Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q1. Faith
Source context
- Theme
- the nature, structure, and epistemic status of faith as a theological act
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 130, 1911-12-02Steiner treats faith as a soul-force whose absence causes inner withering, distinguishing it from mere intellectual assent and grounding it in a living relation to spiritual reality.
- GA 131, 1911-10-07Steiner traces the historical evolution of the concept of faith, identifying a tension within the human soul between faith and knowledge and locating its modern crisis in thinkers such as Soloviev.
- GA 175, 1917-04-10Steiner contrasts the ordinary antithesis of faith and knowledge with the conception of faith proclaimed by Christ, arguing that the latter is a dynamic, transformative inner power rather than acceptance of unproven propositions.
- GA 211, 1922-03-26Steiner identifies pistis — faith — as a whole-bodily power of the divine working in the human being, contrasting it with wisdom as a head-bound faculty of ideas.
- GA 212, 1922-05-27Steiner notes that in the modern period, faith and knowledge are sharply separated, with faith receiving the fruits of human striving that natural-scientific knowledge cannot reach.
- GA 41bSteiner distinguishes blind faith from reasoned faith, questioning whether theosophical conviction is categorically different in kind from the faith it is set against.
Cross-tradition
- Scholastic Christian — Aquinas, Summa Theologiae IIa-IIae Q1Aquinas defines faith as an act of the intellect assenting to divine truth under command of the will moved by grace; this structural definition — faith as infused theological virtue requiring both intellect and will — is the precise doctrinal content Q1 elaborates.
- Scholastic distinction: sacra doctrina / philosophyAquinas's Q1 situates faith within sacra doctrina, which presupposes revealed articles, structurally distinguishing the act of faith from natural rational demonstration — a boundary Steiner's own faith-knowledge distinction recapitulates from a post-Kantian standpoint.
- Greek patristic — pistisThe Greek term pistis, carrying connotations of trust, fidelity, and inward persuasion, underlies both Aquinas's Latin fides and Steiner's identification of pistis as a whole-bodily divine power, marking a cross-tradition congruence across scholastic and anthroposophical registers.
Q1. Faith
Article 1
[II-II.q.1.a.1.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod objectum fidei non sit veritas prima. 1 Al.: « ad. » 2 Corderius apud Migne: « Ratio hæc simplex est ac vere existens veritas, circa quam, ut puram et infallibilem universorum notionem, fides divina versatur. » Hæc quæstio tractatur in dist. xiv, partis III, lib. I Speculi moralis Vincentii Bellovacensis, et ibi in sexdecim articulos absolvitur. Sextum est: « utrum objectum fidei possit esse aliquid opina-tum; » decimum: « de comparatione symboli apostolorum ad alia duo symbola; » duodecimum: « utrum ante Christi adventum fuerit ad salutem necessarium credere mediatorem; » tertium decimum: « utrum omnibus qui secuti sunt adventum Christi fuerit ad salutem necessarium explicite credere omnes articulos fidei; » quartum decimum: « utrum eadem fides sit eorum qui fuerunt ante adventum Christi et eorum qui secuti sunt; » sex-tum decimum: « utrum certius credatur per fidem modernorum quam per fidem eorum qui adventum Illud enim videtur esse objectum fidei quod nobis proponitur ut credendum. Sed non solum proponuntur nobis ad credendum ea quæ pertinent ad divinitatem, quæ est veritas prima, sed etiam ea quæ pertinent ad humanitatem Christi, et Ecclesiæ sacramenta, et creaturarum conditionem. Ergo non solum veritas prima est fidei objectum.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fides et infidelitas sunt circa idem, cum sint opposita. Sed circa omnia quæ in sacra Scriptura continentur, potest esse infidelitas; quidquid enim horum homo negaverit, infidelis reputatur. Ergo etiam fides est circa omnia quæ in sacra Scriptura continentur. Sed ibi multa continentur de hominibus, et de aliis rebus creatis. Ergo objectum fidei non solum est veritas prima, sed etiam veritas creata.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above (I-II, 62, 3). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the First Truth.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fides charitati condividitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed charitate non solum diligimus Deum, qui est summa bonitas, sed etiam diligimus proximum. Ergo fidei objectum non est solum veritas prima.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.sc] On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, vii cap. De div. nom., § 4, col. 871, t. 4, quod « fides est circa simplicem et semper existentem veritatem. » Hæc autem est veritas prima. Ergo objectum fidei est veritas prima.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.co] I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.
Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cujuslibet cognoscitivi habitus objectum duo habet, scilicet id quod materialiter cognoscitur, quod est sicut materiale objectum; et id per quod cognoscitur, quod est formalis ratio objecti, sicut in scientia geometriæ materialiter scita sunt conclusiones; formalis vero ratio sciendi sunt media demonstra- Christi præcesserunt. » Sed, ut videre est, nonnulli ex his Speculi moralis articulis in quæstione sequenti de actu fidei rectius collocarentur. Revelatio est mera objecti credibilis applicatio, nec ingreditur objectum formale fidei. Et hic loquor de revelatione sive publica, sive privata, sive immediata, sive mediata, sive activa quatenus se tenet ex parte Dei loquentis, sive passiva quatenus se tenet ex parte recipientis. Fateor equidem necessariam esse revelationem ad actum fidei, sed dico assensum esse præbendum non propter revelationem immediate sed propter veracitatem revelantis. Et hoc assero quam vis quidam Catholici contendant propositionem Ecclesiæ ingredi saltem partialiter motivum credendi revelatis, proindeque esse partiale quoddam objectum formale fidei. Ecclesia sola tamen regula est discernendi revelata, definiendique quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est. tionis, per quæ conclusiones cognoscuntur. Sic igitur in fide, si consideremus formalem rationem objecti, nihil est aliud quam veritas prima. Non enim fides de qua loquimur, assentit alicui, nisi quia est a Deo revelatum. Unde ipsi veritati divinæ innittur tanquam medio. Si vero consideremus materialiter ea quibus fides assentit, non solum est ipse Deus, sed etiam multa alia; quæ tamen sub assensu fidei non cadunt, nisi secundum quod habent aliquem ordinem ad Deum, prout scilicet per aliquos divinitatis effectus homo adjuvatur ad tendendum in divinam fruitionem. Et ideo etiam ex hac parte objectum fidei est quodammodo veritas prima, inquantum nihil cadit sub fide nisi in ordine ad Deum; sicut etiam objectum medicinæ est sanitas, quia nihil medicina considerat nisi in ordine ad sanitatem.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.
The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ea quæ pertinent ad humanitatem Christi, et ad sacramenta Ecclesiæ, vel ad quascumque creaturas, cadunt sub fide, inquantum per hæc ordinamur ad Deum, et eis etiam assentimus propter divinam veritatem. Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum de omnibus illis quæ in sacra Scriptura traduntur.
[II-II.q.1.a.1.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on (25, 1).
