Q113. The effects of grace

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Prima Secundae·Q113. The effects of grace

Source context

Theme: justification as the transformative effect of sanctifying grace on the human soul
Soul-faculty: Consciousness Soul

Steiner

GA 188, 1919-01-04Steiner distinguishes gratiae gratum facientes (sanctifying grace) from gratiae gratis datae (charismatic gifts), directly engaging the Thomistic taxonomy that underlies Q113's account of justifying grace.
GA 342, 1921-06-12Steiner identifies the effect of grace as an indispensable concept within the domain of religious life, while noting that spiritual science must clarify how such concepts are to be understood in relation to knowledge.
GA 94, 1906-10-31Steiner characterises the Christian idea of grace as structurally correspondent to buddhi meeting the upward-striving human being as a gift from above, framing justification in terms of evolutionary-spiritual anthropology.
GA 259, 1923-02-26Steiner links the effect of grace to the intersection of freedom and sacrifice in religious experience, indicating that grace does not bypass human moral activity but presupposes it.
GA 37, 19210000x01Steiner argues that from the standpoint of a knowledge-based epistemology, grace-effects cannot be derived from cognitive causation, marking the boundary between natural and supernatural orders that Aquinas's Q113 presupposes.

Cross-tradition

Lutheran soteriology (sola gratia)Luther's insistence that justification is entirely the work of divine imputation without intrinsic human transformation structurally contrasts with Aquinas's Q113, which treats justification as a real infused movement of the soul through sanctifying grace.
Vedanta — anugraha (divine grace)In Shaiva Siddhanta and Vishishtadvaita, anugraha denotes the lord's transforming descent into the bound soul; this presents a cross-tradition congruence with Q113's claim that grace initiates and completes the soul's movement toward God.
Neoplatonism — epistrophe (return)Plotinus's epistrophe, the soul's return to the One through contemplative ascent, offers a cross-tradition congruence with Q113's movement-structure of justification: remission of sin, infusion of grace, movement of free choice, and ordination to God as terminus.

Article 1

[I-II.q.113.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, but to all the other virtues, as stated above (Question 71, Article 1). Now justification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even remission of sin is justification, since movement is from one contrary to the other.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justificatio impii non sit remissio peccatorum. Peccatum enim non solum justitiae opponitur, sed omnibus virtutibus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed justificatio significat motum quemdam ad justitiam. Non ergo omnis peccati remissio est justificatio, cum omnis motus sit de contrario in contrarium. 2. Praeterea, unumquodque debet nominari ab eo quod est potissimum in ipso, ut dicitur in II De anima, text. 49. Sed remissio peccatorum præcipue fit per fidem, secundum illud Act., xv, 9: Fide purificans corda eorum; et per charitatem, secundum illud Proverb., x, 12: Universa delicta operit charitas. Magis ergo remissio peccatorum debuit denominari a fide vel a charitate, quam a justitia. Vega de hac re certitudinem moralem, omni formidine exclusa, possibilem esse voluit. Sed communiter theologi tenent nullam certitudinem absolutam de gratia sua hominem habere posse, seclusa revelatione speciali.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.arg.2] Further, everything ought to be named from what is predominant in it, according to De Anima ii, text. 49. Now the remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to Acts 15:9: "Purifying their hearts by faith"; and by charity, according to Proverbs 10:12: "Charity covereth all sins." Therefore the remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.arg.3] Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off from God by sin. But one is called before being justified according to Romans 8:30: "And whom He called, them He also justified." Therefore justification is not the remission of sins.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, remissio peccatorum idem esse videtur quod vocatio; vocatur enim qui distat; distat autem aliquis a Deo per peccatum. Sed vocatio justificationem praecedit, secundum illud Rom., viii, 30: Quos vocavit, hos et justificavit. Ergo justificatio non est remissio peccatorum.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.sc] On Romans 8:30, "Whom He called, them He also justified," the gloss says i.e. "by the remission of sins." Therefore the remission of sins is justification.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Rom., viii, super illud: Quos vocavit, hos et justificavit, dicit Glossa interl., « remissione peccatorum. » Ergo remissio peccatorum est justificatio.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.co] Justification taken passively implies a movement towards justice, as heating implies a movement towards heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of order, it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man's act, and thus justice is placed amongst the virtues--either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating them in relation to his fellowman--or as legal justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to the common good of society, as appears from Ethic. v, 1.

Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls "justice metaphorically speaking" (Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus justification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man by a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle (Romans 4:5): "But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly," etc. And because movement is named after its term "whereto" rather than from its term "whence," the transmutation whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term "whereto," and is called "justification of the ungodly."

