Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q60. The love or dilection of the angels
Source context
- Theme
- angelic love and dilection as the mode of will and appetite proper to purely spiritual beings
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Proclus / Pseudo-Dionysius)In Dionysian and Proclean hierarchiology, higher intelligences are characterized by a unitary, non-discursive eros directed toward the Good, a structural parallel to Aquinas's account of angelic dilection as an act of intellective will rather than sensory appetite.
- Kabbalistic tradition (Seraphim and the attribute of Love)The Kabbalistic identification of the Seraphim with the sefirah of Chesed (loving-kindness) exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that angelic love is ordered entirely toward the divine good without the distortion introduced by sensitive appetite.
Q60. The love or dilection of the angels
Article 1
[I.q.60.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.
[I.q.60.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in angelis non sit amor vel dilectio naturalis. Amor enim naturalis dividitur contra intellectualem, ut patet per Dionysium, De div. nom., cap. iv, § 15, col. 514, tom. I. Sed amor angeli est intellectualis. Ergo non est naturalis.
[I.q.60.a.1.arg.2] Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above (Question 59, Article 3). Consequently there is no natural love in them.
[I.q.60.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ amant amore naturali, magis aguntur quam agant; nihil enim habet dominium suæ naturæ. Sed angeli non aguntur, sed agunt, cum sint liberi arbitrii, ut ostensum est. Ergo in angelis non est amor, seu dilectio naturalis.
[I.q.60.a.1.arg.3] Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels.
[I.q.60.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis dilectio aut est recta aut non recta. Dilectio autem recta pertinet ad charitatem; dilectio autem non recta pertinet ad iniquitatem; neutrum autem horum pertinet ad naturam, quia charitas est supra naturam, iniquitas autem est contra naturam. Ergo nulla dilectio naturalis est in angelis.
[I.q.60.a.1.sc] Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.
[I.q.60.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dilectio sequitur cognitionem; nihil enim amatur nisi cognitionum, ut Augustinus dicit, De Trin., lib. X, cap. 1, col. 973, t. 8. Sed in angelis est cognition naturalis. Ergo et dilectio naturalis.
[I.q.60.a.1.co] We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.
[I.q.60.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est in angelis ponere dilectionem naturalem. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est quod semper prius salvatur in posteriori. Natura autem prior est quam intellectus; quia natura cujuscumque rei est essentia ejus. Unde id quod est naturæ, oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum. Est autem hoc commune omni naturæ, ut ha-beat aliquam inclinationem, quæ est appetitus naturalis, vel amor, quæ tamen inclinationo diversimode inventur in diversis naturis, in unaquaque secundum modum ejus. Unde in natura intellectuali inventur Inquirendo, et sub forma quæstionis cujus solutionem differt, loquitur in textu D. Augustinus. « Certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest. » Et c. ii, col. 975, « neque omnino quidquam ametur incognitum, arbitror me persuasisse. » inclinatio naturalis secundum voluntatem, in natura autem sensitiva, secundum appetitum sensitivum; in natura vero carente cognitione, secundum solum ordinem naturæ in aliquid. Unde, cum angelus sit natura intellectualis, oportet quod in voluntate ejus sit naturalis dilectio.
[I.q.60.a.1.ad.1] Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.
[I.q.60.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectualis amor dividitur contra naturalem qui est solum naturalis, inquantum est naturæ quæ non addit supra rationem naturæ perfectionem sensus aut intellectus.
[I.q.60.a.1.ad.2] All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will.
[I.q.60.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnia quæ sunt in toto mundo, aguntur ab aliquo, praeter primum agens, quod ita agit quod nullo modo ab alio agitur; in quo est idem natura et voluntas. Et ideo non est inconveniens, si angelus agatur, inquantum inclinatio naturalis est sibi indita ab auctore suæ naturæ. Non tamen sic agitur quod non agat, cum habeat liberam voluntatem.
[I.q.60.a.1.ad.3] As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.
[I.q.60.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut cognitio naturalis semper est vera, ita dilectio naturalis semper est recta; cum amor naturalis nihil aliud sit quam inclinatio naturæ indita ab auctore naturæ. Dicere ergo quod inclinatio naturæ non sit recta, est derogare auctori naturæ. Alia tamen est rectitudo naturalis dilectionis, et alia est rectitudo charitatis et virtutis; quia una rectitudo est perfectiva alterius; sicut etiam alia est veritas naturalis cognitionis, et alia est veritas cognitionis infusæ vel acquisitæ.
Article 3
[I.q.60.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (2), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object.
[I.q.60.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus non diligat seipsum dilectione naturali et electiva. Dilectio enim naturalis est ipsius finis, sicut dictum est; dilectio autem electiva est eorum quæ sunt ad finem. Sed idem non potest esse finis et ad finem respectu ejusdem. Ergo non potest esse ejusdem dilectio naturalis et electiva.
