Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Pars·Q118. The production of man from man as to the soul
Source context
- Theme
- Transmission of the human soul through biological generation — whether the soul is propagated from parent to offspring or originates independently
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic traducianist/creationist debateAquinas in Q118 argues against traducianism — the view that souls are propagated materially from parent to child — and defends creationism, holding that each rational soul is individually created by God; this structural question of soul-origin per generation has no clean parallel in Steiner's treatment of reincarnation and karma, where the I descends from the spiritual world into a new physical vehicle rather than being either 'produced' by parents or specially created at conception.
- Vedāntic ātman-doctrineIn Advaita Vedānta, the individual ātman is not generated by parental act but is a manifestation of Brahman entering a new vehicle; this parallels Aquinas's creationist position in rejecting material transmission of the soul, though the metaphysical framing differs fundamentally.
Q118. The production of man from man as to the soul
Article 1
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine, sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quæ non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non est per generationem, sed per creationem; quia nihil generatur nisi ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta; alioquin non posset movere corpus; et, cum sit forma corporis, non est ex materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem, sed per creationem.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.2] Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam generativam; quæ cum numeretur inter vires animæ vegetabilis, est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem. Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam animalis.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.3] Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, generans generat sibi simile; et sic oportet quod forma generati sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in semine nec ipsa, nec aliqua pars ejus; quia nulla pars animæ sensitivæ est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est quæ non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima sensitiva non causatur ex semine.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.4] Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above (Question 76, Article 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
[I.q.118.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, si in semine est aliquod principium activum animæ sensitivæ, aut illud principium manet generato jam animali, aut non manet. Sed manere non potest; quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et generatum, et faciens et factum; vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est, quod in uno animali non est nisi unum principium formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile; quia sic aliquod agens ageret ad corruptionem sui ipsius; quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima sensitiva potest generari ex semine.
[I.q.118.a.1.sc] The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Genesis 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.
[I.q.118.a.1.sc] Sed contra, ita se habet virtus quæ est in semine, ad animalia quæ ex semine generantur, sicut se habet virtus quæ est in elementis mundi, ad animalia quæ ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quæ ex putrefactione generantur. Sed in hujusmodi animalibus animæ producuntur ex virtute quæ est in elementis, secundum illud Genes., 1, 20: Producant aquæ reptile animæ viventis. Ergo et animalium quæ generantur ex semine, animæ producuntur ex virtute quæ est in semine.
[I.q.118.a.1.co] Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (65, 4). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.
But this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Question 75, Article 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.
Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium--in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.
[I.q.118.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari. Quæ quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberet ei fieri; et cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem, sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem. Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet; non enim corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse; sed esse dicuntur, inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato, necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva quam aliæ hujusmodi formæ producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus agentibus, transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum per aliquam virtutem corpoream quæ est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis distans; sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia quæ sunt inferiora naturæ ordine, generant quidem sibi simile non per aliquod medium, sed per seipsa, sicut ignis per seipsum generat ignem; sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad generandum sibi simile et sine medio et per medium; sine medio quidem in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem; cum medio vero in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur quædam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantæ; sicut et a principali agente derivatur quædam vis motiva ad instrumentum: et sicut non refert dicere, quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento vel a principali agente, ita non refert dicere, quod anima generati causetur ab anima generantis vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quæ est in semine.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.1] The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (25, 3) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se subsistens; et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic iterare.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.2] The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute propria, sed in virtute totius animæ, cujus est potentia; et ideo virtus generativa plantæ generat plantam; virtus vero generativa animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto virtus generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.3] This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (115, 3, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod virtus illa activa quæ est in semine, ex anima generantis derivata, est quasi quædam motio ipsius animæ generantis, nec est anima aut pars animæ nisi in virtute; sicut in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quædam ad talem formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod organum in actu, sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine, quod est spumosum, ut attestatur ejus albedo; in quo etiam spiritu est quidam calor ex virtute cælestium corporum, quorum etiam virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in hujusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animæ cum virtute cælesti, dicitur quod « homo generat hominem, et sol. » Calidum autem elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animæ; sicut etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 50.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.4] In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
[I.q.118.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu, virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum Philosophum in lib. I De generat. animal., cap. π et xx; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a femina: in qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus; cum autem incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc jam actu operatur. Hujusmodi igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quæ est in semine maris, quousque perducatur in actum animæ sensitivæ; non ita quod ipsamet vis quæ erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva, quia sic idem esset generans et generatum, et hoc magis esset simile nutritioni et augmento quam generationi, ut Philosophus dicit lib. I De gener. et corrupt., text. 33. Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine, producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem principalem, tunc jam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit operari ad complementum proprii corporis per modum nutritionis et augmenti. Virtus autem activa quæ erat in semine, esse desinit, dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu jam producto in esse.