[I-II.q.113.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod justificatio passive accepta importat motum ad justitiam, sicut et calefactio motum ad calorem. Cum autem justitia de sui ratione importet quamdam rectitudinem ordinis, dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod importat ordinem rectum in ipso actu hominis; et secundum hoc justitia ponitur virtus quædam, sive sit particularis justitia, quæ ordinat actum hominis secundum rectitudinem in comparatione ad alium singularem hominem; sive sit justitia legalis, quæ ordinat secundum rectitudinem actus hominis in comparatione ad bonum commune multitudinis, ut patet in V Ethic., cap. i, a med. Alio modo dicitur justitia, prout importat rectitudinem quamdam ordinis in ipsa interiori dispositione hominis, prout scilicet supremum hominis subditur Deo, et inferiores vires animæ, subduntur supremæ, scilicet rationi; et hanc etiam dispositionem vocat Philosophus in V Ethic., cap. ult., « justitiam metaphorice dictam. » Hæc autem justitia in homine potest fieri dupliciter: uno quidem modo per modum simplicis generationis, qui est ex privatione ad formam, et hoc modo justificatio posset competere etiam ei qui non esset in peccato, dum hujusmodi justitiam a Deo acciperet, sicut Adam dicitur accepisse originalem justitiam. Alio modo potest fieri hujusmodi justitia in homine secundum rationem motus, qui est de contrario in contrarium; et secundum hoc justificatio importat transmutationem quamdam de statu injustitia ad statum justitiae prædictæ. Et hoc modo loquimur hic de justificatione impii, secundum illud Apostoli, ad Rom., iv, 5: Ei qui non operatur, credenti autem in eum qui justificat impium, reputatur fides ejus ad justitiam, secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Et quia motus denominatur magis a termino ad quem, quam a termino a quo; ideo hujusmodi transmutatio, qua aliquis transmutatur a statu injustitiae ad statum justitiae per remissionem peccati, sortitur nomen a termino ad quem, et vocatur justificatio impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.ad.1] Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 John 3:4: "Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity." And thus the removal of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod omne peccatum, secundum quod importat quamdam inordinationem mentis non subditae Deo, injustitia potest dici, prædictæ justitiae contraria, secundum illud I Joan., iii, 4: Omnis qui facit peccatum, et iniquitatem facit, et peccatum est iniquitas; et secundum hoc remotio cujuslibet peccati dicitur justificatio.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.ad.2] Faith and charity imply a special directing of the human mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies a general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after justice rather than after charity or faith.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod fides et charitas dicunt ordinem specialem mentis humanæ ad Deum, secundum intellectum vel affectum; sed justitia importat generaliter totam rectitudinem ordinis; et ideo magis denominatur hujusmodi transmutatio a justitia quam a charitate vel fide.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.ad.3] Being called refers to God's help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission of sins, but its cause.

[I-II.q.113.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vocatio refertur ad auxilium Dei interius moventis et excitantis mentem ad deserendum peccatum; quæ quidem motio Dei non est ipsa remissio peccati, sed causa ejus.

Article 2

[I-II.q.113.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ad remissionem culpæ, quæ est justificatio impii, non requiratur gratiae infusio. Potest enim aliquis removeri ab uno contrario sine hoc quod perducatur ad alterum, si contraria sint mediata. Sed status culpæ et status gratiae sunt contraria mediata; est enim medius status innocentiæ, in quo homo nec gratiam habet, nec culpam. Ergo tificato infundatur justitia inhærens, qua renovetur interius. Et ideo non solum peccata non imputantur, sed remittuntur et delentur. potest alicui remitti culpa sine hoc quod perducatur ad gratiam. 2. Praeterea, remissio culpæ consistit in reputatione divina, secundum illud psal. xxxi, 2: Beatus vir cui non imputavit Dominus peccatum. Sed infusio gratiae ponit etiam aliquid in nobis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo infusio gratiae non requiritur ad remissionem culpæ. 3. Praeterea, nullus subjicitur simul duobus contrariis. Sed quædam peccata sunt contraria, sicut prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Ergo qui subjicitur peccato prodigalitatis, non simul subjicitur peccato illiberalitatis; potest tamen contingere quod prius ei subjiciebatur. Ergo peccando vitio prodigalitatis liberatur a peccato illiberalitatis; et sic remittitur aliquod peccatum sine gratia.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.arg.2] Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine imputation, according to Psalm 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1). Hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.arg.3] Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted without grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.sc] It is written (Romans 3:24): "Justified freely by His grace."

[I-II.q.113.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., 24: Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.co] by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Question 71, Article 5). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod homo peccando Deum offendit, sicut ex supra dictis patet. Oflensa autem non remittitur alicui, nisi per hoc quod animus offensi pacatur offendenti. Et ideo secundum hoc peccatum nobis remitti dicitur, quod Deus nobis pacatur; quæ quidem pax consistit in dilectione qua Deus diligit nos. Dilectio autem Dei, quantum est ex parte actus divini, est aeterna et immutabilis, sed quantum ad effectum quem nobis imprimit, quando interrumpitur, prout scilicet ab ipso quando deficimus, et quando iterum recuperamus. Effectus autem divinæ dilectionis in nobis, qui per peccatum tollitur, est gratia, qua homo fit dignus vita aeterna, a qua peccatum mortale excludit. Et ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpæ, si non adesset infusio gratiae.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.ad.1] More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod plus requiritur ad hoc quod offendenti remittatur offensa, quam ad hoc quod simpliciter aliquis non offendens non habeatur odio. Potest enim apud homines contingere quod unus homo aliquem alium nec diligat, nec Ita mss. et editi passim. Theologi legendum censent: «in non reputatione.» Hic inter catholicos quæritur utrum per solum Dei favorem extrinsecum, vel per solos charitatis et contritionis actus absque infusione gratiae habitualis, de «potentia Dei absoluta» justificatio impii fieri posset? Contra theologos communiter affirmativum tenent S.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.ad.2] As God's love consists not merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above (Question 110, Article 1), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God.

[I-II.q.113.a.2.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (Question 87, Article 6). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt.