[I.q.60.a.3.arg.2] Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.
[I.q.60.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dilectio est quidam motus. Sed omnis motus in alterum tendit. Ergo videtur quod angelus non possit amare seipsum dilectione naturali, nec electiva.
[I.q.60.a.3.arg.3] Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.
[I.q.60.a.3.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): "Love for others comes of love for oneself."
[I.q.60.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit, IX Ethic., cap. viii, paulo a princ., quod « amicabilia quæ sunt ad alterum, veniunt ex amicabilibus quæ sunt ad seipsum. »
[I.q.60.a.3.co] Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name "concupiscence" while the first is called "friendship."
Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself.
[I.q.60.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum amor sit boni, bonum autem sit et in substantia et in accidente, ut patet I Ethic., cap. vi, paulo post. princ., dupliciter aliquid amatur: uno modo ut bonum subsistens; alio modo ut bonum accidentale, sive inhærens. Illud quidem amatur ut bonum subsistens, quod sic amatur ut ei aliquis velit bonum; ut bonum vero accidentale seu inhærens amatur id quod desideratur alteri; sicut amatur scientia, non ut ipsa sit bona, sed ut habeatur. Et hunc modum amoris quidam nominaverunt « concupiscentiam, » primum vero « amicitiam. » Manifestum est autem quod in rebus cognitione carentibus unumquodque naturaliter appetit consequi id quod est sibi bonum, sicut ignis locum sursum. Unde et angelus et homo naturaliter appetunt suum bonum et suam perfectionem. Et hoc est amare seipsum. Unde naturaliter tam angelus quam homo diligit seipsum, inquantum aliquod bonum naturali appetitu sibi desiderat. Inquantum vero sibi desiderat aliquod bonum per electionem, in tantum amat seipsum dilectione electiva.
[I.q.60.a.3.ad.1] It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love, as was observed above.
[I.q.60.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod angelus aut homo non diligit se dilectione naturali et electiva secundum idem, sed secundum diversa, ut dictum est.
[I.q.60.a.3.ad.2] As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms "uniting" and "binding" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.
[I.q.60.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut plus est esse unum quam uniri, ita amor magis est unus ad seipsum quam ad diversa quæ ei uniuntur. Sed ideo Dionysius usus fuit nomine unionis et concretionis, ut ostende-ret derivationem amoris a se in alia, sicut ab uno derivatur unitio.
[I.q.60.a.3.ad.3] As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.
[I.q.60.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut amor est actio manens in agente, ita est motus manens in amante, non autem tendens in aliquid aliud ex necessitate; sed potest reflecti super amantem, ut amet seipsum; sicut et cognitio reflectitur in cognoscentem, ut cognoscat seipsum.
Article 4
[I.q.60.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as was said above (56, 1,2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
[I.q.60.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unus angelus non diligat naturali dilectione alium sicut seipsum. Dilectio enim sequitur cognitionem. Sed unus angelus non cognoscit alium sicut seipsum; quia seipsum cognoscit per suam essentiam, alium vero per ejus similitudinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod unus angelus non diligat alium sicut seipsum.
[I.q.60.a.4.arg.2] Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.
[I.q.60.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, causa est potior causato, et principium eo quod ex principio derivatur. Sed dilectio quæ est ad alium, derivatur ab ea quæ est ad seipsum, sicut dicit Philosophus, IX Ethic., cap. viii, non remote a princ. Ergo angelus non diligit alium sicut seipsum, sed seipsum magis.
[I.q.60.a.4.arg.3] Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.
[I.q.60.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, dilectio naturalis est alicujus tanquam finis, et non potest removeri. Sed unus angelus non est finis alterius; et iterum hæc dilectio potest removeri, ut patet in dæmonibus, qui non diligunt bonos angelos. Ergo unus angelus non diligit alium naturali dilectione sicut seipsum.
[I.q.60.a.4.sc] That seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, "every beast loves its like," as is said, Sirach 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself.
[I.q.60.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quia illud quod inventur in omnibus etiam ratione carentibus, videur esse naturale. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccli., xiii, 19, omne animal diligit sibi simile*. Ergo angelus diligit naturaliter alium sicut seipsum.
[I.q.60.a.4.co] As was observed (3), both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.
Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne upwards.
So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.
