Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q63. The malice of the angels with regard to sin
Source context
- Theme
- Angelic fall: the nature, cause, and moral structure of sin in purely spiritual beings
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Jewish Midrashic and Kabbalistic traditionMidrashic accounts of the fall of the Watchers (Book of Enoch; Zoharic commentary) treat angelic sin as originating in self-directed will that refuses subordination to the divine order — a structural parallel to Aquinas's analysis of pride as the first movement of angelic defection.
- Neoplatonic hypostatic hierarchy (Plotinus, Proclus)Neoplatonic accounts of the soul's reversion or failure to revert toward the One provide a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that the sinning angel turns away from participation in the divine good through an act of excessive self-affirmation.
- Islamic angelology (Iblis tradition)The Qur'anic narrative of Iblis's refusal to prostrate before Adam, grounded in pride of ontological rank, exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's location of angelic sin in prideful self-preference over divinely ordered participation.
Q63. The malice of the angels with regard to sin
Article 1
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod malum culpæ in angelis esse non possit. Quia malum culpæ non potest esse nisi in his quæ sunt in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaph., text. 19; subjectum enim privationis est ens in potentia. Sed angeli, cum sint formæ subsistentes, non habent esse in potentia. Ergo in eis non potest esse malum culpæ.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.2] Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies. Therefore neither can there by in the angels.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, angeli sunt digniores quam corpora cælestia. Sed in corporibus cælestius non potest esse malum, ut philosophi dicunt. Ergo neque in angelis.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.3] Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, id quod est naturale, semper inest. Sed naturale est angelis quod moveantur motu dilectionis in Deum. Ergo hoc ab eis removeri non potest. Sed diligendo Deum non peccant. Ergo angeli peccare non possunt.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.4] Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.
[I.q.63.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, appetitus non est nisi boni, vel apparentis boni. Sed in angelis non potest esse apparens bonum, quod non sit verum bonum, quia in eis vel omnino error esse non potest, vel saltem non potest præcedere culpam. Ergo angeli non possunt appetere nisi id quod est vere bonum. Sed nullus appetendo id quod est vere bonum, peccat. Ergo angelus appetendo non peccat.
[I.q.63.a.1.sc] It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found wickedness."
[I.q.63.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Job, iv, 18: In angelis suis reperit pravitatem.
[I.q.63.a.1.co] An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condition of its nature.
[I.q.63.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tam angelus quam quæcumque creatura rationalis, si in sua natura consideretur, potest peccare. Et cuicumque creaturæ hoc convenit ut peccare non possit, hoc habet ex dono gratiae, non ex conditione naturæ. Cujus ratio est, quia peccare nihil est aliud quam declinare a rectitudine actus quam debet habere, sive accipiatur peccatum in naturalibus, sive in artificialibus, sive in moralibus. Solum autem illum actum a rectitudine declinare non contingit cujus regula est virtus agentis. Si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis, nunquam posset artifex nisi recte lignum incidere; sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia regula, contingit incisionem esse rectam et non rectam. Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus, quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur; omnis autem voluntas cujuslibet creaturæ rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis; sicut quælibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, ut voluntas militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate divina peccatum esse non potest; in qualibet autem voluntate creaturæ potest esse peccatum secundum ordinem suæ naturæ.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.1] In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in angelis non est potentia ad esse naturale; est tamen in eis potentia secundum intellectivam partem ad hoc quod convertantur in hoc vel in illud; et quantum ad hoc potest in eis esse malum.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.2] The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpora cælestia non habent operationem nisi naturalem; et ideo, sicut in natura eorum non potest esse corruptionis malum, ita nec in actione naturali eorum potest esse malum inordinationis. Sed supra actionem naturalem in angelis est actio liberi arbitrii, secundum quam contingit in eis esse malum.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.3] It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod naturale est angelo quod convertatur motu dilectionis in Deum, secundum quod est principium naturalis esse; sed quod convertatur in ipsum, secundum quod est objectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, hoc est ex amore gratuito, a quo averti potuit peccando.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.4] Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.
First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (Question 59, Article 4); nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.
[I.q.63.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod peccatum mortale in actu liberi arbitrii contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo ex hoc quod aliquod malum eligitur, sicut homo peccat eligendo adulterium quod secundum se est malum, et tale peccatum semper procedit ex aliqua ignorantia vel errore; alioquin id quod est malum, non eligeretur ut bonum. Errat qui dem adulter in particulari eligens hanc delectationem inordinati actus, quasi aliquod bonum ad nunc agendum, propter inclinationem passionis aut habitus, etiamsi in universali non erret, sed veram de hoc sententiam teneat. Hoc autem modo in angelo peccatum esse non potuit, quia nec in angelis sunt passiones, quibus ratio aut intellectus ligetur, ut ex supra dictis patet, nec iterum primum peccatum habitus præcedere potuit ad peccatum inclinans. Alio modo contingit peccare per liberum arbitrium eligendo aliquid quod secundum se est bonum, sed non cum ordine debitæ mensuræ aut regulæ; ita quod defectus inducens peccatum sit solum ex parte electionis, quæ non habet debitum ordinem nisi ex parte rei electæ, sicut si aliquis eligeret orare, non attendens ad ordinem ab Ecclesia institutum. Et hujusmodi peccatum non præexigit ignorantiam, sed absentiam solum considerationis eorum quæ considerari debent. Et hoc modo angelus peccavit convertendo se per liberum arbitrium ad proprium bonum absque ordine ad regulam divinæ voluntatis.