Article 3

[I-II.q.113.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, "he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated"; which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ad justificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii. Videmus enim quod per sacramentum baptismi justificantur pueri absque motu liberi arbitrii, et etiam interdum adulti. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IV Confess., cap. iv, § 8, col. 696, t. 4, quod cum quidam suus amicus laboraret febribus, « jacuit diu sine sensu in sudore lethali, et cum desperaretur, baptizatus est nesciens, et renatus est; » quod fit per gratiam justificantem. Sed Deus potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis. Ergo etiam potest justificare hominem sine sacramentis absque omni motu liberi arbitrii.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.arg.2] Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 1 Kings 3 and 2 Chronicles 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the movement of his free-will.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in dormiendo homo non habet usum rationis, sine quo non potest esse motus liberi arbitrii. Sed Salomon in dormiendo consecutus est a Deo donum sapientiae, ut habetur III Reg., iii, et II Paral., i. Ergo etiam pari ratione donum gratiae justificantis quandoque datur homini a Deo absque motu liberi arbitrii.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.arg.3] Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "so ought man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him." Now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per eamdem causam gratia producitur in esse, et conservatur; dicit enim Augustinus, VIII Super Gen. ad litt., cap. xii, col. 382, t. 3, quod « ita se debet homo ad Deum convertere, ut ab illo semper fiat justus. » Sed absque motu liberi arbitrii gratia in homine conservatur. Ergo absque motu liberi arbitrii potest a principio infundi.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.sc] It is written (John 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a movement of the free-will.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., vi, 45: Omnis qui audivit a Patre, et didicit, venit ad me. Sed discere non est sine motu liberi arbitrii; addiscens enim consentit docenti. Ergo nullus venit ad Deum per gratiam justificantem absque motu liberi arbitrii.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.co] The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it is "that justifieth the ungodly" according to Romans 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man's proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod justificatio impii fit Deo movente hominem ad justitiam. Ipse enim est qui justificat impium, ut dicitur Rom., iv. Deus autem movet omnia secundum modum uniuscujusque; sicut in naturalibus videmus quod aliter moventur ab ipso gravia, et aliter levia, propter diversam naturam utriusque. Unde et hominem ad justitiam movet secundum conditionem naturæ humanæ. Homo autem secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii. Et ideo in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii, non fit motio a Deo ad justitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum gratiae justificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum in his qui sunt hujus motionis capaces.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.ad.1] Infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, does not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and afterwards he assented to the Baptism.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pueri non sunt capaces motus liberi arbitrii; et ideo moventur a Deo ad justitiam per solam informationem animæ ipsorum. Hoc autem non fit sine sacramento: quia, sicut peccatum originale, a quo justificantur, non propria voluntate ad eos pervenit, sed per carnalem originem; ita etiam per spiritualem regenerationem a Christo in eos gratia derivatur. Et eadem ratio est de furiosis et amentibus, qui nunquam usum liberi arbitrii habuerunt. Sed si quis aliquando habuit usum liberi arbitrii, et postmodum eo careat vel per infirmitatem vel per somnum, non consequitur gratiam justificantem per baptismum exterius adhibitum, aut per aliquod aliud sacramentum, nisi prius habuerit sacramentum in proposito; quod sine usu liberi arbitrii non contingit. Et hoc modo ille de quo loquitur Augustinus, renatus fuit, quia et prius et postea baptismum acceptavit.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.ad.2] Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his person (Wisdom 7:7): "I wished, and understanding was given unto me." Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of prophecy, according to Numbers 12:6: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." In such cases the use of free-will remains.

And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect which precedes the will; hence without any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job 33:15-16: "When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to learn."

[I-II.q.113.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam Salomon dormiendo non meruit sapientiam, nec accepit; sed in somno declaratum est ei quod propter praecedens desiderium ei a Deo sapientia infunderetur; unde ex ejus persona dicitur Sapient., vii, 7: Optavi, et datus est mihi sensus. Vel potest dici, quod ille somnus non fuit naturalis, sed somnus prophetiae, secundum quod dicitur Num., xii, 6: Si quis fuerit inter vos propheta Domini, in visione apparebo ei, vel per somnium loquar ad illum; in quo casu aliquis usum liberi arbitrii habet. Et tamen sciendum est quod non est eadem ratio de dono sapientiae, et de dono gratiae justificantis. Nam donum gratiae justificantis praecipue ordinat hominem ad bonum, quod est objectum voluntatis; et ideo ad ipsum movetur homo per motum voluntatis, qui est motus liberi arbitrii. Sed sapientia perficit intellectum, qui pracedit voluntatem; unde absque complete motu liberi arbitrii potest intellectus dono sapientiae illuminari; sicut etiam videmus quod in dormiendo aliqua hominibus revelantur, sicut dicitur Job, xxxiii, 45: Quando irruit sopor super homines et dormiunt in lectulo, tunc aperit aures virorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplina.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.ad.3] In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the Divine influx.

[I-II.q.113.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in infusione gratiae justificantis est quædam transmutatio animæ humanæ; et ideo requiritur motus proprius animæ humanæ, ut anima moveatur secundum modum suum. Sed conservatio gratiae est absque transmutatione; unde non requiritur aliquis motus ex parte animæ, sed sola continuatio influxus divini.

Article 4

[I-II.q.113.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written (Sirach 1:27): "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified"; and again by charity, according to Luke 7:47: "Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much"; and again by humility, according to James 4:6: "God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble"; and again by mercy, according to Proverbs 15:27: "By mercy and faith sins are purged away." Hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad justificationem impii non requiratur motus fidei. Sicut enim per fidem justificatur homo, ita etiam et per quædam alia; scilicet per timorem, de quo dicitur Eccli., 1, 27: Timor Domini expellit peccatum; nam qui sine timore est non poterit justificari; et iterum per charitatem, secundum illud Luc., VII, 47: Dimissa sunt* ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum; et iterum per humilitatem, secundum illud Jac., IV, 6: Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam; et iterum per misericordiam, secundum illud Prov., XV, 27: Per misericordiam et fidem purgantur peccata. Non ergo magis motus fidei requiritur ad justificationem impii quam motus prædictarum virtutum.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.arg.2] Further, the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, actus fidei non requiritur ad justificationem, nisi inquantum per fidem homo cognoscit Deum. Sed etiam aliis modis potest homo Deum cognoscere, scilicet per cognitionem naturalem, et per donum sa- Fidem Lutherani et Calvinistæ distinguunt triplicem: 1. Historicam, qua omnia contenta in Biblia credimus; — 2. miraculorum, per quem miracula funt vel impetrantur; — 3. promissionum, qua Deum credimus remissionem peccatorum promisisse; et illa dividitur fides in generalem, et particularem: generalem, qua fidelibus omnibus in communi Deum credunt remissionem peccatorum pientiae. Ergo non requiritur actus fidei ad justificationem impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.arg.3] Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, diversi sunt articuli fidei. Si igitur actus fidei requiritur ad justificationem impii, videtur quod oporteret hominem, quando primo justificatur, de omnibus articulis fidei cogitare. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, cum talis cogitatio longam temporis moram requirat. Ergo videtur quod actus fidei non requiritur ad justificationem impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.sc] It is written (Romans 5:1): "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God."

