiarum; unde et caput dicitur scientiarum, ut VI Ethic. patet, cap. vii, paulo a princ. Sed hæc doctrina non probat principia aliarum scientiarum. Ergo non est sapientia.

[I.q.1.a.6.arg.3] Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isaiah 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.

[I.q.1.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, hæc doctrina per studium acquiritur; sapientia autem per infusionem habetur; unde inter septem dona Spiritus sancti connumeratur, ut patet Isa., xi. Ergo hæc doctrina non est sapientia.

[I.q.1.a.6.sc] It is written (Deuteronomy 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations."

[I.q.1.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Deuter., iv, 6, in principio legis: Hæc est nostra* sapientia et intellectus coram populis.

[I.q.1.a.6.co] This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: "As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation" (1 Corinthians 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end: "Wisdom is prudence to a man" (Proverbs 10:23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause — not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him — "That which is known of God is manifest in them" (Romans 1:19) — but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.

[I.q.1.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hæc doctrina maxime sapientia est inter omnes sapientias humanas, non quidem in aliquo genere tantum, sed simpliciter. Cum enim sapientis sit ordinare, et judicare, judicium autem per altiorem causam de inferioribus habeatur; ille sapiens dicitur in unoquoque genere qui considerat causam altissimam illius generis; sicut in genere ædificii artifex qui disponit formam domus dicitur sapiens et architecton respectu inferiorum artificum qui dolant lapides vel parant cæmentum; unde dicitur I Cor., 10: Ut sapiens architector*, fundamentum posui. Et rursus in genere totius humanæ vitæ prudens sapiens dicitur, inquantum ordinat humanos actus ad debitum finem; unde dicitur Prov., x, 23: Sapientia est viro pruden-non scientiam, esse contendunt.

[I.q.1.a.6.ad.1] Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

[I.q.1.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sacra doctrina non supponit sua principia ab aliqua scientia humana, sed a scientia divina, a qua, sicut a summa sapientia, omnis nostra cognitio ordinatur.

[I.q.1.a.6.ad.2] The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false: "Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God" (2 Corinthians 10:4-5).

[I.q.1.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliarum scientiarum principia vel sunt per se nota et probari non possunt, vel per aliquam rationem naturalem probantur in una alia scientia. Propria autem hujus scientiæ cognitio est quæ est per revelationem, non autem quæ est per naturalem rationem. Et ideo non pertinet ad eam probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum judicare de eis. Quidquid enim in aliis scientiis inventur veritati hujus doctrinæ repugnans to tum condemnatur ut falsum. Unde dicitur II Cor., x, 4: Consilia destruentes, et omnem altitudinem extollentem se adversus scientiam Dei.

[I.q.1.a.6.ad.3] Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: "The spiritual man judgeth all things" (1 Corinthians 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things." The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.

[I.q.1.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, cum judicium ad sapientem pertineat, secundum duplicem modum judicandi dupliciter sapientia accipitur. Contingit enim aliquem judicare uno modo per modum inclinationis: sicut qui habet habitum virtutis, recte judicat de his quæ sunt secundum virtutem agenda, inquantum ad illa inclinatur; unde et in quam practica, in Ecclesia spectetur, sive etiam eadem theologia spectetur in nobis. Forsitan in nobis veritate impermixta non clarescet, sed nec propterea in nobis ipsa scientia theologica judicio sapientum erit error. Arnoldus quoque, ac Biblistæ haud aliter philosophicas omnes scientias vel re-probant, vel saltem contemnunt: quis sanæ mentisista deliramenta laudaret? — — X Ethic., c. v, parum ante fin., et lib. III, cap. iv, dicitur, quod « virtuosus est mensura et regula actuum humanorum. » Alio modo per modum cognitionis, sicut aliquis instructus in scientia morali posset judicare de actibus virtutis, etiamsi virtutem non haberet. Primus igitur modus judicandi de rebus divinis pertinet ad sapientiam, quae ponitur donum Spiritus sancti, secundum illud I Cor. ii, 13: Spiritualis homo judicat omnia, etc.; et Dionysius, c. ii De div. nom., § 9, col. 647, t. 4, dicit: « Hierotheus doctus est non solum discens, sed et patiens divina. » Secundus autem modus judicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam secundum quod per studium habetur, licet ejus principia ex revelatione habeantur.

