Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q95. Things pertaining to the first man's will—namely, grace and righteousness
Source context
- Theme
- Original grace, original righteousness, and the will-constitution of the first human being before the Fall
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Vedantic doctrine of the primordial human (Adi Purusha)Vedantic accounts of the primordial being (Adi Purusha) as originally unified in consciousness and unconditioned by desire show cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that the first man's will was ordered by grace prior to disorder introduced through the Fall.
- Kabbalistic doctrine of Adam Kadmon and the state before the Shevirat ha-KelimKabbalistic teaching posits Adam Kadmon as a state of primordial luminous integrity preceding the shattering of vessels, offering cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's original righteousness (iustitia originalis) as a gift structuring will, intellect, and body in proper subordination before transgression.
Q95. Things pertaining to the first man's will—namely, grace and righteousness
Article 1
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Corinthians 15:45): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. Apostolus enim, I Cor., xv, 45, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit: Factus est primus Adam in animam viventem, novissimus autem* in spiritum vivificantem. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti, q. cxxiii, col. 2371, t. 3, quod Adam non habuit Spiritum sanctum. Sed quicumque habet gratiam, habet Spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit creatus in gratia.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De correptione et gratia, cap. x, col. 932, t. 10, quod « Deus sic ordinavit angelorum et hominum vitam, ut in ea prius ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset suæ gratia beneficium justitiæque judicium. » Primo ergo condidit hominem et angelum in sola naturalis arbitrii libertate, et postmodum ei gratiam contulit.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.4] Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Magister dicit in xxiv dist. lib. II Sent., quod « homini in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non poterat proficere. » Quicumque autem habet gratiam potest proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.5] Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.5] 5. Præterea, ad hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte recipientis; cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti suæ creationis.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.6] Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummaed. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.
[I.q.95.a.1.arg.6] 6. Præterea, natura plus distat a gratia, quam gratia a gloria, quæ nihil est aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia præcessit gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura præcessit gratiam.
[I.q.95.a.1.sc] Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace.
[I.q.95.a.1.sc] Sed contra, homo et angelus αequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed angelus est creatus in gratia; dicit enim Augustinus, De civit. Dei, lib. XII, c. 1x, col. 357, t. 7, quod « Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam, et largiens gratiam. » Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia.
[I.q.95.a.1.co] Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.
But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Ecclesiastes 7:30, "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.
[I.q.95.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit creatus in gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit ei collata, antequam peccasset. Plurimæ enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem in statu innocentiæ gratiam habuisse. Sed quod fuerit etiam conditus in gratia, ut allii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud Eccle., vii, 30: Deus fecit hominem rectum. Erat enim hæc rectitudo secundum hoc quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero inferiores vires et animæ corpus. Prima autem subjectio erat causa et secundæ et tertiæ. Quamdiu enim ratio manebat Deo subjecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit lib. I De remiss. peccatorum, c. xvi, col. 120, t. 10. Manifestum est autem, quod illa subjectio corporis ad animam et inferiorum virium ad rationem non erat naturalis; alioquin post peccatum mansisset, cum etiam in dæmonibus data naturalia post peccatum permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., c. iv, § 23, col. 726, t. 4. Unde manifestum est, quod et illa prima subjectio, qua ratio Deo subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum supernaturale donum gratia; non enim potest esse quod effectus sit potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII De civ. Dei, cap. xiii, col. 386, t. 7, quod « postquam præcepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt. Sensorunt enim novum motum inobedientis carnis suæ, tanquam reciprocam pœnam inobedientiæ suæ. » Ex quo datur intelligi, si, deserente gratia, soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.1] The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum, esse corpus spirituale, sicut corpus animale; quia vita spiritualis corporis incepit in Christo, Opus De quaestionibus Veteris et Novi Testamenti, annuentibus omnibus, Augustino abjudicatur. De auctore quidem nil certum habetur; cum iste liber a quibusdam deputetur Hilario diacono, Sardo natione, et secto Luciferiano; aliis autem mixtum opus plurium scriptorum videatur. qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, sicut vita corporis animalis incepit in Adam. Non ergo in verbis Apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam, sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.2] As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur in eodem loco, non negatur quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam Spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis justis; sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, qui admittuntur ad perceptionem hæreditatis æternæ statim post mortem.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.3] This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate arbitrii quam habuisset gratiam; sed quod ostendit quid in eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum consecuti essent per auxilium gratiae confirmantis.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.4] The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus tantum. Vel potest dici, quod etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, non tamen habuit ex creatione naturæ quod posset proficere per meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.5] As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suæ creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.6] We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.