Article 2
[I.q.63.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
[I.q.63.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in angelis non possit esse solum peccatum superbiæ et invidiæ. In quemcumque enim cadit delectatio alicujus peccati, potest cadere peccatum illud. Sed dæmones delectantur etiam in obscœnitatibus carnalium peccatorum, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV De civitate Dei, cap. III, col. 406, t. 7. Ergo in dæmonibus etiam peccata carnalia possunt esse.
[I.q.63.a.2.arg.2] Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
[I.q.63.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut superbia et invidia sunt peccata spiritualia, ita acedia, et avaritia, et ira. Sed spiritui conveniunt peccata spiri- 1. Diabolus fornicator vel ebriosus, vel si quid hujusmodi mali est quod ad carnis pertinet voluptates, non potest dicii: est tamen maxime superbus atque invidus. » 2. et tunc regula est in recto. Est inter Thomistas commune quod Deus tualia, sicut et carni peccata carnalia. Ergo non solum superbia et invidia in angelis esse potest, sed etiam acedia et avaritia.
[I.q.63.a.2.arg.3] Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.
[I.q.63.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum Gregorium, in Moralibus, lib. XXXI, cap. xlv, § 87 et 88, col. 620, t. 2, ex superbia nascuntur plura vitia, et similiter ex invidia. Posita autem causa, ponitur effectus. Si ergo superbia et invidia in angelis esse possunt, pari ratione et alia vitia in eis esse possunt.
[I.q.63.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he is proud and envious."
[I.q.63.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV De civ. Dei, c. III, col. 406, t. 7, quod « diabolus non est fornicator, aut ebriosus, neque aliquid hujusmodi; est tamen superbus et invidus. »
[I.q.63.a.2.co] Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.
Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.
[I.q.63.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum aliquod in aliquo esse potest dupliciter: uno modo secundum reatum, alio modo secundum affectum. Secundum reatum quidem omnia peccata in dæmonibus esse contingit; quia, dum homines ad omnia peccata inducunt, omnium peccatorum reatum incurrunt. Secundum affectum vero illa solum peccata in malis angelis esse possunt, ad quae contingit affici spiritualem naturam. Spiritualem autem naturam affici non contingit ad bona quæ sunt propria corpori, sed ad ea quæ in rebus spiritualibus inveniri possunt; nihil enim afficitur nisi ad id quod suæ naturæ potest esse quodammodo conveniens. In spiritualibus autem bonis non potest esse peccatum dum aliquis ad ea afficitur, nisi per hoc quod in tali affectu superioris regula non ordinatur; et hoc est peccatum superbiæ, non subdi superiori in eo in quo debet. Unde peccatum primum angeli non potest esse aliud quam superbia. Sed consequenter potuit in eis esse etiam invidia. Ejusdem enim rationis est quod affectus tendat in aliquid appetendum, et quod renitatur opposito. Invidus autem ex hoc de bono alterius dolet, inquantum bonum alterius æstimat sui boni impedimentum. Non autem bonum alterius poterat æstimari impedimentum boni affectati per angelum malum, nisi inquantum affectavit excellentiam singularem, quæ quidem singularitas per alterius excellentiam cessat. Et ideo post creaturam ex natura sua contra legem naturalem directe et immediate impeccabilem producere pos-set, et sic angeli, si non elevati fuissent ad ordinem supernaturalem, simpliciter fuissent impeccabiles. peccatum superbiæ consecutum est in angelo peccante malum invidiae, secundum quod de bono hominis doluit, et etiam de excellentia divina, secundum quod ea Deus contra voluntatem ipsius diaboli utitur in gloriam divinam.
[I.q.63.a.2.ad.1] The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.
[I.q.63.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dæmones non delectantur in obscænitatibus carnalium peccatorum quasi ipsi afficiantur ad delectationes carnales; sed hoc totum ex invidia procedit, quod in peccatis hominum quibuscumque delectantur, inquantum sunt impedimenta humani boni.
[I.q.63.a.2.ad.2] Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.
[I.q.63.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod avaritia, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est immoderatus appetitus rerum temporalium, quæ veniunt in usum vitæ humanæ, quæ-cumque pecunia æstimari possunt; et ad ista non afficiuntur dæmones, sicut nec ad delectationes carnales. Unde avaritia proprie sumpta in eis esse non potest. Sed si avari-tia dicatur omnis immoderata cupiditas habendi quodcumque bonum creatum, sic avaritia continetur in superbia, quæ est in dæmonibus. Ira vero cum quadam passione est, sicut et concupiscentia; unde ipsa in dæmonibus esse non potest nisi metaphorice. Acedia vero est quædam tristitia qua homo redditur tardus ad spirituales actus propter corporalem laborem, qui dæmonibus non competit. Et sic patet quod sola superbia et invidia sunt pure spiritualia peccata quæ dæmonibus competere possunt; ita tamen quod invidia non sumatur pro passione, sed pro voluntate renitente bono alterius.
[I.q.63.a.2.ad.3] Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.