Article 7

[I.q.1.a.7.arg.1] It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): "It is impossible to define the essence of God." Therefore God is not the object of this science.

[I.q.1.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Deus non sit subjectum hujus scientiæ. In qualibet enim scientia oportet supponere de subjecto quid est, secundum Philosophum, in II Posteriorum, non procul a princ.; sed hæc scientia non supponit de a nobis, etiam absque scientia practica amorem regulante, necessario amaretur.

[I.q.1.a.7.arg.2] Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the object of this science.

[I.q.1.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omnia quæ determinantur in aliqua scientia comprehenduntur sub subjecto illius scientiæ. Sed in sacra Scriptura determinatur de multis aliis quam de Deo, puta de creaturis, et de moribus hominum. Ergo Deus non est subjectum hujus scientiæ.

[I.q.1.a.7.sc] The object of the science is that of which it principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this science.

[I.q.1.a.7.sc] Sed contra, illud est subjectum scientiæ de quo principaliter est sermo in scientia. Sed in hac scientia principaliter fit sermo de Deo; dicitur enim theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo Deus est subjectum hujus scientiæ.

[I.q.1.a.7.co] God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God — that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.

[I.q.1.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus est subjectum hujus scientiæ. Sic enim se habet subjectum ad scientiam, sicut objectum ad potentiam vel habitum. Proprie autem illud assignatur objectum alicujus potentiæ vel habitus, sub cujus ratione omnia referuntur ad potentiam vel habitum; sicut homo et lapis referuntur ad visum inquantum sunt colorata; unde coloratum est proprium objectum visus. Omnia autem tractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subjectum hujus « At vero quid Dei substantia sit,... nec scimus, nec dicere possumus. » Et c. iv, col. 798: « Quid (Deus) secundum essentiam et naturam sit, nullo prorsus modo comprehendi, vel etiam cognosci potest. » Et eodem cap., col. 799: « De Deo impossibile est, quidnam essentia sua ac natura sit enuntiare » Liber De orthodoxa fide, primum e græco in latinam linguam a Burgundione Pisano, Frederici imperatoris præfecto, sæculo duodecimo, redditus fuit. Hujus versione, licet imperfecta et omnino rudi, usi sunt scholastici, P. Lombardus, D. Thomas, cæterique xiii et xiv sæculi magistri. An qui dem D. Thomas translationem Burgundionis serviliter secutus est, an potius, suo more, versionem correxit, sensumque propriis et fidelioribus verbis reddidit, scire placuisset: ad manum autem non habetur illa translatio. His in notis refertur versio a Mich. Lequien, ord. Frat. Præd., ex schedis Franc. Combefisii, ejusdem ordinis, et anteriore translatione Jacobi Billii, novis cum curis, exarata et Parisii anno 1712 impressa, quam reproduxit Migne, in suo cursu Patrologix. scientiae. Quod etiam manifestum fit ex principis hujus scientiae, quae sunt articuli fidei, quae est de Deo. Idem autem est subjectum principiorum et totius scientiae, cum tota scientia virtute contineatur in principiis. Quidam vero attendentes ea quae in ista scientia tractantur, et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur, assignaverunt aliter materiam hujus scientiae; vel res et signa, vel opera reparationis, vel totum Christum, id est, caput et membra; de omnibus enim istis tractatur in ista scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum.

[I.q.1.a.7.ad.1] Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.

