Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q110. How angels act on bodies
Source context
- Theme
- angelic action on material and bodily reality through intermediate spiritual causation
Steiner
- GA 265a, 1911-12-17Steiner describes how transformed portions of the human etheric body are surrendered to angelic beings, indicating a direct angelic-bodily relationship mediated through the etheric constitution.
Cross-tradition
- Neoplatonism (Proclus / Pseudo-Dionysius)Neoplatonic hierarchical emanation posits that higher intelligences act on lower material levels only through intermediary orders, a structural parallel to Aquinas's account of how angels move bodies without directly informing matter as a form.
- Islamic Kalam (occasionalism and angelic mediation)Certain Ashari theologians attributed natural causation to angelic or divine intermediaries rather than to inherent material powers, showing cross-tradition congruence with the scholastic question of how incorporeal beings produce physical effects.
Q110. How angels act on bodies
Article 1
[I.q.110.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.
[I.q.110.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non administretur per angelos. Res enim quæ habent determinatum modum operandi, non indigent gubernari ab aliquo præsidente; ideo enim indigemus gubernari, ne aliter operemur quam oporteat. Sed res corporales habent determinatas actiones ex naturis sibi divinitus datis. Non ergo indigent gubernatione angelorum.
[I.q.110.a.1.arg.2] Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.
[I.q.110.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea inferiora in entibus gubernantur per superiora. Sed in corporibus quædam dicuntur inferiora, quædam superiora. Inferiora igitur gubernantur per superiora. Non ergo est necessarium quod gubernentur per angelos.
[I.q.110.a.1.arg.3] Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Question 108, Article 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.
[I.q.110.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, diversi ordines angelorum distinguuntur secundum diversa officia. Sed si creaturæ corporales administrentur per angelos, tot erunt officia angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Ergo etiam tot erunt ordines angelorum, quot sunt species rerum, quod est contra supra dicta. Non ergo corporalis creatura administratur per angelos.
[I.q.110.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature."
[I.q.110.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III Una opinio falsa, multis improbata rationibus juxta Bonaventuram, tenet quod a prima causa sola cælum immediate movetur. Alia opinio Avi-cennæ et aliorum est quod movetur ab anima cæli: hæc opinio cælum esse animatum supponit. Opinio catholica docet quod ab angelis cælum movetur, et angeli non lassantur; sed ex Francisco De Trinit., c. iv, col. 873, t. 8, quod « omnia corpora reguntur per spiritum vitæ rationalem; » et Gregorius dicit in IV Dial., c. vi, col. 329, t. 3, quod « in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per creaturam invisibilem disponi potest. »
[I.q.110.a.1.co] It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above (55, 3; 108, 1), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.
[I.q.110.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tam in rebus humanis, quam in rebus naturalibus hoc communiter inventur, quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali, sicut potestas ballivi gubernatur a potestate regis. Et in angelis etiam est dictum, quod superiores angeli qui præsunt inferioribus, habent scientiam magis universalem. Manifestum est autem quod virtus cujuslibet corporis est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiæ: nam omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et determinata ad hic et nunc; formæ autem immateriales sunt absolutæ et intelligibiles. Et ideo, sicut inferiores angeli, qui habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores, ita omnia corporalia reguntur per angelos. Et hoc non solum a sanctis doctoribus ponitur, sed etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui incorporeas substantias posuerunt.
[I.q.110.a.1.ad.1] Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.
[I.q.110.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod res corporales habent determinatas actiones; sed has actiones non exercent, nisi secundum quod moventur; quia proprium corporis est quod non agat nisi per motum. Et ideo oportet quod creatura corporalis a spirituali moveatur.
[I.q.110.a.1.ad.2] The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
[I.q.110.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio ista procedit secundum opinionem Aristotelis, III Metaph., text. 44, qui posuit quod corpora cælestia moventur a substantiis spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus cælestibus. Sed non posuit, quod essent aliquæ substantiæ spiritales quæ haberent immediatam præsidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas humanas; et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in inferioribus corporibus exerceri, nisi naturales, ad quas sufficiebat motus corporum cælestium. Sed Mayrone, si novæ stellæ adderentur, virtus angelorum augeri deberet. Motus ille, secundum Richardum, absque attractione, vel impulsione fit, sed magis attractioni quam impulsioni assimilatur; unde legem attractionis universalis non penitus Scholastici ignorabant. quia nos ponimus, multa in corporibus inferioribus fieri præter naturales actiones corporum, ad quæ non sufficiunt virtutes cælestium corporum; ideo secundum nos necesse est ponere, quod angeli habeant immediatam præsidentiam, non solum supra cælestia corpora, sed etiam supra corpora inferiora.
