Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q93. The end or term of the production of man
Source context
- Theme
- Man as image and likeness of God: the final cause and terminus of human production in the divine similitude
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedanta (Advaita)The Upanishadic teaching that the individual self (jīvātman) is a reflected expression of the universal self (Brahman) presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's argument that man's likeness to God is grounded in intellectual nature and the capacity for knowing and loving the divine.
- Jewish mysticism (Kabbalah)The Kabbalistic doctrine that Adam Kadmon, the primordial man, images the divine structure of the sefirot exhibits a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that the image of God in man consists primarily in the intellectual soul's orientation toward the Trinity.
- Neoplatonism (Plotinus, Enneads)Plotinus's account of the soul as an image of Nous descending from the One provides a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's distinction between image (imago) as participatory likeness and mere trace (vestigium), both locating the highest human dignity in intellective participation in the divine source.
Q93. The end or term of the production of man
Article 1
[I.q.93.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isaiah 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?"
[I.q.93.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim Isa., xl, 18: Cui similem fecistis Deum, aut quam imaginem ponetis ei?
[I.q.93.a.1.arg.2] Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Colossians 1:15): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.
[I.q.93.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, esse Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit Apostolus ad Coloss., 1, 15: Qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis creaturæ. Non ergo in homine inventur Dei imago.
[I.q.93.a.1.arg.3] Further, Hilary says (De Synod [Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.
[I.q.93.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Hilarius dicit in lib. De syn., § 13, col. 490, t. 2, quod « imago est ejus rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens; » et iterum dicit, ibid., quod « imago est rei ad rem coæquandæ indiscreta et unita similitudo. » Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec potest esse æqualitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest esse imago Dei.
[I.q.93.a.1.sc] It is written (Genesis 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness."
[I.q.93.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Gen., 1, 26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.
[I.q.93.a.1.co] As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it.
But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.
[I.q.93.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. Lxxiv, col. 85, t. 6, « ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est similitudo, non continuo est imago. » Ex quo patet quod similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et imago aliquid addit supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressa. Imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius; unde ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et æqualale, quia tamen non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago ejus: æqualitas autem non est de ratione imaginis; quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit: « ubi est imago, non continuo est æqualitas, » ut patet in imagine alicujus in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione perfectæ imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem, quod in homine inventur aliqua Dei similitudo, quæ deducitur a Deo sicut ab exemplari; non tamen est similitudo secundum æqualitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei. Præpositio enim, ad, accessum quemdam significat, qui competit rei distanti.
[I.q.93.a.1.ad.1] The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.
[I.q.93.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab homine fabricatis; et ideo signanter dicit: Quam imaginem ponetis ei? Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem imaginem.
[I.q.93.a.1.ad.2] The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).
[I.q.93.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod primogenitus omnis creaturæ est imago Dei perfecta, perfecte implens illud cujus imago est. Et ideo dicitur imago, et nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur imago, et propter imperfectionem similitudinis dicitur ad imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in identitate naturæ, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito, sicut imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo, ut patet per Augustinum in lib. De decem chordis, Sermone ix, c. viii, col. 82, t. 5.
[I.q.93.a.1.ad.3] As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image.
[I.q.93.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid, non solum numero, aut specie, aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel proportionem quamdam; et sic est unitas, vel convenientia creaturæ ad Deum. Quod autem dicit, « rei ad rem coæquandæ, » pertinet ad rationem perfectæ imaginis.
Article 2
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiæ angelos per essentiam viderit. Dicit enim Gregorius, Dialog., lib. IV, cap. 1, col. 317, t. 3: « In paradiso quipe assueverat homo verbo Dei perfrui, beatorum angelorum spiritibus cordis munditia et celsitudine visionis interesse. »
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.2] Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, anima in statu præsenti impeditur a cognitione substantiarum separatarum ex hoc quod est unita corpori corruptibili, quod aggravat animam, ut dicitur Sap., 1x. Unde et anima separata substantias separatas videre potest, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima primi hominis non aggravabatur a corpore, cum non esset corruptibile. Ergo poterat videre substantias separatas.
