Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q70. The fruits of the Holy Ghost
Source context
- Theme
- enumerated fruits of the Holy Ghost as habitual effects of charity in the soul's affective life
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Pauline Christianity (Galatians 5:22–23)Aquinas's enumeration of twelve fruits derives directly from Paul's list of the Spirit's fruits (charity, joy, peace, patience, etc.), which Aquinas organizes under the cardinal and theological virtues as their perfected affective expressions.
- Neoplatonic henologyThe structure of fruits as overflows from an infused principle (charity) into the affective faculties shows cross-tradition congruence with Plotinian emanation, where higher unities produce lower expressions without diminishment of the source.
Q70. The fruits of the Holy Ghost
Article 1
[I-II.q.70.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Galatians 5:22-23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wisdom 3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (John 4:36): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fructus Spiritus sancti, quos Apostolus nominat ad Gal., v, non sint actus. Id enim cujus est alius fructus, non debet dici fructus; sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus; dicitur enim Sap., 11, 15: Bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus; et Joan., iv, 36: Qui Octava beatitudo communis est omnibus. Nihil enim est nisi probatio supradictarum. Verus enim pauper, verus mitis, verus lugens, verus misericors, verus justus, verus mundus, verus pacificus tribulatione probatus, et purior, et fortior efficitur, sicut aurum in fornace. Et inde sicut est ascensus in virtutibus, sic et in remunerationibus. Pauperibus datur regnum cælorum, quia minus non potest haberi quam id quod est commune omnibus bonis, et omnium præmium generale. Different tamen habent regnum prima et octava virtus. Prima habet in spe, octava in re. Qui enim pro Christo terrena abjiciunt, non statim cum moriuntur evolant, sed quandoque igne purgantur; qui vero pro Christo moriuntur, statim ascendunt in cælum, quia falce martyrii resecatur quicquid purgandum inventur. Mitibus qui se hic recte possederunt congruit possidere regnum, quod plus est quam habere. Multa enim habere dicimur quæ non possidemus, quia statim amittimus, vel quia nostra non sunt. Lugenti promittitur consolatio, quod plus est quam possidere regnum. Plus enim est gaudere in regno quam possidere; multi enim multa cum dolore et timore possident. Esurienti justitiam promittitur saturitas, et hoc etiam plus est, quia majus est saturari in palatio quam gaudere in eo. Misericordi promittitur misericordia, ut plus recipiat in præmio quam habuit in merito; et hoc plus est. Ultra enim saturitatem dabitur miserimetit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat* in vitam æternam. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.arg.2] Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy ['Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in X De Trinit., cap. x, § 13, col. 981, t. 8, « fruimur cognitis, in quibus voluntas ipsa delectata conquiescit. » Sed voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.arg.3] Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (Question 55, Article 1). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter fructus Spiritus sancti enumerantur ab Apostolo aliquæ virtutes, scilicet charitas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fructus non sunt actus.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.sc] It is written (Matthew 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., xii, 33: Ex fructibus* arbor cognoscitur, id est, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi actus humani dicuntur fructus.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.co] The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine seed, for it is written (1 John 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him."
[I-II.q.70.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus id quod ex planta producitur, cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quamdam in se suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest; scilicet ad arborem producentem cordi gloria, sicut dicitur: Habenti dabitur, et abundabit. Mundo corde promittitur visio Dei, ut qui mundum habet oculum mentis clare videat Deum. Et hoc omnibus præcedentibus majus est, sicut ille qui in curia regis prandet et saturatur, dignior judicatur, quia facie ad faciem regem videt. Sed inter omnes et summus et maximus judicatur qui regis filius nominatur, quam dignitatem habent pacifici. Fructus Spiritus est gustus dulcedinis beato-rum, et perficit dulcorem gustus ut desideretur finiri exilium. Perfecta gratia habet virtutem in summo, donum in adjutorio, beatitudinem in perfectione, et fructum in gustu. Et licet dona sint septem, una tamen est ratio adjutorii virtutum; et quamvis beatitudines sint octo, tamen unum statum perficiunt perfectionis; et licet fructus duodecim, tamen unum gustum ingerunt dulcedinis æternæ. Fructus est sicut amethystus, rubor, scilicet, cælestis in obscuritate mortalitatis terrenæ. Hæc Albertus Magnus. — Ut autem intelligatur comparatio fructus et amethysti notanda sunt quæ dicit in Speculo naturali Vincentius Bellovacensis: « Isidorus: Amethystus indicus inter purpureas gemmas tenet principatum. Causam nominis ejus reddunt, quia sit in ejus purpura quoddam non igneum in toto, sed vini colorem habens. — Ex libro De natura rerum: Amethystus est quædam velut gutta vini rubei aqua corrupta. » Et sic in hac vita fructus. ipsum, et ad hominem, qui fructum ex arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur no men fructus in rebus spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus: uno modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur. Non autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id quod est ultimum delectationem habens. Habet enim homo agrum et arborem, quæ fructus non dicuntur, sed solum id quod est ultimum, quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum hoc fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui. Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur. Operatio enim est actus secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum facultatem suæ rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis; si vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quæ est virtus Spiritus sancti, sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus Spiritus sancti, quasi cujusdam divini seminis. Dicitur enim I Joan., III, 9: Omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.ad.1] Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written (Sirach 24:23): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches."