[I.q.95.a.1.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum naturæ. Unde non est similis ratio.
Article 2
[I.q.95.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Galatians 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.
[I.q.95.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animæ passiones. Secundum enim passiones animæ contingit quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, Gal., v, 17. Sed hoc non erat in statu innocentiæ. Ergo in statu innocentiæ non erant animæ passiones.
[I.q.95.a.2.arg.2] Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
[I.q.95.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, anima Adæ erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adæ fuit impassibile. Ergo nec in anima ejus fuerunt passiones.
[I.q.95.a.2.arg.3] Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.
[I.q.95.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per virtutem moralem comprimuntur animæ passiones. Sed in Adam fuit virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab eo.
[I.q.95.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the soul.
[I.q.95.a.2.sc] Sed contra est, quod dicit Augustinus, XIV De civit. Dei, c. x, col. 417, t. 7, quod « erat in eis amor imperturbatus in Deum, et quædam aliæ animæ passiones. »
[I.q.95.a.2.co] The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
[I.q.95.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod passiones animæ sunt in appetitu sensuali, cujus objectum est bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animæ quædam ordinantur ad bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quædam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat, nec aliquod bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, ut patet per Augustinum, De civit. Dei, ubi supra, omnes illæ passiones quæ respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant, ut timor et dolor et hujusmodi; similiter nec illæ passiones quæ respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut cupiditas æstuans; illæ vero passiones quæ possunt esse boni præsentis ut gaudium et amor, vel quæ sunt futuri boni in suo tempere habendi, ut desiderium et spes non Nicolaï: « ut dolor et hujusmodi. » Codices Alcan. et Tarrac. cum editis plurimis: « et tunc; » edit. Rom. cum Nicolaï, et nostri Juxta Guillermum, justitia originalis bene a gratia, sicut gratia non gratum faciens a gratia gratum faciente distinguebatur. Justitia originalis sola, Adam gratum Deo sine gratia gratum faciente non reddebat. Quemadmodum in angelis excellentia data naturæ gratis data fuit, sic in Adam talis excellentia fuisset, licet supernaturaliter ei collata, sine gratia gratum faciente, nisi largius hæc justiaffligens, fuerunt in statu innocentiæ; aliter tamen quam in nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non totaliter subest rationi; unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis prævenientes judicium rationis et impedientes; quandoque vero ex judicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiæ inferior appetitus erat rationi totaliter subjectus. Unde non erant in eo passiones animæ, nisi ex rationis judicio consequentes.
[I.q.95.a.2.ad.1] The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.
[I.q.95.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum per hoc quod quod passiones rationi repugnant; quod in statu innocentiæ non erat.
[I.q.95.a.2.ad.2] The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (97, 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.
[I.q.95.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiæ erat impassibile quantum ad passiones quæ removent dispositionem naturalem, ut infra dicetur; et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad passiones quæ impediunt rationem.
[I.q.95.a.2.ad.3] Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.
[I.q.95.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit passiones, sed ordinat eas. Temperati enim est concupiscere sicut oportet et quæ oportet, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. xi, ad fin.