[I.q.63.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sub invidia et superbia, prout in dæmonibus ponuntur, comprehenduntur omnia peccata quæ ab illis derivantur.
Article 3
[I.q.63.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for if the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.
[I.q.63.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod 1 Sub Augustini nomine hæc verba adducuntur a D. Thoma; sed opus de quæstionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti, quibusque criticis annuentibus, incerto cuidam, fortasse diversis auctoribus, tribendum est., et melius quam in edit., ubi legitur: diabolus non appetierit esse ut Deus. Illud enim quod non cadit in apprehensione non cadit in appetitu, cum bonum apprehensum moveat appetitum, vel sensibilem, vel rationalem, vel intellectualem; in solo autem hu-jusmodi appetitu contingit esse peccatum. Sed creaturam aliquam esse æqualem Deo non cadit in apprehensione, implicat enim contradictionem, quia necesse est finitum esse infinitum, si æquatur infinito. Ergo angelus non potuit appetere esse ut Deus.
[I.q.63.a.3.arg.2] Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.
[I.q.63.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod est finis naturæ, absque peccato appetiti potest. Sed assimilari Deo est finis in quem tendit naturaliter quæ-libet creatura. Si ergo angelus appetii esse ut Deus non per æqualitatem, sed per similitudinem, videtur quod in hoc non peccaverit.
[I.q.63.a.3.arg.3] Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.
[I.q.63.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, angelus in majori plenitudine sapientiæ conditus est quam homo. Sed nulus homo, nisi omnino amens, eligit esse æqualis angelo, nedum Deo; quia electio non est nisi possibilium, de quibus est consilium. Ergo multo minus peccavit angelus appetendo esse ut Deus.
[I.q.63.a.3.sc] It is said, in the person of the devil (Isaiah 14:13-14), "I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being "inflated with pride, he wished to be called God."
[I.q.63.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiæ, xiv, 13, ex persona diaboli: Ascendam in cælum..., et ero similis * Altissimo; et Augustinus, lib. De quæstionibus Vet. Test., q. cxiii, col. 2340, t. III, dicit quod « elatione inflatus voluit dici Deus. »
[I.q.63.a.3.co] Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God.
To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect--by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone.
Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God.
From this we have the answer to all the objections.
[I.q.63.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod angelus absque omni dubio peccavit appetendo esse ut Deus. Sed hoc potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo per æquiparantiam, alio modo per similitudinem. Primo quidem modo non potuit appetere esse ut Deus, quia scivit hoc esse imposibile naturali cognitione; nec primum actum peccandi in ipso præcessit, vel habitus, vel passio ligans cognoscitivam ipsius virtutem, ut in particulari deficiens eligeret imposibile, sicut in nobis interdum accidit. Et ideo, dato quod esset possibile, hoc esset contra naturale desiderium; inest enim unicuique naturale desiderium ad conservandum suum esse, quod non conservaretur, si transmutaretur in altiorem naturam. Unde nulla res quæ est in inferiori « in alteram; » hic enim agitur de appetitione « altioris » naturæ. Dæmon invidus est: hinc a communi omnium pontificum romanorum, omnium conciliorum, omnium Patrum, hostis humani generis vocatur. gradu naturæ, potest appetere superioris naturæ gradum; sicut asinus non appetit esse equus, quia si transferretur in gradum superioris naturæ, jam ipsum non esset. Sed in hoc imaginatio decipitur, quia enim homo appetit esse in altiori gradu quantum ad aliqua accidentalia, quae possunt crescere absque corruptione subjecti, aestimatur quod possit appetere altiorem gradum naturæ, in quem pervenire non posset, nisi esse desineret. Manifestum est autem quod Deus excedit angelum non secundum aliqua accidentalia, sed secundum gradum naturæ, et etiam unus angelus alium. Uude impossibile est quod unus angelus inferior appetat esse aequalis superiori, nedum quod appetat esse aequalis Deo. Appetere autem esse ut Deus per similitudinem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad id in quo aliquid natum est Deo assimilari; et sic, si aliquis quantum ad hoc appetat esse Deo similis, non peccat, dummodo similitudinem Dei debito ordine appetat adipisci, ut scilicet eam a Deo habeat. Si quis autem appetetet secundum justitiam esse similis Deo quasi propria virtute, et non ex virtute Dei, peccaret. Alio vero modo potest aliquis appetere similis esse Deo quantum ad hoc in quo non natus est assimilari; sicut si quis appetetet creare cælum et terram, quod est proprium Dei; in quo appetitu esset peccatum. Et hoc modo diabolus appetiit esse ut Deus, non ut ei assimilaretur quantum ad hoc quod est nulli subesse simpliciter; quia sic suum non esse appetetet, cum nulla creatura esse possit nisi per hoc quod sub Deo esse participat. Sed in hoc appetiit indebite esse similis Deo, quia appetiit ut finem ultimum beatitudinis id ad quod virtute suæ Angeli contra Deum non contra Luciferum superbi fuerunt: o dementia peccati! Sed quomodo superbierunt? Circa Deum aqualitatem cum ipso appetendo? Circa unionem hypostaticam eam sibi appetendo, et naturæ humanæ communicatam despiciendo? Circa principatum tyrannicum super alias creaturas, illum ambiendo? Circa supernaturalem beatitudinem, illam ex gratia, et cum hominibus communem nolendo? Vel solam beatitudinem naturalem, cum praeeminentia per eam super omnes alias creaturas volendo, absque elevatione ad beatitudinem supernaturalem in qua ab aliis aequari, superari etiam potuissent? Hæc sunt naturæ poterat pervenire, avertens suum appetitum a beatitudine supernaturali, quæ est ex gratia Dei. Vel si appetiit ut ultimum finem illam Dei similitudinem quæ datur ex gratia, voluit hoc habere per virtutem suæ naturæ, non ex divino auxilio secundum Dei dispositionem. Et hoc consonat dictis Anselmi, lib. De casu diaboli, c. iv, col. 333, t. 4, qui dicit quod « appetiit illud ad quod pervenisset, si stetisset. » Et hæc duo quodam modo in idem redeunt: quia secundum utrumque appetiit finalem beatitudinem per suam virtutem habere, quod est proprium Dei. Quia vero quod est per se est principium et causa ejus quod est per aliud, ex hoc etiam consecutum est quod appetiit aliquem principatum super alia habere; in quo etiam perverse voluit Deo assimilari. Et per hoc patet responsio ad omnia objecta.
