Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q33. The person of the Father
Source context
- Theme
- Proper name, innascibility, and causal primacy of the First Person of the Trinity
Steiner
- GA 220, 1923-01-27Steiner addresses the scholastic-theological debate over whether the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone or from Father and Son together, placing the question of the Father's unique hypostatic role at the center of medieval Trinitarian controversy.
- GA 214, 1922-07-30Steiner identifies the Father-principle as a living cosmic reality—the foundational ground breathed into the human being as soul—distinct from the Son- and Spirit-principles, paralleling Aquinas's treatment of the Father as the unoriginate source within the Trinity.
- GA 117a, 1910-01-11Steiner describes the physical body as a crystallization of the Father-principle of the cosmos, indicating that the Father represents the originating creative ground from which substantial existence derives.
Cross-tradition
- Eastern Orthodox theology (Cappadocian Fathers)The Cappadocian Fathers, particularly Gregory of Nazianzus, locate the Father's personal property in being agennetos (unbegotten), the sole arche or principle within the Godhead — a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of the Father's incommunicable property as innascibility.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads)Plotinus's One as the absolute, self-sufficient first hypostasis from which Nous and Soul emanate offers a structural analogue to the Father's causal primacy, though Aquinas carefully distinguishes Trinitarian procession from Neoplatonic emanation by insisting on equality of persons.
Q33. The person of the Father
Article 1
[I.q.33.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the principle of the Son.
[I.q.33.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Pater non possit dici principium Filii, vel Spiritus sancti. Principium enim et causa idem sunt, secundum Philosophum, ex l. IV Metaph., text. 3. Sed non dicimus Patrem esse causam Filii. Ergo non debet dici quod sit ejus principium.
[I.q.33.a.1.arg.2] Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears false.
[I.q.33.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, principium dicitur respectu principiati. Si igitur Pater est principium Filii, sequitur Filium esse principiatum, et per consequens esse creatum; quod videtur esse erroneum.
[I.q.33.a.1.arg.3] Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.
[I.q.33.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nomen principii a prioritate sumitur. Sed in divinis non est prius et posterius, ut Athanasius dicit in suo Symb. fid., Helcanæ, indirecte affirmatio mea, non negatio, pertinet ad fidem. Hujus articuli claritatem, prudentiam et charitatem observa. Non incaute enim hæretici vocandi sunt contra nos orthodoxos quicumque sentientes, etiam sentientes pertinaciter, nisi eorum sententiam esse hæreticam judicium Ecclesiæ declaraverit. col. 4583, t. 4. Ergo in divinis non debemus uti nomine principii.
[I.q.33.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), "The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity."
[I.q.33.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, IV De Trin., cap. xx, col. 908, t. 8: « Pater est principium totius Deitatis. »
[I.q.33.a.1.co] The word "principle" signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.
[I.q.33.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc nomen principium nihil aliud significat quam id a quo aliquid procedit. Omne enim a quo aliquid procedit quocumque modo, dicimus esse principium, et e converso. Cum ergo Pater sit a quo procedit alius, sequitur quod Pater est principium.
[I.q.33.a.1.ad.1] The Greeks use the words "cause" and "principle" indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word "cause," but only "principle." The reason is because "principle" is a wider term than "cause"; as "cause" is more common than "element." For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (13, 11), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term "cause" seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word "principle." For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we use the term "principle" even in things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a line.
[I.q.33.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Græci utuntur in divinis indifferenter nomine causæ, sicut et nomine principii; sed latini doctores non utuntur nomine causæ, sed solum nomine principii. Cujus ratio est, quia principium communius est quam causa, sicut causa communius quam elementum. Primus enim terminus, vel etiam prima pars rei, dicitur principium, sed non causa. Quanto autem aliquod nomen est communius, tanto convenientius assumitur in divinis, ut supra dictum est, quia nomina quanto magis specialia sunt, tanto magis determinant modum convenientem creaturæ. Unde hoc nomen, causa, videtur importare diversitatem substantiæ, et dependentiam alicujus ab altero, quam non importat nomen principii. In omnibus enim causæ generibus semper inventur distantia inter causam et id cujus est causa, secundum aliquam perfectionem aut virtutem. Sed nomine principii utimur etiam in his quæ nullam hujusmodi differentiam habent, sed solum secundum quemdam ordinem; sicut cum dicimus punctum esse principium lineæ, vel etiam cum dicimus frontem lineæ esse primam partem lineæ.