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.3] Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" (Genesis 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, una substantia separata cognoscit aliam cognoscendo seipsam, ut dicitur in lib. De causis, propos. 13. Sed anima primi hominis cognoscebat seipsam. Ergo cognoscebat alias substantias separatas.
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.4] Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.
[I.q.93.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Boetius, in lib. III De consol., metr. 1x, col. 759, t. 4, dicit de Deo: « Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine [formans. » Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura.
[I.q.93.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image.
[I.q.93.a.2.sc] Sed contra, anima Adæ fuit ejusdem naturæ cum animabus nostris. Sed anima nostræ non possunt nunc intelligere substantias separatas. Ergo nec anima primi hominis potuit.
[I.q.93.a.2.co] Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species."
Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.
[I.q.93.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod status animæ hominis distingui potest dupliciter: uno modo secundum diversum modum naturalis esse, et hoc modo distinguitur status animæ separatæ a statu animæ conjunctæ corpori; alio modo distinguitur status animæ secundum integritatem et corruptionem, servato eodem modo essendi secundum naturam, et sic status innocentiæ distinguitur a statu hominis post peccatum. Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiæ erat corpori perficiendo et gubernando accommodata, sicut et nunc. Unde dicitur primus homo factus fuisse in animam viventem, id est corpori vitam dantem, scilicet animalem. Sed hujus vitæ integritatem habebat, inquantum corpus erat totaliter animæ subditum, in nullo ipsam impediens, ut supra dictum est. Manifestum est autem ex præmissis, quod ex hoc quod anima est accommodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem secundum animalem vitam, competit animæ nostræ talis modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantasmata. Unde et hic modus intelligendi etiam animæ primi hominis competebat. Secundum autem hunc modum intelligendi motus quidam inveniuntur in anima, ut Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., c. iv, § 9, col. 706, t. 1, secundum tres gradus. Quorum primus est secundum quod a rebus exterioribus aggregatur anima ad seipsam. Secundus autem est prout anima conscendit 1 ad hoc quod uniatur virtutibus superioribus unitis, scilicet angelis. Tertius autem gradus est secundum quod ulterius manuducitur ab bonum quod est supra omnia, scilicet Deum. Secundum igitur primum processum animæ, qui est a rebus exterioribus ad seipsam, perficitur animæ cognitio, quia scilicet intellectualis operatio animæ naturalem ordinem habet ad ea quæ sunt extra, ut supra dictum est, et ita per eorum cognitionem perfecte cognosci potest nostra intellectualis operatio, sicut actus per objectum, et per ipsam intellectualem operationem perfecte potest cognosci humanus intellectus, sicut potentia per proprium actum. Sed in secundo processu non invenitur perfecta cognitio; quia cum angelus non intelligat per con- 1 Non: « accendit, » ut in Parm. Durandus tenet hominem viatorem non potuisse videre Deum.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.1] Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omne imperfectum est quædam participatio perfecti. Et ideo etiam ea quæ deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen aliquaem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod « causata habent causarum contingentes imagines, » id est, quantum contingit ea habere, et non simpliciter.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.2] Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravatione corporis, sed ex hoc quod objectum ei connaturale erat deficiens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem deficimus propter utrumque.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.3] The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod anima primi hominis non poterat per cognitionem sui ipsius pertingere ad cognoscendas substantias separatas, ut supra dictum est, quia unaquæque substantia separata cognoscit aliam per modum sui ipsius.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.4] Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.
[I.q.93.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem similitudinis, qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis, quæ est in mente artificis. Sic autem quælibet creatura est imago rationis exemplaris, quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem naturæ, prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum sunt entia, et primæ vitæ, inquantum sunt viventia; et summæ sapientia, inquantum sunt intelligentia.
Article 3
[I.q.93.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God.
[I.q.93.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod primus homo non habuerit scientiam omnium. Aut enim habuit talem scientiam per species acquisitas, aut per species connaturales, aut per species infusas. Non autem per species acquisitas; hujusmodi enim cognitio ab experientia causatur, ut dicitur in I Metaph., a princ.; ipse autem non tunc fuerat omnia expertus. Similiter etiam nec per species connaturales, quia erat ejusdem naturæ nobiscum; anima autem nostra est « sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, » ut dicitur, in III De anima, text. 14. Si autem per species infusas; ergo scientia ejus quam habebat de rebus non erat ejusdem rationis cum scientia nostra, quam a rebus acquirimus.