[I.q.1.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet de Deo non possimus scire quid est, utimur tamen in hac doctrina effectu ejus, vel naturæ vel gratiae, loco definitionis, ad ea quae de Deo in hac doctrina considerantur; sicut et in quibusdam scientiis philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum, accipiendo effectum loco definitionis causae.

[I.q.1.a.7.ad.2] Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidents but as in some way related to Him.

[I.q.1.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnia alia quae determinantur in sacra Scriptura comprehenduntur sub Deo, non ut partes vel species et accidentia, sed ut ordinata aliqualiter ad ipsum.

Article 8

[I.q.1.a.8.arg.1] It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): "Put arguments aside where faith is sought." But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: "But these things are written that you may believe" (John 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

[I.q.1.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hæc doctrina non sit argumentativa. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in lib. I De fide cathol., c. xiii, § 84, col. 570, t. 3: « Tolle argumenta ubi fides quæritur. » Sed in hac doctrina præcipue fides quæritur; unde dicitur Joan., xx, 31: Hæc scripta sunt ut credatis. Ergo sacra doctrina non est argumentativa.

[I.q.1.a.8.arg.2] Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), "faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience." Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

[I.q.1.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si sit argumentativa, aut argumentatur ex auctoritate, aut ex ratione. Si ex auctoritate, non videtur hoc congruere ejus dignitati; nam « locus ab auctoritate est infirmissimus, » secundum Boetium, ex Comm. super Topica Cic., lib. V, col. 4166, t. 2. Si autem ex ratione, hoc non congruit ejus fini; quia, secundum Gregorium, Hom. xxvi in Evang., col. 4197, t. 2, « fides non habet meritum, ubi humana ratio præbet experimentum. » Ergo sacra doctrina non est argumentativa.

[I.q.1.a.8.sc] The Scripture says that a bishop should "embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers" (Titus 1:9).

[I.q.1.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur ad Tit., I, 9, de episcopo amplectente eum qui secundum doctrinam est fidelem sermonem, ut potens sit exhortari in doctrina sana, et eos qui contradicunt arguere.

[I.q.1.a.8.co] As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Corinthians 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections — if he has any — against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

[I.q.1.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut aliæ scientiæ non argumentantur ad sua principia probanda, sed ex principiis argumentantur ad ostendendum alia in ipsis scientiis, ita hæc doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quæ sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid ostendendum; sicut Apostolus, I ad Cor., xv, ex resurrectione Christi argumentatur ad resurrectionem communem probandam. Sed tamen considerandum est, in scientiis philosophicis, quod inferiores scientiæ nec probant sua principia, nec contra negantem principia disputant, sed hoc relinquunt superiori scientiæ; suprema vero inter eas, scilicet metaphysica, disputat contra negantem sua principia, si adversarius aliquid concedit; si autem nihil concedit, non potest cum eo disputare; potest tamen solvere rationes ipsius. Unde sacra Scriptura, cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum negante sua principia, argumentando quidem, si adversarius aliquid concedat eorum quæ per divinam revelationem habentur; sicut per auctoritates sacræ doctrinæ disputamus contra hæreticos, et per unum articulum contra negantes alium. Si vero adversarius nihil credat eorum quæ divinitus revelantur, non remanet amplius via ad probandum per rationem articulos fidei, sed ad solvendum rationes, si quas inducit contra fidem. Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est probationes quæ contra fidem inducuntur non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta.

[I.q.1.a.8.ad.1] Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.

[I.q.1.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet argumenta rationis humanæ non habeant locum ad probandum quæ fidei sunt, tamen ex articulis fidei hæc doctrina ad alia argumentatur, ut dictum est.

[I.q.1.a.8.ad.2] This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says: "Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ" (2 Corinthians 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: "As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): "Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning."