[I.q.33.a.1.ad.2] It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): "By authority of the Giver, the Father is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is give."
[I.q.33.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod apud Græcos inventur de Filio vel Spiritu sancto dici, quod principientur. Sed hoc non est in usu doctorum nostrorum; quia, licet attribuamus Patri aliquid auctoritatis ratione principii, nihil tamen ad subjectionem vel mino-rationem quocumque modo pertinens attribuimus Filio vel Spiritui sancto, ut vitetur omnis erroris occasio. Secundum quem modum Hilarius dicit, De Trinit., lib., ix, § 54, col. 325, t. 2: « Donantis auctoritate Pater major est; sed minor non est Filius, cui unum esse donatur. »
[I.q.33.a.1.ad.3] Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above (Question 13, Article 8).
[I.q.33.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet hoc nomen principium, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum, videatur a prioritate sumptum, non tamen significat prioritatem, sed originem. Non enim idem est quod significat nomen, et a quo nomen imponitur, ut supra dictum est.
Article 2
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that this name "Father" is not properly the name of a divine person. For the name "Father" signifies relation. Moreover "person" is an individual substance. Therefore this name "Father" is not properly a name signifying a Person.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hoc nomen, Pater, non sit proprie nomen divinæ personæ. Hoc enim nomen, Pater, significat relationem. Persona autem est substantia individua. Non ergo hoc nomen, Pater, est proprie nomen significativum personæ.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.2] Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is more properly applied to God, as stated above (Question 13, Article 11). Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, generans communius est quam pater; nam omnis pater est generans, sed non e converso. Sed nomen communius magis proprie dicitur in divinis, ut dictum est. Ergo magis proprium nomen est personæ divinæ generans et genitor, quam Pater.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.3] Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly called Father.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nihil quod secundum metaphoram dicitur potest esse nomen proprium alicujus. Sed verbum metaphorice apud nos dicitur genitum, vel proles, et per consequens ille cujus est verbum, metaphorice dicitur pater. Non ergo principium Verbi in divinis potest dici Pater.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.4] Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name "Father" taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person.
[I.q.33.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, omne quod proprie dicitur « Totius divinitatis, vel, si melius dicitur, deitatis, principium Pater est. » Nicolaï: « primam partem lineæ. » Sic etiam codices; Parm. vero: « principium. » Hic, ni fallor, S. Doctor primæ lineæ, seu fronti aciei alludit; hæc autem prima linea, prima pars est seu principium linearum aciei, et ordinem solummodo signat. Sic cod.; in Parm. et in edit. omittitur « proprie: » omissio mala. 1. Quando Græci utuntur in divinis nomine causæ, sumunt causam prout significat id a quo aliquid est quovismodo sit. Eodem sensu Patres concilii Florentini dixerunt Patrem esse causam Filii. 2 Græcis posset quidem concedi Filium in divinis esse principiatum; non tamen sic loquimur propter arianismum. 3. Hoc nomen principium potest sumi essential-liter respective ad creaturas, et notionaliter; primo modo est commune tribus personis: opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa; secundo modo special-liter Patri convenit. in divinis, per prius dicitur de Deo quam de creaturis. Sed generatio per prius videtur dici de creaturis quam de Deo; verior enim ibi videtur esse generatio, ubi aliquid procedit ab alio distinctum, non secundum relationem tantum, sed etiam secundum essentiam. Ergo nomen patris, quod a generatione sumitur, non videtur esse proprium alicujus divinæ personæ.