Article 3
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quædam enim virtutes ordinantur ad refrenandam immoderantiam passionum; sicut per temperentiam refrenatur immoderata concupiscentia et per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non erat in statu innocentiæ. Ergo nec dictæ virtutes.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.2] Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quædam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum, ut mansuetudo circa iras, fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales passiones non erant in statu innocentiæ, 1 Sermo De symbolo contra Judæos, Paganos et Arianos multa continet ex Augustino deprompta; ab hujus autem dictionis forma longe differt. Videtur auctor incertus scripsisse tempore quo dominantur Ariani. Plenius autem in textu: « Hiç dum ut dictum est. Ergo nec hujusmodi virtutes.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.3] Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, pœnitentia est quædam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum; misericordia etiam est quædam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in statu innocentiæ non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque hujusmodi virtutes.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.4] Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, perseverantia est quædam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit, ut sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.5] Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.
[I.q.95.a.3.arg.5] 5. Præterea, fides quædam virtus est. Sed hæc in statu innocentiæ non fuit; importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem quæ perfectioni primi status repugnare videtur.
[I.q.95.a.3.sc] Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness."
[I.q.95.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in quadam Homil. contra Judæos, Pagan. et Arian., cap. 11, col. 4117, t. 8: « Princeps vitiorum vidit Adam de luto terræ ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia ornatum, temperantia compositum, claritate circumdatum. »
[I.q.95.a.3.co] in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above (Article 1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (I-II, 63, 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue.
It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9).
[I.q.95.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod homo in statu innocentiæ aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes, et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra, quod talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subjecta, inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt quam perfectiones quædam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum et inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis, ut magis patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed considerandum est, quod virtutum quædam sunt quæ de sui ratione nullam imperfectionem important, ut charitas et justitia: et hujusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiæ simpliciter et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quædam vero sunt quæ de sui ratione imperfectionem important vel ex parte actus, vel ex parte materiæ. Et si hujusmodi imperfectio non repugnat perfectioni primi status, nihilominus hujusmodi virtutes poterant esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quæ est eorum quæ non videntur, et spes, quæ est eorum quæ non habentur. Perfectio enim primi status non se extendebat ad hoc ut videret Deum 1 Sermo De symbolo contra Judæos, Paganos et Arianos multa continet ex Augustino deprompta; ab hujus autem dictionis forma longe differt. Videtur auctor incertus scripsisse tempore quo dominantur Ariani. Plenius autem in textu: « Hiç dum illum primum, Adam scilicet, patrem omnium nostrum intueretur, videretque hominem ex limo teræ ad imaginem Dei factum..., caritate circumdatum. » 2 per essentiam et ut haberet eum fruitione finalis beatitudinis. Unde fides et spes esse poterant in primo statu et quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Si vero imperfectio, quæ est de ratione virtutis alicujus, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huujsmodi virtus ibi esse secundum habitum et non secundum actum, ut patet de pœnitentia, quæ est dolor de peccato commisso et de misericordia, quæ est dolor de miseria aliena. Perfectioni autem primi status repugnat tam dolor quam culpa et miseria. Unde hujusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum et non secundum actum. Erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si peccatum præcessisset, doleret: et similiter si miseriam in alio videret, eam pro posse repelleret; sicut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., c. ult., in fin., quod « verecundia, quæ est de turpi facto, contingit studioso solum sub conditione; est enim sic dispositus quod verecundaretur, si turpe aliquid committeret. »
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.1] It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod accidit temperantiæ et fortitudini quod superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones superabundantes in subjecto. Sed per se convenit hujusmodi virtutibus passiones moderari.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.2] Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illæ passiones ad malum ordinatæ repugnant perfectioni primi status, quæ habent respectum ad malum in ipso qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quæ respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status. Poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam dæmonum, sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quæ circa tales passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu et quantum ad habitum, et quantum ad actum. Quæ vero sunt circa passiones respicientes malum in eodem subjecto, si circa hujusmodi solas passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, sed solum secundum habitum, sicut de pœnitentia et misericordia dictum est. Sed sunt quædam virtutes quæ non sunt circa has passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quæ non solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa de- 1 In — 2 Secundum Guillermum gratiarum et virtutum cumulus amplior in præsenti quam in innocentiæ statu datur. D. Thomas in statu innocentiæ copiosiorem gratiam fuisse affirmat; seà concedit lectationes; et fortitudo, quæ non solum est circa timorem, sed etiam circa audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus temperantiæ, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive spei, non autem secundum quod moderatur tristitiam et timorem. Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quæ dicta sunt.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.3] appears from what has been said above.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.4] Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur; uno modo prout est quædam virtus; et sic significat quemdam habitum quo quis eligit perseverare in bono, et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo prout est circumstantia virtutis: et sic significat continuationem quamdam virtutis absque corruptione; et hoc modo Adam perseverantiam non habuit. Ad quintum patet responsio per ea quæ dicta sunt.