[I.q.1.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium hujus doctrinæ, eo quod principia hujus doctrinæ per revelationem habentur. Et sic oportet quod credatur auctoritati eorum quibus revelatio facta est. Nec hoc derogat dignitati hujus doctrinæ; nam, licet locus ab auctoritate quæ fundatur super revelatione humana sit infirmissimus, locus tamen ab auctoritate quæ fundatur super revelatione divina, est efficacissimus. Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidei, quia per hoc tolleretur meritum fidei, sed ad manifestandum aliqua quæ traduntur in hae doctrina. Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam sed persiciat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis subsequitur charitati. Unde et Apostolus dicit, II ad Cor., x, 5: In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi. Et inde est quod etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doctrina utitur, ubi per rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt, sicut Paulus, Act., xvii, 28, inducit verbum Arati, dicens: Sicut et quidam poetarum vestrorum* dixerunt: Genus Dei sumus. Sed tamen sacra doctrina hujusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis argumentis et probabilibus. « Aufer hinc argumenta. » al.: « Ratione. » Sed in argumento opponitur rationi auctoritas. Unde S. Doctor in- Auctoritatibus autem canonicæ Scripturæ utitur proprie et ex necessitate argumentando; auctoritatibus autem aliorum Doctorum Ecclesiæ quasi argumentando ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis factæ qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi, si qua fuit, aliis Doctoribus factæ. Unde dicit Augustinus, in Epistola ad Hieronymum Lxxxii, c. 1; § 3, col. 277, t. 2: « Solis eis Scripturarum libris qui canonicii appellantur didici hunc timorem honoremque deferre, ut nullum auctorem eorum in scribendo aliquid errasse firmissime credam. Alios autem ita lego ut, quantalibet sanctitate doctrinaque præpolleant, non ideo verum putem quod ipsi ita senserunt vel scripserunt. »

Article 9

[I.q.1.a.9.arg.1] It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes.

[I.q.1.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sacra doctrina non debeat uti metaphoris. Id enim quod est proprium infimae doctrinæ non videtur competere huic scientiæ, quæ inter alias tenet locum supremum, ut jam dictum est. Procedere autem per similitudi- Felicianus quidam dixerat in fidei disciplina rationibus potius quam sacra Scripturæ auctoritatibus et testimoniis agendum esse. Bruckerus vero eumdem errorem D. Thomæ Aquinati tribuere videtur, siquidem de illo scripsit: « Immodicus peripateticæ philosophiæ amor virum hunc supersti-tioso obsequio philosopho addictum seduxit, ut theologiæ vulneribus, quæ præpostera philosophiæ commixtio inflixerat, nova adderet vulnera, sicque sacram doctrinam vere faceret philosophicam, immo gentilem. » Histor. crit. philosoph., t. III. Nostris autem temporibus in opere gallico cui titulus: de la Philosophie scholastique, Bartholomæus Haureau D. Thomam ethicam gentilem assumsisse non sine incredibili audacia affirmat. Ad refellendos hos omnes et consimiles, quid articulo isto clarius et brevius? « Utitur sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidem, sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia quæ tranes varias et repræsentationes est proprium poeticæ, quæ est infima inter omnes doctrinas. Ergo hujusmodi similitudinibus uti non est conveniens huic scientiae.

[I.q.1.a.9.arg.2] Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: "They that explain me shall have life everlasting" (Sirach 24:31). But by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

[I.q.1.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, hæc doctrina videtur esse ordinata ad veritatis manifestationem; unde et manifestatoribus ejus præmium promittitur, Eccli., xxiv, 31: Qui elucidant me, vitam æternam habebunt. Sed per hujusmodi similitudines veritas occultatur. Non igitur competit huic doctrina divina tradere sub similitudine corporalium rerum.

[I.q.1.a.9.arg.3] Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scriptures.

[I.q.1.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quanto aliquæ creaturæ sunt sublimiores tanto magis ad divinam similitudinem accedunt. Si igitur aliquæ ex creaturis transumerentur ad Deum, tunc oporteret talem transumptionem maxime fieri ex sublimioribus creaturis, et non ex infi-mis; quod tamen in Scripturis frequenter inventur.

