Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q93. The eternal law
Source context
- Theme
- The eternal law as the rational ordering of all things in the divine intellect, foundational to all derived law
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 346, 1924-09-05Steiner describes eternal laws governing the interaction of divine beings with humanity as primeval structuring principles operative from the gods' own activity — a structural parallel to Aquinas's eternal law as the divine reason ordering creation.
- GA 268, spiritual_exercisesSteiner frames the individual's self-constitution in terms of an eternal law by which the seventh creative principle both forms uniqueness and will lead it beyond uniqueness — pointing to a lawfulness immanent in the divine creative act.
- GA 9, chapter 4Steiner describes the knower as one who acts in accordance with laws implanted in things from the eternal within — a functional analog to Aquinas's participation of rational creatures in the eternal law.
Cross-tradition
- Stoic logos / cosmic lawThe Stoic concept of the logos as universal rational law governing all things exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's eternal law as the ratio of divine wisdom directing the whole community of the universe.
- Vedanta: Ṛta / dharmic orderThe Vedic principle of Ṛta as the cosmic-moral order embedded in the nature of things exhibits cross-tradition congruence with the eternal law's role as a prior divine ordering from which all natural and moral law derives.
Q93. The eternal law
Article 1
[I-II.q.93.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod lex æterna non sit summa ratio in Deo existens. Lex enim æterna est una tantum. Sed rationes rerum in mente divina sunt plures; dicit enim Augustinus in lib. LXXXIII Quæstion., q. xlvi, col. 30, t. 6, quod « Deus singula fecit propriis rationibus. » Ergo lex æterna non videtur esse idem quod ratio in mente divina existens.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Question 90, Article 4). But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the I, 34, 1: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, de ratione legis est quod verbo promulgetur, ut supra dictum est. Sed verbum in divinis dicitur personaliter, ut in I habitum est; ratio autem dicitur essentialiter. Non igitur idem est lex æterna quod ratio divina.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in libro De vera relig., cap. xxx, col. 147, t. 3: « Apparet supra mentem nostram esse legem, quæ veritas dicitur. » Lex autem supra mentem nostram existens est lex æterna. Ergo veritas est lex æterna. Sed non est eadem ratio veritatis et rationis. Ergo lex æterna non est idem quod ratio summa.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.sc] Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."
[I-II.q.93.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in I De lib. arb., cap. vi, § 15, col. 1229, t. 4, quod « lex æterna est summa ratio, cui semper obtemperandum est. »
[I-II.q.93.a.1.co] Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Article 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the I, 14, 8. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the I, 103, 5. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut in quoli-bet artifice præexistit ratio eorum quæ constituentur per artem, ita etiam in quolibet gubernante oportet quod præexistat ratio ordinis eorum quæ agenda sunt per eos qui gubernationi subduntur. Et sicut ratio rerum fiendarum per artem vocatur ars, vel exemplar rerum artificiatarum, ita etiam ratio gubernantis actus subditorum rationem legis obtinet, servatis aliis quæ supra esse diximus de legis ratione. Deus autem per suam sapientiam conditor est universarum rerum; ad quas comparatur sicut artifex ad artificiata, ut in I habitum est. Est etiam gubernator omnium actuum et motionum quæ inveniuntur in singulis creaturis, ut etiam in I habitum est. Unde sicut ratio divinæ sapientia, inquantum per eam cuncta sunt creata, rationem habet artis, vel exemplaris vel ideæ, ita ratio divinæ sapientia moventis omnia ad debitum finem obtinet rationem legis. Et secundum hoc lex æterna nihil aliud est quam « ratio divinæ sapientia, secundum quod est directiva omnium actuum et motionum. »
[I-II.q.93.a.1.ad.1] Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the I, 15, 2. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2). And things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de rationibus idealibus, quæ respiciunt proprias naturas singularum rerum; et ideo in eis invenitur quædam distinctio et pluralitas, secundum diversos respectus ad res, ut in I habitum est. Sed lex dicitur directiva actuum in ordine ad bonum commune, ut supra dictum est. Ea autem quæ sunt in seipsis diversa considerantur ut unum, secundum quod ordinantur ad aliquod commune; et ideo lex æterna est una, quæ est ratio hujus ordinis.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.ad.2] With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quæ verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo exprimuntur quæ verbis humanis significantur; et eadem ratio est de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mente conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat. Sic igitur in divinis ipsum Verbum, quod est conceptio patterni intellectus, personaliter dicitur; sed omnia, quæcumque sunt in scientia Patris, sive essentialia, sive personalia, sive etiam Dei opera, exprimuntur hoc Verbo, ut patet per Augustinum in XV De Trin., cap. xiv, col. 1076, t. 8; et inter cætera quæ hoc Verbo exprimuntur, etiam ipsa lex æterna Verbo ipso exprimitur. Nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod lex æterna personaliter in divinis dicatur; appropriatur tamen Filio propter convenientiam quam habet ratio ad verbum.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.ad.3] The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the I, 16, 1. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
[I-II.q.93.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio intellectus divini aliter se habet ad res quam ratio humani intellectus. Intellectus enim humanus est mensuratus a rebus, ut scilicet conceptus hominis non sit verus propter seipsum, sed dicitur verus ex hoc quod consonat rebus. Ex hoc enim quod res est, vel non est, opinio vera, vel falsa est. Intellectus vero divinus est mensura rerum; quia unaquæque res intantum habet de veritate, inquantum imitatur intellectum divinum, ut in I dictum est. Et ideo intellectus divinus est verus secundum se; unde ratio ejus est ipsa veritas.