[II-II.q.1.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod etiam charritas diligit proximum propter Deum, et sic objectum ejus proprie est ipse Deus, ut infra dicetur.
Article 2
[II-II.q.1.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above (Article 1). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod objectum fidei non sit aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Objectum enim fidei est veritas prima, sicut dictum est. Sed prima veritas est aliquid incomplexum. Ergo objectum fidei non est aliquid complexum.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.arg.2] Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . . almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, expositio fidei in symbolo continetur. Sed in symbolo non ponuntur enuntiabilia, sed res: non enim dicitur ibi quod Deus sit omnipotens, sed: « Credo in Deum omnipotentem. » Ergo objectum fidei non est enuntiabile, sed res.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.arg.3] Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fidei succedit visio, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 42: Videmus nunc per speculum in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. Sed visio patriæ est de incomplexo, cum sit ipsius divinæ essentiæ. Ergo etiam fides viæ.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.sc] Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.sc] Sed contra, fides est media inter scientiam et opinionem. Medium autem et extrema sunt ejusdem generis. Cum ergo scientia et opinio sint circa enuntiabilia, videtur quod similiter fides sit circa enuntibilia; et ita objectum fidei, cum sit circa enuntiabilia, est aliquid complexum.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.co] The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in I, 85, 5. Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves.
Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.
Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of truth.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cognita sunt in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Est autem modus proprius humani intellectus ut in componendo et dividendo veritatem cognoscat, sicut in I dictum est. Et ideo ea quæ sunt secundum se simplicia, Dei esse fidei totale objectum formale, et revelationem nihil aliud esse quam conditionem sine qua non. Juenin et allii hanc revelationem pro fidei objecto formali quo habent. — Manichæus et Abælardus, fidem cum scientia confundentes, nil credendum volebant nisi quod ratio naturalis demonstrat. Hic agitur de objecto materiali. Porro, si consideretur objectum materiale fidei ex parte credentis, et complexum et incomplexum est. Complexum est integra una propositio cui credimus, v. g.: « Christus mortuus est pro omnibus; » et hoc est objectum immediatum fidei. Incomplexum est extremum propositionis creditæ: « Christus, mortuus; et hoc est objectum mediatum fidei, quia non sunt nec esse possunt objectum tale nisi reperiantur in aliqua propositione revelata. Intellectus etenim noster voci solitariæ non assentitur. Unde melius forsitan diceretur nullum incomplexum esse objectum fidei praecise loquendo. intellectus humanus cognoscit secundum quamdam complexionem; sicut e converso intellectus divinus incomplexe cognoscit ea quæ sunt secundum se complexa. Sic ergo objectum fidei dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo ex parte ipsius rei creditæ; et sic objectum fidei est aliquid incomplexum, scilicet res ipsa de qua fides habetur. Alio modo ex parte credentis; et secundum hoc objectum fidei est aliquid complexum per modum enuntiabilis. Et ideo utrumque vere opinatum fuit apud antiquos, et secundum aliquid utrumque est verum.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.ad.1] This argument considers the object of faith on the part of the thing believed.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de objecto fidei ex parte ipsius rei creditæ.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.ad.2] The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in symbolo tanguntur ea de quibus est fides, inquantum ad ea terminatur actus credentis, ut ex ipso modo loquendi apparet. Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad enuntiabile, sed ad rem. Non enim formamus enuntiabilia, nisi ut per ea de rebus cognitionem habeamus, sicut in scientia, ita et in fide.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.ad.3] The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 John 3:2: "We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is": hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.
[II-II.q.1.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod visio patriæ erit veritatis primæ, secundum quod in se est, secundum illud I Joan., Ⅲ: Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est; et ideo visio illa erit non per modum enuntiabilis, sed per modum simplicis intelligentiæ. Sed per fidem non apprehendimus veritatem primam sicut in se est; unde non est similis ratio.
Article 3
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that something false can come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object of faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fidei possit subesse falsum. Fides enim condividitur spei et charitati. Sed spei potest aliquid subesse falsum; multi enim sperant se habituros vitam æternam, quam non habebunt; similiter etiam et charitati; multi enim diliguntur tanquam boni, qui tamen In Parm. erronee: «complexum: » — In edit.: Scimus quoniam. — In edit.: Vidit, et gavisus est. — Al: « lucem, luciferum. » Hic, cum S. Thomas inquirit de objecto fidei boni non sunt. Ergo et fidei potest aliquid subesse falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.2] Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to John 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad." But after the time of Abraham, God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Abraham credidit Christum nasciturum, secundum illud Joan., Ⅷ, 56: Abraham, pater vester, exultavit ut videret diem meum. Sed post tempus Abraham Deus poterat non incarnari; sola enim sua voluntate carnem acceptit; et ita esset falsum quod Abraham de Christo credidit. Ergo fidei potest subesse falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.3] Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false can come under faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fides antiquorum fuit quod Christus esset nasciturus; et hæc fides duravit in multis usque ad prædicationem Evangelii. Sed Christo jam nato, antequam prædicare inciperet, falsum erat Christum nasciturum. Ergo fidei potest subesse falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.4] Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was not Christ's true Body there, but only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, unum de pertinentibus ad fidem est ut aliquis credat sub sacramento altaris verum corpus Christi contineri. Potest autem contingere, quando non recte consecratur, quod non est ibi verum corpus Christi, sed solum panis. Ergo fidei potest subesse falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.sc] No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on (4, 2,5). Therefore nothing false can come under it.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.sc] Sed contra, nulla virtus perficiens intellectum se habet ad falsum, secundum quod est malum intellectus, ut patet per Philosophum, in VI Ethic., cap. Ⅱ. Sed fides est quædam virtus perficiens intellectum, ut infra patebit. Ergo ei non potest subesse falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.co] Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated (1) that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come under faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nihil subest alicui potentiæ, vel habitui, aut etiam actui, nisi mediante ratione formali objecti; sicut color videri non potest nisi per lumen, et conclusio sciri non potest nisi per medium demonstrationis. Dictum est autem, quod ratio formalis objecti fidei est veritas prima, unde nihil potest cadere sub fide, nisi in quantum stat sub veritate prima, sub qua nullum falsum stare potest, sicut nec « non ens » sub ente, nec malum sub bonitate. Unde relinquitur quod fidei non potest subesse aliquod falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.1] Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.
Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.