[I.q.1.a.9.sc] It is written (Hosea 12:10): "I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets." But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.

[I.q.1.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Ose., xxii, 40: Ego visionem multiplicavi, et in manibus Prophetarum assimilatus sum. Tradere autem aliquid sub similitudine est metaphoricum. Ergo ad sacram doctrinam pertinet uti metaphoris.

[I.q.1.a.9.co] It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): "We cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils." It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of persons — "To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor" (Romans 1:14) — that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it.

[I.q.1.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conveniens est sacrae Scripturæ divina et spiritualia sub corporalium metaphoris tradere. Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum naturæ. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia veniat; quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet. Unde convenienter in sacra doctrina traduntur nobis spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium; et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, * Multiplicari, et in manu. 1 cap. Cælestis hierarch., § 2, col. 122, t. 4: « Impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum. » Convenit etiam sacrae Scripturæ, quæ communitur omnibus proponitur, secundum illud ad Rom., 1, 14: Sapientibus et insipientibus debitor sum, ut spiritualia sub similitudinibus corporalium proponantur, ut saltem vel sic rudes eam capiant, qui ad intelligibilia secundum se capienda non sunt idonei.

[I.q.1.a.9.ad.1] Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.

[I.q.1.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod poetica utitur metaphoris propter repræsentationem: repræsentatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitatem et utilitatem, sicut jam dictum est.

[I.q.1.a.9.ad.2] The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words "Give not that which is holy to dogs" (Matthew 7:6).

[I.q.1.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod radius divinæ revelationis non destruitur propter figuras sensibiles quibus circumvelatur, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. 11 Cæl. hierar., col. 138, t. 4, sed remanet in sua veritate, ut mentes, quibus fit revelatio, non permittantur in similitudinibus remanere, sed elevet eas ad cognitionem intelligibilium, et, per eos quibus revelatio facta est, allii etiam circa hæc instruantur. Unde ea quæ in uno loco Scripturæ traduntur sub metaphoris in aliis locis expressius exponuntur. Et ipsa etiam occultatio figurarum utilis est ad exercitium studiosorum, et contra irrisiones infidelium; de quibus dicitur Matth., vii, 6: Nolite sanctum dare canibus⁺.

[I.q.1.a.9.ad.3] As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.

[I.q.1.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut docet Dionysius, cap 11 Cæl. hierar., § 2, col. 138, 139, magis est conveniens quod divina in Scripturis tradantur sub figuris vilium corporum quam corporum nobiliorum. Et hoc propter tria. Primo, quia propter hoc magis liberatur humanus animus ab errore. Manifestum enim apparet quod hæc secundum proprietatem non dicuntur de divinis; quod posset esse dubium, si sub figuris nobiliorum corporum describerentur divina, maxime apud illos qui nihil aliud a corporibus nobilius excogitare noverunt. Secundo, quia hic modus convenientior est cognitioni quam de Deo habemus in hac vita. Magis enim manifestatur nobis de ipso quid non est quam quid est; et ideo similitudines illorum quæ magis elongantur a Deo veriorem nobis faciunt æstimationem quod sit supra illud quod de Deo dicimus vel cogitamus. Tertio, quia per hujusmodi divina magis occultantur indignis.

Article 10

[I.q.1.a.10.arg.1] It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.

[I.q.1.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sacra Scriptura sub una littera non habeat plures sensus, qui sunt historicus vel litteralis, allegoricus, tropologicus sive moralis, et anagogicus. Multiplicitas enim sensuum in una scriptura parit confusionem et deceptionem, et tollit argumentandi firmitatem; unde ex multiplicibus propositionibus non procedit argumentatio, sed secundum hoc aliquæ fallaciæ assignantur. Sacra autem Scriptura debet esse efficax ad ostendendam veritatem absque omni fallacia. Ergo non debent in ea sub una littera plures sensus tradi.

[I.q.1.a.10.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that "the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and allegory." Now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses mentioned above.

