Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q31. The unity or plurality in God
Source context
- Theme
- Trinitarian unity and plurality as structural problem in divine ontology
Steiner
- GA 265a, 1912-08-01Steiner treats the opposition of monism and pluralism as a question that dissolves at the level of spiritual reality: multiplicity belongs to origin, unity to goal, so the apparent contradiction between divine oneness and plurality of persons is a function of perspective within earthly consciousness.
- GA 142, 1912-12-28Steiner contrasts the Sankhya-philosophical position, which holds plurality of souls as irreducible and traces no origin back to unity, with the Christian-revelatory stream in which unity of source is foundational — a structural point relevant to Aquinas's insistence that the three Persons share one divine essence.
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads)Plotinus's derivation of the Many from the One (to Hen) provides a structural analogue to Aquinas's argument that real distinction of Persons is compatible with absolute unity of substance, though Aquinas's Trinitarian persons are co-equal rather than hierarchically emanated.
- Vedanta (Advaita)Advaita Vedanta's insistence on non-dual Brahman as ground of apparent plurality offers cross-tradition congruence with the Thomistic claim that numerical unity in God does not exclude relational distinction, though the Vedantic resolution absorbs distinction whereas Aquinas preserves real personal relations.
- Kabbalistic doctrine of Ein Sof and SefirotThe Kabbalistic structure of an unknowable infinite unity (Ein Sof) unfolding into ten relational attributes (Sefirot) presents cross-tradition congruence with the Scholastic problem of reconciling divine simplicity with Trinitarian plurality.
Q31. The unity or plurality in God
Article 1
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.1] It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be applied to God.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit Trinitas in divinis. Omne enim nomen in divinis vel significat substantiam, vel relationem. Sed hoc nomen, Trinitas, non significat substantiam, prædicaretur enim de singulis personis; neque significat relationem, quia non dicitur secundum nomen ad aliud. Ergo nomine Trinitas non est utendum in divinis.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.2] Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity" does not apply to God.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, hoc nomen Trinitas videtur esse nomen collectivum, cum significet multitudinem. Tale autem nomen non convenit in divinis, cum unitas importata per nomen collectivum sit minima unitas. Ergo hoc nomen, Trinitas, non convenit in divinis.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.3] Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither is there trinity in God.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne trinum est triplex. Sed in Deo non est triplicitas, cum triplicitas sit species inæqualitatis. Ergo nec Trinitas.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.4] Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, quidquid est in Deo, est in unitate essentiae divinæ, quia Deus est sua essentia. Si igitur Trinitas est in Deo, erit in unitate essentiae divinæ; et sic erunt tres essentiales unitates, quod est hæreticum.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.5] Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word trinity is not to be applied to God.
[I.q.31.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, in omnibus quæ dicuntur de Deo, concretum prædicatur de abstracto; Deitas enim est Deus, et paternitas est Pater. Sed Trinitas non potest dici trina, quia sic essent novem res in divinis, quod est erroneum. Ergo nomine Trinitatis non est utendum in divinis.
[I.q.31.a.1.sc] Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in Unity is to be revered."
[I.q.31.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Athanasius, in Symbolo fidei, col. 1583, text. 4, dicit quod « Unitas in Trinitate, et Trinitas in Unitate veneranda sit. »
[I.q.31.a.1.co] The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner.