In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom we love for God's sake.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia verum est bonum intellectus, non autem est bonum appetitivæ virtutis; ideo omnes virtutes quae perficiunt intellectum, excludunt totaliter falsum; quia de ratione virtutis est quod se habeat solum ad bonum. Virtutes autem perficientes partem appetitivam non excludunt totaliter falsum; potest an sit res, vel propositio, incomplexum vel complexum, de objecto materiali loquitur, siquidem Deus, qui certo est fidei objectum formale, est etiam certo quid incomplexum. enim aliquis secundum justitiam aut temperantiam agere, habens aliquam falsam opinionem de eo circa quod agit. Et ita, cum fides perficiat intellectum, spes autem et charitas appetitivam partem, non est similis ratio de eis. Et tamen neque etiam spei subest falsum: non enim aliquis sperat se habiturum vitam aternam secundum propriam potestatem, hoc enim esset præsumptionis, sed secundum auxilium gratiae; in qua si perseveravit omnino infallibiliter vitam aternam consequetur. Similiter etiam ad charitatem pertinet diligere Deum, in quocumque fuerit; unde non refert ad charitatem utrum in isto sit Deus, qui propter Deum diligitur.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.2] That "God would not take flesh," considered in itself was possible even after Abraham's time, but in so far as it stands in God's foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained in I, 14, 13 and 15: and it is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod « Deum non incarnari » secundum se consideratum fuit possibile etiam post tempus Abrahæ; sed secundum quod cadit sub præscientia divina, habet quamdam necessitatem infallibilitatis, ut in I dictum est, et hoc modo cadit sub fide. Unde prout cadit sub fide, non potest esse falsum.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.3] After Christ's birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in Christ's birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the outcome of faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc ad fidem credentis pertinebat post Christi nativitatem quod crederet eum quandoque nasci. Sed illa determinatio temporis, in qua decipiebatur, non erat ex fide, sed ex conjectura humana. Possibile est enim ex conjectura humana hominem fidelem falsum aliquid estimare; sed quod ex fide falsum aestimet, hoc est impossibile.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.4] The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false comes under faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod fides credentis non refertur ad has species panis, vel illas, sed ad hoc quod verum corpus Christi sit sub specibus panis sensibilis, quando recte fuerit consecratum. Unde si non sit recte consecratum, fidei non suberit propter hoc falsum.
Article 4
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (John 20:29): "Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed." Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod objectum fidei sit aliquid visum. Dicit enim Dominus Thomæ, Joan., xx, 29: Quia vidisti me, credidisti. Ergo et de eodem est visio et fides.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.2] Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith, says (1 Corinthians 13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore what is believed is seen.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Apostolus, I ad Cor., xiii, 12, dicit: Videmus nunc per speculum in xnigmate; et loquitur de cognitione fidei. Ergo id quod creditur, videtur.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.3] Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, fides est quoddam spirituale lumen. Sed quolibet lumine aliquid videtur. Ergo fides est de rebus visis.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.4] Further, "Every sense is a kind of sight," as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according to Romans 10:17: "Faith . . . cometh by hearing." Therefore faith is of things seen.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, « quilibet sensus visus nominatur, » ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De verbis Domini, serm. cxii, cap. vi, col. 646, In edit.: « et. » — In edit. omittitur: « et. » — In edit.: « sub. » Colligitur ex §7: « Cum proprie ad oculos pertineat visus, ipsum videre per omnes quinque sensus solemus appellare, etc. » Sensus propositionis hujus: « Utrum fidei possit subesse falsum, » duplex est; nam intelligi potest ex parte Dei revelantis, et ex parte credentis. Quod Priscillianistæ dixerint Deum posse mentiri et etiam de facto aliquando mentiri, non mirum, siquidem mendacium juxta Priscillianistas erat licitum. Sed omnino stupendum est quosdam ex Catholicis tenuisse Deum posse mentiri de potentia absoluta. Scimus potentiam absolutam Dei illam esse de qua nunquam usus est, nec utitur, nec utetur. Non intelligimus tamen quomodo etiam de illa potentia Deus veritas prima et essentialis mentiri posset; et ideo ex parte Dei revelantis fidei falsum nullo modo subesse potest. Nec ex parte credentis fidei veræ, sed fidei humanæ, vel opinioni, vel scientiæ, vel suspicioni falsum subest.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.sc] The Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1) that "faith is the evidence of things that appear not."
[II-II.q.1.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., xi, 4, quod fides est argumentum non apparentium.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.co] Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.
Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the intellect.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod fides importat assensum intellectus ad id quod creditur. Assentit autem intellectus alicui dupliciter: uno modo quia ad hoc movetur ab ipso objecto, quod est vel per seipsum cognitum, sicut patet in principiis primis, quorum est intellectus; vel est per aliud cognitum, sicut patet de conclusionibus, quarum est scientia. Alio modo intellectus assentit alicui, non quia sufficienter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per quamdam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam; et si quidem hoc sit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis, erit opinio; si autem sit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides. Illa autem videri dicuntur quae per seipsa movent intellectum nostrum vel sensum ad sui cognitionem. Unde manifestum est quod nec fides nec opinio potest esse de visis aut secundum sensum, aut secundum intellectum.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.1] Thomas "saw one thing, and believed another" [St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: "My Lord and my God."
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Thomas aliud vidit, et aliud credidit: hominem vidit, et Deum credens confessus est, cum dixit: Dominus meus et Deus meus.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.2] Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ea quae subsunt fidei, dupliciter considerari possunt: uno modo in speciali; et sic non possunt esse simul visa et credita, sicut dictum est; alio modo in generali, scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis; et sic sunt visa ab eo qui credit. Non enim crederet, nisi videret ea esse credenda vel propter eviden-tiam signorum, vel propter aliquid hujus-modi.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.3] The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and not to assent to others.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod lumen fidei facit videre esse quae creduntur. Sicut enim per alios habitus virtutum homo videt illud quod est sibi conveniens secundum habitum illum, ita etiam per habitum fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his quae conveniunt rectæ fidei, et non aliis.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.4] Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow that these things are seen.
[II-II.q.1.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod auditus est 1 «Est» in edit. deest. — 2 In Parm. : «ipsis.» — 3 Ita cod. et recte; nam fides est de obscuris, et facit videre ea obscura «esse,» quamvis remaneat obscuritas. In edit. : «videre ea quae.» — 4 Ita editi omnes. Cod. Alcan. et Camer. : «videre esse quae verborum significantium ea quæ sunt fidei, non autem est ipsarum rerum de quibus est fides; et sic non oportet ut hujusmodi res sint visæ.
Article 5
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Timothy 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod ea quæ sunt fidei possint esse scita. Ea enim quae non sciuntur videntur esse ignorata: quia ignorantia scientiæ opponitur. Sed quæ sunt fidei non sunt ignorata: horum enim ignorantia ad infidelitatem pertinet, secundum illud I ad Tim., 1, 13: Ignorans feci in incredulitate mea. Ergo ea quæ sunt fidei possunt esse scita.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.2] Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of science.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, scientia per rationes acquiritur. Sed ad ea quæ sunt fidei a sacris auctoribus rationes inducuntur. Ergo ea quæ sunt fidei possunt esse scita.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.3] Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ea quæ demonstrative probantur sunt scita, quia « demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire.» Sed quædam quae in fide continentur sunt demonstrative probata a philosophis, sicut Deum esse, et Deum esse unum, et alia hujusmodi. Ergo ea quæ sunt fidei possunt esse scita.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.4] Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, opinio plus distat a scientia quam fides; cum fides dicatur esse media inter opinionem et scientiam. Sed opinio et scientia possunt esse aliquo modo de eodem, ut dicitur in I Poster., text. ult. Ergo etiam fides et scientia.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.sc] Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, Hom. xxvi in Evangel., § 8, col. 1202, t. 2, quod « apparentia non habent fidem, » sed agnitionem. Ea ergo de quibus est fides agnitionem habent. Ergo de eis quæ sunt scita, non potest esse fides.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.co] All science is derived from self-evident and therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen.
