Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q95. Human law
Source context
- Theme
- origin, force, and justice of positive human law as derived from natural law
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian political philosophyAristotle's account of positive law as a specification of natural justice (Nicomachean Ethics V; Politics III) provides the immediate philosophical substrate Aquinas elaborates in Q95, distinguishing law that derives from natural reason from law that is mere convention.
- Stoic natural law traditionThe Stoic doctrine that right reason (logos) is the source from which particular civic ordinances must draw their authority shows cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's insistence that human law lacking derivation from natural law is not law but a corruption of law.
- Vedantic dharma-shastraThe dharmashastra tradition's grounding of civil and ritual regulation in an underlying cosmic dharma (rita) presents a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's schema in which positive human enactments must remain ordered to a higher normative principle to retain binding force.
Q95. Human law
Article 1
[I-II.q.95.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above (Question 92, Article 1). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non fuerit utile aliquas leges poni ab hominibus. Intentio enim cujuslibet legis est ut per eam homines fiant boni, sicut supra dictum est. Sed homines magis inducuntur ad bonum voluntarii per monitiones quam coacti per leges. Ergo non fuit necessarium leges ponere.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.arg.2] Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut dicit Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. iv, circa med., « ad judicem confugiunt homines sicut ad justum animatum. » Sed justitia animata est melior quam inanimata quæ legibus continetur. Ergo melius fuisset ut executio justitiæ committeretur arbitrio judicum, quam quod super hoc lex aliqua ederetur.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.arg.3] Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (90, A1,2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, lex omnis directiva est actuum humanorum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed cum humani actus consistant in singularibus, quæ sunt infinita, non possunt ea quæ ad directionem humanorum actuum pertinent, sufficienter considerari, nisi ab aliquo sapiente, qui inspiciat singula. Ergo melius fuisset arbitrio sapientum dirigi actus humanos quam aliqua lege posita. Ergo non fuit necessarium leges humanas ponere.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.sc] Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit in lib. V Etymol., cap. xx, col. 202, t. 3: « Factæ sunt leges, ut earum metu humana coerceatur audacia, tutaque sit inter improbos innocentia, et in ipsis improbis formidato supplicio refrenetur nocendi facultas. » Sed hæc sunt necessaria maxime humano ge- Contra Lutherum et Sarrabaïtas. Lutherus scripsit nullam legem Christianis, nisi inquantum ipsi voluerint, sive ab hominibus, sive ab angelis neri. Ergo necessarium fuit ponere leges humanas.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.co] As stated above (63, 1; 94, 3), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, homini naturaliter inest quædam aptitudo ad virtutem; sed ipsa virtutis perfectio necesse est quod homini adveniat per aliquam disciplinam; sicut etiam videmus quod per aliquam industriam subveniur homini in suis necessitatibus, puta in cibo et vestitu, quorum initia quædam habet a natura, scilicet rationem et manus; non autem ipsum complementum, sicut cætera animalia, quibus natura dedit sufficienter tegumentum et cibum. Ad hanc autem disciplinam non de facili inventur homo sibi sufficiens: quia perfectio virtutis præcipue consistit in retrahendo homine ab indebitis delectationibus, ad quas præcipue homines sunt proni, et maxime juvenes, circa quos est efficacior disciplina. Et ideo oportet quod hujusmodi disciplinam, per quam ad virtutem pervenitur, homines ab alio sortiantur. Et quidem quantum ad illos juvenes qui sunt proni ad actus virtutum ex bona dispositione naturæ, vel consuetudine, vel magis divino munere, sufficit disciplina paterna, quæ est per monitiones. Sed quia inventur quidam protervi, et ad vitia proni, qui verbis de facili moveri non possunt, necessarium fuit quod per vim vel metum cohibentur a malo, ut saltem sic malefacere desistentes, et aliis quietam vitam redderent, et ipsi tandem per hujusmodi assuetudinem ad hoc perducerentur quod voluntarie facerent quæ prius metu implebant, et sic fierent virtuosi. Hujusmodi autem disciplina cogens metu pœnæ est disciplina legum. Unde necessarium fuit ad pacem hominum et virtutem, quod leges ponerentur: quia, sicut Philosophus dicit in I Polit., cap. 11, in fin.: « Sicut homo, si sit perfectus virtute, est optimum animalium, sic, si sit separatus a lege et justitia, est pessimum omnium; » quia homo habet arma rationis ad explendas concupiscentias et sævitias, quæ non habent alia animalia.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.ad.1] Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homines bene dispositi melius inducuntur ad virtutem monitionibus voluntariis quam coactione; sed quidam male dispositi non ducuntur ad virtutem, nisi cogantur.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.ad.2] As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.
Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Phi-imponi posse. Sarrabaïtæ, monachi gyrovagi, de quibus Cassianus, S. Benedictus et S. Hieronymus loquuntur, omne jugum disciplinæ renuebant. losophus dicit, I Rhet., cap. 1, aliquant. a princ., « melius est omnia ordinari lege, quam dimittere judicum arbitrio; » et hoc propter tria. Primo quidem, quia facilius est venire paucos sapientes, qui sufficiant ad rectas leges ponendas, quam multos qui requirerentur ad recte judicandum de singulis. Secundo, quia illi qui leges ponunt, ex multo tempore considerant quid lege ferendum sit; sed judicia de singularibus factis fiunt ex casibus subito exortis. Facilius autem ex multis consideratis potest homo videre quid rectum sit, quam solum ex aliquo uno facto. Tertio, quia legislatores judicant in universali et de futuris; sed homines judiciis præsidentes judicant de præsentibus, ad quæ afficiuntur amore vel odio, aut aliqua cupiditate; et sic eorum depravatur judicium. Quia ergo justitia animata judicis non invenitur in multis, et quia flexibilis est ratio, necessarium fuit, ut in quibus-cumque est possibile, lex determinaret quid judicandum sit, et paucissima arbitrio hominum committerentur.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.ad.3] Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
[I-II.q.95.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quædam singularia, quæ non possunt lege comprehendi, necesse est commitere judicibus; ut ibidem Philosophus dicit, loc. sup. cit., puta de eo quod est factum esse vel non esse, et de aliis hujusmodi.
Article 2
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omnis lex humanitus posita a lege naturali derivetur. Dicit enim Philosophus, in V Ethic., cap. VII, in princ., quod « justum legale est quod principio quidem nihil differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat. » Sed in his quæ oriuntur ex lege naturali, differt utrum sic vel aliter fiat. Ergo ea quæ sunt legibus humanis statuta, non omnia derivantur a lege naturæ.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.2] Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Question 94, Article 4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, jus positivum dividitur contra omnes; sed ex mala eorum lectione edit. habent: « et quia flexibilis est, ideo necessarium fuit, in quibuscumque est possibile, legem determinare..., et paucissima arbitrio hominum jus naturale, ut patet per Isidorum, in lib. V Etymol., cap. IV, col. 199, t. 3, et per Philosophum in V Ethic., loc. cit. Sed ea quæ derivantur a principiis communibus lege naturæ, sicut conclusiones, pertinent ad legem naturæ, ut supra dictum est. Ergo ea quæ sunt de lege humana non derivantur a lege naturæ.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.3] Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, lex naturæ est eadem apud omnes; dicit enim Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. VII, in princ., quod « naturale jus est quod ubique habet eamdem potentiam. » Siigitur leges humanæ a naturali lege derivantur, sequeretur etiam quod ipsæ essent eædem apud omnes, quod patet esse falsum.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.4] Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says [Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, eorum quæ a lege naturali derivantur, potest aliqua ratio assignari. Sed non omnium quæ a majoribus lege statuta sunt, ratio reddi potest, ut Jurisperitus dicit. Ergo non omnes leges humanæ derivantur a lege naturali.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.sc] Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws."
[I-II.q.95.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Tullius dicit in sua Rhet., lib. II De invent., aliquant. ante fin.: « Res a natura profectas et a consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit. »
[I-II.q.95.a.2.co] As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (91, 2, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.
But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.
Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I De lib. arb., c. v, col. 1227, t. 1, « non videtur esse lex quæ justa non fuerit: » unde inquantum habet de justitia, in tantum habet de virtute legis. In rebus autem humanis dicitur esse aliquid justum ex eo quod est rectum secundum regulam rationis. Rationis autem prima regula est lex naturæ, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturæ derivatur. Si vero in aliquo a lege naturali discordet, jam non erit lex, sed legis corruptio. Sed sciendum est quod a lege naturali dupliciter potest aliquid derivari: uno modo sicut conclusiones ex principiis, alio modo sicut determinationes quædam aliquorum communium. Primus quidem modus similis est ei quo in scientiis ex principiis conclusiones demonstrativæ producuntur; secundo vero modo simile est quod in artibus formæ communes determinantur ad aliquid speciale; sicut artifex formam communem domus necesse est quod determinet ad hanc vel illam domus figuram. Derivantur ergo committere. » 2 Ulpianus in Digesto veteri, lib. I, tit. 3, De leg. senatusque const., cap. Non omnium. quædam a principiis communibus legis naturæ per modum conclusionum; sicut hoc quod est non esse occidendum, ut conclusio quædam derivari potest ab eo quod est nulli esse faciendum malum: quædam per modum determinationis; sicut lex naturæ habet quod ille qui peccat puniatur, sed quod tali pœna puniatur, hoc est quædam determinatio legis naturæ. Utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege humana posita. Sed ea quæ sunt primi modi continentur in lege humana, non tanquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid vigoris ex lege naturali. Sed ea quæ sunt secundi modi, ex sola lege humana vigorem habent.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.1] The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de illis quæ sunt lege posita per determinationem vel specificationem quamdam præceptorum legis naturæ.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.2] This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de his quæ derivantur a lege naturæ tanquam conclusions.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.3] The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod principia communia legis naturæ non eodem modo applicari possunt omnibus, propter multam varietatem rerum humanarum; et ex hoc provenit diversitas legis positivæ apud diversos.