Article 4
[I.q.63.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked.
[I.q.63.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliqui dæmones sint naturaliter mali. Dicit enim Porphyrius, ut Augustinus introducit, X De civit. Dei, c. xi, col. 289, t. 7, quod « est quoddam genus dæmonum natura fallax, simulans deos, et animas defunctorum. » Sed esse fallacem est esse matheologorum opiniones variæ. Juxta Gregorium appetivit sui juris esse, ita quod sicut Deus nulli subessenet; juxta Anselmum, omnibus propria auctoritate præesse, sine Deo datore, sine meritis; juxta Bernardum, peccavit invidens quod homo per Incarnationem elevaretur, volensque Christi honorem rapere. Scotus et Scotistæ cum Anselmo sentiunt. Sed angelus non peccavit aequalitatem Dei in natura appetendo: hoc enim omnino esse impossibile cognoscebat; nec appetendo principatum sensu Anselmi, Scotorelli et Scotistarum: hoc enim ad ambitionem quæ superbiam consequitur pertineret; nec etiam, ut communiter creditur, peccavit circa unionem hypostaticam, quamvis sit probabilis opinio Joannis a S. Thoma dicentis rem esse incertam, non impossibilem. lum. Ergo aliqui dæmones sunt naturaliter mali.
[I.q.63.a.4.arg.2] Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wisdom 12:10): "Their malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.
[I.q.63.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut angeli sunt creati a Deo, ita et homines. Sed aliqui homines sunt naturaliter mali, de quibus dicitur Sap., xii, 40: Erat eorum malitia naturalis*. Ergo et angeli aliqui possunt esse naturaliter mali.
[I.q.63.a.4.arg.3] Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.
[I.q.63.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, aliqua animalia irrationalia habent quasdam naturales malitias, sicut vulpes naturaliter est subdola, et lupus naturaliter est rapax; et tamen sunt creaturæ Dei. Ergo et dæmones, licet sint creaturæ Dei, possunt esse naturaliter mali.
[I.q.63.a.4.sc] Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not naturally wicked."
[I.q.63.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., c. iv, § 23, col. 723, t. 1, quod « dæmones non sunt naturaliter mali. »
[I.q.63.a.4.co] Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.
[I.q.63.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omne quod est, inquantum est et naturam habet aliquam, in bonum aliquod naturaliter tendit, utpote ex principio bono existens: quia semper effectus convertitur in suum principium. Contingit autem alicui bono particulari aliquod malum esse adjunctum, sicut igni conjungitur hoc malum quod est esse consumptivum aliorum; sed bono universali nullum malum potest esse adjunctum. Si ergo aliquid sit cujus natura quidem ordinetur in aliquod honum particulare, potest naturaliter tendere in aliquod malum, non inquantum malum, sed per accidens, inquantum est conjunctum cuidam bono. Si vero aliquid sit cujus natura ordinetur in bonum secundum communem boni rationem, hoc secundum suam naturam non potest tendere in aliquod malum. Manifestum est autem quod quælibet natura intellectualis habet ordinem in bonum universale quod potest apprehendere, et quod est objectum voluntatis. Unde, cum dæmones sint substantiae intellectuales, nullo modo possunt habere inclinationem naturalem in aliquod quodcumque malum; et ideo non possunt esse naturaliter mali.
[I.q.63.a.4.ad.1] Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.
[I.q.63.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus ibidem reprehendit Porphyrium de hoc quod dixit, quod « dæmones erant naturaliter fallaces, » dicens eos non esse naturaliter fallaces, sed propria voluntate. Porphyrius autem hac ratione posuit dæmones esse natura fallaces, quia ponebat dæmones esse animalia habentia naturam sensitivam et animam passivam. Natura autem sensitiva ordinatur ad aliquod bonum particulare, cui potest esse conjunctum malum; et secundum hoc aliquam inclinationem naturalem habere possunt ad malum, per accidens tamen, inquantum malum est conjunctum bono.
[I.q.63.a.4.ad.2] The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.