Now as stated above (Article 4), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Corinthians 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. On like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis scientia habetur per aliqua principia per se nota, et per consequens visa; et ideo oportet quae-cumque sunt scita, aliquo modo esse visa. Non autem est possibile quod idem ab eo- dem sit visum et creditum, sicut supra dictum est. Unde etiam impossibile est quod ab eodem idem scit scitum et creditum. Potest tamen contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno, sit creditum ab alio. Etenim quae de Trinitate credimus, nos visuros speramus, secundum illud I ad Corinth., xiii, 12: Videmus nunc per speculum in anig-mate, tunc autem facie ad faciem; quam quidem visionem jam angeli habent; unde quod nos credimus, illi vident. Et sic similiiter potest contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno homine, etiam in statu viæ, sit ab alio creditum, qui hoc demonstrative non novit. Id tamen quod communiter omnibus proponitur hominibus ut credendum, est communiter non scitum; et ista sunt quae simpliciter fidei subsunt. Et ideo fides et scientia non sunt de eodem.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.1] Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (4, ad 2,3).
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod infideles eorum quae sunt fidei ignorantiam habent, quia nec vident aut sciunt ea in seipsis, nec cognoscunt ea esse credibilia. Sed per hunc modum fideles habent eorum notitiam, non quasi demonstrative, sed inquantum per lumen fidei videntur esse credenda, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.2] The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (I, 1, 2).
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod rationes quae inducuntur a sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt demonstrative, sed persuasiones quædam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur; vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, scilicet ex auctoritatibus sacræ Scripturæ, sicut dicit Dionysius, De div. nom., cap. ii, § 2, col. 639, t. 4. Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles, sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes. Unde etiam theologia scientia est, ut in principio operis dictum est.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.3] Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ea quae demonstrative probari possunt, inter credenda numerantur, non quia de ipsis simpliciter sit fides apud omnes, sed quia præexiguntur ad ea quae sunt fidei, et oportet ea saltem per fidem præsupponi ab his qui eorum demonstrationem non habent.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.4] As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
[II-II.q.1.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus ibidem dicit, « a diversis hominibus de eodem omnino potest haberi scientia et opinio, » sicut et nunc dictum est, de scientia et fide; sed ab uno et eodem potest quidem haberi fides et scientia de eodem secundum quid, scilicet subjecto, sed non secundum idem; potest enim esse quod de una et eadem re aliquis aliquid sciat, et aliquid aliud opinetur; et similiter de Deo potest aliquis demonstrative scire quod sit unus, et credere quod sit trinus. Sed de eodem secundum idem non potest esse simul in uno homine scientia nec cum opinione, nec cum fide; alia tamen et alia ratione. Scientia enim cum opinione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eodem, quia de ratione scientia est quod id quod scitur existimetur esse impossibile aliter se habere, de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod est opinatum, existimetur possibile aliter se habere. Sed id quod fide tenetur, propter fidei certitudinem existimatur etiam impossibile aliter se habere. Sed ea ratione non potest simul idem et secundum idem esse scitum et creditum, quia « scitum » est visum, et « creditum » est non visum, ut dictum est.
Article 6
[II-II.q.1.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod credibilia non sint per certos articulos distinguenda. Eorum enim omnium quae in sacra Scriptura continentur, est fides habenda. Sed illa non possunt reduci ad aliquem certum numerum propter sui multitudinem. Ergo superfluum videtur articulos fidei distinguere.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.arg.2] Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above (Article 1), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into articles.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, materialis distinctio, cum in infinitum fieri possit, est ab arte prætermittenda. Sed formalis ratio objecti credibilis est una et indivisibilis, ut supra dictum est, scilicet veritas prima; et sic secundum rationem formalem credibilia distinguui non possunt. Ergo prætermittenda est credibilium materialis distinctio per articulos.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.arg.3] Further, it has been said by some [Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that "an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief." Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), "no man believes against his will." Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into articles.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut a quibusdam dicitur, « articulus est indivisibilis veritas de Deo, arctans nos ad credendum. » Sed credere est voluntarium; quia, sicut Augustinus dicit Tract. xxvi in Joan., § 2, col. 1607, t. 3, « nullus credit nisi volens. » Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur credibilia per articulos.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.sc] Isidore says: "An article is a glimpse of Divine truth, tending thereto." Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit : « Articulus est perceptio divinæ veritatis tendens in ipsam. » Sed perceptio divinæ veritatis competit nobis secundum distinctionem quamdam; quae enim in Deo unum sunt, in nostro intellectu multiplicantur. Ergo credibilia debent per articulos distinguui.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.co] the word "article" is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek arthron [Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the Latin renders "articulus," signifies a fitting together of distinct parts: wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: "Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes."
Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated above (Article 4). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nomem articuli ex græco videtur esse derivatum. Arthron enim in græco, quod in latino « articulus » dicitur, significat quamdam coaptationem aliquarum partium distinctarum; et ideo particulæ corporis sibi invicem coaptatæ opinio, et in diversis intellectibus respectu ejusdem objecti, et in eodem intellectu temporibus diversis, tamen in eodem intellectu respectu ejusdem objecti, et secundum idem non possunt esse simul actus opinandi et actus credendi, quia de ratione actus credendi est assentire veritati creditæ sine alterius partis formidine. Quia, sicut dicit Bern., V De consid., cap. vi : « Fides ambiguum non habet, aut si habet, fides non est. » Unde credens ita determinate assentit veritati creditæ quod tenet hoc impossibile aliter se habere per primam comparisonem ad primam veritatem cui innititur. De dicuntur membrorum articuli, et similiter in grammatica apud Græcos dicuntur « articuli » quædam partes orationis coaptatæ aliis dictionibus ad exprimendum earum genus, numerum vel casum; et similiter in rhetorica « articuli » dicuntur quædam partium coaptationes. Dicit enim Tullius in IV Rhetoricæ, ad Heren., aliquant. ante med., quod « articulus dicitur, cum singula verba intervallis distinguuntur cæsa oratione, hoc modo : acrimonia, voce, vultu adversarios perterruisti. » Unde et credibilia fidei christianæ dicuntur per articulos distinguui, inquantum in quasdam partes dividuntur, habentés aliquam coaptationem ad invicem. Est autem objectum fidei aliquid non visum circa divina, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ubi occurrit aliquid speciali ratione non visum, ibi est specialis articulus; ubi autem multa secundum eamdem rationem sunt cognita vel incognita, ibi non sunt articuli distinguendi; sicut aliam difficultatem habet ad videndum quod Deus sit passus, et aliam, quod mortuus resurrexerit; et ideo distinguitur articulus resurrectionis ab articulo passionis. Sed quod sit passus, mortuus et sepultus, unam et eamdem difficultatem habent, ita quod, uno suscepto, non est difficile alia suscipere; et propter hoc omnia hæc pertinent ad unum articulum.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.ad.1] Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Hebrews 11:2: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for," it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus' bones, and the like, which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct articles.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliqua sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides secundum se; aliqua vero sunt credibilia, de quibus non est fides secundum se, sed solum in ordine ad alia; sicut etiam in scientiis quædam proponuntur ut per se intenta, et quædam ad manifestationem aliorum. Quia vero fides principaliter est de his quæ videnda speramus in patria, secundum illud Hebr., xi, 4 : Fides est substantia sperandarum rerum, ideo per se ad fidem pertinent illa quæ directe nos ordinant ad vitam aternam; sicut sunt tres personæ omnipo-ratione autem opinionis est quod ille qui opinatur rei opinatæ assentiat cum alterius partis formidine, ut superius ostensum est; non est autem possibile quod idem intellectus eidem veritati assentiat cum formidine et sine formidine simul. « Credere non potest nisi volens. » — Non occurrit in Operibus Isidori. — « Nicolaï : « græce. » Ita codices, et editi omnes. An « ad credendum? » conjectura est Nicolaï Ita Nicolaï et edit. Patav. 1712; al. « in aliis scientiis. » tentis Dei, mysterium incarnationis Christi, et alia hujusmodi; et secundum ista distinguuntur articuli fidei. Quædam vero proponuntur in sacra Scriptura ut credenda, non quasi principaliter intenta, sed ad prædictorum manifestationem; sicut quod Abraham habuit duos filios, quod ad tactum ossium Elisæi suscitatus est mortuus, et alia hujusmodi, quæ narrantur in sacra Scriptura in ordine ad manifestationem divinæ majestatis vel incarnationis Christi; et secundum talia non oportet articulos distinguere.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.ad.2] The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio formalis objecti fidei potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ipsius rei creditae; et sic ratio formalis omnium credibilium est una, scilicet veritas prima; et ex hac parte articuli non distinguuntur. Alio modo potest accipi ratio formalis credibilium ex parte nostra; et sic ratio formalis credibilis est ut sit non visum; et ex hac parte articuli fidei distinguuntur, ut visum est.
[II-II.q.1.a.6.ad.3] This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of end, since "he that cometh to God must believe that He is," and "without faith it is impossible to please God," as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 11:6).
[II-II.q.1.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa definitio datur de articulo magis secundum quam-dam etymologiam nominis, prout habet derivationem latinam, quam secundum ejus veram significationem, prout a græco derivatur; unde non est magni ponderis. Potest tamen et sic dici, quod licet ad credendum necessitate coactionis nullus arctetur, cum credere sit voluntarium, arctatur tamen necessitate finis, quia credere oportet accedentem ad Deum; et sine fide impossibile est placere Deo, ut Apostolus dicit, Hebr., xi, 6.
Article 7
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1), "faith is the substance of things to be hoped for." Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to be believed.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod articuli fidei non creverint secundum temporum successionem. Quia, ut Apostolus Edit. : « nostri » Desumptum est autem ex Origenis Comm. in VIII Roman., v. 23, lib. VII, col. 4145, t. 4. Expresse legitur in D. Gregorio : « Per incrementa temporum crevit scientia spiritualium Patrum. » Cætera quidem, etsi colligantur ex eadem homilia, non autem iisdem verbis. Sed dicit ad Hebr., xi, 4, fides est substantia sperandarum rerum*. Sed omni tempore sunt eadem speranda. Ergo omni tempore sunt eadem credenda.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.2] Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Ephesians 2:8: "It is the gift of God." Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in scientiis humanitus ordinatis per successionem temporum augmentum factum est propter defectum cognitionis in primis qui scientias invenerunt, ut patet per Philosophum in II Metaph., text. 1 et 2. Sed doctrina fidei non est inventa humanitus, sed tradita a Deo : Dei enim donum est, ut dicitur Ephes., ii, 8. Cum ergo in Deum nullus defectus scientiae cadat, videtur quod a principio cognitio credibilium fuerit perfecta, et quod non creverit secundum successionem temporum.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.3] Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, operatio gratiae non minus ordinate procedit quam operatio naturæ. Sed natura semper initium sumit a perfectis, ut Boetius dicit in lib. III De consolatione, prosa x, t. 4. Ergo etiam videtur quod operatio gratiae a perfectis initium sumpserit; ita quod illi qui primo tradiderunt fidem, perfectissime eam cognoverint.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.4] Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to Deuteronomy 32:7: "Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee." Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for "they received them more fully than others, even as they received them earlier," as a gloss says on Romans 8:23: "Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit." Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.arg.4] 4. Præterea, sicut per Apostolos ad nos fides Christi pervenit, ita etiam in Veteri Testamento per priores patres ad posteriores devenit cognitio fidei, secundum illud Deut., xxxii, 7 : Interroga patrem tuum, et annuntiabit tibi. Sed apostoli plenissime fuerunt instructi de mysteriis; acceperunt enim « sicut tempore prius, ita et cæteris abundantius, » ut dicit Glossa, super illud Rom., viii, 23, Nos ipsi primitias spiritus habentes. Ergo videtur quod cognitio credibilium non creverit per temporum successionem.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.sc] Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that "the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior's coming, the more fully did they received the mysteries of salvation."
[II-II.q.1.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, Hom. xvi in Ezech., § 12, col. 980, t. 2 : « Per incrementa temporum crevit scientia spiritualium patrum; et quanto viciniores adventui Salvatoris fuerunt, tanto sacramenta salutis plenius perceperunt. »
[II-II.q.1.a.7.co] The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: "The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). On like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to Hebrews 11: "He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him." For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for man's salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.
Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Exodus 6:2-3): "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [Vulgate: 'I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob'] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them": David also said (Psalm 118:100): "I have had understanding above ancients": and the Apostle says (Ephesians 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, "in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets."