[I-II.q.113.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Röm., v, 1: Justificati igitur* ex fide pacem habeamus ad Deum.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 3) a movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind is moved by God. Now God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself according to Psalm 84:7 (Septuagint): "Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life." Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith, according to Hebrews 11:6: "He that cometh to God must believe that He is." Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii requiritur ad justificationem impii, secundum quod mens hominis movetur a Deo. Deus autem movet animam hominis convertendo eam ad seipsum, ut dicitur in psal. Lxxxiv, 7, secundum aliam litteram LXX Interpr.: Deus tu convertens vivificabis nos. Et ideo ad justificationem impii requiritur motus mentis, quo convertitur in Deum. Prima autem conversio in Deum fit per fidem, secundum illud ad Hebr., xi, 6: Accedentem ad Deum oportet credere* quia est. Et ideo motus fidei requiritur ad justificationem impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.ad.1] The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus fidei non est perfectus, nisi sit charitate informatus; unde simul in justificatione impii cum motu fidei est etiam motus charitatis. Movetur autem liberum arbitrium in Deum ad hoc quod ei se subjiciat; unde etiam concurrit actus timoris filialis, et actus humilitatis. Contingit enim unum et eumdem actum liberi arbitrii diversarum virtutum esse, secundum quod una imperat, et aliæ imperantur; prout scilicet actus est ordinabilis ad diversos fines. Actus autem misericordiae vel operatur circa peccatum per modum satisfactionis, et sic sequitur justificationem; vel per modum praeparationis, inquantum misericordes misericordiam consequuntur; et sic etiam potest praecedere justificationem, vel etiam ad justificationem concurrere simul cum et salutem promisisse; et particularem, qua unusquisque certo confidit peccata sibi per merita Christi esse remissa; hæc fides particularis nil aliud est quam spes roborata, seu fiducia. — Requiritur ad justificationem non fiducia simplex, sed fides dogmatica, christiana et catholica. Nec tamen illa fides ipsa, ut somniarunt Simon Magus et Eu-nomius, sola sufficit ut homo justificetur. prædictis virtutibus, secundum quod misericordia includitur in dilectione proximi.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.ad.2] By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (68, 4, ad 3).

[I-II.q.113.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per cognitionem naturalem homo non convertitur in Deum, inquantum est objectum beatitudinis et justificationis causa. Unde talis cognitio non sufficit ad justificationem. Donum autem sapientiae præsupponit cognitionem fidei, ut ex supra dictis patet.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.ad.3] As the Apostle says (Romans 4:5), "to him that . . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God." Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ.

[I-II.q.113.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Apostolus dicit ad Rom., iv, 5, credenti in eum qui justificat impium, reputabitur fides ejus ad justitiam secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Ex quo patet quod in justificatione impii requiritur actus fidei quantum ad hoc quod homo credat Deum esse justificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi.

Article 5

[I-II.q.113.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, according to Proverbs 10:12: "Charity covereth all sins." Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards sin is required.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ad justificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. Sola enim charitas sufficit ad deletionem peccati, secundum illud Prov., x, 12: Universa delicta operit charitas. Sed charitatis objectum non est peccatum. Ergo non requiritur ad justificationem impii motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.arg.2] Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, according to Philippians 3:13-14: "Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation." But whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, qui in anteriora tendit, ad posteriora respicere non debet, secundum illud Apostoli ad Philipp., 11, 43: Quæ qui dem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea vero quæ sunt priora extendens meipsum, ad destinatum persequor, ad bravium supernæ vocationis. Sed tendenti in justitiam retrorsum sunt peccata præterea. Ergo eorum debet oblivisci, nec in ea se debet extendere per motum liberi arbitrii.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.arg.3] Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not remitted without another, for "it is irreverent to expect half a pardon from God" [Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence, in the justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will must move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be required for such thought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is required.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, in justificatione impii non remittitur unum peccatum sine alio; « impium enim est a Deo dimidiam sperare veniam, » ex cap. « Sunt plures, » dist. 11, De pænit., col. 1613. Si igitur in justificatione impii oportet liberum arbitrium moveri contra peccatum, oporteret quod de omnibus peccatis suis cogitaret: quod vide-tur inconveniens: tum quia requireretur magnum tempus ad hujusmodi cogitationem; tum etiam quia peccatorum quorum est homo oblitus, veniam habere non posset. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum non requiritur ad justificationem impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.sc] It is written (Psalm 31:5): "I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin."

[I-II.q.113.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. xxxi, 5: Dixi: Confitebor adversum me injustitiam meam Domino; et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.co] As stated above (Article 1), the justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term "whence" and nears the term "whereto." Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice.

Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the words "the hireling fleeth," etc. (John 10:12): "Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the soul's flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you are afraid." Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of the free-will--one, whereby it tends to God's justice; the other whereby it hates sin.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, justificatio impii est quidam motus quo humana mens movetur a Deo a statu peccati in statum justitiae. Oportet igitur quod humana mens se habeat ad utrumque extremorum secundum motum liberi arbitrii, sicut se habet corpus localiter motum ab aliquo movente ad duos terminos motus. Manifestum est autem in motu locali corporum quod corpus motum recedit a termino a quo, et accedit ad terminum ad quem. Unde oportet quod mens humana, dum justificatur, per motum liberi arbitrii, recedat a peccato et accedat ad justitiam. Recessus autem et accessus in motu liberi arbitrii accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium. Dicit enim Augustinus, Super Joan., x, exponens illud: Mercenarius autem fugit, tract. xlvi, § 8, col. 1732, t. 3: « Affectiones nostræ motus animorum sunt; laetitia animi diffusio; timor animi fuga est; progrederis animo, cum appetis; fugis animo, cum metuis. » Oportet igitur quod in justificatione impii sit motus liberi arbitrii duplex: unus, quo per desiderium tendat in Dei justitiam, et alius, quo detestetur peccatum.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.ad.1] It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad eam-dem virtutem pertinet prosequi unum oppositorum, et refugere aliud; et ideo sicut ad charitatem pertinet diligere Deum, ita etiam detestari peccata, per quæ anima separatur a Deo.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.ad.2] A man ought not to return to those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad poste- 1 Al.: ad destinatum persequor bravium. Quæritur a quo principio procedant actus contritionis et charitatis qui ad gratiam habitualem ultimo disponunt? — Ab auxilio actuali transeunter communicato: ita Joannes a S. Thomas, Sylvius, Contenson, et plures extranei. — Ab ipsa gratia habituali: ita Gonet, Serra et alii. — A virtute infusa charitatis et pænitentiae, non permanenter per modum habitus, sed transeunter per modum actualis motionis et auxilii communicata: ita Goudin. riora non debet homo regredi per amorem, sed quantum ad hoc debet ea oblivisci, ut ad ea non afficiatur. Debet tamen eorum recordari per considerationem, ut ea detestetur; sic enim ab eis recedit.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.ad.3] Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and this movement cooperates in his justification.

[I-II.q.113.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod in tempore praecedente justificationem, oportet quod homo singula peccata quæ commisit, detestetur, quorum memoriam habet; et ex tali consideratione praecedenti subsequitur in anima quidam motus detestantis universa-liter omnia peccata' commissa; inter quæ etiam includuntur peccata oblivioni tradita, quia homo in statu illo est sic dispositus, ut etiam de his quæ non meminit contereretur, si memoriae adessent; et iste motus concurrit ad justificationem.

Article 6

[I-II.q.113.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod remissio peccatorum non debeat numerari inter ea quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii. Substantia enim rei non connumeratur his quæ ad rem requiruntur, sicut homo non debet connumerari animæ et corpori. Sed ipsa justificatio impii est remissio peccatorum, ut dictum est. Ergo remissio peccatorum non debet computari inter ea quæ ad justificationem impii requiruntur. 2. Praeterea, idem est gratiae infusio et culpæ remissio, sicut idem est illuminatio et tenebrarum expulsio. Sed idem non debet connumerari sibi ipsi; unum enim multitudini opponitur. Ergo non debet culpæ remissio connumerari infusioni gratiae. 3. Praeterea, remissio peccatorum consequitur ad motum liberi arbitrii in Deum et in peccatum, sicut effectus ad causam; per fidem enim et contritionem remittuntur peccata. Sed effectus non debet connumerari suæ causæ; quia ea quæ connumerantur, quasi ad invicem condivisa, sunt simul natura. Ergo remissio culpæ non debet connu-merari aliis quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.arg.2] Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.arg.3] Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.sc] In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Isaiah 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken away." Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.sc] Sed contra est, quod in enumeratione eorum quæ requiruntur ad rem, non debet praetermitti finis, qui est potissimum in uno-quoque. Sed remissio peccatorum est finis in justificatione impii; dicitur enim Isa., xxvii, 9: Iste est omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum ejus. Ergo remissio peccatorum debet connumerari inter ea quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.co] There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for this is that, as stated above (Article 1), the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two movements--of departure from the term "whence," and of approach to the term "whereto"; but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quatuor enumerantur quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii, scilicet gratiae infusio, motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem, et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, et remissio culpæ. Cujus ratio est, quia, sicut dictum est, justificatio est quidam motus quo anima movetur a Deo a statu culpæ in statum justiæ. In quolibet autem motu, quo aliquid ab altero movetur, tria requiruntur: primo quidem motio ipsius moventis; secundo motus mobilis; tertio consummatio motus, sive perventio ad finem. Ex parte igitur motionis divinæ accipitur gratiae infusio; ex parte vero liberi arbitrii moti accipiuntur duo motus ipsius, secundum recessum a termino a quo, et accessum ad terminum ad quem. Consummatio autem, sive perventio ad terminum hujus motus, importatur per remissionem culpæ; in hoc enim justificatio consummatur.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.ad.1] The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated above (Article 5).

[I-II.q.113.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justificatio impii dicitur esse ipsa remissio peccatorum, secundum quod omnis motus accipit speciem a termino. Tamen ad terminum consequendum multa alia requiruntur, ut ex supra dictis patet.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.ad.2] The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod gratiae infusio et remissio culpæ dupliciter considerari possunt: uno modo secundum ipsam substantiam actus, et sic idem sunt; eodem enim actu Deus et largitur gratiam, et remittit culpam. Alio modo possunt considerari ex parte objectorum; et sic differunt secundum differentiam culpæ, quæ tollitur, et gratiae, quæ infunditur; sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus generatio et corruptio differunt, quamvis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.ad.3] This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow.