[I.q.63.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod malitia aliquorum hominum potest dici naturalis vel propter consuetudinem, quæ est natura altera, vel propter naturalem inclinationem ex parte naturæ sensitivæ ad aliquam inordinatam passionem, sicut quidam dicuntur naturaliter iracundi vel concupiscentes, non autem ex parte naturæ intellectualis.
[I.q.63.a.4.ad.3] Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).
[I.q.63.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod animalia bruta secundum naturam sensitivam habent naturalem inclinationem ad quædam particularia bona, quibus conjuncta sunt aliqua mala, sicut vulpes ad quærendum victum sagaciter, cui adjungitur dolositas, unde esse dolosum non est malum vulpi, cum sit ei naturale, sicut nec esse furiosum est malum cani, sicut Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., c. iv, § 25, col. 727, t. 1.
Article 5
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil (John 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod diabolus in primo instanti suæ creationis fuerit malus per culpam propriæ voluntatis. Dicitur enim Joan., viii, 44, de diabolo: Ille homicida erat ab initio.
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.2] Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: "Be light made: and light was made," we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, I Super Gen. ad litt., c. xv, col. 257, t. 3, « informitas creaturæ non præcessit formationem tempore, sed origine tantum. » Per cælum autem, quod legitur primo creatum, ut ipse dicit, in II lib., c. viii, col. 270, § 19, t. 3, intelligitur natura angelica informis. Per hoc autem quod dicitur, quod Deus dixit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux, intelligitur formatio ejus per conversionem ad Verbum. « Sed neque dæmones natura sua mali sunt. »; in Parm. et in edit. deest: « et animam passivam. » « Possunt, » scilicet dæmones; in edit.: « po- Simul ergo natura angeli creata est, et facta est lux. Sed simul dum facta est lux, distincta est a tenebris, per quas intelliguntur angeli peccantes. Ergo in primo instanti suæ creationis quidam angeli fuerunt beati, et quidam peccaverunt.
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.3] Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation.
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum opponitur merito. Sed in primo instanti suæ creationis aliqua natura intellectualis potest mereri, sicut anima Christi, vel etiam ipsi boni angeli. Ergo et dæmones in primo instanti suæ creationis potuerunt peccare.
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.4] Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Question 62, Article 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant.
[I.q.63.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, natura angelica virtuosior est quam natura corporea. Sed res corporalis statim in primo instanti suæ creationis vel generationis incipit habere suam operationem, sicut ignis in primo instanti quo generatus est, incipit moveri sursum. Ergo et angelus, in primo instanti suæ creationis, potuit operari. Aut ergo habuit operationem rectam, aut non rectam. Si rectam, cum gratiam habuerint, per eam meruerunt beatitudinem. In angelis autem statim ad meritum sequitur præmium, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fuissent statim beati, et ita nunquam peccassent, quod est falsum. Relinquitur ergo quod in primo instanti non recte operando peccaverunt.
[I.q.63.a.5.sc] It is written (Genesis 1:31): "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.
[I.q.63.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Genes., 1, 34: Vidit Deus cuncta quæ fecerat, et erant valde bona. Inter ea autem erant etiam dæmones. Ergo et dæmones aliquando fuerunt boni.
[I.q.63.a.5.co] Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture--for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Isaiah 14:12): "How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezekiel 28:13): "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God," --consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.
Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence.
This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (58, 3). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.
We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation.
[I.q.63.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt, quod statim dæmones in primo instanti suæ creationis mali fuerunt, non qui dem per naturam, sed per peccatum propriæ voluntatis, quia ex quo est factus diabolus, justitiam recusavit. Cui sententiæ, ut Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XI, c. xiii, col. 329, t. 7, « quisquis acquiescit, non cum illis hæreticis sapit, id est Manichæis, qui dicunt, quod diabolus habet naturam mali.» Sed quia hæc opinio auctoritati Scripturæ contradicit, dicitur enim sub figura principis Babylonis de diabolo, Isa., xiv, 42: Quomodo cecidisti, Lucifer, qui mane oriebaris? et Ezech., xxviii, 43: In deliciis paradisi Dei fuisti, dicitur ad diabolum sub persona regis Tyri; ideo a magistris hæc opinio, tanquam erronea, rationabiliter reprobata est.; « vel generationis » deest in edit. « Qui dicunt quod suam quamdam propriam tanquam ex adverso quodam principio diabolus Unde aliqui dixerunt quod angeli in primo instanti suæ creationis peccare potuerunt, sed non peccaverunt. Sed hæc opinio etiam a quibusdam improbatur ea ratione quia cum duæ operationes se consequuntur, impossibile videtur quod in eodem « nunc » utraque operatio terminur. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum angeli fuit operatio creatione posterior; terminus autem creationis est ipsum esse angeli; terminus vero operationis peccati est quod sunt mali. Impossibile ergo videtur quod in primo instanti quo angelus esse cæpit, fuerit malus. Sed hæc ratio non videtur sufficiens. Habet enim solum locum in motibus temporalibus, qui successive aguntur; sicut si motus localis sequitur ad alterationem, non potest in eodem instanti terminari alteratio et localis motus. Sed si sunt mutationes instantaneæ, simul et in eodem instanti potest esse terminus primæ et secundæ mutationis; sicut in eodem instanti in quo illuminatur luna a sole illuminatur aer a luna. Manifestum est autem quod creatio est instantanea, et similiter motus liberi arbitrii in angelis; non enim indigent collatione et discursu rationis, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde nihil prohibet simul et in eodem instanti esse terminum creationis, et terminum liberi arbitrii. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod impossibile fuit angelum in primo instanti peccasse per inordinatum actum liberi arbitrii. Quamvis enim res aliqua in primo instanti quo esse incipit, simul incipere possit operari, tamen illa operatio quæ simul incipit cum esse rei, est ei ab agente, a quo habet esse; sicut moveri sursum inest igni a generante. Unde, si aliqua res habeat esse ab agente deficiente quod possit esse causa defectiva actionis, poterit in primo instanti in quo incipit esse, habere defectivam operationem; sicut si tibia quæ nascitur clauda ex debilitate seminis, statim incipiat claudicare. Agens autem quod angelos in esse produxit, scilicet Deus, non potest esse causa peccati. Unde non potest dici quod diabolus in primo instanti suæ creationis fuerit malus.