[I.q.93.a.3.arg.2] Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
[I.q.93.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in omnibus individuis ejusdem speciei est idem modus consequendi perfectionem. Sed alii homines non statim in sui principio habent omnium scientiam, sed eam per temporis successionem acquirunt secundum suum modum. Ergo nec Adam statim formatus habuit omnium scientiam.
[I.q.93.a.3.arg.3] Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.
[I.q.93.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, status præsentis vitæ homini conceditur, ut in eo proficiat anima et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad meritum: propter hoc enim anima corpori videtur esse unita. Sed homo in statu illo profecisset quantum ad meritum. Ergo etiam profecisset quantum ad cognitionem rerum. Non ergo habuit omnium rerum scientiam.
[I.q.93.a.3.sc] Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [Ezekiel 28:12 because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression."
[I.q.93.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod ipse imposuit nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen., ii. Nomina autem debent naturis rerum congruere. Ergo Adam scivit naturas omnium animalium, et pari ratione habuit omnium aliorum scientiam.
[I.q.93.a.3.co] We may speak of God's image in two ways.
First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (58, 3; 79, 8).
Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God.
[I.q.93.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod naturali ordine perfectum præcedit imperfectum, sicut et actus potentiam; quia ea quæ sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo institutæ sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut essent aliorum principia, ideo productæ sunt in statu perfecto, in quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse principium alterius, non solum per generationem corporalem, sed etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo sicut primus homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim posset generare, ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et hæc sunt omnia illa quæ virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quæcumque scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt. Ad gubernationem autem vitæ propriæ et aliorum non solum requiritur cognitio corum quæ naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quæ naturalem cognitionem excedunt, eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad quemdam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis ad gubernationem vitæ nostræ necessarium est cognoscere quæ fidei sunt. Unde et de his supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitæ humanæ secundum statum illum. Alia vero quæ nec naturali hominis studio cognosci possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitæ humanæ, primus homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura contingentia, et quædam singularia, puta quot 1 lapilli jaceant in flumine et alia hujusmodi.
[I.q.93.a.3.ad.1] Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels.
[I.q.93.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo infusas; nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia nostra, sicut nec oculi quos cæco nato Christus dedit fuerunt alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit.
[I.q.93.a.3.ad.2] As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.
[I.q.93.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Adam debat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum erat primus homo, quod cæteris hominibus non competit, ut ex dictis patet.
[I.q.93.a.3.ad.3] When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
[I.q.93.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi; quia quæ sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset etiam quantum ad numerum per novas revelationes; sicut et angeli proficiunt per novas illuminationes. Nec tamen est simile de profectu meriti et scientia; quia unus homo non est alteri principium merendi, sicut et sciendi.
Article 6
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 11:7) that "the man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum mentem. Dicit enim Apostolus, I ad Cor., xi, 7, quod vir est imago Dei *. Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum secundum mentem.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.2] Further, it is written (Genesis 1:27): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Genes., 1, 27, dicitur: Creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum; masculum et feminam creavit eos. Sed distinctio masculi et feminæ est secundum corpus. Ergo secundum corpus attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.3] Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, imago præcipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.4] Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.
[I.q.93.a.6.arg.4] 4. Præterea, secundum Augustinum, XII Super Genes. ad litt., cap. vii, col. 459, t. 3, triplex visio inventur in nobis, scilicet « corporalis, spiritualis, » sive imaginaria, et « intellectualis. » Si ergo secundum visionem intellectualem, quæ ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei, pari ratione et in aliis visionibus.
[I.q.93.a.6.sc] The Apostle says (Ephesians 4:23-24): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Colossians 3:10): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.