[I.q.33.a.2.sc] It is said (Psalm 88:27): "He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father."
[I.q.33.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in ps. Lxxxviii, 27: Ipse invocabit me: Pater meus es tu.
[I.q.33.a.2.co] The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other persons. Hence this name "Father," whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father.
[I.q.33.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen proprium cujuslibet personæ significat id per quod illa persona distinguitur ab omnibus aliis. Sicut enim de ratione hominis est anima et corpus, ita de intellectu hujus hominis est hæc anima et hoc corpus, ut dicitur in VII Met., text. 34 et 35, his autem hic homo ab omnibus aliis distinguitur. Id autem per quod distinguitur persona Patris ab omnibus aliis, est paternitas. Unde proprium nomen personæ Patris est hoc nomen Pater, quod significat paternitatem.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.1] Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name "father" among us does not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God the relation signified by the name "Father" is a subsisting person. Hence, as above explained (29, 4), this name "person" in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apud nos relatio non est subsistens persona. Et ideo hoc nomen Patter, apud nos non significat personam, sed relationem personæ. Non autem est ita in divinis, ut quidam falso opinati sunt; nam relatio quam significat hoc nomen, Patter, est subsistens persona. Unde supra dictum est, quod hoc nomen persona in divinis significat relationem ut subsistentem in divina natura.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.2] According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the name "Father" is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, secundum Philosophum in II De anima, in text. 49, denominatio rei maxime debet fieri a perfectione et fine. Generatio autem significat ut in fieri; sed paternitas significat complementum generationis; et ideo potius est nomen divinæ personæ Patter, quam generans vel genitor.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.3] In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod verbum non est quid subsistens in natura humana; unde non proprie potest dici genitum vel filius. Sed Verbum divinum est aliquid subsistens in natura divina; unde proprie et non metaphorice dicitur Filius, et ejus principium Patter.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.4] The terms "generation" and "paternity" like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, "I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named" (Ephesians 3:14). This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.
[I.q.33.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod nomen generationis et paternitatis, sicut et alia nomina quæ proprie dicuntur in divinis, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis quantum ad rem significatam, licet non quantum ad modum significandi. Unde et Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., 11, 14: Flecto genua mea ad patrem Domini mei * Jesu Christi, ex quo omnis paternitas in cælo * et in terra nominatur. Quod sic apparet: manifestum est enim quod generatio accipit speciem a termin qui est forma generati; et quanto hic fuerit propinquior formæ generantis, tanto verior et perfectior est generatio; sicut generatio univoca est perfectior quam non univoca: nam de ratione generantis est quod generet sibi simile secundum formam. Unde hoc ipsum quod in generatione divina est eadem numero forma generantis et geniti, in rebus autem creatis non est eadem numero, sed specie tantum, ostendit quod generatio, et per consequens paternitas, per prius sit in Deo quam in creaturis. Unde hoc ipsum quod in divinis est distinctio geniti a generante secundum relationem tantum, ad veritatem divinæ generationis et paternitatis pertinet.
Article 4
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod esse ingenitum non sit Patri proprium. Omnis enim proprietas ponit aliquid in eo cujus est proprietas. Sed « ingenitus » nihil ponit in Patre, sed removet tantum. Ergo non significat proprietatem Patris.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.2] Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ingenitum aut dicitur privative, aut negative. Si negative, tunc quidquid non est genitum, potest dici ingenitum. Sed Spiritus sanctus non est genitus, neque etiam essentia divina. Ergo ingenitum etiam ei convenit, et sic non est proprium Patri. Si autem privative sumatur, cum omnis privatio significet imperfectionem in privato, sequitur quod persona Patris sit imperfecta, quod est impossibile.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.3] Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ingenitus in divinis non significat relationem, quia non dicitur relative. Significat ergo substantiam. Ingenitus igitur et genitus secundum substantiam differunt. Filius autem qui est genitus non differt a Patre secundum substantiam. Pater ergo non debet dici ingenitus.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.4] Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, proprium est quod uni soli convenit. Sed cum sint plures ab alio procedentes in divinis nihil videtur prohibere quin etiam sint plures ab alio non existentes. Non igitur est proprium Patri esse ingenitum.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.5] Further, as the Father is the principle of the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be unproceeding.