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.1] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never went back from his sin.
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XI, c. xv, habeat naturam mali. » Nicolaï habet: « Tyrii. » col. 330, t. 7, cum dicitur, quod « diabolus ab initio peccat, non ab initio ex quo creatus est, peccare putandus est, sed ab initio peccati, » scilicet quia nunquam a peccato suo recessit.
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.2] That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa distinctio lucis et tenebrarum, secundum quod per tenebras peccata dæmonum intelliguntur, accipienda est secundum Dei præscientiam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XI De civitate Dei, c. xix, col. 333, t. 7, quod « solus lucem ac tenebras discernere potuit, qui potuit etiam prius quam caderent, præscire casuros. »
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.3] All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod meritum est a Deo; et ideo in primo instanti suæ creationis angelus mereri potuit. Sed non est similis ratio de peccato, ut dictum est.
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.4] God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.
[I.q.63.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod Deus non discrevit inter angelos ante aversionem quorumdam et conversionem aliorum, ut Augustinus dicit, XI De civit. Dei, cap. xix, col. 327, t. 7; et ideo omnes in gratia creati in primo instanti meruerunt. Sed quidam eorum statim impedimentum præstiterunt suæ beatitudinis præcedens meritum mortificantes; et ideo beatitudine, quam meruerant, sunt privati.
Article 6
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezekiel 28:15): "Thou didst walk perfect [Vulgate: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and his fall.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliqua mora fuerit inter creationem et lapsum angeli. Dicitur enim Ezech., xxviii, 14 et 15: Ambulasti perfectus in viis tuis a die conditionis tuæ, donec inventa est iniquitas in te. Sed ambulatio, cum sit motus continuus, requirit aliquam moram. Ergo aliqua mora fuit inter creationem diaboli et ejus lapsum.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.2] Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Origenes dicit, Hom. 1 in Ezech., col. 671, t. 3, quod « serpens antiquus non statim super pectus et ventrem; in edit.: « quidquid est in merito, » nec bene; aliquid enim in merito est a libertate, sed in primo instanti creationis suæ, libertas operans angeli erat ei ab agente a quo angelus habebat esse; unde in primo instanti non poterat peccare, quia libertas primo operans angeli a Deo erat, qui non potest esse causa peccati. per quod intelligitur ejus peccatum. Ergo diabolus non statim post primum instans suæ creationis peccavit.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.3] Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin. Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, posse peccare commune est homini et angelo. Fuit autem aliqua mora inter formationem hominis et ejus peccatum. Ergo pari ratione fuit aliqua mora inter formationem diaboli et ejus peccatum.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.4] Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall.
[I.q.63.a.6.arg.4] 4. Præterea, aliud instans fuit in quo diabolus peccavit ab instanti in quo creatus fuit. Sed inter quælibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium. Ergo aliqua mora fuit inter creationem ejus et lapsum.
[I.q.63.a.6.sc] It is said of the devil (John 8:44): "He stood not in the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it."
[I.q.63.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., viii, 44, de diabolo, quod in veritate non stetit; et sicut Augustinus dicit, De civ. Dei, lib. XI, c. xv, col. 330, t. 7: « Oportet ut hoc sic accipiamus, quod in veritate fuerit, sed non permanserit. »
[I.q.63.a.6.co] There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said (62, 3). For since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above (Question 62, Article 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.
If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall.