[I.q.1.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De utilitate credendi, cap. 11, col. 68, t. 8, quod « Scriptura quæ Testamentum vetus vocatur quadrifariam traditur scilicet secundum historiam, secundum aetiologiam, secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam. » Quæ quidem quatuor a quatuor prædictis Sic ex versione Scoti Erigenæ. Corderius autem, apud Migne: « Neque enim potest aliter divino principalis ille radius nobis illucescere, nisi sacrorum varietate operimentorum anagogice obvelatus. » Al., poeta. — Vocatur, diligenter eam nosse cupientibus, quadrifaria traditur: secundum, etc. » In maxima disceptatione positum est an genumina sint opera S. Dionysio Areopagitæ adscripta, an etiam S. Dionysius ille idem sit ac S. Dionysius parisiensis episcopus. Hanc controversiam pro præsenti dimittimus; melius enim tractanda veniet, cum de commentariis D. Thomæ super quosdam S. Dionysii libros agetur. Ubi invenerit P. Capponi a Porrecta Judæos Testamentum Vetus ubique in significatione vocum propria velle exponere, nescimus. Fatemur ipsum Christum quibusdam Judæis interpretationem Scripturæ nimium litteralem exprobrasse, cum dixit eis: Littera occidit, spiritus vivificat. In eumdem errorem nonnullos e Christianis incidisse non diffitemur. Ast ex hoc non sequitur tales sensum metaphoricum omnino rejecisse, significationique propriæ vocum semper ac pertinaciter insensato animo adhæsisse. omnino videntur aliena. Non igitur videtur conveniens quod eadem littera sacra Scripturæ secundum quatuor sensus praedictos exponatur.

[I.q.1.a.10.arg.3] Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four.

[I.q.1.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præter praedictos sensus inventur sensus parabolicus, qui inter illos quatuor non continetur.

[I.q.1.a.10.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): "Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery."

[I.q.1.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius, XX Moral., cap. 1, col. 135, t. 2: « Sacra Scriptura omnes scientias ipso locutionis suæ more transcendit; quia uno eodemque sermone, dum narrat gestum, prodit mysterium. »

[I.q.1.a.10.co] The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (Hebrews 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) "the New Law itself is a figure of future glory." Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

[I.q.1.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod auctor sacra Scripturæ est Deus, in cujus potestate est ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet, quod etiam homo facere potest, sed etiam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significant, hoc habet proprium ista scientia quod ipsæ res significatæ per voces etiam significant aliquid. Illa ergo prima significatio qua voces significant res pertinet ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel litteralis. Illa vero significatio qua res significatæ per voces iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis, qui super litteralem fundatur, et eum supponit.

[I.q.1.a.10.ad.1] The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one — the literal — from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