[I.q.110.a.1.ad.3] Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."
The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text, "When the ass saw the angel" (Numbers 22:23), that "the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (108, 2), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
[I.q.110.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod de substantiis immaterialibus diversimode philosophi sunt locuti. Plato enim posuit substantias immateriales esse rationes et species sensibilium corporum et quasdam aliis universaliores; et ideo posuit substantias immateriales habere præsidentiam immediatam circa omnia sensibilia corpora, et diversas circa diversa. Aristoteles autem posuit, XII Met., text. 43, quod substantiæ immateriales non sunt species corporum sensibilium, sed aliquid altius et universalius; et ideo non attribuit eis immediatam præsidentiam supra singula corpora, sed solum supra universalia agentia, quæ sunt corpora cælestia. Avicenna vero mediam viam secutus est. Posuit enim cum Platone aliquam substantiam spiritualem præsidentem immediate spheræ activorum et passivorum, eo quod, sicut Plato ponebat, quod formæ horum sensibilium derivantur a substantiis immaterialibus, ita etiam Avicenna hoc posuit. Sed in hoc a Platone differt, quod posuit unam tantum substantiam immaterialem præsidentem omnibus corporibus inferioribus, quam vocavit « intelligentiam agentem. » Doctores autem sancti posuerunt, sicut Platonici, diversas rebus corporeis substantias spirituales esse præpositas. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. Lxxix, col. 90, t. 6: « Unaquæque res visibilis in hoc mundo habet angelicam potestatem sibi præpositam; » et Damascenus dicit, lib. II Orth. fid., c. iv, col. 875, t. 4: « Diabolus erat ex iis angeliis virtutibus quæ præerant terrestri ordini; » et Origenes dicit super illud Num., xxii: Cum vidisset asina angelum, hom. xiv, col. 680, t. 2, quod « opus est mundo angelis, qui sint super bestias, et præsint animalium nativitati, et virgultorum, et plantationum et cæteris pluralibus incrementis. » Sed hoc non est ponendum propter hoc quod secundum suam naturam unus angelus magis se habeat ad præsidendum animalibus quam plantis: quia quilibet angelus, etiam minimus, habet altiorem virtutem et universaliorem quam aliquod genus corporalium; sed ex ordine divinæ sapientiae, quæ diversis rebus diversos rectores præposuit. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod sint plures ordines angelorum quam novem; quia, sicut supra dictum est, ordines distinguuntur secundum generalia officia. Unde, sicut secundum Gregorium, Hom. xxxiv in Evang., § 10, col. 1251, t. 2, ad ordinem potestatum pertinent omnes angeli qui habent proprie præsidentiam super dæmones; ita ad ordinem virtutum pertinere videntur omnes angeli qui habent præsidentiam super res pure corporeas; horum enim ministerio interdum etiam miracula fiunt.
Article 2
[I.q.110.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
[I.q.110.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod materia corporalis obediat angelis ad nutum. Major est enim virtus angeli quam virtus animæ. Sed conceptioni animæ obedit materia corporalis; immutatur enim corpus hominis ex conceptione animæ ad calorem et frigus, et quandoque usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ergo multo magis secundum conceptionem angelia materia corporalis transmutatur.
[I.q.110.a.2.arg.2] Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
[I.q.110.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior. Sed virtus angeli est superior quam virtus corporalis; corpus autem sua virtute potest transmutare materiam corporalem ad formam aliquam, sicut patet cum ignis generat ignem. Ergo multo fortius virtute sua angeli possunt materiam corporalem transmutare ad aliquam formam.
[I.q.110.a.2.arg.3] Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (Article 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
[I.q.110.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tota natura corporalis administratur per angelos, ut dictum est, et sic videtur quod corpora se habent ad angelos sicut instrumenta; nam ratio instrumenti est quod sit movens motum. Sed in effectibus aliquid invenitur ex virtute principalium agentium quod non potest esse per virtutem instrumenti; et hoc est id quod est principalius in effectu; sicut digestio nutrimenti est per virtutem caloris naturalis, qui est instrumentum animæ nutritivæ; sed quod generetur caro viva, est ex virtute animæ: similiter quod secetur lignum, pertinet ad serram; sed quod perveniatur ad formam lecti, est ex ratione artis. Ergo forma substantialis, quæ est principalis in effectibus corporalibus, est ex virtute angelorum. Materia ergo obedit ad sui informationem angelis.