[I.q.63.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Sed probabilior et sanctorum dictis consona magis est quod statim post primum instans suæ creationis diabolus peccaverit. Et hoc necesse est dicere, si ponatur quod in primo instanti suæ creationis in actum liberi arbitrii proruperit, et cum gratia fuerit creatus, ut supra diximus. Cum enim angeli per unum actum meritorium ad beatitudinem perveniant, ut supra dictum est, si diabolus in primo instanti, in gratia creatus, meruit, statim post primum instans beatitudinem accepisset, nisi statim impedimentum præstitisset peccando. Si vero ponatur quod angelus in gratia creatus non fuerit, vel quod in primo instanti actum liberi arbitrii non potuerit habere, nihil prohibet aliquam moram fuisse inter creationem et lapsum.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.1] Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement of free-will tending towards good.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per motus corporales, qui per tempus mensurantur, quando in sacra Scriptura intelliguntur métaphorice motus spirituales instantanei; et sic per ambulationem intelligitur motus liberi arbitrii tendentis in bonum.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.2] Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in which he was not wicked.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Origenes dicit, quod « serpens antiquus non a principio, nec statim super pectus ambulavit, » Trinitarii diabolum dicebant nunquam unde stare posset habuisse, et ab instanti suæ creationis fuisse malum. Certum est angelos in primo instanti suæ creationis non peccasse; contrariam hujus sententiam, tempore S. Thomæ, ut erroneam magistri parisienses reprobaverunt. propter primum instans in quo malus non fuit.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.3] An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and therefore the argument does not hold good.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod angelus habet liberum arbitrium inflexibile post electionem; et ideo nisi statim post primum instans, in quo naturalem habuit motum ad bonum, impedimentum beatitudini præstitisset, fuisset firmatus in bono. Sed non est simile de homine; et ideo ratio non sequitur.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.4] It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves, became night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked.
[I.q.63.a.6.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod inter quæliet duo instantia esse tempus medium habet veritatem, inquantum tempus est continuum, ut probatur in VI Physic., text. 2 et seqq. Sed tamen in angelis qui non sunt subjecti cælesti motui, qui primo per tempus continuum mensuratur, tempus accipitur pro ipsa successione operationum intellectus, vel etiam affectus. Sic igitur instans primum in angelis intelligitur respondere operationi mentis angelicæ, quia se in seipsam convertit per vespertinam cognitionem; quia in primo die commemoratur vespere sed non mane. Et hæc quidem operatio in omnibus bona fuit. Sed ab hac operatione quidam per matutinam cognitionem ad laudem Verbi sunt conversi; quidam vero in seipsis remanentes facti sunt nox, per superbiam intumescentes, ut Augustinus dicit, Super Gen. ad litt., lib. IV, c. xxiv, col. 313, t. 3. Et sic prima operatio fuit omnibus communis; sed in secunda sunt distincti. Et ideo in primo instanti omnes fuerunt boni, sed in secundo fuerunt boni a malis distincti.
Article 7
[I.q.63.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezekiel 28:14): "Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God." Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.
[I.q.63.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ille angelus qui fuit supremus inter peccantes, non fuerit supremus inter omnes. Dicitur enim Ezech., xxviii, 14: Tu cherub extentus et protegens; posui te in monte sancto Dei. Sed ordo cherubim est sub ordine seraphim, ut Dionysius dicit, vii cap. Angel. hierarch., § 1, etc., col. 206, t. 1. Ergo angelus qui fuit supremus inter peccantes, non fuit supremus inter omnes.
[I.q.63.a.7.arg.2] Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is unfitting.
[I.q.63.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Deus fecit naturam intellectualem propter beatitudinem consequendam. Si igitur angelus, qui fuit supremus inter omnes, peccavit, sequitur quod ordinatio divina fuerit frustrata in nobilissima creatura; quod est inconveniens.
[I.q.63.a.7.arg.3] Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.
[I.q.63.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quanto aliquid magis inclinatur in aliquid, tanto minus potest ab illo deficere. Sed angelus, quanto est superior, tanto magis inclinatur in Deum. Ergo minus potest a Deo peccando deficere; et sic videur quod angelus qui peccavit, non fuerit supremus inter omnes, sed de inferioribus.
[I.q.63.a.7.sc] Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them."
[I.q.63.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Gregorius in Homil. de centum ovibus, xxxiv in Evang., § 7, col. 1250, t. 2, quod « primus angelus qui peccavit, dum cunctis agminibus angelorum prælatus eorum claritatem transcenderet, ex eorum comparatione clarior fuit. »
[I.q.63.a.7.co] Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.
But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said (2), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.
[I.q.63.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in peccato est duo considerare, scilicet pronitatem ad peccandum, et motivum ad peccandum. Si ergo consideremus in angelis pronitatem ad peccandum, minus videtur quod peccaverint superiores angeli quam inferiores; mæ reverentia, hæc opinio somnium est. Melius diceretur quod istæ moræ diversa nunc ανi fuerunt. Prima mora in qua fuerunt omnes in gratia conditi, instanti temporis nostri correspondebat, et ideo valde modica fuit. Secunda non solum instanti sed tempori habito correspondebat. Totum tempus obstinationem sequens tertiae moræ correspondet.
[I.q.63.a.7.ad.1] Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while "Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire." Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.
[I.q.63.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cherubim interpretatur « plenitudo scientiæ, » seraphim autem interpretatur « ardentes, » sive « incendentes. » Et sic patet quod cherubim denominatur a scientia, quæ potest esse cum mortali peccato; seraphim vero denominatur ab ardore charitatis, quæ cum peccato mortali esse non potest; et ideo primus angelus peccans non est denominatus seraphim, sed cherubim.
[I.q.63.a.7.ad.2] The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its end.
[I.q.63.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod divina intentio non frustratur nec in his qui peccant, nec in his qui salvantur. Utrorumque enim eventum Deus præcognoscit; et ex utroque habet gloriam, dum hos ex sua bonitate salvat, illos ex sua justitia punit. Ipsa vero creatura intellectualis, dum peccat, a fine debito deficit. Nec hoc est inconveniens in quacumque creatura sublimi; sic enim creatura intellectualis instituta est a Deo, ut in ejus arbitrio positum sit agere propter finem.