[I.q.31.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen Trinitatis in divinis significat determinatum numerum personarum. Sicut igitur ponitur pluralitas personarum in divinis, utendum est nomine Trinitatis; quia hoc idem quod significat pluralitas indeterminate, significat hoc nomen Trinitas determinate.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.1] In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity" seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc no- 1 Sic cod.; in edit.: « in divinis autem est maxima unitas. » 2 Sic codices quos vidimus, excepto codice quomen, Trinitas, secundum etymologiam vocabuli videtur significare unam essentiam trium personarum, secundum quod dicitur Trinitas, quasi trium unitas; sed secundum proprietatem vocabuli significat magis numerum personarum unius essentiae; et propter hoc non possumus dicere quod Pater sit Trinitas, quia non est tres personae. Non autem significat ipsas relationes personarum, et inde est quod secundum nomen ad aliud non refertur.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.2] Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For "people" is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words; but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is unity of essence.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nomen collectivum duo importat, scilicet pluralitatem suppositorum, et unitatem quamdam, scilicet ordinis alicujus. Populus enim est multitudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum. Quantum ergo ad primum, hoc nomen, Trinitas, convenit cum nominibus collectivis; sed quantum ad secundum differt, quia in divina Trinitate non solum est unitas ordinis, sed cum hoc etiam unitas essentiae.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.3] "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons. "Triplicity" signifies a proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not triplicity, but Trinity.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Trinitas absolute dicitur; significat enim numerum ternarium personarum. Sed triplicitas significat proportionem inæqualitatis: est enim species proportionis inæqualis, sicut patet per Boetium in Arithmetica, lib. I, cap. xxiii, col. 1100, t. 4. Et ideo non est in Deo triplicitas, sed Trinitas.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.4] In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in its "supposita."
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in Trinitate divina intelligitur et numerus et personae numeratæ. Cum ergo dicimus Trinitatem in unitate, non ponimus numerum in unitate essentiae, quasi sit ter una; sed personas numeratas ponimus in unitate naturæ, sicut supposita alicujus naturæ dicuntur esse in natura illa. E converso autem dicimus unitatem in Trinitate, sicut natura dicitur esse in suis suppositis.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.5] When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three "supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it follows that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead.
[I.q.31.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum dicimus: Trinitas est trina, ratione numeri importati significatur multiplicatio ejusdem numeri in seipsum; cum hoc quod dico trinum importet distinctionem in suppositis illius de quo dicitur. Et ideo non potest dici quod Trinitas sit trina, quia sequeretur, si Trinitas esset trina, quod tria essent supposita Trinitatis; sicut cum dicitur: Deus est trinus, sequitur quod sunt tria supposita deitatis.
Article 2
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father. For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity."
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Filius non sit alius a Patre. Alius enim est relativum diversitatis substantiæ. Si igitur Filius est alius a Patre, videtur quod sit a Patre diversus; quod est contra Augustinum, De Trin., lib. VII, c. vi, col. 946, t. 8, ubi dicit quod « cum dicimus tres personas, non diversitatem intelligere volumus. »
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.2] Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity."
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque sunt alii ab invicem, aliquo modo ab invicem differunt. Si igitur Filius est alius a Patre, sequitur quod sit differens a Patre, quod est contra Ambrosium, in I De fide, cap. 11, § 18, col. 555, t. 3, ubi ait: « Pater et Filius deitate unum sunt; nec est ibi substantiae differentia, neque ulla diversitas. »
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.3] Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, alienum ab alio dicitur. Sed Filius non est alienus a Patre; dicit enim Hilarius in VII De Trin., § 39, col. 232, t. 2, quod « in divinis personis nihil est diversum, nihil alienum, nihil separabile. » Ergo Filius non est alius a Patre.
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.4] Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father.
[I.q.31.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, alius et aliud idem significant, sed sola generis consignificatione different. Si ergo Filius est alius a Patre; videtur sequui quod Filius sit alius a Patre.
[I.q.31.a.2.sc] Augustine [Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says: "There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another."
[I.q.31.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De fide ad Petrum, cap. 1, col. 755, t. 6, inter opera Augustini, et inter opera Fulgentii, col. 674, § 5: « Una est enim essentia Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti, in qua non est aliud Pater, aliud Filius, aliud Spiritus sanctus; quamvis personaliter sit alius Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus sanctus. »
[I.q.31.a.2.co] Since as Jerome remarks [In substance, Ep. lvii.], a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them--namely, the error of Arius, who placed a Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or "difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of "diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead": and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable."
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity," lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead." We must avoid the adjective "only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness." Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference." The word "solitary" is also to be avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God."