Article 2
[I-II.q.93.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Corinthians 2:11), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod lex æterna non sit omnibus nota. Quia, ut dicit Apostolus, I ad Cor., 11, 41, quæ Dei sunt, nemo cognovit nisi Spiritus Dei. Sed lex æterna est quædam ratio in mente divina existens. Ergo omnibus est ignota, nisi soli Deo.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.arg.2] Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. I De lib. arb., cap. vi, § 15, col. 1229, t. 4, « lex æterna est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. » Sed non omnes cognoscunt qualiter omnia sint ordinatissima. Ergo non omnes cognoscunt legem æternam.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera relig., cap. xxxi, col. 148, t. 3, quod « lex æterna est de qua homines judicare non possunt. » Sed sicut in I Ethic., cap. 111, a med., dicitur, « unusquisque bene judicat quæ cognoscit. Ergo lex æterna non est nobis nota.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us."
[I-II.q.93.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. I De lib. arb., cap. vi, § 15, col. 1229, t. 4, quod « æternæ legis notio nobis impressa est. »
[I-II.q.93.a.2.co] A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod dupliciter aliquid cognosci potest: uno modo in seipso; alio modo in suo effectu, in quo aliqua similitudo ejus invenitur; sicut aliquis non videns solem in sua substantia, cognoscit ipsum in sua irradiatione. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod legem æternam nullus potest cognoscere, secund dum quod in seipsa est, nisi solum beati, qui Deum per essentiam vident; sed omnis creatura rationalis ipsam cognoscit secund dum aliquam ejus irradiationem vel majorem, vel minorem. Omnis enim cognitio veritatis est quædam irradiatio et participatio legis æternæ, quæ est veritas incommmutabilis, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De vera relig., cap. xxxi, col. 147, t. 3; veritatem autem omnes aliqualiter cognoscunt, ad minus quantum ad principia communia legis naturalis; in aliis vero quidam plus et quidam minus participant de cognitione veritatis; et secundum hoc etiam plus vel minus cognoscunt legem æternam.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.ad.1] We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Romans 1:20: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
[I-II.q.93.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quæ sunt Dei, in seipsis quidem cognosci a nobis non possunt, sed tamen in effectibus suis manifestantur, secundum illud Rom., 1, 20: Invisibilia Dei, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.ad.2] Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod legem æternam etsi unusquisque cognoscat pro sua capacitate secundum modum prædictum, nullus tamen eam comprehendere potest; non enim totaliter manifestari potest per suos effectus. Et ideo non oportet quod quicumque cognoscit legem æternam secundum modum prædictum, cognoscat totum ordinem rerum, quo omnia sunt ordinatissima.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.ad.3] To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod judicare de aliquo potest intelligi dupliciter: uno modo, sicut vis cognitiva dijudicat de proprio objecto, secundum illud Job, xii, 11: Nonne auris verba dijudicat, et fauces comedentis, saporem? Et secundum istum modum judicii Philosophus dicit, lib. I Ethic., cap. iii, a med., quod « unusquisque bene dijudicat quæ cognoscit, » judicando scilicet an sit verum quod proponitur. Alio modo, secundum quod superior judicat de inferiori quodam practico judicio, an scilicet ita debeat esse, vel non ita; et sic nullus potest judicare de lege æterna.