[I.q.33.a.4.arg.5] 5. Præterea, sicut Pater est principium personæ genitæ, ita et personæ procedentis. Si ergo propter oppositionem quam habet ad personam genitam, proprium Patris ponitur esse quod sit ingenitus, etiam proprium ejus debet poni quod sit improcessibilis.
[I.q.33.a.4.sc] Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "One is from one --that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten--namely, by the property in each one respectively of innascibility and origin."
[I.q.33.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Hilarius, IV De Trinit., § 33, col. 120, t. 2: « Est unus ab uno, » scilicet ab ingenito, genitus, « proprietate videlicet in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis. »
[I.q.33.a.4.co] As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.
Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way as the first "principle," by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a "first" principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word "unbegotten."
[I.q.33.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut in creatis invenitur principium primum, et principium secundum, ita in personis divinis, in quibus non est prius et posterius, dicitur principium non de principio quod est Pater, et principium a principio, quod est Filius. In rebus autem creatis aliquod principium primum innotescit dupliciter: uno quidem modo in quantum est principium primum per hoc quod habet relationem ad ea quæ ab ipso sunt; alio modo in quantum est primum principium per hoc quod non est ab alio. Sic igitur et Pater innotescit quidem paternitate et communi spiratione per respectum ad personas ab eo procedentes. In quantum autem est principium non de principio innotescit per hoc quod non est ab alio; quod pertinet ad proprietatem innascibilitatis, quam significat hoc nomen, ingenitus.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.1] Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by the word "unbegotten," as a property of the Father, is not a negative term only, but either that it means both these things together--namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and authority signify in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that "unbegotten" imports the negation of passive generation. For he says that "unbegotten" has the same meaning as "not a son." Nor does it follow that "unbegotten" is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what has no part.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod innascibilitas, quam significat hoc nomen, ingenitus, secundum quod est proprietas Patris, non dicitur tantum negative, sed importat vel utrumque simul, scilicet quod Pater a nullo est, et quod est principium aliorum; vel importat universalem auctoritatem, vel etiam fontalem plenitudiem. Sed hoc non videtur verum: quia sic innascibilitas non esset alia proprietas a paternitate et spiratione, sed includeret eas, sicut includitur proprium in communi. Nam fontalitas et auctoritas nihil aliud significant in divinis quam principium originis. Et ideo dicendum est, secundum Augustinum, lib. V, De Trinit., cap. vii, col. 915, t. 8, quod ingenitus negationem generationis passivæ importat. Dicit enim quod tantum valet quod dicitur ingenitus quantum valet quod dicitur non filius. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod ingenitus non debeat poni propria notio Patris; quia prima et simplicia per negationes notificantur, sicut dicimus punctum esse cujus pars non est.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.2] "Unbegotten" is taken sometimes in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that "the Holy Ghost is unbegotten," that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise "unbegotten" may be taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense, "unbegotten" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this sense the term "unbegotten" can be applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name "unbegotten" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the term "unbegotten" that He is not in any way derived from another; and not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In this sense the term "unbegotten" does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another--namely, from the Father.