This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
[I.q.31.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur hæresis, ut Hieronymus dicit 7, ideo cum de Trinitate loquimur, cum cautela et modestia est agendum: quia, ut Augustinus dicit in I De Trin., cap. 11, col. 822, t. 8, « nec periculosius alicubi erratur, nec laboriosius aliquid quæritur, nec fructuosius aliquid inveni-tur. » Oportet autem in his quæ de Trinitate loquimur, duos errores oppositos cavere; temperate inter utrumque procedentes, sci-licet errorem Arii, qui posuit cum Trinitate personarum Trinitatem substantiarum, et errorem Sabellii, qui posuit cum unitate essentiae unitatem personæ. Ad evitandum igitur errorem Arii, vitare debemus in divinis nomen separationis vel divisionis 8, ne tollatur unitas essentiae. Possumus autem uti nomine distinctionis propter oppositionem relativam. Unde sicubi in aliqua Scriptura authentica diversitas vel differentia personarum invenitur, sumitur diversitas vel differentia pro distinctione. Ne autem tollatur simplicitas divinæ essentiae, vitandum est nomen separationis et divisionis, quæ est totius in partes. Ne autem tollatur aequalitas, vitandum est nomen disparitatis. Ne vero tollatur similitudo, vitandum est nomen alieni et discrepantis. Dicit enim Ambrosius, in lib. I De fide, cap. 11, § 17, col. 555, t. 3, quod « in Patre et Filio non est discrepans, sed una divinitas 9. » Et, secundum Hilarium, ut dictum est: « In divinis nihil est separabile. » Ad vitandum vero errorem Sabellii vitare debemus singularitatem, ne tollatur communicabilitas essentiae divinæ. Unde Hilarius dicit, VII De Trin., § 39, col. 233, t. 2: « Patrem et Filium singularem Deum pra-dicare sacrilegium est. » Debemus etiam vitare nomen, « unici, » ne tollatur numerus personarum. Unde Hilarius, in eod. lib., dicit quod « a Deo excluditur singularitas, atque unici intelligentia. » Dicimus tamen unicum Filium, quia non sunt plures filii in divinis. Neque tamen dicimus unicum 1 Equivalenter tantum.—2 Cod. Alc.: « sequetur.» 3 Quanto magis Pater et Filius divinitate unum sunt, ubi nec substantiae nec voluntatis ulla est differentia? » 4 5 In his nominibus ac rebus nihil in se novum, nihil diversum, nihilque peregrinum est. »; sed loco nominis Augustini repo-nendum est Fulgentii nomen: nam liber De fide, qui ex auctoritate aliquot manuscriptorum olim D. Augustino tribuebatur, jam omnium consensu ut genuinum opus S. Fulgentii cognoscitur. 7 Citatur in IV Sentent., dist. xiii. Sed nullibi sic expresse, fatente eruditissimo Nicolai, legitur apud D. Hieronymum, licet aliquid simile ex diversis locis colligi possit, præsertim, ex Ose., c. ix, v. 8, col. 895, t. 6: « Hi sunt speculatores Ephraim, qui insaniam in domo Domini confinxerunt, hoc est, in Ecclesia, sive in Scripturis sanctis, perverse eas interpretantes, » etc. 8 Sic cod.; in edit.: « diversitatis et differentia. » 9 Est enim plenitudo divinitatis in Patre, est plenitudo divinitatis in Filio, non discrepans, sed una divinitas. » Deum, quia pluribus deitas est communis. Vitamus etiam nomen « confusi, » ne tollatur ordo naturæ a personis. Unde Ambrosius dicit, I De fide, cap. 11, § 18, col. 555, t. 3: « Neque confusum est quod unus est, neque multiplex esse potest quod indifferens est. » Vitandum est etiam nomen « solitarii, » ne tollatur consortium trium personarum; dicit enim Hilarius, IV De Trin., § 18, col. 411, t. 2: « Nobis neque solitarius neque diversus Deus est confitendus. » Hoc autem nomen, alius, masculine sumptum, non importat nisi distinctionem suppositi. Unde convenienter dicere possumus quod Filius est alius a Patre, quia scilicet est aliud suppositum divinæ naturæ, sicut est alia persona et alia hypostasis.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.1] "Other," being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod alius, quia est sicut quoddam particulare nomen, tenet se ex parte suppositi; unde ad ejus rationem sufficit distinctio substantiæ, quæ est hypostasis, vel persona. Sed diversitas requirit distinctionem substantiæ, quæ est essentia. Et ideo non possumus dicere quod Filius sit diversus a Patre, licet sit alius.