[I.q.1.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod multiplicitas horum sensuum non facit æquivocationem, aut aliam speciem multiplicitatis; quia, sicut jam dictum est, isti non multiplicantur propter hoc quod una vox multa significet, sed quia ipsæ res significatæ per voces aliarum rerum possunt esse signa. al.: « In iis quæ Christum significant. » Sed, ni fallimur, hic agitur de his qui, ut Christi figuræ, per Christum significant, v. g. Adam, Noe, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Moyses, Samson et alii quam plurimi. Item Agnus paschalis, etc. Sensus Scripturæ sacræ generatim dividitur in litteralem seu historicum, et mysticum seu spiritualem. Quidam tamen recentiores, inter Catholicos etiam, sed non absque magna audacia, sensum mysticum vel excludere videntur, vel aperte excludunt. Aliqui nihilominus ex ipsis duplicem Scripturæ sensum, immediatum scilicet seu litteralem, et mediatum seu symbolicum retinent. Hæc Protestantium inventa redolent, qui fundamentum suæ theologiæ grammaticam ponunt. Sensus litteralis dicit id quod directe Spiritus sanctus exprimere voluit, et grammaticalis vel metaphoricus est. Sensus mysticus id dicit quod Spiritus sanctus mediate et oblique exprimere intendit, et est anagogicus, allegoricus et tropologicus seu moralis. Allegoricus fidei, anagogicus spei, tropologicus charitati respondet. Sub nomine allegorici et anagogicus et tropologicus comprehendi possent. Præter illos sensus, auctores accommodatitium et parabolicum agnoscunt: accommodatitius non Spiritus sancti sed hominis sensus est; parabolicus ad metaphoricum pertinet. Porro quidam grammaticalem proprium et metaphoricum translatum vocant. Mystico litteralis prioritate, certitudine, efficacia argumentativa, et generalitate; litterali mysticus dignitate, intentione Spiritus sancti, et nobilitate prævalet. Argumentatio regulariter ex solo litterali fit; nil obstat tamen quin et ex mystico per aliam Scripturam sacram vel per Ecclesiam asserto ac determinato procedat. An vero textus unicus plures litterales sensus patiatur? Illud S. Augustinus, S. Thomas, et romani pontifices multi cum aliis communius theologis catholicis affirmant, Lutherus omnium primus, et post ipsum nonnulli negant. Prioris et communioris sententiae patroni textum Isaiae: Generationem ejus quis enarrabit? in exemplum allegant; hunc enim textum de duplici generatione Christi, temporali scilicet ac æterna litteraliter intelligunt. Nota caute SS. Patres aliquando ly mysticum usurpasse non ad dividendum sensum litteralem contra sensum mysticum, sed ad dividendum sensum litteralem jam clarum et manifestatum contra sensum litteralem adhuc absconditum et occultum. Nam obscura secundum litteralem quoque sensum sacra Scriptura esse potest et est interdum, quidquid asserant Wicleffus et Lutherus sibimetipsis in hoc aperte mentientes. Et ita etiam nulla confusio sequitur in sacra Scriptura, cum omnes sensus fundentur super unum, scilicet litteralem, ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum, non ex iis quae secundum allegoriam dicuntur, ut dicit Augustinus, in Epist. xliii cont. Vincentium Donatistam, col. 334, t. 2. Non tamen ex hoc aliquid deperit sacræ Scripturæ, quia nihil sub spirituali sensu continetur fidei necessarium quod Scriptura per litteralem sensum alicubi manifeste non tradat.

[I.q.1.a.10.ad.2] These three — history, etiology, analogy — are grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives — namely, on account of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only — the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

[I.q.1.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod tria illa, scilicet historia, aetiologia, analogia, ad unum litteralem sensum pertinent; nam historia est, ut ipse Augustinus exponit, ubi supra, cum simpliciter aliquid proponitur: aetiologia vero, cum causa dicti assignatur, sicut cum Dominus assignavit causam quare Moyses permisit licentiam repudiandi uxores, scilicet propter duritiam cordis ipsorum, Matth., xix. Analogia vero est cum veritas unius Scripturæ ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare. Sola autem allegoria inter illa quatuor pro tribus spiritualibus sensibus ponitur, sicut et Hugo de Sancto Victore sub sensu allegorico etiam anagogicum comprehendit, ponens in IV suarum Sententiarum, col. 184, t. 4, solum tres sensus, scilicet historicum, allegoricum et tropologicum.

[I.q.1.a.10.ad.3] The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[I.q.1.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sensus parabolicus sub litterali continetur; nam per voces significatur aliquid proprie et aliquid figurate. Nec est litteralis sensus ipsa figura, sed id quod est figuratum. Non enim, cum Scriptura nominat Dei brachium, est litteralis sensus quod in Deo sit membrum hujsmodi corporale, sed id quod per hoc membrum significatur, scilicet virtus operativa; in quo patet quod sensui litterali sacræ Scripturæ nunquam potest subesse falsum.

Prima Pars

Q2. The existence of God →

JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-pars/q001.json