[I.q.60.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, angelus et homo naturaliter seipsum diligit. Illud autem quod est unum cum aliquo, est ipsummet; unde unumquodque diligit id quod est unum sibi. Et si quidem sit unum sibi unione naturali, diligit illud dilectione naturali; si vero sit unum secum unione non naturali, diligit ipsum dilectione non naturali: sicut homo diligit civem suum dilectione politicæ virtutis, consanguineum autem suum dilectione naturali, inquantum est unum cum eo in principio generationis naturalis. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est unum cum aliquo, genere vel specie, est unum per naturam; et ideo dilectione naturali quælibet res diligit quod est secum unum secundum speciem, inquantum diligit speciem suam. Et hoc etiam apparet in his quæ cognitione carent; nam ignis naturalem inclinationem habet ut communicet alteri suam formam, quod est bo-num ejus; sicut naturaliter inclinatur ad hoc quod quærat bonum suum, ut esse sur-sum. Sic ergo dicendum est quod unus angelus diligit alium naturali dilectione, inquantum convenit cum eo in natura, sed inquantum convenit cum eo in aliquibus aliis, vel etiam inquantum differt ab eo secundum quædam alia, non diligit eum naturali dilectione.
[I.q.60.a.4.ad.1] The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other's essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love another by the other's will.
[I.q.60.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc quod dico, sicut seipsum, potest uno modo determinare cognitionem seu dilectionem ex parte cogniti et dilecti; et sic cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia cognoscit alium esse sicut cognoscit seipsum esse. Alio modo potest determinare cognitionem et dilectionem ex parte diligentis et cognoscentis: et sic non cognoscit alium sicut seipsum, quia se cognoscit per suam essentiam, alium autem non per ejus essentiam. Et similiter non diligit alium sicut seipsum, quia seipsum diligit per suam voluntatem, alium autem non diligit per ejus voluntatem.
[I.q.60.a.4.ad.2] The expression "as" does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.
[I.q.60.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ly sicut non designat æqualitatem, sed similitudinem. Cum enim dilectio naturalis super unitatem naturalem fundetur, illud quod est minus unum cum eo, naturaliter minus diligit. Unde naturaliter plus diligit quod est unum numero quam quod est unum specie vel genere. Sed naturale est quod similem dilectionem habeat ad alium sicut ad seipsum, quantum ad hoc quod sicut seipsum diligit inquantum vult sibi bonum, ita alium diligat inquantum vult ejus bonum.
[I.q.60.a.4.ad.3] Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness.
[I.q.60.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod dilectio naturalis dicitur esse ipsius finis, non tanquam cui aliquis velit bonum, sed tanquam boni quod quis vult sibi, et per consequens aliii, inquantum est unum sibi. Nec ista dilectio naturalis removeri potest etiam ab angelis malis quin dilectionem naturalem habeant ad alias angelos, inquantum cum eis communicant in natura, sed odiunt eos inquantum diversificantur secundum justitiam et injustitiam.
Article 5
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (4), natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod angelus naturali dilectione non diligat Deum plus quam seipsum. Quia, ut dictum est, dilectio naturalis fundatur super unione naturali. Sed natura divina maxime distat a natura angeli. Ergo naturali dilectione angelus minus diligit Deum quam se, vel etiam alium angelum.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.2] Further, "That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so." But every one loves another with natural love for his own sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural love.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, propter quod unumquodque et illud magis. Sed naturali dilectione quilibet diligit alium propter se, unumquodque enim diligit aliquid inquantum est bonum sibi. Ergo dilectione naturali angelus non diligit Deum plus quam seipsum.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.3] Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, natura reflectitur in seipsam: videmus enim quod omne agens naturaliter agit ad conservationem sui. Non autem reflecteretur in seipsam natura, si tenderet in aliud plus quam in seipsam. Non ergo naturali dilectione diligit angelus Deum plus quam se.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.4] Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, hoc videtur esse proprium charitatis, ut aliquis Deum plus quam seipsum diligat. Sed dilectio charitatis non est naturalis in angelis, sed « diffunditur in cordibus eorum per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est eis, » ut dicit Augustinus, De civ. Dei, lib. XII, c. 1x, § 2, col. 357, t. 7. Ergo non diligunt Deum angeli dilectione naturali plus quam seipsos.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.5] Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city." Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.
[I.q.60.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, dilectio naturalis semper manet, manente natura. Sed diligere Deum plus quam seipsum, non manet in peccante angelo vel homine; quia, ut Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XIV, c. xxviii, col. 436, t. 7: « Fecerunt civitates duas amores duo, terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei; cælestem vero, amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. » Ergo diligere Deum supra seipsum non est naturale.
[I.q.60.a.5.sc] All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.
[I.q.60.a.5.sc] Sed contra, omnia moralia legis præcepta sunt de lege naturæ. Sed præceptum de diligendo Deum supra seipsum est præceptum morale legis. Ergo est de lege naturæ; ergo dilectione naturali angelus diligit Deum supra seipsum.
[I.q.60.a.5.co] There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.
The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved," as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.
Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.