[II-II.q.1.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ita se habent in doctrina fidei articuli fidei, sicut principia per se nota in doctrina quæ per rationem naturalem haberetur; in quibus principiiis ordo quidam invenitur, ut quædam in aliis implicite contineantur; sicut omnia prin- Hugo de S. Victore : « Ut ait etiam sanctus Gregorius, secundum incrementa temporum, crevit et scientia spiritualium Patrum; et quanto viciniores adventui Salvatoris exstiterunt, tanto mysterium salutis plenius perceperunt. » De sacrament., lib. I, part. x, c. vi, col. 337, t. 2. Al. : « habetur. » cipia reducuntur ad hoc sicut ad primum : « Impossibile est simul affirmare et negare, » ut patet per Philosophum in IV Metaph., text. 9 et seq. Et similiter omnes articuli implicite continentur in aliquibus primis credibilibus, scilicet ut credatur Deus esse, et providentiam habere circa hominum salutem, secundum illud ad Hebr., xi, 6 : Credere oportet accedentem ad Deum quia est, et quod * inquirentibus se remunerator sit. In esse enim divino includuntur omnia quæ credimus in Deo æternaliter existere, in quibus nostra beatitudo consistit; in fide autem providentiæ includuntur omnia quæ temporaliter a Deo dispensantur ad hominum salutem, quæ sunt via in beatitudinem; et per hunc etiam modum aliorum subsistentium articulorum quidam in aliis continentur; sicut in fide redemptionis humanæ implicite continentur et incarnatio Christi, et ejus passio, et omnia hujusmodi. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod quantum ad substantiam articulorum fidei, non est factum eorum augmentum per temporum successionem : quia quæcumque posteriores crediderunt, continebantur in fide præcedentium patrum, licet implicite. Sed quantum ad explicationem crevit numerus articulorum : quia quædam explicitite cognita sunt a posterioribus, quæ a prioribus non cognoscebantur explicite. Unde Dominus Moysi dicit, Exod., vi, 2 et 3 : Ego sum Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac, Deus Jacob et nomen meum Adonai non indicavi eis; et David dicit, psal. cxviii, 100 : Super senes intellexi; et Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., Ⅲ, 5 : Aliis generationibus non est agnitum, mysterium Christi, sicut nunc revelatum est sanctis apostolis ejus et prophetis.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.1] Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:13): "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off." Now the further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to Christ's advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod semper fuerunt eadem speranda apud omnes; quia tamen ad hæc speranda homines non pervenerunt nisi per Christum, quanto a Christo fuerunt remotiores secundum tempus, tanto a consecutione sperandorum longinquiores. Unde Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., xi, 43 : Juxta fidem defuncti sunt omnes isti, non acceptis repromissionibus, sed a longe eas aspicientes. Quanto autem aliquid a longinquioribus videtur, tanto minus distincte videtur; et ideo bona speranda distinctius cognoverunt qui fuerunt adventui Christi vicini.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.2] Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple's capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Galatians 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod profectus cognitionis dupliciter contingit : uno modo ex parte docentis, qui in cognitione proficit, sive unus, sive plures, per temporum successionem, et ista est ratio augmenti in scientiis per rationem humanitus inventis; alio modo ex parte addiscentis, sicut magister, qui novit totam artem, non statim a principio tradit eam discipulo, quia capere non posset, sed paulatim, condescendens ejus capacitati; et hac ratione profecerunt homines in cognitione fidei per temporum successionem. Unde Apostolus ad Galat., Ⅲ, comparat statum Veteris Testamenti pueritiæ.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.3] Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. On the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God's action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1 Corinthians 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ad generationem naturalem duæ causæ præexiguntur, scilicet agens et materia. Secundum ergo ordinem causæ agentis naturaliter prius est quod est perfectius; et sic natura a perfectis sumit exordium, quia imperfecta non ducuntur ad perfectionem, nisi per aliqua perfecta præexistentia. Secundum vero ordinem causæ materialis prius est quod est imperfectius; et secundum hoc natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum. In manifestatione autem fidei Deus est sicut agens, qui habet perfectam scientiam ab æterno; homo autem est sicut materia recipiens influxum Dei agentis; et ideo oportuit quod ab imperfectis ad perfectum procedet cognitio fidei in hominibus; et licet in hominibus quidam se habuerint per modum causæ agentis, quia fuerunt fidei doctores; tamen manifestatio spiritus datur talibus ad utilitatem communem, ut dicitur I ad Cor., xii; et ideo tantum dabatur patribus, qui erant institutores fidei, de cognitione fidei, quantum oportebat pro tempore illo populo tradi, vel nude, vel in figura.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.4] The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the "time of fulness [Vulgate: 'fulness of time']" (Galatians 4:4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to man's state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man's state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.
[II-II.q.1.a.7.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ultima consummatio gratiae facta est per Christum; unde et tempus ejus dicitur tempus plenitudinis, ad Galat., Ⅳ. Et ideo illi qui fuerunt propinquiores Christo, vel ante, sicut Joannes Baptista, vel post, sicut apostoli, plenius mysteria fidei cognoverunt. Quia et circa statum hominis hoc videmus, quod perfectio est in juventute, et tanto Sic omnes cod.; in edit. : « subsequentium. » — Sic. cod.; in edit. : « homines a Christo. » — In Parm. : « erant. » ´ Non de verbo ad verbum : tempus plenitudinis; sed bene : « plenitudo temporis. » habet homo perfectiorem statum vel ante, vel post, quanto est juventuti propinquior.
Article 8
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above (Article 5). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that "there is one God" should not be set down as an article of faith.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter articuli fidei enumerentur. Ea enim quæ possunt ratione demonstrativa sciri, non pertinent ad fidem, ut apud omnes sint credibilia, sicut supra dictum est. Sed Deum esse unum potest esse scitum per demonstrationem; unde et Philosophus hoc, in XII Metaph., text. 52 et seq., probat, et multi alii philosophi ad hoc demonstrationes induxerunt. Ergo « Deum esse unum » non debet poni unus articulus fidei.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.2] Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to be "all-knowing" and "provident for all," about both of which points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should have been made of God's wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut de necessitate fidei est quod credamus Deum « omnipotentem, » ita etiam quod credamus eum « omnia scientem » et « omnibus providentem; » et circa utrumque horum aliqui erraverunt. Debuit ergo inter articulos fidei fieri mentio de sapientia et providentia divina, sicut et de omnipotentia.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.3] Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the Son, according to John 14:9: "He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also." Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, eadem est notitia Patris et Filii, secundum illud Joan., xiv, 9 : Qui videt me, videt et Patrem. Ergo unus tantum articulus debet esse de Patre et Filio, et eadem ratione de Spiritu sancto.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.4] Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.4] 4. Præterea, persona Patris non est minor quam Filii et Spiritus sancti. Sed plures articuli ponuntur circa personam Spiritus sancti, et similiter circa personam Filii. Ergo plures articuli debent poni circa personam Patris.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.5] Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets." Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.5] 5. Præterea, sicuti personæ Patris et per- sonæ Spiritus sancti aliquid appropriatur, ita et personæ Filii secundum divinitatem. Sed in articulis fidei ponitur aliquod opus appropriatum Patri, scilicet opus creationis; et similiter aliquod opus appropriatum Spiritui sancto, scilicet quod « locutus est per prophetas. » Ergo etiam inter articulos fidei debet aliquod opus appropriarii Filio secundum divinitatem.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.6] Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there is not a sufficient number of articles.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.arg.6] 6. Præterea, sacramentum Eucharistiæ habet specialem difficultatem præ multis articulis. Ergo de ea debuit poni specialis articulus. Non videtur ergo quod articulus sufficienter enumerentur. Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Ecclesiæ sic enumerantis.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.sc] stands the authority of the Church who formulates the articles thus.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.co] As stated above (4,6), to faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons of God, according to Romans 5:2. Hence it is written (John 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Timothy 3:16).
Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.
In like manner, with regard to Christ's human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christ's incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles.
Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, illa per se pertinent ad fidem quorum visione in vita æterna perfruemur, et per quæ ducemur in vitam æternam. Duo autem nobis videnda proponentur : scilicet occultum divinitatis, cujus visio nos beatos facit; et mysterium humanitatis Christi, per quem in gloriam filiorum Dei accessum habemus, ut dicitur ad Rom., v, 2. Unde dicitur Joan., xvii, 3 : Hæc est vita æterna ut cognoscant te Deum verum, et quem misisti Jesum Christum. Et ideo prima distinctio credibilium est quod quædam pertinent ad majestatem divinitatis, quædam vero pertinent ad mysterium humanitatis Christi, quod est pietatis sacramentum, ut dicitur I ad Tim., Ⅲ, 46. Circa majestatem autem divinitatis tria nobis credenda proponuntur : primo qui dem unitas divinitatis, et ad hoc pertinet primus articulus; secundo trinitas personarum, et de hoc sunt tres articulus secundum tres personas; tertio vero proponuntur nobis opera divinitatis propria, quorum primum pertinet ad esse naturæ, et sic proponitur nobis articulus creationis; secundum vero pertinet ad esse gratiae, et sic proponuntur nobis sub uno articulo omnia pertinentia ad sanctificationem humanam; tertium vero pertinet ad esse gloriæ, et sic proponitur nobis alius articulus de resurrec- Sic. cod.; in Parm. satis inepte : « homines; » non enim supra dixit ratione demonstrative scibilia non pertinere ad fidem apud « homines, » sed bene dixit ea non pertinere ad fidem apud « omnes. » Sic cod.; in edit. : « de eo. » Sic cod.; in edit. : « ducimur ad. » Sic cod. et melius; in edit. : « proponuntur. » Aliquo sensu sustineri potest quoad certos articulos, doctrinæ apostolicæ accidentales, fidem esse auctam. Nam hodie sunt aliqua tanquam de fide credenda, quæ non fuerunt credita semper; v. g. : S. Dominicum, S. Franciscum, et alias sanctorum catalogo adscriptos mortuos esse in gratia. Hoc tamen implicite continetur in potestate Ecclesiæ pro canonisatione sanctorum. tione carnis et de vita æterna. Et ita sunt septem articuli ad divinitatem pertinentes. Similiter etiam circa humanitatem Christi ponuntur septem articuli, quorum primus est de incarnatione, sive de conceptione Christi; secundus de nativitate ejus ex Virgine; tertius de passione ejus, et morte, et sepultura; quartus est de descensu ad inferos; quintus est de resurrectione; sextus de ascensione; septimus de adventu ad judicium; et sic in universum sunt quatuordecim. Quidam tamen distinguunt duodecim articulos fidei: sex pertinentes ad divinitatem, et sex pertinentes ad humanitatem; tres enim articulos trium personarum comprehendunt sub uno; quia eadem est cognitio trium personarum. Articulum vero de opere glorificationis distinguunt in duos, scilicet resurrectionem carnis et gloriam animæ. Similiter articulum conceptionis et nativita-tis conjungunt in unum.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.1] By faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod multa per fidem tenemus de Deo, quæ naturali ratione investigare philosophi non potuerunt; puta circa providentiam ejus et omnipotentiam, et quod ipse solus sit colendus; quæ omnia continentur sub articulo unitatis Dei.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.2] The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in I, 13, 8. Now in beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence God's omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence over them.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ipsum no-men divinitatis importat provisionem quam-dam, ut in I dictum est. Potentia autem in habentibus intellectum non operatur nisi secundum voluntatem et cognitionem. Et ideo omnipotentia Dei includit quodammodo omnium scientiam et providentiam. Non enim posset omnia quæ vellet in istis inferioribus agere, nisi ea cognosceret, et eorum providentiam haberet.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.3] We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. On like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. On the same way Christ's conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special difficulty.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus sancti est una cognitio quantum ad unitatem essentia, quæ pertinet ad primum articulum; quantum vero ad distinctionem personarum, quæ est per relationes originis, quodammodo in cognitione Patris includitur cognitio Filii; non enim esset Pater, si Filium non haberet, quorum nexus est Spiritus sanctus. Et quan- Hujus vocis « symbolum » etymologia non una. — Collationem significat ad pastum animarum, ad instar collationum pecuniæ vel cibi, vel potus ad convivium apud veteres: sic Rufinus, S. Isidorus, Rabanus Maurus, S. Eucherius Lugdunensis, Innocentius III et alii. Sed, ut probat Gerardus Vossius, veteres collationem vocabant symbolam, non symbolum. — Proprie symbolum tum ad hoc bene moti sunt qui posuerunt unum articulum trium personarum. Sed quia circa singulas personas sunt aliqua attendenda, circa quæ contingit esse errorem; quantum ad hoc de tribus personis possunt poni tres articuli. Arius enim credidit Patrem « omnipotentem » et « æternum; » sed non credidit Filium « coæqualem et consubstantialem Patri; » et ideo necessarium fuit apponere articulum de persona Filii, ad hoc determinandum. Et eadem ratione contra Macedonium necesse fuit ponere articulum tertium de persona Spiritus sancti. Et similiter etiam conceptio Christi, et nativitas, et etiam resurrection, et vita æterna, secundum unam rationem possunt comprehendi sub uno articulo, inquantum ad unum ordinantur; et secundum aliam rationem possunt distingui, inquantum seorsum habent speciales difficultates.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.4] It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we stated in I, 43, 4.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod Filio et Spiritui sancto convenit mitti ad sanctificandum creaturam; circa quod plurima credenda occurrunt; et ideo circa personam Filii et Spiritus sancti plures articuli multiplicantur, quam circa personam Patris, quæ nunquam mittitur, ut in I dictum est.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.5] The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod sanctificatio creaturæ per gratiam, et consummatio per gloriam fit etiam per donum charitatis, quod appropriatur Spiritui sancto, et per donum sapientiae, quod appropriatur Filio; et ideo utrumque opus pertinet ad Filium et ad Spiritum sanctum per appropriationem secundum rationes diversas.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.6] Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ's body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included under God's omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to God's almighty power.
[II-II.q.1.a.8.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod in sacramento Eucharistiae duo possunt considerari: unum scilicet quod sacramentum est; et hoc habet eamdem rationem cum aliis effectibus gratiae sanctificantis; aliud est quod miraculose ibi corpus Christi continetur; et sic concluditur sub omnipotentia, sicut et omnia alia miracula, quæ omnipotentiæ attribuuntur.
