Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q47. The cause that provokes anger, and the remedies of anger
Source context
- Theme
- causes of anger, gradations of irascibility, and the remedies by which the passion of anger is ordered toward virtue
- Soul-faculty
- Sentient Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethics (Nicomachean Ethics IV.5)Aristotle distinguishes the irascible (orgilós) person from the patient (aórgetos) and identifies the mean of praótes (gentleness) as the virtuous ordering of anger in response to genuine injustice — a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of anger as a passion that admits of both defect and excess.
- Stoic philosophyThe Stoic tradition, particularly Seneca's De Ira, treats anger as a disturbance of rational judgment to be extinguished through reason and reflection, providing a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's remedies of anger, though Aquinas stops short of the Stoic counsel of complete extirpation.
Q47. The cause that provokes anger, and the remedies of anger
Article 1
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to Psalm 105:40: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man is angry.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non semper aliquis irascatur propter aliquid contra se factum. Homo enim pecando nihil contra Deum facere potest; dicitur enim Job, xxxv, 6: Si multiplicat fuerint iniquitates tuæ, quid facies contra illum*? Dicitur tamen Deus irasci contra homines propter peccata, secundum illud psal. cv, 40: Iratus est furore Dominus in populum suum. Ergo non semper aliquis irascitur propter aliquid contra se factum.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.2] Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always angry on account of something done against us.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ira est appetitus vindictæ, ut jam supra definita est. Sed aliquis appetit vindictam facere etiam de his quæ contra alios fiunt. Ergo non semper motivum iræ est aliquid contra nos factum.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.3] Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. 11, post. med., « homines irascuntur præcipue contra eos qui despiciunt ea circa quæ ipsi maxime student; sicut qui student in philosophia, irascuntur contra eos qui philosophiam despiciunt; et simile est in aliis. » Sed despicere philosophiam non est nocere ipsi studenti. Non ergo semper irascimur propter id quod contra nos fit.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.4] Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, « ille qui tacet contra contumeliantem, magis ipsum ad iram provocat, » ut dicit Chrysostomus. Sed in hoc contra ipsum nihil agit, quod tacet. Ergo non semper ira alicujus provocatur propter aliquid quod contra ipsum fit.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.sc] The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such."
[I-II.q.47.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. 11, prope fin., quod « ira fit semper ex his quæ ad seipsum; inimicitia autem et sine his quæ ad ipsum; si enim putemus talem esse, odimus. »
[I-II.q.47.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 46, Article 6), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, ira est appetitus nocendi alteri sub ratione justi vindicativi. Vindicta autem locum non habet nisi ubi præcessit injuria; nec injuria omnis ad vindictam provocat, sed illa sola quæ ad eum pertinet qui appetit vindictam. Sicut enim unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, ita etiam naturaliter repellit proprium malum. Injuria autem ab aliquo facta non pertinet ad aliquem, nisi aliquid fecerit quod aliquo modo sit contra ipsum. Unde sequitur quod motivum iræ alicujus semper sit aliquid contra ipsum factum.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.1] We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ira non dicitur in Deo secundum passionem animi, sed secundum judicium justitiæ, prout vult vindictam facere de peccato. Peccator enim peccando Deo nihil nocere effective potest. Tamen ex parte sua dupliciter contra Deum agit: primo quidem inquantum eum in suis mandatis contemnit; secundo inquantum nocumentum aliquod infert alicui, vel sibi, vel alteri; quod ad Deum pertinet, prout ille cui nocumentum infertur, sub Dei providentia et tutela continetur.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.2] If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod irascimur contra illos qui aliis nocent, et vindictam appetimus, inquantum illi quibus nocetur, aliquo modo ad nos pertinent vel per aliquam affinitatem, vel per amicitiam, vel saltem per communionem naturæ.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.3] When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod id in quo maxime studemus, reputamus esse bonum nostrum; et ideo cum illud despicitur, reputamus nos quoque despici, et arbitramur nos læsos.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.4] Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight is an action.
[I-II.q.47.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod tunc aliquis tacens ad iram provocat injuriantem, quando videtur ex contemptu tacere, quasi parvi pendat alterius iram; ipsa autem parvipensio quidam actus est.