[I.q.110.a.2.sc] Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
[I.q.110.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III De Trinit., c. viii, col. 876, t. 8: « Non est putandum istis transgressoribus angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum materiam, sed soli Deo. »
[I.q.110.a.2.co] The Platonists [Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218 asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
[I.q.110.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Platonici posuerunt, formas quæ sunt in materia, causari ex immaterialibus formis; quia formas materiales ponebant esse participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos quantum ad aliquid secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit, omnes formas quæ sunt in materia procedere a conceptione intelligentiæ, et quod agentia corporalia sunt solum disponentia ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid per se factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed, sicut Philosophus probat in VII Metaph., text. 27, hoc quod proprie fit, est compositum. Hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens; forma autem non dicitur ens, quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est; et sic per consequens nec forma proprie fit; ejus enim est fieri, cujus est esse; cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales habet similitudinem cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem, vel quia totum compositum et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad formam, est in virtute ipsius, quod est proprium Dei. Sic igitur omnis informatio materiæ vel est a Deo immediate vel ab aliquo agente corporali, non autem immediate ab angelo.
[I.q.110.a.2.ad.1] Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
[I.q.110.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; præsertim cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione corporali, subdatur imperio rationis. Angelus autem non sic se habet ad corpora naturalia: unde ratio non sequitur.
[I.q.110.a.2.ad.2] Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
[I.q.110.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior, non eodem, sed excellentiori modo; sicut intellectus cognoscit sensibilia excellentiori modo quam sensus. Et sic angelus excellentiori modo transmutat materiam corporalem quam agentia corporalia, scilicet movendo ipsa agentia corporalia tanquam causa superior.
[I.q.110.a.2.ad.3] There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
[I.q.110.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod nihil prohibet ex virtute angelorum aliquos effectus sequi in rebus naturalibus, ad quos agentia corporalia non sufficerent. Sed hoc non est angelo obedire materiam ad nutum: sicut nec coquis obedit materia ad nutum, quia aliquem modum decoctionis operantur per ignem secundum aliquam artis moderationem, quam ignis per se non faceret; cum reducere materiam in actum formæ substantia-tialis non excedat virtutem corporalis agen-tis; quia simile natum est sibi simile facere.
Article 3
[I.q.110.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above (Article 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.
[I.q.110.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod corpora non obediant angelis ad motum localem. Motus enim localis corporum naturalium sequitur formas eorum. Sed angeli non causant formas corporum naturalium, ut dictum est. Ergo neque possunt causare in eis motum localem.
[I.q.110.a.3.arg.2] Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.
[I.q.110.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in VIII Phys., a text. 54 ad 60, probatur quod motus localis est primus motuum. Sed angeli non possunt causare alias motus, transmutando materiam formaliter. Ergo neque etiam possunt causare motum localem.
[I.q.110.a.3.arg.3] Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
[I.q.110.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, membra corporalia obedient conceptioni animæ ad motum localem, in quantum habent in seipsis aliquod principium vitæ. In corporibus autem naturalibus non est aliquod principium vitæ. Ergo non obedient angelis ad motum localem.
[I.q.110.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.
[I.q.110.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, III De Trinit., cap. viii, col. 876, t. 8, quod « angeli adhibent semina corporalia ad aliquos effectus producendos. » Sed hoc non possunt facere nisi localiter movendo. Ergo corpora obediunt eis ad motum localem.
[I.q.110.a.3.co] As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic--that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.
[I.q.110.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Dionysius dicit, De div. nom., c. viii, § 3, col. 871, t. 1, « divina sapientia conjungit fines primorum principiis secundorum. » Ex quo patet quod natura inferior in sui supremo attingitur a natura superiori. Natura autem corporalis est infra naturam spiritualem. Inter omnes autem motus corporeos perfectior est motus localis, ut probatur in VIII Physic., text. 57. Cujus ratio est, quia mobile secundum locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum hujusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad locum. Et ideo natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura spirituali secundum locum. Unde et philosophi posuerunt suprema corpora moveri localiter a spiritualibus substantiis; unde videmus quod anima movet corpus primo et principaliter locali motu.
[I.q.110.a.3.ad.1] There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances.
[I.q.110.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in corporibus sunt alii motus locales præter eos qui consequuntur formas; sicut fluxus et refluxus maris non consequitur formam substantialem aquæ, sed virtutem lunæ; et multo magis aliqui motus locales consequui possunt virtutem spiritualium substantia-rum.
[I.q.110.a.3.ad.2] The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.
[I.q.110.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod angeli causando motum localem, tanquam priorem, per eum causare possunt alios motus, adhibendo scilicet agentia corporalia ad hujusmodi effectus producendos, sicut faber adhibet ignem ad emollitionem ferri.