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.4] These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.
Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations."
[I-II.q.95.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum illud Jurisperiti intelligendum est in his quæ introducta sunt a majoribus circa particulares determinationes legis naturalis, ad quas quidem determinationes se habet expertorum et prudentum judicium, sicut ad quædam principia; inquantum scilicet statim vident quid congruentius sit particulariter determinari. Unde Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. xi, ad fin., quod « in talibus oportet attendere judicium expertorum et seniorum vel prudentum in demonstrabilibus enuntiationibus et opinionibus, non minus quam demonstrationibus. »
Article 3
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good." Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal." Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Isidorus inconvenienter qualitatem legis positivæ describat, dicens, lib. V Etymolog., cap. xxI, col. 203, t. 3: « Erit lex honesta, justa, possibilis, secundum naturam, secundum patriæ consuetudinem, loco temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis, manifesta quoque, ne aliquid per obscuritatem in captionem contineat, nullo privato commodo, sed pro communi civium utilitate scripta. » Supra enim, cap. III, col. 199, t. 3, in tribus conditionibus qualitatem legis explicaverat, dicens: « Lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit duntaxat, quod religioni congruat, quod disciplinæ conveniat, quod saluti proficiat. » Ergo superflue postmodum conditiones legis multiplicat.
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.2] Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous to add "just."
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, justitia est pars honestatis, ut Tullius dicit in I De offic., in tit. « De quatuor virtutibus. » Ergo postquam dixerat, « honesta, » superflue additur, « justa. »
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.3] Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country."
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, lex scripta, secundum Isidorum, lib. II Etymol., cap. x, col. 130, et lib. V, cap. III, col. 199, t. 3, contra consuetudinem dividitur. Non ergo debuit in definitione legis poni quod esset secundum consuetudinem patriæ.
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.4] Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both "necessary" and "useful."
[I-II.q.95.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, necessarium dupliciter dicitur: scilicet id quod est necessarium simpliciter, quod impossibile est aliter se habere, et hujusmodi necessarium non subjacet humano judicio; unde talis necessitas ad legem humanam non pertinet. Est etiam aliquid necessarium propter finem, et talis necessitas idem est quod utilitas. Ergo superflue utrumque ponitur, « necessaria et utilis. »
[I-II.q.95.a.3.sc] stands the authority of Isidore.
[I-II.q.95.a.3.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas ipsius Isidori.
[I-II.q.95.a.3.co] Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above (2; 93, 3). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law; and that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.
All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time," he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above (Question 90, Article 2), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[I-II.q.95.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod uniuscujusque rei quæ est propter finem, necesse est quod forma determinetur secundum proportionem ad finem; sicut forma serræ talis est qualis convenit sectioni, ut patet in II Phys., text. 88. Quælibet etiam res recta et mensurata oportet quod habeat formam proportionam suæ regulæ et mensuræ. Lex autem humana utrumque habet: quia et est aliquid 1 — deest in edit. ordinatum ad finem; et est quædam regula vel mensura regulata vel mensurata qua-dam superiori mensura; quæ quidem est duplex, scilicet divina lex et lex naturæ, ut ex supra dictis patet. Finis autem humanæ legis est utilitas hominum, sicut etiam Juris-peritus dicit. Et ideo Isidorus, lib. V Etym., c. III, col. 199, t. 3, in conditione legis primo quidam tria posuit: scilicet quod « religioni congruat, » inquantum scilicet est proportionata legi divinæ; quod « disciplinæ conveniat, » inquantum est proportionata legi naturæ; quod « saluti proficiat, » inquantum est proportionata utilitati humanæ. Et ad hæc tria omnes aliæ conditiones, quas postea ponit, reducuntur. Nam quod dicitur « honesta, » refertur ad hoc quod « religioni congruat; » quod autem subditur: « Justa, possibilis, secundum naturam, secundum consuetudinem patriæ, loco temporique conveniens, » reducitur ad hoc quod « conveniat disciplinæ. » Attenditur enim humana disciplina primum quidem quantum ad ordinem rationis, qui importatur in hoc quod dicitur justa. Secundo quantum ad facultatem agentium; debet enim esse disciplina conveniens unicuique secundum suam possibilitatem, observata etiam possibilitate naturæ. Non enim eadem sunt imponenda pueris quæ imponuntur viris perfectis. Et secundum humanam consuetudinem; non enim potest homo solus in societate vivere, aliis morem non gerens. Tertio quantum ad debitas circumstantias dicit: « Loco temporique conveniens. » Quod vero subditur: « Necessaria, utilis, » etc., refertur ad hoc quod expediat saluti: ut necessitas referatur ad remotionem malorum, utilitas ad consecutionem bonorum, manifestatio vero ad cavendum nocumentum, quod ex ipsa lege posset provenire. Et quia, sicut supra dictum est, lex ordinatur ad bonum commune, hoc ipsum in ultima parte determina-tionis ostenditur. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
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