[I-II.q.113.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ista non est connumeratio secundum divisionem generis in species, in qua oportet quod connumerata sint simul; sed secundum differentiam eorum quæ requiruntur ad completionem ali-cujus, in qua quidem enumeratione aliquid potest esse prius et aliquid posterius, quia principiorum et partium rei compositæ potest esse aliquid aliquid alio prius.

Article 7

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already stated (3), for the justification of the ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above (Question 13, Article 1). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod justificatio impii non fiat in instanti, sed successive. Quia, ut dictum est, ad justificationem impii requiritur motus liberi arbitrii. Actus autem liberi arbitrii est eligere, qui præexigit deliberationem consilii, ut dictum est. Cum igitur deliberatio discursum quemdam importet, qui successionem quamdam habet, videtur quod justificatio impii sit successiva.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.2] Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually and at once, as stated above (I, 85, 4). Hence, since for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an instant.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, motus liberi arbitrii non est absque actuali consideratione. Sed impossibile est simul multa intelligere in actu, ut in I dictum est. Cum igitur ad justificationem impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in diversa, scilicet in Deum et in peccatum, videtur quod justificatio impii non possit esse in instanti.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.3] Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated above (Question 112, Article 4). Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, forma, quæ suscipit magis et minus, successive recipitur in subjecto, sicut patet de albedine et nigredine. Sed gratia suscipit magis et minus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non recipitur subito in subjecto. Cum igitur ad justificationem impii requiratur gratia infusio, videtur quod justificatio impii non possit esse in instanti.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.4] Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (114, 2). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, motus liberi arbitrii, qui ad justificationem impii concurrit, est meritorius; et ita oportet quod procedat a gratia, sine qua nullum est meritum, ut infra dicetur. Sed prius est aliquid consequi formam, quam secundum formam operari. Ergo prius infunditur gratia, et postea liberum arbitrium movetur in Deum et in detestationem peccati. Non ergo justificatio est tota simul.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.5] Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between which there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once, but successively.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.arg.5] 5. Præterea, si gratia infundatur animæ, oportet dare aliquod instans in quo primo animæ insit; similiter si culpa remittitur, oportet ultimum instans dare in quo homo culpæ subjaceat; sed non potest esse idem instans, quia sic opposita simul inessent eidem. Ergo oportet esse duo instantia sibi succedentia, inter quæ, secundum Philosophum, in VI Physic., text. 2, oportet esse tempus medium. Non ergo justificatio fit tota simul, sed successive.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.sc] The justification of the ungodly is caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod justificatio impii fit per gratiam Spiritus sancti justificantis. Sed Spiritus sanctus subito advenit mentibus hominum, secundum illud Act., π, 2: Factus est repente de cælo sonus tanquam adventientis spiritus vehementis; ubii dicit Glossa interl. quod « nescit tarda molimina Spiritus sancti gratia. » Ergo justificatio impii non est successiva, sed instantanea.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.co] The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated (112, 2) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above (112, 2, ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod tota justificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione. Per eam enim et liberum arbitrium movetur, et culpa remittitur. Gratiæ autem infusio fit in instanti absque successione. Cujus ratio est, quia quod aliqua forma non subito imprimatur subjecto, contingit ex hoc quod subjectum non est dispositum, et agens indiget tempore ad hoc quod subjectum disponat. Et ideo videmus quod statim cum materia est disposita per alterationem præcedentem, forma substantialis acquiritur materiæ; et eadem ratione quia diaphanum est secundum se dispositum ad lumen recipendum, subito illuminatur a corpore lucido in actu. Dictum est autem supra, quod Deus ad hoc quod gratiam infundat animæ, non requirit aliquam dispositionem, nisi quam ipse facit. Facit autem hujusmodi dispositionem sufficientem ad susceptionem gratiae quandoque quidem subito, quandoque autem paulatim et successive, ut supra dictum est. Quod enim agens naturale non subito possit disponere materiam, contingit ex hoc quod est aliqua proportio ejus quod in materia resistit, ad virtutem agentis; et propter hoc videmus quod quanto virtus agentis fuerit fortior, tanto materia citius disponitur. Cum igitur virtus divina sit infinita, potest quam-cumque materiam creatam subito disponere ad formam, et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis, cujus motus potest esse instantaneus secundum naturam. Sic igitur justificatio impii fit a Deo in instanti.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.1] The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod motus liberi arbitrii, qui concurrit ad justificationem impii, est consensus ad detestandum peccatum et ad accedendum ad Deum; qui quidem consensus subito fit. Contingit autem quandoque, quod praecedit aliqua deliberatio, quæ non est de substantia justificationis, sed via in justificationem; sicut motus localis est via ad illuminationem, et alteratio ad generationem.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.2] As stated above (I, 85, 5), there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, since a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut in I dictum est, nihil prohibet duo simul intelligere actu, secundum quod sunt quodammodo unum: sicut simul intelligimus subjectum et prædicatum, inquantum uniuntur in ordine affirmationis unius. Et per eumdem modum liberum arbitrium potest in duo simul moveri, secundum quod unum ordinatur in aliud. Motus autem liberi arbitrii in peccatum ordinatur ad motum liberi arbitrii in Deum; propter hoc enim homo detestatur peccatum, quia est contra Deum, cui vult adhærere. Et ideo liberum arbitrium in justificatione impii simul detestatur peccatum, et convertit se ad Deum; sicut etiam corpus simul recedendo ab uno loco accedit ad alium.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.3] The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non est ratio quare forma subito in materia non recipiatur, quia magis et minus potest inesse; sic enim lumen non subito recipetur in aere, qui potest magis et minus illuminari. Sed ratio est accipienda ex parte dispositionis materiæ vel subjecti, ut dictum est.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.4] The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will--the movements of the free-will--are not successive, but instantaneous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in eodem instanti in quo forma acquiritur, incipit res operari secundum formam; sicut ignis statim cum est generatus movetur sursum; et si motus ejus esset instantaneus, in eodem instanti compleretur. Motus autem liberi arbitrii, qui est velle, non est successivus, sed instantaneus. Et ideo non oportet quod justificatio impii sit successiva.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.5] The succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant. Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the term of the movement.