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod « ingenitus » quandoque sumitur negative tantum, et secundum hoc Hieronymus dicit Spiritum sanctum esse ingenitum, id est, non geni- « Est enim unus ab uno... Uterque itaque unus et salus est, proprietate videlicet in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis. » Refertur a Mag., Sentent., dist. xiii, § 6, ut ex tum. Alio modo potest dici ingenitum aliquo modo privative; non tamen aliquam imperfectionem importat. Multipliciter enim dicitur privatio; uno modo quando aliquid non habet quod natum est haberi ab alio, etiamsi ipsum non sit natum habere illud; sicut si lapis dicatur res mortua, quia caret vita, quam quædam res natæ sunt habere. Alio modo dicitur privatio quando aliquid non habet quod natum est haberi ab aliquo sui generis; sicut si talpa dicatur cæca. Tertio modo quando ipsum non habet quod natum est habere; et hoc modo privatio imperfectionem importat. Sic autem ingenitum non dicitur privative de Patre; sed secundo modo, prout scilicet aliquod suppositum divinæ naturæ non est genitum, cujus tamen naturæ aliquod suppositum est genitum. Sed secundum hanc rationem etiam de Spiritu sancto potest dici ingenitum. Unde ad hoc quod sit proprium soli Patri, oportet ulterius in nomine ingeniti intelligere quod conveniat alicui personæ divinæ quæ sit principium alterius personæ; ut sic intelligatur importare negationem in genere principii personaliter dicti in divinis; vel ut intelligatur in nomine ingeniti, quod omnino non sit ab alio, et non solum quod non sit ab alio per generationem. Sic enim nec Spiritui sancto convenit esse ingenitum, qui est ab alio per processionem, ut persona subsistens; nec etiam divinæ essentiæ, de qua potest dici quod est in Filio vel in Spiritu sancto ab alio, scilicet a Patre.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.3] According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9), "unbegotten" in one sense signifies the same as "uncreated"; and thus it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as "not man" is reduced to the genus of substance, and "not white" to the genus of quality. Hence, since "begotten" implies relation in God, "unbegotten" belongs also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum Damascenum, lib. I De fide orth., cap. viii, col. 818, t. 4, ingenitum uno modo significat idem quod increatum, et sic secundum substantiam dicitur; per hoc enim differt substantia creata ab increata. Alio modo significat id quod non est genitum; et sic relative dicitur, eo modo quo negatio reduci-tur ad genus affirmationis; sicut non homo ad genus substantiae et non album ad genus qualitatis. Unde cum genitum in divinis relationem importet, ingenitum etiam ad relationem pertinet. Et sic non sequitur quod Pater ingenitus distinguatur a Filio genito secundum substantiam, sed solum secundum relationem, inquantum scilicet relatio Filii negatur de Patre.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.4] In every genus there must be something first; so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from another, and which we call "unbegotten." To admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): "As there is one God, so there cannot be two innascibles." And this especially because, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut in quo-nymus, ab interprete veteri « ingenitus » vertitur. Unde suspicatur Nicolaï dictum istud pro versione Hieronymi fuisse substitutum, et sub hujus no-libet genere oportet ponere unum primum, ita in divina natura oportet ponere unum principium quod non sit ab alio, quod ingenitum dicitur. Ponere igitur duos innasci-biles est ponere duos deos, et duas naturas divinas. Unde Hilarius dicit in lib. De synodis advers. Arianos, § 60, col. 521, t. 2, et est explicatio canonis xxvi: « Cum unus Deus sit, duo innascibiles esse non possunt. » Et hoc præcipue, quia si essent duo innasci-biles, unus eorum non esset ab alio; et sic non distinguerentur oppositione relativa. Oporteret igitur quod distinguuerentur diversitate naturæ.
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.5] The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as stated above (27, 4, ad 3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person begotten.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.33.a.4.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod proprietas Patris, prout non est ab alio, potius significatur per remotionem nativitatis Filii, quam per remotionem processionis Spiritus sancti; tum quia processio Spiritus sancti non habet nomen speciale, ut supra dictum est, tum quia etiam ordine naturæ præsupponit generationem Filii. Unde remoto a Patre quod non sit genitus, cum tamen sit principium generationis, sequitur consequenter quod non sit procedens processione Spiritus sancti, quia Spiritus sanctus non est generationis principium, sed a genito procedens.
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