[I.q.93.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., iv, 23: Renovamini spiritu mentis vestræ, et induite novum hominem. Ex quod datur intelligigi, quod renovatio nostra, quæ fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad mentem pertinet. Sed ad Coloss., Ⅲ, 10, dicit: Induentes novum hominem, eum qui renovatur in agnitionem, secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit eum. Ubi renovationem, quæ est secundum novi hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem Dei pertinet solum ad mentem.
[I.q.93.a.6.co] While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" as we have explained above (1,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.
Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (28, 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace."
[I.q.93.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali inventur similitudo Dei per modum imaginis, ut supra dictum est; in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in ipsa rationali creatura inventur Dei imago nisi secundum mentem; in aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, inventur similitudo vestigii, sicut et in cæteris rebus, quibus secundum partes hujusmodi assimilatur. Cujus ratio manifeste cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repræsentat vestigium, et quo repræsentat imago. Imago enim repræsentat secundum similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repræsentat per modum effectus, qui sic repræsentat suam causam, quod tamen ad « Trinitates istas ad sensus nostros vel ad animum pertinentes videmus potius, etc. » In edit.: « unde. » speciei similitudinem non pertingit. Impressiones enim quæ ex motu animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia: et similiter cinis dicitur vestigium ignis, et desolatio terrae vestigium hostilis exercitus. Potest ergo hujusmodi differentia attendi inter creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in creaturis rationalibus repræsentatur similitudo divinæ naturæ, et quantum ad hoc quod in eis repræsentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatæ. Nam quantum ad similitudinem divinæ naturæ pertinet, creaturæ rationales videntur quodammodo ad repræsentationem speciei pertingere, in-quantum imitantur Deum, non solum in hoc quod est et vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliæ vero creaturæ non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio consideretur. Similiter cum increata Trinitas distinguatur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut supra habitum est, in creaturura rationali in qua invenitur processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatæ per quamdam repræsentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur principium verbi et verbum et amor, sed apparet in eis quoddam vestigium quod hæc inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam demonstrat quod sit a quodam principio. Species vero ejus demonstrat verbum facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis. Ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut usus ædificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis secundum mentem, sed secundum alias partes ejus per modum vestigii.
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.1] Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man.
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; sicut denarius dicitur imago Cæsaris, inquantum habet Cæsaris imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis accipiatur Dei imago. 1 Sic in textu, paucis, nec ad sensum spectantibus, mutatis. 2 Illud non subdit quoad textum Apostolus in c. III ep. ad Coloss.; sed hoc in alio loco dicit, Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, De Trinit., lib. XII, cap. v, col. 1000, t. 8, quidam imaginem Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed secundum plura, dicentes quod « vir Patris personam intimat, Filii vero personam, quod de viro ita processit, ut de illo nasceretur; atque ita tertiam personam, velut Spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse mulierem, quae ita de viro processit, ut non ipsa esset filius, aut filia. » Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia sequeretur quod Spiritus sanctus esset principium Filii, sicut mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personæ. Tertio, quia secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere non debuisset, nisi producta jam prole. Et ideo dicendum est, quod Scriptura, postquam dixerat: Ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, addidit: Masculam et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum distinctiones sexuum attendatur, sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio sexuum. Unde Apostolus ad Col., III, postquam dixerat: Secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit illum, subdit: Ubi non est masculus neque femina, ad Galat., III, 28.
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.2] As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Colossians 3:10), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [these words are in reality from Galatians 3:28 (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew").
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.3] Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum figuram corpoream, « quia corpus hominis solum inter terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, sed tale est, ut ad contemplandum cæ-lum sit aptius, magis hoc ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cætera corpora animalium factum jure videri potest, » ut Augustinus dicit, in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., quæst. LI, § 3, col. 33, t. 6. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi in corpore hominis sit imago Dei; sed quia ipsa figura humani corporis repræsentat imaginem Dei in anima per modum vestigii.
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.4] Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.
Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.