[I.q.63.a.7.ad.3] However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently it was in his power not to follow it.
[I.q.63.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quantacumque inclinatio ad bonum fuerit in supremo angelo, tamen ei necessitatem non inducebat: unde potuit per liberum arbitrium eam non sequi.
Article 8
[I.q.63.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others' sinning.
[I.q.63.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod peccatum primi angeli peccantis non fuit aliis causa peccandi. Causa enim prior est causato. Sed omnes simul peccaverunt, ut Damascenus dicit, lib. II De fide orthod., c. iv, col. 875, t. 4. Ergo peccatum unius non fuit aliis causa peccandi.
[I.q.63.a.8.arg.2] Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above (Article 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.
[I.q.63.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, primum peccatum angeli non potest esse nisi superbia, ut supra dictum est. Sed superbia excellentiam quærit; magis autem excellentiæ repugnat quod aliquis inferiori subdatur quam superiori; et sic non videtur quod dæmones peccaverint per hoc quod voluerunt subesse alicui superiorum angelorum potius quam Deo. Sic autem peccatum unius angeli fuisset aliis causa peccandi, si eos ad hoc induxisset ut sibi subjicerentur. Non ergo videtur quod peccatum primi angeli fuerit causa peccandi aliis.
[I.q.63.a.8.arg.3] Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss on Psalm 103:26: "This dragon which Thou hast formed--He who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice." Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.
[I.q.63.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, majus peccatum est velle subesse alteri contra Deum, quam contra Deum alteri velle præesse; quia minus habet de motivo ad peccandum. Si ergo pecca- « Ex his angelicis virtutibus, terrestris ordinis princeps, cui custodiendæ terræ cura a Deo comtum primi angeli fuit aliis causa peccandi in hoc quod eos ut sibi subjicerentur induxit, gravius peccassent inferiores angeli quam supremus; quod est contra 1 illud psalm. ciii, 26: Draco iste, quem formasti; dicit Glossa ord., col. 4017, t. 4: « Qui cætetris in essentia erat excellentior, factus est in malitia major. » Non ergo peccatum primi angeli fuit aliis causa peccandi.
[I.q.63.a.8.sc] It is said (Apocalypse 12:4) that the dragon "drew" with him "the third part of the stars of heaven."
[I.q.63.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc., xii, 4, quod draco traxit secum tertiam partem stellarum.
[I.q.63.a.8.co] The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words: "Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matthew 25:41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2 Peter 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."
[I.q.63.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccatum primi angeli fuit aliis causa peccandi, non quidem cogens, sed quadam quasi exhortatione inducens. Cujus signum ex hoc apparet quod omnes dæmones illi supremo subduntur, ut manifeste apparet per illud quod dicit Dominus, Matth. xxv, 41: Discedite a me maledicti, in ignem æternum, qui paratus est diabolo et angelis ejus. Habet enim hoc ordo divinæ justitiæ; ut cujus suggestioni aliquis consentit in culpa, ejus potestati subdatur in pœna, secundum illud II Petr., ii, 19: A quo quis superatus est, huic servus addictus * est.
[I.q.63.a.8.ad.1] Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts directly they are heard" [Boethius, De Hebdom.]. Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto.
[I.q.63.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet simul dæmones peccaverint, tamen peccatum unius potuit esse aliis causa peccandi. Angelus enim non indiget ad eligendum, vel exhortandum, vel etiam consentiendum, temporis mora, sicut homo, qui deliberatione indiget ad eligendum et ad consentiendum, et locutione vocali ad exhortandum, quorum utrumque tempore agitur. Manifestum est autem quod etiam homo simul dum aliquid jam corde concepit, in eodem instanti incipit loqui; et in ultimo instanti locutionis in quo aliquis sensum loquentis capit, potest assentire ei quod dicitur, ut patet maxime in primis conceptionibus, quas quisque probat auditas. Sublato ergo tempore locutionis et deliberationis, quod in nobis requiritur, in eodem instanti in quo primus angelus suam affectionem intelligibili locutione expressit, possibile fuit ab aliis in eam consentiri.
[I.q.63.a.8.ad.2] Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.
[I.q.63.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod superbus, cæteris paribus, magis vult subesse superiori quam inferiori. Sed si aliquam excellentiam consequatur sub inferiori, quam sub superiori consequi non possit, magis eligit inferiori subesse quam superiori. Sic igitur non fuit contra superbiam dæmonum quod subesse inferiori voluerunt in ejus principatum consentientes, ad hoc eum principem et ducem habere volentes, ut virtute naturali suam ultimam beatitudinem consequerentur; præsertim quia supremo angelo naturæ ordine etiam tunc subjecti erant.
[I.q.63.a.8.ad.3] As was observed above (Question 62, Article 6), an angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice.
[I.q.63.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, angelus non habet aliquid retardans, sed secundum suam totam virtutem movetur in illud ad quod movetur, sive in bonum sive in malum. Quia igitur supremus angelus majorem habuit naturalem virtutem quam inferiores, intensiori motu in peccatum prolapsus est, et ideo factus est etiam in malitia major.
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