[I.q.95.a.3.ad.5] appears from what has been said above.
Article 4
[I.q.95.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.
[I.q.95.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei misericordia datur, quæ magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiæ. Ergo copiosius infunditur nobis gratia; quæ cum sit radix meriti, opera nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur.
[I.q.95.a.4.arg.2] Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Timothy 2:5): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.
[I.q.95.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad meritum requiritur pugna quædam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad Timoth., ii, 5: Non coronabitur * nisi qui legitime certaverit; et Philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., cap. iii, ad fin., quod « virtus est circa difficile et bonum. » Sed nunc est ma-nunc ex parte Dei gratiam oblatam esse copiosiorem. Ratio D. Thomæ est ista: in statu innocentiæ nullum in natura humana inveniebatur obstaculum. jor pugna et difficultas. Ergo et major efficacia ad merendum.
[I.q.95.a.4.arg.3] Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state.
[I.q.95.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Magister dicit xxiv dist. II lib. Sent., quod homo non meruisset tentationi resistendo. Nunc autem meretur qui tentationi resistit. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam in primo statu.
[I.q.95.a.4.sc] if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning.
[I.q.95.a.4.sc] Sed contra est, quia secundum hoc homo esset melioris conditionis post peccatum.
[I.q.95.a.4.co] Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.
First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God.
Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good.
We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.
[I.q.95.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo ex radice charitatis et gratia, et talis quantitas meriti respondet præmio essentiali quod consistit in Dei fruitione; qui enim ex majori charitate aliquid facit perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis; quæ quidem est duplex, scilicet absoluta et proportionalis. Vidua enim quæ misit duo aera minuta in gazophylacium, minus opus fecit quantitate absoluta quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt; sed quantitate proportionali vidua plus fecit secundum sententiam Domini, quia magis ejus facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti respondet præmio accidentali, quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic igitur dicendum, quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum in statu innocentiæ quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas meriti ex parte gratia, quæ tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo obstaculo in natura humana invento; similiter etiam, si consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia cum homo esset majoris virtutis majora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur quantitas proportionalis, major inventur ratio meriti post peccatum propter hominis imbecillitatem. Magis enim excedit parvum opus potestatem ejus qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus magnum potestatem ejus qui sine difficultate illud operatur.
[I.q.95.a.4.ad.1] After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.
[I.q.95.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante peccatum, sed non magis, quia homo etiam ante peccatum indigebat gratia ad vitam æternam consequendam, quæ est principalis necessitas gratia; sed homo post peccatum super hoc indiget gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem et infirmitatis sustentaionem. In Merita juxta Guillermum ex triplici radice prodeunt: Voluntate, ante peccatum magis expedita; unde meritum ex hac parte majus; — ardui-
[I.q.95.a.4.ad.2] Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin.
[I.q.95.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quæ conatur ad id quod est sibi difficile. Promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine charitatis. Potest autem contingere quod aliquis ita prompta voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas ta-men actualis, inquantum est pœnalis, habet etiam quod sit satisfactoria pro peccato.
[I.q.95.a.4.ad.3] The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.95.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet, sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad malum, sicut modo est. Unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere tentationi sine gratia quam modo.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-pars/q095.json