[I.q.93.a.6.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod tam in visione corporali quam in imaginaria inventur quædam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. XI De Trinit., cap. II, col. 985, t. 8. In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris corporis; secundo vero scilicet ut notavimus, in ep. ad Gal., c. III, 28. 3 Ita editi libri quos vidimus; cod. Alcan.: « ta-men hominis quia, » etc. 4 Legitur magis in extenso apud D. Augustinum. ipsa visio, quæ fit per impressionem cujus-dam similitudinis prædictæ speciei in visum; tertio est ibi intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa detinens. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, quæ provenit ex hoc quod acies animæ, id est ipsa vis imaginaria, informatur secundum prædictam speciem; tertio vero inventur intentio voluntatis conjungens utrum-que. Sed utraque Trinitas deficit a ratione divinæ imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris corporis est extra naturam animæ. Species autem quæ est in memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animæ. Et ita utrobique deficit repræsentatio connaturali-tatis et coæternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a sensu videntis. Et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a specie quæ in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute imaginativa. Et ita per hoc non repræsentatur convenienter processio Filii a solo Patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quæ conjungit duo prædicta, non ex eis procedit neque in visione corporea, neque in spirituali. Unde non convenienter repræsentatur processio Spiritus sancti a Patre et Filio.
Article 7
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, De civ. Dei, lib. XI, cap. xxvi, col. 339, t. 7, quod « homo factus est ad imaginem Dei secundum quod sumus, et nos esse novimus, et nostrum esse ac nosse diligimus. » Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.2] Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus, in IX De Trin., cap. iv, col. 963, t. 8, assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum hæc tria, quæ sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non si-agnificat actum, sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam intellectivæ animæ. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum actus.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.3] Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus, De Trin., lib. X, cap. xi, col. 982, t. 8, assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed hæc tria sunt vires naturales animæ, ut Magister dicit, Ⅲ dist., I lib. Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum actus.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.4] Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.
[I.q.93.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, imago Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.
[I.q.93.a.7.sc] Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.
[I.q.93.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus, XI De Trinit., cap. Ⅱ et Ⅲ, col. 985, t. 8, assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus animæ partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quæ est in mente, secundum quam homo est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem.
[I.q.93.a.7.co] As above explained (2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.
[I.q.93.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet aliqualis repræsentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinæ debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad repræsentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinæ autem personæ distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV De Trinit., cap. vii, col. 1042, t. 8. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, co-gitando, interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiæ, unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio; secundario et quasi ex consequenti imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima secundum potentias, et præcipue secundum habitus, prout in eis scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.1] Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis inquantum men- Ita cod. Alcan. cum editis pene omnibus; edit. Rom.: « imago divina. » tem habemus. Et ideo eadem est hæc Trinitas cum illa quam Augustinus ponit, De Trinit., lib. XX, cap. iv, col. 963, t. 8, quæ consistit in mente, notitia et amore.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.2] Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. Sed quia mens etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta, et sic etiam se quærit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat, in X De Trinit., cap. 11 et iv, col. 975, t. 8, ideo quia notitia non totaliter menti coæquatur, accipit in anima tria quædam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, quæ nullus ignorat se habere; et in istis tribus potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat quasi prima assignatio sit quodammodo deficiens.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.3] As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [Cf. 79, 7, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus probat, XIV De Trinit., cap. VII, intelligere dicimur et velle seu amare aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et quando de his non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad solam memoriam pertinent, quæ nihil est aliud, secundum ipsum, quam habitualis retentio notitiæ et amoris. Sed quia, ut ipse dicit, XIV De Trin., c. VII, col. 1043, t. 8, « ibi verbum esse sine cogitatione non potest, cogitamus enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo, quod ad nullius gentis pertinet linguam, in tribus potius illis imago ista cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia, voluntate. Hanc autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quæ istam prolem parentemque conjungit. » Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinæ Trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoria; licet etiam quantum ad hoc aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in Sententiis dicitur.
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.4] Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence."
[I.q.93.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquis res- 1. Ab initio quo esse cæpit... sive ita obsoleta sit hæc imago, ut pene nulla sit, sive obscura atque deformis, sive clara et pulchra sit, semper est.