[I-II.q.70.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi et finis, nihil prohibet alicujus fructus esse alium fructum, sicut finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra, inquantum sunt effectus quidam Spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem fructus; sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitæ æternæ, sic magis habent rationem florum: unde dicitur Eccli., xxiv, 23: Flores mei fructus honoris et honestatis.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.ad.2] When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight."
[I-II.q.70.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari, potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, secundum quod ly «propter,» dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi in ultimo fine; alio modo, secundum quod 1 Ita codd. quos vidimus omnes. Cod. Alc.: «Quam continent delectabilem virtuosis.» Edit.: «quam continet delectabile in virtuosis.» 2 Implicite. Colligi etiam potest ex libro De Isaac, c. v, § 48 et 49, col. 545, t. 1. De fructibus rationis loquitur Paulus circa finem Epistolæ ad Colossenses: Requiro fructum abundantem in ratione vestra; quasi diceret, juxta designat causam formalem, et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod delectabile est secundum suam formam: sicut patet quod infirmus delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem delectabilem: in medicina autem austera nullo modo propter se, sed solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod in Deo delectari debet homo propter se sicut propter ultimum finem; in actibus autem virtuosis non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem, quam continet delectabilem in virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit, lib. De Paradiso, cap. xiii, § 64, col. 325, t. 4, quod « opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, quia suos possessores sancta et sincera delectatione reficiunt. » Ad tertium dicendum, quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quando pro actibus earum, sicut Augustinus dicit, Tract. xL in Joan., § 9, col. 1690, t. 3, quod « fides est credere quod non vides; » et lib. III De doctr. christ., cap. x, col. 72, t. 3, « charitas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum. » Et hoc modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.
[I-II.q.70.a.1.ad.3] Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
Article 2
[I-II.q.70.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (69, 1, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy Ghost.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non different. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem, secundum quod movetur a Spiritu sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsæ sunt fructus Spiritus sancti.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.arg.2] Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut se habet fructus vitæ æternæ ad beatitudinem futuram, quæ est rei, ita se habent fructus præsentis vitæ ad beatitudinem præsentis vitæ, quæ est spei. Hugonem a Sancto Charo: Hunc fructum requiro in vobis, ut scilicet gratia fidei sit in mente, et ratione vestra. Fructus enim rationis, id est animæ, id est rationabiles, sunt motus fidei, bona consilia et sancta desideria. Vel in ratione vestra, ut scilicet in computatione vestra, cum requiretur villicatio commissa vobis in die judicii, copiam bonorum operum habeatis. Sed fructus vitæ aternæ est ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitæ præsentis sunt ipsæ beatitudines.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.arg.3] Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above (3, 1; 4, 1). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem distingui.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.sc] Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.sc] Sed contra, quorum species sunt diversæ, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines, ut patet per enumerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a beatitudinibus.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.co] More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated (69, 1, ad 1).
[I-II.q.70.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis quam ad rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis. Sed ad rationem beatitudinis ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quæcumque virtuosa opera in quibus homo delectatur; sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, quæ etiam ratione suæ perfectionis magis attribuuntur donis quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.ad.1] This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.ad.2] The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fructus vitæ aternæ est simpliciter ultimus et perfectus; et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura. Fructus autem præsentis vitæ non sunt simpliciter ultimi et perfecti; et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.ad.3] More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated.
[I-II.q.70.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de ratione fructus, ut dictum est.
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