But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above (I, 53, 2,3). In these, therefore, there is a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no continuity of time, which this would necessitate.

Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species, as stated above (I, 85, A1,2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin inhered.

[I-II.q.113.a.7.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod successio duorum oppositorum in eodem subjecto, aliter est consideranda in his quæ subjacent tempori, et aliter in his quæ sunt supra tempus. In his enim quæ subjacent tempori non est dare ultimum instans, in quo forma prior subjecto inest: est autem dare ultimum tempus, et primum instans in quo forma subsequens inest materiæ vel subjecto. Cujus ratio est, quia in tempore non po-test accipi ante unum instans aliud instans præcedens immediate, et quod instantia non consequenter se habent in tempore, sicut nec puncta in linea, ut probatur in VI Phys., text. 1 et seq., sed tempus terminatur ad instans. Et ideo in toto tempore præcedenti quo aliquid movetur ad unam formam, subest formæ oppositæ; et in ultimo instanti illius temporis, quod est primum instans sequentis temporis, habet formam, quæ est terminus motus. Sed in his quæ sunt supra tempus, aliter se habet. Si qua enim successio sit ibi affectuum vel intellectualium conceptionum, puta in angelis, talis successio non mensuratur tempore continuo, sed tempore discreto; sicut et ipsa quæ mensurantur, non sunt continua, ut in I habitum est. Unde in talibus est dandum ultimum instans, in quo primum fuit, et primum instans, in quo est id quod sequitur. Nec oportet esse tempus medium; quia non est ibi continuitas temporis, quæ hoc requirebat. Mens autem humana, quæ justificatur, secundum se quidem est supra tempus, sed per accidens subditur tempori, inquantum scilicet intelligit cum continuo et tempore secundum phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles considerat, ut in I dictum est. Et ideo judicandum est secundum hoc de ejus mutatione secundum conditionem motuum temporali, ut scilicet dicamus quod non est dare ultimum instans in quo culpa infuit, sed ultimum tempus; est autem dare primum instans in quo gratia inest; in toto autem tempore præcedenti inerat culpa.

Article 8

[I-II.q.113.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Psalm 33:15: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod gratiae infusio non sit prima ordine naturæ inter ea quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii. Prius enim est recedere a malo, quam accedere ad bonum, secundum illud ps. xxxiii, 15: Declina* a malo, et fac bonum. Sed remissio culpæ pertinet ad recessum a malo; infusio autem gratiae pertinet ad prosecutionem boni. Ergo naturaliter prius est remissio culpæ quam infusio gratiae.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.arg.2] Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dispositio præcedit naturaliter formam ad quam disponit. Sed motus liberi arbitrii est quædam dispositio ad susceptionem gratiae. Ergo naturaliter præcedit infusionem gratiae.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.arg.3] Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, peccatum impedit animam, ne libere tendat in Deum. Sed prius est removere id quod prohibet motum, quam motus sequatur. Ergo prius est naturaliter remissio culpæ, et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum, quam motus liberi arbitrii in Deum, et quam infusio gratiae.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.sc] The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (Article 7). Therefore it is naturally prior to it.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.sc] Sed contra, causa est prior naturaliter suo effectu. Sed gratiae infusio causa est omnium aliorum quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii, ut supra dictum est. Ergo est naturaliter prior.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.co] The aforesaid four things required for the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the ungodly is not successive, as stated above (Article 7); but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth, the remission of sin.

The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is the infusion of grace, as stated above (Article 6); the movement or disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above (Article 6). Hence in their natural order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the free-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards God naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above (1,6).

[I-II.q.113.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prædicta qua-tuor quæ requiruntur ad justificationem impii, tempore quidem sunt simul, quia justificatio impii non est successiva, ut dictum est; sed ordine naturæ unum eorum est prius altero; et inter ea naturali ordine primum est gratiae infusio; secundum motus liberi arbitrii in Deum; tertium est motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; quartum vero est remissio culpæ. Cujus ratio est, quia in quolibet motu naturaliter primum est motio ipsius moventis; secundum autem est dispositio materiae, sive motus ipsius mobilis; ultimum vero est finis vel terminus motus ad quem terminatur motio moventis. Ipsa igitur Dei moventis motio, est gratiae infusio, ut dictum est supra; motus autem vel dispositio mobilis est duplex motus liberi arbitrii; terminus autem vel finis motus est remissio culpæ, ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo naturali ordine primum in justificatione impii est gratiae infusio; secundum est motus liberi arbitrii in Deum; tertium vero est motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; propter hoc enim ille qui justificatur, detestatur peccatum, quia est contra Deum; unde motus liberi arbitrii in Deum præcedit naturaliter motum liberi arbitrii in peccatum, cum sit causa et ratio ejus; quartum vero et ultimum est remissio culpæ, ad quam ista transmutatio ordinatur sicut ad finem, ut dictum est.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.ad.1] The withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God Who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term "whence" of justification is sin; and the term "whereto" is justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod recessus a terminus et accessus ad terminum dupliciter considerari possunt: uno modo ex parte mobilis; et sic naturaliter recessus a termino præcedit accessum ad terminum; prius enim est in subjecto mobili oppositum quod abjicitur, et postmodum est id quod per motum assequitur mobile. Sed ex parte agentis est e converso: agens enim, per formam, quae in eo præexistit, agit ad removendum contrarium; sicut sol per suam lucem agit ad removendum tenebras: et ideo ex parte solis prius est illuminare quam tenebras removere; ex parte autem aeris illuminandi prius est purgari a tenebris quam consequi lumen ordine naturæ, licet utrumque sit simul tempore. Et quia infusio gratiae et remissio culpæ dicuntur ex parte Dei justificantis, ideo ordine naturæ prior est gratiae infusio quam culpæ remissio. Sed si sumantur ea quae sunt ex parte hominis justificati, est e converso; nam prius est ordine naturæ liberatio a culpa, quam consecutio gratiae justificantis. Vel potest dici quod termini justificationis sunt culpa sicut a quo, et justitia sicut ad quem; gratia vero est causa remissionis culpæ et adeptionis justitiæ.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.ad.2] The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows the infusion of grace.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dispositio subjecti præcedit susceptionem formæ ordine naturæ; sequitur tamen actionem agentis per quam etiam ipsum subjectum disponitur; et ideo motus liberi arbitrii naturæ ordine præcedit consecutionem gratiae; sequitur autem gratiae infusionem.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.ad.3] As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the impediment of sin.