Article 2
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Genesis 46:26): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine. Dicitur enim Gen., xlvi, 26: Cunctæ animæ quæ egressæ sunt de femore Jacob, sexaginta sex. Sed nihil egreditur de femore hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.2] Further, as shown above (Question 76, Article 3), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus, unde et Philosophus dicit in lib. II De generat. animal., cap. 111, quod « non simul fit animal et homo; sed prius fit animal habens animam sensitivam. » Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unum et idem agens est cujus actio terminatur ad formam et materiam; alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis causatur.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.4] Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a generante.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.5] Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.
[I.q.118.a.2.arg.5] 5. Præterea, inconveniens est dicere, quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si animæ rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non ergo animæ rationales creantur a Deo.
[I.q.118.a.2.sc] It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition."
[I.q.118.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in lib. De eccles. dogm., cap. xiv, col. 1216, t. 8 Op. August., quod « animæ rationales non seminantur per coitum. »
[I.q.118.a.2.co] It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.
Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Question 75, Article 2): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
[I.q.118.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod impossibile est virtutem activam quæ est in materia, extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum. Manifestum est autem, quod principium intellectivum in homine est principium transcendens materiam; habet enim operationem in qua non communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quæ est in semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam, quia virtus quæ est in semine, agit in virtute animæ generantis, secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis utens ipso corpore in sua operatione; in operatione autem intellectus non communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout intellectivum est, non potest a semine provenire. Et « Neque cum corporibus per coitum semina-tas. » Liber iste Augustino abjiciendus est, quippe qui Gennadio communiter tribuitur. Ita cod. Camer. cum plurimis editis; cod. Alcan. cum edit. Rom.: « ad semen pervenire. » Cum brutum generat brutum anima vegetativa et anima sensitiva producuntur ex traduce, juxta Guillermum. Juxta Bonaventuram, tunc non transfunditur anima ab anima sicut corpus a corpore, sed cum ipso corporeo semine deciduntur spiritus et calores vivifici, et virtus etiam animalis generantis quæ adjuvat cum virtute matricis continentis, ut illa potentia activa in humore semina-rio ad actum completum perveniat. — Hæc ex Bonaventura. ideo Philosophus, in lib. II De gen. animal., c. Ⅲ, dicit: « Relinquitur intellectum solum deforis advenire. » Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem vitæ sine corpore, est subsistens, ut supra habitum est; et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri, et, cum sit immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a generante causari nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem, et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo hæreticum est dicere, quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum semine.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.1] In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synedochen pars pro toto, idest anima pro toto homine.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.2] Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Question 76, Article 3).
Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold.
First, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration.
Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called.
Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.
There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved above (Question 76, Article 2).
We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitæ quæ apparent in embryone non sunt ab anima ejus, sed ab anima matris, vel a virtute formativa quæ est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est. Opera enim vitæ non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut sentire, nutriri et augeri: et ideo dicendum est quod anima præexistit in embryone; a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam, quod supra animam vegetabilem, quæ primo inerat, supervenit alia anima, quæ est sensitiva; supra illam iterum alia quæ est intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animæ, quarum una est in potentia ad aliam; quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt, quod illa eadem anima quæ primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum per actionem virtutis quæ est in semine perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat sensitiva, et tandem ad hoc ut ipsa eadem fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei de foris illustrantis. Et propter hoc dicit Philosophus, lib. II De gen. animal., cap. xxxiii, quod « intellectus venit ab extrinseco. » Sed hoc stare non potest: primo quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio majoris perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio uni-tatis facit aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus paulatim procedens de imperfecto ad perfectum, sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio, quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit generatio simpliciter, quia subjectum ejus esset ens actu. Si enim a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur, erit semper additio perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis præcedentis; quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens; et ita oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma præexistente, quæ non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas in corpore; aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quædam perfectio animæ præexistentis; et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima intellectiva corrumpatur corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile. Est autem et alius modus dicendi secundum eos qui ponunt unum intellectum in omnibus, quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo dicendum est, quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius, necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis, quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris; ita tamen quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius; et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad ultimam formam substantialem tam in homine quam in aliis animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum apparet in animalibus ex putrefactione generatis. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod anima intellectiva creatur a Deo in fine generationis humanæ, quæ simul est et sensitiva et nutritiva, corruptis formis præexistentibus.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.3] This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above (105, 5; 110, 1) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa locum habet in diversis agentibus non ordinatis ad invicem. Sed si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil prohibet virtutem superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam, virtutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad aliquam materiae dispositionem; 1 In edit. Nicolaï deest « ejus. » Rectius diceretur: videtur esse hæreticum. — Hoc etenim multis hæreticum esse videtur, quam vis traductionem animarum sustinuerint Tertulliasicut virtus seminis disponit materiam, virtus autem animæ dat formam in generatione animalis. Manifestum est autem ex præmissis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut instrumentum spiritualis virtutis, et præcipue Dei. Et ideo nihil prohibet quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali, anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.4] Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod homo generat sibi simile, inquantum per virtutem seminis ejus disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formæ.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.5] In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur.