[I.q.60.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt quod angelus naturali dilectione diligit Deum plus quam se amore concupiscentiae, quia scilicet plus appetit sibi bonum divinum quam bonum suum; et etiam amore amicitiae, inquantum scilicet Deo vult naturaliter angelus majus bonum quam sibi; vult enim naturaliter Deum esse Deum, se autem vult habere naturam propriam. Sed, simpliciter loquendo, naturali dilectione plus diligit se quam Deum, quia intensius et principalius naturaliter diligit se quam Deum. Sed falsitas hujus opinionis aperte apparet, si quis in rebus naturalibus consideret ad quid res naturaliter moveatur: inclinatio enim naturalis in his quæ secundum naturam sunt, demonstrat inclinationem naturalem in voluntate intellectualis naturæ. Unumquodque autem in rebus naturalibus quod secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est alterius est, principalius et magis inclinatur in id cujus est, quam in seipsum. Et hæc inclinatio naturalis demonstratur ex his quæ naturaliter aguntur: quia unumquodque sicut agitur naturaliter, sic aptum natum est agi, ut dicitur in II Phys., text. 78. Videmus enim quod naturaliter pars se exponit ad conservationem totius, sicut manus exponitur ictui absque deliberatione ad conservationem totius corporis. Et quia ratio imitatur naturam, hujusmodi imitationem invenimus in virtutibus politicis; est enim virtuosi civis ut se exponat mortis perriculo pro totius reipublicæ conservatione, et si homo esset naturalis pars hujus civitatis, hæc inclinatio esset ei naturalis.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.1] Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit in his quae ex aequo dividuntur, quorum unum non est alteri ratio existendi et bonitatis; in talibus enim unumquodque diligit naturaliter magis seipsum quam alterum, inquantum est magis sibi ipsi unum quam alteri. Sed in illis quorum unum est tota ratio existendi et bonitatis aliis, magis diligitur naturaliter tale alterum quam ipsum, sicut dictum est, quod unaquæque pars diligit naturaliter totum plus quam se, et quodlibet singulare naturaliter diligit plus bonum suæ speciei quam bonum suum singulare. Deus autem non solum est bonum unius speciei, sed est ipsum universale bonum simpliciter. Unde unumquodque suo modo naturaliter diligit Deum plus quam seipsum. Ad secundum diceudum, quod cum dictur quod Deus diligitur ab angelo inquantum est ei bonus, si ly inquantum dicat finem, sic falsum est; non enim diligit naturaliter Deum propter bonum suum, sed propter ipsum Deum: si vero dicat rationem amoris ex parte amantis, sic verum est, non enim esset in natura alicujus quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.2] When it is said that God is loved by an angel "in so far" as He is good to the angel, if the expression "in so far" denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, except from this--that everything is dependent on that good which is God.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.3] Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod natura reflectitur in seipsam, non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune. Inclinatur enim unumquodque ad conservandum non solum suum individuum, sed etiam suam speciem; et multo magis habet naturalem inclinationem 1 Angelus se et Deum dilectione naturali et necessaria quoad specificationem diligit; utrum quoad exercitium? Scinduntur Thomistæ. Pro negativa Ferrariensem, Contenson, et alios habes; pro affirmativa Bannem, Sylvium, Gonet et alios, etiam extraneos; pro utraque ut probabili Billuart et Serram. Hermannus Riswich angelos a Deo dixit non esse creatos. Secundum Magistrum Sententiarum et D. Thomam, ante omnia corporalia non tempore, sed dignitate naturæ, creatura angelica vere producta esse dicitur. Producta est duratione simul cum cælo empyreo, et tempore, et elementorum materia. Secundum Bedam, Magistrum Sententiarum et alios, duratione simul creata sunt ista quatuor: angelica natura, cælum empyreum, tem-unumquodque in id quod est bonum universale simpliciter.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.4] God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus, secundum quod est universale bonum, a quo dependet omne bonum naturale, diligitur naturali dilectione ab unoquoque; inquantum vero est bonum beatificans universaliiter omnes supernaturali beatitudine, sic diligitur dilectione charitatis.
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.5] Since God's substance and universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him. But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.60.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod cum in Deo sit unum et idem ejus substantia et bonum commune, omnes qui vident ipsam Dei essentiam, eodem motu dilectionis moventur in ipsam Dei essentiam, prout est ab aliis distincta, et secundum quod est quoddam bonum commune. Et quia inquantum est bonum commune, naturaliter amatur ab omnibus, quicumque videt eum per essentiam, impossibile est quin diligat ipsum. Sed illi qui non vident essentiam ejus, cognoscunt eum per aliquos particulares effectus, qui interdum eorum voluntati contrarian-tur: et sic hoc modo dicuntur odio habere Deum, cum tamen, inquantum est bonum commune omnium, unumquodque naturali dilectione; non autem amore concupiscentiæ.
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