Article 8
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (Article 7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod imago divinæ Trinitatis sit in anima non solum per comparationem ad objectum, quod est Deus. Imago enim divinæ Trinitatis inventur in anima, sicut dictum est, secundum quod verbum in nobis procedit a dicente et amor ab utroque. Sed hoc inventur in nobis secundum quodcumque objectum. Ergo secundum quodcumque objectum inventur in mente nostra imago divinæ Trinitatis. 2. Eadem anima perfectionem aliam habet, intelligentiam quæ notitiam recipit. Intellectus enim cum actu intelligendi notitiae vel intelligentiae rationem habet, et hæc est secunda pars imaginis. 3. Eadem anima tertiam perfectionem habet, voluntatem quæ volitionem recipit. Volitiva enim potentia cum volitione rationem interi amoris seu voluntatis habet, et est tertia pars imaginis. Memoria dicitur parens, intelligentia proles, voluntas amor.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in XII De Trinit., cap. iv, col. 1000, t. 8, quod « cum quærimus in anima Trinitatem, in tota quærimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum. » Ergo etiam secundum temporalia objecta invenitur imago Trinitatis in anima.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.3] Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod Deum intelligamus et amemus, convenit nobis secundum gratia donum. Si igitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, seu dilectionem Dei attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, non erit imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed secundum gratiam; et sic non erit omnibus communis.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.4] Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Corinthians 3:18): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.
[I.q.93.a.8.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sancti qui sunt in patria, maxime conformantur imagini Dei secundum gloriæ visionem. Unde dicitur II Cor., 18: In eamdem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem. Sed secundum visionem gloriæ temporalia cognoscuntur. Ergo etiam per comparisonem ad temporalia Dei imago attenditur in nobis.
[I.q.93.a.8.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.
[I.q.93.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV De Trinit., cap. xii, col. 1048, t. 8, quod « non propterea est Dei imago in mente, quia sui meminit mens et intelligit ac diligit se; sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta est. » Multo igitur minus secundum alia objecta attenditur imago Dei in mente.
[I.q.93.a.8.co] As above explained (2,7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (6,7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).
[I.q.93.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, imago importat similitudinem utcumque pertingentem ad speciei repräsentationem. Unde oportet quod imago divinæ Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod repræsentat divinas personas representatione speciei, sicut est possibile creaturæ. Distinguuntur autem divinæ personæ, ut dictum est, secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque. Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat. Manifestum est autem, quod diversitas objectorum diversificat speciem verbi et amoris. Non enim idem est specie in corde hominis verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nec idem specie amor. Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum de Dei notitia et amorem exinde derivatum; et sic imago Dei attenditur in anima, secundum quod fertur vel nata est ferri in Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter; uno modo directe et immediate; alio modo indirecte et mediate; sicut cum aliquis videndo imaginem hominis in speculo dicitur ferri in ipsum hominem. Et ideo Augustinus dicit in XIV De Trinit., c. viii, col. 1044, t. 8, quod « mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se. Hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum, sed jam imaginem Dei. » Sed hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed prout per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum, ut patet per auctoritatem supra inductam.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.1] For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad rationem imaginis non solum oportet attendere quod aliquid procedat ab aliquo, sed etiam quid a quo procedat, scilicet quod verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.2] In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in tota quidem anima inventur aliqua Trinitas, non quidem ita quod præter actionem temporalium et contemplationem aeternorum quæratur aliquod tertium quo Trinitas impleatur, prout ibidem subditur; sed in illa parte rationis quæ derivatur a parte temporalium, etsi Trinitas inventiri possit, non tamen imago Dei potest inventiri, ut postea dicitur, quia hujusmodi temporalium notitia adventitia est animæ; et habitus etiam ipsi quibus temporalia cognoscuntur, non semper adsunt; sed quandoque quidem præsenitaliter adsunt; quandoque autem secundum memoriam tantum, etiam postquam adesse incipiunt; sicut patet de fide quæ temporaliter nobis advenit in præsenti: in statu autem futuræ beatitudinis jam non erit fides, sed memoria fidei.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.3] The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (12, 12; 56, 3; 60, 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6).