[I.q.118.a.2.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod in actione adulterorum illud quod est naturæ, bonum est: et huic cooperatur Deus; quod vero est inordinatæ voluptatis, malum est; et huic Deus non cooperatur.
Article 3
[I.q.118.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Genesis 2:2): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.
[I.q.118.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod animæ humanæ fuerint creatæ simul a principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen., II, 2: Requievit Deus ab universo opere quod patrarat. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas animas crearet. Ergo omnes animæ sunt simul creatæ.
[I.q.118.a.3.arg.2] Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Genesis 2:2, where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
[I.q.118.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si igitur animæ simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi adderentur; et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum; quod est contra illud quod dicitur Genes., II, 2: Deum omne opus suum complexse.
[I.q.118.a.3.arg.3] Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body.
[I.q.118.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, finis rei respondet ejus principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet destructo corpore. Ergo incepit esse ante corpus.
[I.q.118.a.3.sc] It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body."
[I.q.118.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro De eccles. dogm., c. xiv, col. 1216, t. 8 Oper. Augustini, quod « simul anima creatur cum corpore. »
[I.q.118.a.3.co] Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false.
Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Question 75, Article 4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above (55, 2; 85, 1): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (84, 6,7; 85, 1). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.
But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous.
First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in what is necessary."
Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions.
Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them.
[I.q.118.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt, quod animæ intellectivæ accidat uniri « Dicimus…… formato jam corpore animam creari et infundi. » Et c. xviii: « formato in ventre corpori, ponentes eam esse ejusdem conditionis cum substantiis spiritualibus quæ corpori non uniuntur; et ideo posuerunt, animas hominum simul a principio cum angelis creatas. Sed hæc opinio falsa est; primo quidem quantum ad radicem: si enim accidentaliter conveniret animæ corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset homo; quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima humana non sit ejusdem naturæ cum angelis, ipse diversus modus intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est. Homo enim intelligit a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra ostensum est, et ideo anima ejus indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad operationem sensitivæ partis; quod de angelo dici non potest. Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animæ naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suæ naturæ perfectionem. Non fuit autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab his quæ sunt præter naturam; non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut sine pede, quæ sunt partes naturales hominis; multo igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat, quod non est naturale animæ corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sit corpori unita. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex ejus voluntate, aut ex alia causa. Si ex ejus voluntate, videtur hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia hæc voluntas irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore et vellet ei uniri; si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniret, quia natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset quare animæ a principio mundi creatæ post tot tempora voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur; est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones cæli excedens. Tertio, quia videretur a casu esse quod hæc anima huic corpori uniret, cum ad hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animæ advenientis et hominis generantis. Si autem præter voluntatem ipsius corpori unitur, et præter ejus naturam, oportet quod hoc sit ex causa violentiam inferente: et sic erit ei poenale et triste; quod est secundum matris corpore, Dei judicio (anima) creatur et infunditur. » Gennadio tribuitur opus De eccl. dogm. errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas incorporari propter pœnam peccati. Unde, cum hæc omnia sint inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est, quod animæ non sunt creatæ ante corpora; sed simul creantur cum corporibus infunduntur.
[I.q.118.a.3.ad.1] God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (John 5:17): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.
[I.q.118.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni opere, cum dicatur Joan., v, 17: Pater meus usque modo operatur, sed a novis rerum generibus et specibus condendis, quæ in operibus primis non aliquo modo præextiterint. Sic enim animæ quæ nunc creantur, præextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adæ creata fuit.
[I.q.118.a.3.ad.2] Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species.
[I.q.118.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum individuo-rum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad numerum specierum.
[I.q.118.a.3.ad.3] That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wisdom 1:13-16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I.q.118.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per corporis corruptionem quæ consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera; quia, sicut scriptum est Sap., 1, 13 et 16: Deus mortem non fecit..., sed impii manibus et verbis accer-sierunt eam*.
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