Article 3
[I-II.q.93.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above (Question 91, Article 6), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh," of which the Apostle says (Romans 8:7), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omnis lex a lege æterna derivetur. Est enim quædam lex fomitis, ut supra dictum est. Ipsa autem non derivatur a lege divina quæ est lex æterna; ad ipsam enim pertinet prudentia carnis; de qua Apostolus dicit, Rom., viii, 7, quod legi Dei non potest esse subjecta. Ergo non omnis lex procedit a lege æterna.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.arg.2] Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (2, Objection 2), "the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to Isaiah 10:1: "Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, a lege æterna nihil iniquum procedere potest: quia, sicut dictum est, lex æterna est secundum quam justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima. Sed quædam leges sunt iniquæ, secundum illud Isa., x, 1: Væ qui condunt leges iniquas! Ergo non omnis lex procedit a lege æterna.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in I lib. De lib. arb., cap. v, § 13, col. 1228, t. 1, quod « lex quæ populo regendo scribitur, recte multa permittit quæ per divinam providentiam vindicantur. » Sed ratio divinæ providentiae est lex æterna, ut dictum est. Ergo nec etiam omnis lex recta procedit a lege æterna.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.sc] Divine Wisdom says (Proverbs 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.sc] Sed contra est, quod, Proverb. viii, 15, divina Sapientia dicit: Per me reges regnant, et legum conditores justa decernunt. Ratio autem divinæ sapientiae est lex æterna, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnes leges a lege æterna procedunt.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.co] As stated above (90, A1,2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law."
[I-II.q.93.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, lex importat rationem quamdam directivam actuum ad finem. In omnibus autem moventibus ordinatis oportet quod virtus secundi moventis derivetur a virtute moventis primi; quia movens secundum non movet nisi inquantum movetur a primo. Unde in omnibus gubernantibus idem videmus, quod ratio gubernationis a primo gubernante ad secundos derivatur, sicut ratio eorum quæ sunt agenda in civitate derivatur a rege per præceptum in inferiores administratores; et in artificialibus etiam ratio artificialium actuum derivatur ab architectore ad inferiores artifices, qui manu operantur. Cum ergo lex æterna sit ratio gubernationis in supremo gubernnante, necesse est quod omnes rationes gubernationis quæ sunt in inferioribus gubernantibus a lege æterna deriventur. Hujusmodi autem rationes inferiorum gubernantium sunt quæcumque aliæ leges praeter legem æternam. Unde omnes leges, inquantum participant de ratione recta, intantum derivantur a lege æterna; et propter hoc Augustinus dicit in I De lib. arb., c. vi, §15, col. 1229, t. 1, quod « in temporali lege nihil est justum ac legitimum, quod non ex lege æterna homines sibi derivarint. »
[I-II.q.93.a.3.ad.1] The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above (Question 91, Article 6).
[I-II.q.93.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod fomes habet rationem legis in homine, inquantum est pœna consequens divinam justitiam; et secundum hoc manifestum est quod derivatur a lege æterna. In quantum vero inclinat ad peccatum, sic contrariatur legi Dei, et non habet rationem legis, ut ex supra dictis patet.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.ad.2] Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Romans 13:1.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod lex humana intantum habet rationem legis, inquantum est secundum rationem rectam; et secundum hoc manifestum est quod a lege æterna derivatur. Inquantum vero a ratione recedit, sic dicitur lex iniqua; et sic non habet rationem legis, sed magis violentiæ cujusdam. Et tamen in ipsa lege iniqua inquantum servatur aliquid de similitudine legis, propter ordinem potestatis ejus qui legem fecit, secundum hoc etiam derivatur a lege æterna. Omnis enim potestas a Domino Deo est*, ut dicitur Rom., xiii, 1.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.ad.3] Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.
[I-II.q.93.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod lex humana dicitur aliqua permittere, non quasi approbans, sed quasi ea dirigere non potens. Multa autem diriguntur lege divina quæ dirigi non possunt lege humana; plura enim subduntur causæ superiori quam inferiori. Unde hoc ipsum quod lex humana non se intromittit de his quæ dirigere non potest ex ordine legis æternæ provenit. Secus autem esset, si approbaret ea quæ lex æterna reprobat. Unde ex hoc non habetur quod lex humana non derivetur a lege æterna, sed quod non perfecte eam assequi possit.
Article 5
[I-II.q.93.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above (Question 90, Article 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod naturalia contingentia subsint legi æternæ. Promulgatio enim est de ratione legis, ut supra dictum est. Sed promulgatio non potest fieri nisi ad creaturas rationales quibus potest aliquid denuntiari. Ergo solæ creaturæ rationales subsint legi æternæ; non ergo naturalia contingentia.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.arg.2] Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated above (Article 1). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « ea quæ obediunt rationi, participant aliqualiter ratione, » ut dicitur in I Ethic., cap. ult. Lex autem æterna est ratio summa, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur naturalia contingentia non participent aliqualiter ratione, sed penitus sint irrationabilia, videtur quod non subsint legi æternæ.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.arg.3] Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, lex æterna est efficacissima. Sed in naturalibus contingentibus accidit defectus. Non ergo subsunt legi æternæ.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.sc] It is written (Proverbs 8:29): "When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits."