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.2] "Difference" implies distinction of form. There is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the form of God" (Philippians 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But "difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod differentia importat distinctionem formæ. Est autem tantum una forma in divinis, ut patet per id quod dicitur, Philip., 11, 6: Qui cum in forma Dei esset. Et ideo nomen differentiæ non proprie competit in divinis, ut patet per auctoritatem inductam in 2 arg. Utitur tamen Damascenus, De orth. fide, lib. III, cap. v, col. 999, t. 1, nomine « differentiæ, » in divinis personis, secundum quod proprietas relativa significatur per modum formæ. Unde dicit quod non differunt ab invicem hypostases secundum substantiam, sed secundum determinatas proprietates. Sed differentia sumitur pro distinctione, ut dictum est.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.3] The term "alien" means what is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that He is anything "alien."
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod alienum est quod est extraneum et dissimile. Sed hoc non importatur cum dicitur alius; et ideo dicimus Filium alium a Patre, licet non dicamus alienum.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.4] The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.
[I.q.31.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod neutrum genus est informe; masculinum autem est informatum et distinctum et similiter femininum. Et ideo convenienter per neutrum genus significatur essentia communis, per masculinum autem et femininum aliquod suppositum determinatum in communi natura. Unde etiam in rebus humanis si quæ-ratur: Quis est iste? respondetur: Socrates, quod nomen est suppositi. Si autem quæ-ratur: Quid est iste? respondetur: Animal rationale et mortale. Et ideo, quia in divinis distinctio est secundum personas, non autem secundum essentiam, dicimus quod Pater est alius a Filio sed non aliud; et e converso dicimus quod sunt unum, sed non unus.
Article 3
[I.q.31.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another." But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that God is alone.
[I.q.31.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dictio exclusiva, « solus, » non sit addenda termino essentiali, in divinis. Quia, secundum Philosophum in II Elenc., c. 111, a med., « solus est qui cum alio non est. » Sed Deus est cum angelis et sanctis animabus. Ergo non possumus dicere Deum solum.
[I.q.31.a.3.arg.2] Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone." Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.
[I.q.31.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidquid adjungitur termino essentiali in divinis potest prædicari de qualibet persona per se, et de omnibus simul; quia enim convenienter dicitur sapiens Deus, possumus dicere: Pater est sapiens Deus, et Trinitas est sapiens Deus. Sed Augustinus, in VI De Trin., cap. 1x, col. 930, t. 8, dicit: « Consideranda est illa sententia, qua dicitur non esse Patrem verum Deum solum. Ergo non potest dici solus Deus.
[I.q.31.a.3.arg.3] Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
[I.q.31.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, si hæc dictio « solus, » adjungitur termino essentiali, aut hoc erit respectu prædicati personalis, aut respectu prædicati essentialis; sed non respectu prædicati personalis, quia hæc est falsa: Solus Deus est pater, cum etiam homo sit pater; neque etiam respectu prædicati essentialis, quia si hæc esset vera: Solus Deus creat, videtur sequi quod hæc esset vera: Pater creat, quia quidquid dicitur de Deo, potest dici de Patre. Hæc autem est falsa, quia etiam Filius est creator. Non ergo hæc dictio « solus » potest in divinis adjungi termino essentiali. « Nec confusum, quod unum est; nec multiplex, quod indifferens. » « Differentiæ » vocabulum in nova versione non habetur, sed « discriminis, » ut videre est loco ci-tato. « Qua dicitur Deum verum solum non esse Patrem solum, sed Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum. »
[I.q.31.a.3.sc] It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God" (1 Timothy 1:17).