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per gratiam. Est tamen aliqua cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut supra habitum est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad intelligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod imaginem Dei semper diximus permanere in mente; sive hæc imago Dei ita sit obsoleta, quasi obumbrata, ut pæne nulla sit ut in his qui non habent usum ra- « Hæc igitur Trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit, etc. » Ita edit. Rom. et Patav.; Nicolaï: « Memoria Dei, tionis; sive sit obscura atque deformis, ut in peccatoribus; sive sit clara et pulchra, ut in justis; sicut Augustinus dicit XIV De Trin., cap. iv, col. 4040, t. 8.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.4] By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.
[I.q.93.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod secundum visionem gloriæ temporalia videbuntur in ipso Deo; et ideo hujusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem pertinebit; et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV De Trinit., c. xiv, col. 4054, t. 8, quod « in illa natura cui mens feliciter adhærebit immutabile videbit omne quod videbit; » nam et in ipso Verbo increato sunt rationes omnium creaturum.
Article 9
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image."
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem ut genus ad speciem; quia « ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non convertitur, » ut dicitur in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. lxxiv, col. 85, t. 6. Ergo inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur.
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.2] Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ratio imaginis attenditur non solum per repræsentationem divinarum personarum, sed etiam secundum repræsentationem divinæ essentiæ; ad quam repræsentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod similitudo est in essentia, quia est immortalis et indivisibilis, imago autem in aliis.
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.3] Further, the image of God in man is threefold--the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness."
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, imago Dei in homine est triplex; scilicet naturæ, gratiae et gloriæ, ut supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et justitia ad gratiam pertinent. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur, quod imago accipitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, similitudo autem secundum innocentiam et justitiam.
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.4] Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue."
[I.q.93.a.9.arg.4] 4. Præterea, cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis ad voluntatem; quæ sunt duæ partes imaginis. Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod imago sit in cognitione veritatis, similitudo in directione virtutis.
[I.q.93.a.9.sc] Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed."
[I.q.93.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. lli, col. 33, t. 6: « Sunt qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et similitudinem, cum si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere potuisset. »
[I.q.93.a.9.co] Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (Article 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue.
[I.q.93.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod similitudo quædam unitas est; unum enim in qualitative similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaph., text. 20. Unum autem, cum sit de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus et ad singula potest aptari, sicut et bonum et verum. Unde sicut bonum alicui rei particulari potest comparari ut præambulum ad ipsam, et ut subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum præambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare bonum; et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum propter perfectionem virtutis. Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut præambulum ad imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est. Consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat quamdam imaginis perfectionem. Dicimus enim imaginem alicujus esse similem vel non similem ei cujus est imago, inquantum perfecte vel imperfecte repræsentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab imagine distingui dupliciter: uno modo prout est præambula ad ipsam et in pluribus existens; et sic similito attenditur secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturæ intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum hoc dicitur in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. lli, col. 33, t. 6, quod « spiritus, » id est mens, « ad imaginem Dei nullo dubitante factus est. » Cætera autem hominis, scilicet quæ pertinent ad inferiores partes animæ, vel etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. Secundum hoc etiam in lib. De quantitate animæ, cap. ii, col. 1037, t. 4, dicitur quod similitudo Dei attenditur in « In illa itaque natura, cum feliciter adhæserit, immutabiliter vivet, et immutabile videbit omne quod viderit. » « Sufficere potuisse asserunt. » « Factus accipitur. » anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis. Nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiæ entis communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem; et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit, De fide orth., lib. II, c. xii, col. 919, t. 4, quod « id quod est secundum imaginem intellectuale significat et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum; quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est habere, similitudinem. » Et ad idem refertur quod similitudo dicitur ad directionem virtutis pertinere; non enim est virtus sine dilectione virtutis.
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.1] "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image."
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum communem rationem similitudinis, sic enim includitur in ratione ipsius imaginis; sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva.
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.2] The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia animæ pertinet ad imaginem, prout repræsentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quæ sunt propria intellectualis naturæ, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indis-solubilem.
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.3] Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness."
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam virtutes quædam naturaliter insunt animæ, ad minus secundum quædam earum semina; et secundum has posset attendi similitudo naturalis; quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur similitudo.
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.4] Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as virtue itself belongs to likeness.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.93.a.9.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad rationem imaginis; sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, sicut et virtus.
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