[I.q.110.a.3.ad.3] The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
[I.q.110.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animæ. Unde virtus motiva animæ contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus angeli non est contracta ad aliquod corpus; unde potest corpora non conjuncta localiter movere. Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « Deus semper fines praecedentium cum principiis sequentium connectit. » « Aliter magi faciunt miracula, aliter boni Christiani, aliter mali Christiani: magi per privatos, » etc. « Cum autem mali homines magicis artibus operantur similia, in manus suas dantur cum
Article 4
[I.q.110.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done."
[I.q.110.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angeli possint facere miracula. Dicit enim Gregorius, Hom. xxxiv in Evang., § 10, col. 1251, t. 2: « Virtutes vocantur illi spiritus per quos signa et miracula frequentius fiunt. » 2. Præterea, dicit Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., q. Lxxix, col. 92, t. 6, quod « magi faciunt miracula per privatos contractus; boni Christiani per publicam justitiam; mali Christiani per signa publicæ justitiae. » Sed « magi faciunt miracula per hoc quod exaudiuntur a dæmonibus, » ut ipse in eodem libro dicit. Ergo dæmones miracula possunt facere. Ergo multo magis angeli boni. 3. Præterea, in eod. lib., loco cit., Augustinus dicit quod « omnia quæ visibiliter fiunt, etiam per inferiores potestates aeris hujus non absurde fieri posse creduntur. » Sed quando effectus aliquis naturalium causarum producitur absque ordine naturalis causæ, hoc dicimus esse miraculum, puta cum aliquis sanatur a febre non per operationem naturæ. Ergo angeli et dæmones possunt facere miracula. 4. Præterea, virtus superior non subditur ordini inferioris causæ. Sed natura corporalis est inferior angelo. Ergo angelus potest operari præter ordinem corporalium agen-tium: quod est miracula facere. Sed contra est quod de Deo dicitur in psalm. cxxxv, 4: Qui facit mirabilia magna solus.
[I.q.110.a.4.arg.2] Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere in the same work [Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
[I.q.110.a.4.arg.3] Further, Augustine says in the same work [Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.
[I.q.110.a.4.arg.4] Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.
[I.q.110.a.4.sc] It is written of God (Psalm 135:4): "Who alone doth great wonders."
[I.q.110.a.4.co] A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.
[I.q.110.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod miraculum proprié dicitur, cum aliquid fit præter ordinem naturæ. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi, si aliquid fiat præter ordinem naturæ alicujus particularis; quia sic, cum aliquis projicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit præter ordinem naturæ exaudiuntur a dæmonibus. » Liber de quo hæc desumpta sunt, non est Augustini, sed incerti cujusdam auctoris, et licet sententias quasdam Augustini præbeat, multa continet Augustino prorsus indigna. 4 Legitur in lib. XXI Sententiarum, c. iv, col. 726, t. 6 Oper. August. lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse miraculum, quod fit præter ordinem totius naturæ creatæ. Hoc autem non potest facere nisi Deus: quia quidquid facit angelus vel quæcumque alia creatura propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem naturæ creatæ: et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus miracula facere possit.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.1] Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod angeli aliqui dicuntur miracula facere vel quia ad eorum desiderium Deus miracula facit, sicut et sancti homines dicuntur miracula facere; vel quia aliquod ministerium exhibent in miraculis quæ fiunt, sicut colligendo pulveres in resurrectione communi, vel hujusmodi aliquid agendo.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.2] Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod miracula, simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum est, cum aliqua fiunt præter ordinem totius naturæ creatæ. Sed quia non omnis virtus naturæ creatæ est nota nobis, ideo cum aliquid fit præter ordinem naturæ creatæ nobis notæ per virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. Sic igitur cum daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per daemones miracula faciunt, et dicuntur fieri « per privatos contractus, » quia quælibet virtus creaturæ in universo se habet ut virtus alicujus privatæ personæ in civitate. Unde cum magus aliquid facit per pactum initum cum daemone, hoc fit quasi per quemdam privatum contractum. Sed justitia divina est in toto universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani, inquantum per justitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere miracula « per publicam justitiam; » mali autem Christiani « per signa publicæ justitiae, » sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo aliqua sacramenta.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.3] Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quæ visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per motum localem.
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.4] Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.110.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, licet angeli possint aliquid facere præter ordinem naturæ corporalis, non tamen possunt aliquid facere præter ordinem totius creaturæ: quod exigitur ad rationem miraculi, ut dictum est.
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