[I-II.q.93.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Prov., viii, 29: Quando circumdabat mari terminum suum, et legem ponebat aquis, ne transirent fines suos.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.co] We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Question 1, Article 2). Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action.
Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Psalm 148:6: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliter est de lege hominis dicendum, et aliter de lege æternae, quæ est lex Dei. Lex enim hominis non se extendit nisi ad creaturas rationales, quæ homini subjiciuntur. Cujus ratio est, quia lex est directiva actuum qui conveniunt subjectis gubernationi alicujus; unde nullus, proprie loquendo, suis actibus legem imponit. Quæcumque autem aguntur circa usum rerum irrationalium homini subditarum, aguntur per actum ipsius hominis moventis hujusmodi res: nam hujusmodi irrationales creaturæ non agunt seipsas, sed ab aliis aguntur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo rebus irrationalibus homo legem imponere non potest, quantumcumque ei subjiciantur; rebus autem rationalibus sibi subjectis potest imponere legem, inquantum suo præcepto vel denuntiatione quacumque imprimitenti earum quamdam regulam, quæ est principium agendi. Sicut autem homo imprimit denuntiando quoddam interius principium actuum homini sibi subjecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit toti naturæ principia propriorum actuum; et ideo per hunc modum Deus dicitur præci-pere toti naturæ, secundum illud ps. cxLVIII, 6: Præceptum posuit, et non præteribit. Et per hanc etiam rationem omnes motus et actiones totius naturæ legi æternæ subduntur. Unde aliquo modo creaturæ irrationales subduntur legi æternæ, inquantum moventur a divina providentia; non autem per intellectum divini præcepti, sicut creaturæ rationales.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.ad.1] The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc modo se habet impressio activa principii intrinseci quantum ad res naturales, sicut se habet promulgatio legis quantum ad homines; quia per legis promulgationem imprimitur hominibus quoddam directivum principium humanorum actuum, ut dictum est.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.ad.2] Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod creaturæ irrationales non participant ratione humana, nec ei obediunt; participant tamen per modum obedientia ratione divina; ad plura enim se extendit virtus rationis divinæ quam virtus rationis humanæ. Et sicut membra corporis humani moventur ad imperium rationis, non tamen participant ratione, quia non habent aliquam apprehensionem ordinatam ad rationem, ita etiam creaturæ irrationales moventur a Deo, nec tamen propter hoc sunt rationales.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.ad.3] Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the I, 22, 2. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above (Article 1), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod defectus qui accidunt in rebus naturalibus, quamvis sint præter ordinem causarum particularium, non tamen sunt præter ordinem causarum universalium, et præcipue causæ primæ, quæ Deus est, cujus providentiam nihil subterfugere potest, ut in I dictum est. Et quia lex æterna est ratio divinæ providentiæ, ut dictum est; ideo defectus rerum naturalium legi æternæ subduntur.
Article 6
[I-II.q.93.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Galatians 5:18): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to Romans 8:14: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omnes res humanæ subjiciantur legi æternæ. Dicit enim Apostolus ad Galat., v, 18: Si spiritu Dei ducimini, non estis sub lege. Sed viri justi, qui sunt filii Dei per adoptionem, spiritu Dei aguntur, secundum illud Rom., vii, 14: Qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt*. Ergo non omnes homines sunt sub lege æternæ.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.arg.2] Further, the Apostle says (Romans 8:7): "The prudence [Vulgate: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of God.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Apostolus dicit ad Rom., vii, 7: Prudentia carnis inimica est Deo, legi enim Dei subjecta non est*. Sed multi homines sunt in quibus prudentia carnis dominatur. Ergo legi æternæ, quæ est lex Dei, non subjiciuntur omnes homines.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.arg.3] Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under the eternal law.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus dicit in I De lib. arb., cap. vi, § 15, col. 1229, t. 1, quod « lex æterna est qua mali miseriam, boni beatam vitam merentur. » Sed homines jam beati vel jam damnati non sunt in statu merendi. Ergo non subsunt legi æternæ.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is administered."
[I-II.q.93.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX De civ. Dei, cap. xii, col. 640, t. 7: « Nullo modo aliquid legibus summi creatoris or-dinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax universitatis administratur. »
[I-II.q.93.a.6.co] There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above (Article 5): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, as stated above (Article 5). But since the rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above (Article 2), it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).
Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of grace and virtue.
Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most suitable laws."
[I-II.q.93.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex est modus quo aliquid subditur legi æternæ, ut ex supra dictis patet: uno modo inquantum participatur lex æterna per modum cognitionis; alio modo per modum actionis et passionis, inquantum participatur per modum interioris principii motivi. Et hoc secundo modo subduntur legi æternæ irrationales creaturæ, ut dictum est. Sed quia rationalis natura cum eo quod est commune omnibus creaturis, habet aliquid sibi proprium, inquantum est rationalis; ideo secundum utrumque modum legi æternæ subditur: quia et notionem legis æternæ aliquo modo habet, ut supra dictum est, et iterum unicuiquè rationali creaturæ inest naturalis inclinatio ad id quod est consonum legi æternæ. « Sumus enim innati ad habendum virtutes, » ut dicitur in lib. II Ethic., circa princ. Uterque tamen modus imperfectus quidem est, et quodammodo corruptus in malis; in quibus et inclinatio naturalis ad virtutem depravatur per habitum vitiosum, et iterum ipsa naturalis cognitio boni in eis obtenebratur per passiones et habitus peccatorum. In bonis autem uterque modus inventur perfectior; quia et supra cognitionem naturalem boni superadditur eis cognitio fidei et sapientiæ, et supra naturalem inclinationem ad bonum superadditur eis interius motivum gratiae et virtutis. Sic igitur boni perfecte subsunt legi æternæ, tanquam semper secundum eam agentes; mali autem subsunt quidem legi æternæ, imperfecte quidem quantum ad actiones ipsorum, prout imperfecte cognoscunt, et imperfecte inclinantur ad bonum; sed quantum deficit ex parte actionis, suppletur ex parte passionis, prout scilicet intantum pa-tiuntur quod lex æterna dictat de eis, in quantum deficiunt facere quod legi æternæ convenit. Unde Augustinus dicit in I De lib. arbitr., cap. xv, col. 1238, t. 1: « Justos sub æterna lege agere existimo; » et in libro De catechizandis rudibus, cap. xviii, § 30, col. 333, t. 6, dicit quod « Deus ex justa miseria animarum se deserentium convenientissimis legibus inferiores partes creaturæ suæ novit ordinare. »
[I-II.q.93.a.6.ad.1] This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue." In this way the spiritual man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (4, ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Corinthians 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."
[I-II.q.93.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum Apostoli potest intelligi dupliciter; uno modo, ut esse sub lege intelligatur ille qui nolens obligationem legis, subditur ei quasi cuidam ponderi; unde Glossa 1 ordin., ibidem, col. 584, t. 2, dicit quod « sub lege est qui timore supplicii, quod lex minatur, non amore justitiæ a malo opere abstinet; » et hoc modo spirituales viri non sunt sub lege; quia per charitatem, quam Spiritus sanctus cordibus eorum infundit, voluntarie id quod legis est, implent. Alio modo potest etiam intelligi, inquantum hominis opera, qui Spiritu sancto agitur, magis dicuntur esse opera Spiritus sancti quam ipsius hominis. Unde cum Spiritus sanctus non sit sub lege, sicut nec Filius, ut supra dictum est, sequitur quod hujusmodi opera, inquantum sunt Spiritus sancti, non sint sub lege. Et huic attestatur quod Apostolus dicit, II ad Corinth., 17: Ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.ad.2] The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above (Question 85, Article 2) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prudentia carnis non potest subjici legi Dei ex parte actionis, quia inclinat ad actiones contrarias legi divinæ; subjicitur tamen legi Dei ex parte passionis, quia meretur pati pœnam secundum legem divinæ justitiæ. Nihilominus tamen in nullo homine ita prudentia carnis dominatur, quod totum bonum naturæ corrumpatur; et ideo remanet in homine inclinatio ad agendum ea quæ sunt legis æternæ. Habitum est enim supra, quod peccatum non tollit totum bonum naturæ.
[I-II.q.93.a.6.ad.3] A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[I-II.q.93.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod commune 2 est per quod aliquid conservatur in fine, et per quod movetur ad finem; sicut corpus grave gravitate quiescit in loco inferiori, per quam etiam ad locum ipsum movetur. Et sic dicendum est, quod sicut secundum legem æternam aliqui merentur beatitudinem vel miseriam, ita per eamdem legem in beatitudine vel miseria conservantur. Et secundum hoc beati et damnati subsunt legi æternæ.
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