Article 2
[I-II.q.47.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sola parvipensio vel despectio sit motivum iræ. Dicit enim Damascenus, lib. II Orth. fid., cap. xv1, col. 934, t. 1, quod « injuriam passi, vel aestimantes pati, irasci-mur. » Sed homo potest injuriam pati etiam absque despectu vel parvipensione. Ergo non sola parvipensio est iræ motivum.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.arg.2] Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ejusdem est appetere honorem, et contristari de parvipensione. Sed bruta animalia non appetunt honorem. Ergo non contristantur de parvipensione; et tamen in eis provocatur ira propter hoc quod vulnerantur, ut dicit Philosophus in III Ethic., cap. viii, circa med. Ergo non sola parvipensio videtur esse motivum iræ.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.arg.3] Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Philosophus in II Rhet., cap. 11, ponit multas alias causas iræ, puta « oblivionem, exultationem in infortuniis, denuntiationem malorum, impedimentum consequendæ propriæ voluntatis. » Non ergo sola parvipensio est provocativum iræ.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.sc] The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly."
[I-II.q.47.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., loc. cit., quod « ira est appetitus cum tristitia punitionis propter apparentem parvipensionem non convenienter factam. »
[I-II.q.47.a.2.co] All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry--if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly."
The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnes causæ iræ reducuntur ad parvipensionem. Sunt enim tres species parvipensionis, ut dicitur in II Rhet., ibid., scilicet despectus, epireasmus, id est, impedimentum voluntatis implendæ, et contumeliatio; et ad hæc tria omnia motiva iræ reducuntur. Cujus ratio potest accipi duplex: prima est, quia ira appetit nocumentum alterius, inquantum habet rationem justi vindicativi; et ideo in tantum quærit vindictam, inquantum videtur esse justa. Justa autem vindicta non fit nisi de eo quod est injuste factum; et ideo provocativum ad iram semper est aliquid sub ratione injusti. Unde dicit Philosophus in II Rhet., cap. 11, prope fin., quod « si homines putaverint se ab eis qui læserunt, esse juste passos, non irascuntur; non enim fit ira ad justum. » Contingit autem tripliciter nocumentum alicui inferri, scilicet ex ignorantia, ex passione et ex electione. Tunc enim aliquis « maxime injustum facit, quando ex electione, vel industria, vel ex certa malitia nocumentum infert, » ut dicitur in V Ethic., cap. viii. Et ideo maxime irascimur contra illos quos putamus ex industria nobis nocuisse. Si enim putemus, aliquos vel per ignorantiam vel ex passione nobis intulisse injuriam, vel non irascimur contra eos, vel multo minus. Agere enim aliquid ex ignorantia vel ex passione diminuit rationem injuriæ; et est quodammodo provocativum misericordiæ et veniæ. Illi autem qui ex industria nocumentum inferunt, ex contemptu peccare videntur; et ideo contra eos maxime irascimur. Unde Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. 11, circa med., quod « his qui propter iram aliquid fecerunt, aut non irascimur, aut minus irascimur; non enim propter parvipensionem videntur egisse. » Secunda ratio est, quia parvipensio excellentia hominis opponitur; quae enim homines nullo modo putant digna esse, parvipendunt, ut dicitur in II Rhet., cap. 11, parum a princ. Ex omnibus autem bonis nostris aliquam excellentiam quærimus; et ideo quodcumque nocumentum nobis inferatur, inquantum excellentiæ derogat, videtur ad parvipensionem pertinere.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.ad.1] Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ex quacumque alia causa aliquis injuriam patiatur, quam ex contemptu, illa causa minuit rationem injuriæ; sed solus contemptus vel parvipensio rationem iræ auget; et ideo est per se causa irascendi.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.ad.2] Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, licet animal brutum non appetat honorem sub ratione honoris, appetit tamen naturaliter quamdam excellentiam, et irascitur contra ea quæ illi excellentiæ derogant.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.ad.3] Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.
[I-II.q.47.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnes illæ causæ ad quamdam parvipensionem reducuntur. Oblivio enim est parvipensionis evidens signum; ea enim quæ magna æstimamus, magis memoriæ infigimus. Similiter ex quadam parvipensione est quod aliquis non vereatur contristare aliquem, denuntiando sibi aliqua tristia. Qui etiam in infortuniis alicujus hilaritatis signa ostendit, videtur parum curare de bono vel malo ejus. Similiter etiam qui impedit aliquem a sui propositi assecutione, non propter aliquam utilitatem sibi inde provenientem, non videur multum curare de amicitia ejus. Et ideo omnia talia, inquantum sunt signa contemptus, sunt provocativa iræ.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/prima-secundae/q047.json