[I.q.31.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Tim., 1, 47: Regi sæculorum immortali, invisibili, soli Deo.
[I.q.31.a.3.co] This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man." If the term "alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is above stated (2). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other "suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.
[I.q.31.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hæc dictio, solus, potest accipi ut categorematica vel syncategorematica. Dicitur autem dictio categorematica quæ absolute ponit rem significatam circa aliquod suppositum, ut albus circa hominem, cum dicitur homo albus. Si ergo sic accipiatur hæc dictio solus, nullo modo potest adjungi alicui termino in divinis, quia poneret solitudinem circa terminum cui adjungeretur; et sic sequeretur Deum esse solitarium, quod est contra prædicta. Dictio vero syncategorematica dicitur quæ importat ordinem prædicati ad subjectum, sicut hæc dictio, omnis, vel nullus; et similiter hæc dictio solus, quia excludit omne aliud suppositum a consortio prædicati. Sicut cum dicitur: Solus Socrates scribit, non datur intelligi quod Socrates sit solitarius, sed quod nullus sit ei consors in scribendo, quamvis cum eo multis existentibus. Et per hunc modum, nihil prohibet hanc distinctionem, solus, adjungere alicui essentiali termino in divinis, inquantum excluduntur omnia alia a Deo, a consortio prædicati; ut si dicamus: Solus Deus est aeternus, quia nihil præter Deum est aeternum.
[I.q.31.a.3.ad.1] Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
[I.q.31.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet angeli et animæ sanctæ semper sint cum Deo, tamen si non esset pluralitas personarum in divinis, sequeretur quod Deus esset solus, vel solitarius. Non enim tollitur solitudo per associationem alicujus quod est extraneæ naturæ; dicitur enim aliquis solus esse in horto, quamvis sint ibi multæ plantæ et animalia. Et similiter diceretur Deus esse solus vel solitarius, angelis et hominibus cum eo existentibus, si non essent in divinis personæ plures. Consociatio igitur angelo-rum et animarum non excludit solitudinem absolutam a divinis; multo minus solitu-dinem respectivam, et per comparationem ad aliquod prædicatum.
[I.q.31.a.3.ad.2] This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the "suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"--that is, no one else--"runs: and Socrates runs only"--that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the "suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.
[I.q.31.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hæc dictio, solus, proprie loquendo, non ponitur ex parte prædicati quod sumitur formaliter; respicit enim suppositum inquantum excludit aliud suppositum ab eo cui adjungitur. Sed hoc adverbium, tantum, cum sit exclusivum, potest poni ex parte subjecti et ex parte prædicati. Possumus enim dicere: Tantum Socrates currit, id est, nullus alius; et Socrates currit tantum, id est, nihil alius facit. Unde non proprie dici potest: Pater est solus Deus; vel, Trinitas est solus Deus, nisi forte ex parte prædicati intelligatur aliqua implicatio, ut dicatur: Trinitas est Deus qui est solus Deus. Augustinus autem cum dicit Patrem non esse solum Deum, sed Trinitatem esse solum Deum, loquitur expositive; ac si diceret, cum di-citur Regi sæculorum invisibili, soli Deo, non esse exponendum de persona Patris, sed de tota Trinitate.
[I.q.31.a.3.ad.3] In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."
[I.q.31.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod utroque modo potest hæc dictio, solus, adjungi termino essentiali. Hæc enim propositio: Solus Deus est pater, est duplex: quia ly pater potest prædicare personam Patris; et sic est vera: non enim homo est illa persona; vel potest prædicare relationem tantum; et sic est falsa, quia relatio paternitatis etiam in aliis invenitur, licet non univoce. Similiter hæc est vera: Solus Deus creat; nec tamen se-quitur: Ergo solus Pater, quia, ut sophistæ dicunt, dictio exclusiva immobilitat terminum cui adjungitur, ut non possit fieri sub eo descensus pro aliquo suppositorum. Non enim sequitur: Solus homo est animal risibile; ergo solus Socrates.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-pars/q031.json