[I-II.q.113.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in II Physic., text. 89, « in motibus animi omnino præcedit motus in principium speculationis, vel in finem actionis; » sed in exterioribus motibus remotio impedimenti præcedit asecutionem finis. Et quia motus liberi arbitrii est motus animi, prius naturæ ordine movetur in Deum sicut in finem, quam ad removendum impedimentum peccati.

Article 10

[I-II.q.113.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine (9). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod justificatio impii sit opus miraculosum. Opera enim miraculosa sunt majora non miraculosis. Sed justificatio impii est majus opus quam alia opera miraculosa, ut patet per Augustinum in auctoritate inducta art. præced. Ergo justificatio impii est opus miraculosum.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.arg.2] Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, motus voluntatis ita est in anima, sicut inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus. Sed quando Deus aliquid operatur in rebus naturalibus contra inclinationem naturæ, est opus miraculosum; sicut cum illuminat cæcum, vel suscitat mortuum. Voluntas autem impii tendit in malum. Cum igitur Deus, justificando hominem, moveat eum in bonum, videtur quod justificatio impii sit miraculosa.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.arg.3] Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut sapientia est donum Dei, ita et justitia. Sed miraculosum est quod aliquis subito sine studio sapientiam assequatur a Deo. Ergo miraculosum est quod aliquis impius justificetur a Deo.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.sc] Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.sc] Sed contra, opera miraculosa sunt supra potentiam naturalem. Sed justificatio impii non est supra potentiam naturalem; dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De prædest. sanct., cap. v, col. 968, t. 40, quod « posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere charitatem, naturæ est hominum; habere autem fidem, quemadmodum habere charitatem, gratia est fidelium. » Ergo justificatio impii non est miraculosa.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.co] In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above (I, 105, 7). And thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is miraculous.

Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation.

Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect; because "charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in operibus miraculosis tria consueverunt inveniri: quorum unum est ex parte potentiæ agentis, quia sola divina virtute fieri possunt; et ideo sunt simpliciter mira, quasi habentia causam occultam, ut in I dictum est; et secundum hoc tam justificatio impii, quam creatio mundi, et universaliter omne opus quod a solo Deo fieri potest, miraculosum dici potest. Secundo in quibusdam miraculosis operibus inventur quod forma inducta est supra naturalem potentiam talis materiæ: sicut in suscitatione mortui vita est supra naturalem potentiam talis corporis; et quantum ad hoc justificatio impii non est miraculosa, quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; eo enim ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit, ubi supra. Tertio modo in operibus miraculosis inventur aliquid præter solitum et consuetum ordinem causandi effectum; sicut cum aliquis infirmus sanitatem perfectam assequitur subito præter solitum cursum sanationis quæ fit a natura vel arte; et quantum ad hoc justificatio impii quandoque est miraculosa et quandoque non. Est enim iste communis et consuetus cursus justificationis, ut Deo movente interius animam, homo convertatur ad Deum, primo quidem conversione imperfecta, ut postmodum ad perfectam deveniat; quia « charitas inchoata meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici, » sicut Augustinus dicit Tract. v in Epist. Joan., § 4, col. 2014, t. 3. Quandoque vero tam vehementer Deus animam movet, ut statim quamdam perfectionem justitiae assequatur; sicut fuit in conversione Pauli, adhibita etiam exterius miraculosa prostrazione: et ideo conversio Pauli tanquam miraculosa in Ecclesia commemoratur.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.ad.1] Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quædam miraculosa opera, etsi sint minora quam justificatio impii, quantum ad bonum quod fit, sunt tamen præter consuetum ordinem talium effectuum; et ideo plus habent de ratione miraculi.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.ad.2] It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non quandocumque res naturalis movetur contra suam inclinationem, est opus miraculosum; alioquin miraculosum esset quod aqua calefieret, vel quod lapis sursum projiceretur; sed quando hoc fit præter ordinem propriæ causæ, quæ nata est facere hoc. Justificare autem impium nulla alia causa potest nisi Deus, sicut nec aquam calefacere nisi ignis; et ideo justificatio impii a Deo quantum ad hoc non est miraculosa.

[I-II.q.113.a.10.ad.3] A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's. Hence there is no parity.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[I-II.q.113.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sapientiam et scientiam homo natus est acquirere a Deo per proprium ingenium et studium; et ideo quando præter hunc modum homo sapiens vel sciens efficitur, est miraculosum. Sed gratiam justificantem non est homo natus acquirere per suam operationem, sed Deo operante. Unde non est simile.

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