Article 9
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.1] It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Deuteronomy 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod inconvenienter articuli fidei in symbolo ponantur. Sacra enim Scriptura est regula fidei, cui nec addere, nec subtrahere licet; dicitur enim Deut., iv, 2: Non addetis ad verbum quod vobis loquor, nec auferetis ex eo. Ergo illicitum fuit aliquod symbolum constituere, quasi regulam fidei, post sacram Scripturam editam.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.2] Further, according to the Apostle (Ephesians 4:5) there is but "one faith." Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Apostolus dicit ad Ephes., iv, 5, una est fides. Sed symbolum apostolorum? Dubitant Calvinus, Chamierus, Erasmus; Gerardus Vossius et Basnagius negant; theologi pro certo habent illud ab apostolis non scripto, sed ore, fidelium memoriae fuisse traditum, ut Rufinus, S. Hieronymus, et S. Petrus Chrysologus testantur. De tempore vero prolationis non satis concordant auctores: Baronius annum post passionem decimum; sed Rufinus, cui doctiores adhærent, ipsum passionis annum assignat. Nil dico de figmentis hæreticorum asserentium symbolum apostolorum editum fuisse sive ab Ecclesia romana, quarto vel quinto sæculo, sive ab iis ipsis qui Canones apostolorum conscripserunt. Plurimæ sunt et variæ symboli apostolorum editiones, vulgaris scilicet, romana, orientalis et aquileiensis. — Dividitur symbolum vel in duodecim, vel in quatuordecim articulos. An singuli apostoli singulas sententias ediderint? incertum. Hanc nihilominus sententiam, quam S. Bonaventura et alii amplexi sunt, S. Leo insinuare videtur. 1 Ita codd.; edit. quidam, « antiquorum Patrum. » Symbolum nicænum his verbis exprimitur in Actis ipsius concilii a Binio collectis, lib. II, in fin. : « Credimus in unum Deum, Patrem omnipotentem, omnium visibilium et invisibilium factorem. Et in unum Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, Filium Dei, de Patre natum, unigenitum, id est de substantia Patris; Deum de Deo, lumen ex lumine, Deum verum ex Deo vero, natum, non factum, Omoussion Patri, hoc est ejusdem cum Patre substantiæ, per quem omnia facta sunt, quæ in cælis et quæ in terra. » Qui propter nos, et propter nostram salutem descendit, et incarnatus est, homo factus, passus est, et resurrexit tertia die. Et ascendit in cælos, inde venturus judicare vivos et mortuos. Et in Spiritum sanctum. » Eos autem qui dicunt: erat aliquando quando non erat, et antequam nasceretur non erat, et quia ex eis quæ non sunt factus est, aut ex alia substantia vel essentia dicunt vel creatum, vel convertibilem, vel mutabilem Filium Dei, anathematizat catholica et apostolica Ecclesia. » Symbolum constantinopolitanum est ipsummet quod legimus in missa, paucis mutatis quæ rei est professio fidei. Ergo inconvenienter traditur multiplex symbolum.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.3] Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: "I believe in one God."
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, confessio fidei, quæ in symbolo continetur, pertinet ad omnes fideles. Sed non omnibus fidelibus convenit credere in Deum, sed solum illis qui habent fidem formatam. Ergo inconvenienter symbolum fidei traditur sub hac forma verborum : « Credo in unum Deum ».
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.4] Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith, as stated above (Article 8). But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.4] 4. Præterea, descensus ad inferos est unus de articulis fidei, sicut supra dictum est. Sed in symbolo Patrum non fit mentio de descensu ad inferos. Ergo videtur insufficienter collectum.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.5] Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage, "You believe in God, believe also in Me" (John 14:1) says: "We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing 'in' God." Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: "In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church."
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.5] 5. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit exponens illud Joan., xiv, 4, Creditis in Deum, et in me credite: Petro aut Paulo credimus; substantiam non tangunt. Addidit symbolo apostolico « in unum, » contra Manichæos et alios binos deos fingentes; « omnipotentem, » contra Origenem, qui docuit Deum ita suam exhausisse potentiam, quod nihil de novo possit facere; « factorem cæli et terræ, » contra Gnosticos volentes cælum et terram non esse a Deo vero; « et invisibilium, » contra duorum deorum fabulatores qui animas nostras, sicut et angelos, fingebant esse increatas et praecisiones divinitatis; « et in unum Dominum, » contra Apollinaristas imponentes catholicis quod admitterent duos Filios in Christo, unum ex Patre, alterum ex matre; « ex Patre natum ante omnia sæcula, » contra Photinum non aliam tribuentem Christo nativitatem, nisi temporalem ex matre; « natum, non factum, » contra Arium et Arianos; « et homo factus est, » contra Apollinaristas, quorum aliqui Christo negabant carnem ex fœmina assumptam, alii animam, alii mentem. Addidit symbolo nicæno : « de Spiritu sancto, » contra Apollinarem, si verum sit quod volebat iste hæreticus carnem humanam non posse nasci nisi ex semine virili; « ex Maria Virgine, » contra Apollinaristas, qui negabant Christi carnalem ex virgine nativitatem. Addidit et apostolico et nicæno : « cujus regni non erit finis, » contra Marcellum Ancyranum somniantem Christum, finito regno, in communem sanctorum sortem esse aliquando reducendum; « Dominum » post « Spiritum sanctum, » contra Eutychen et Nestorium, dicentes Spiritum sanctum esse servum Patris et Filii; « vivificantem, » quod soli Deo convenit, contra Macedonium, dicentem Spiritum sanctum esse creaturam; « qui cum Patre et Filio simul adoratur et conglorificatur, » contra eumdem Macedonium; « qui locutus est per prophetas, » contra eos qui dicebant prophetas esse locutos ut fanaticos; « unam et catholicam » post « sanctam Ecclesiam apostolicam, » contra quasdam Ecclesias orientales, quæ sibi nomen veræ Ecclesiae arrogabant. Latini, circa annum 600, teste Bellarmino, lib. II De Christo, c. xxix, symbolo constantinopolitano addiderunt : « Filioque, » contra quosdam Græcos, qui volebant Spiritum ex solo Patre procedere. sed non dicimur credere nisi in Deum. Cum ergo Ecclesia catholica sit pure ali-quod creatum, videtur quod inconvenienter dicatur: « In unam, sanctam, catholicam et apostolicam Ecclesiam. »
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.6] Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a symbol.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.arg.6] 6. Præterea, symbolum ad hoc traditur ut sit regula fidei. Sed regula fidei debet omnibus proponi, et publice. Quodlibet ergo symbolum deberet in missa cantari, sicut symbolum Patrum. Non videtur ergo esse conveniens editio articulorum fidei in symbolo.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.sc] The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord's promise to His disciples (John 16:13): "When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth." Now the symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing defective.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Ecclesia universalis non potest errare, quia a Spiritu sancto gubernatur, qui est Spiritus veritatis; hoc enim promisit Dominus discipulis, Joan., xvi, 13, dicens: Cum venerit ille Spiritus veritatis, docebit vos omnem veritatem. Sed symbolum est auctoritate universalis Ecclesiae editum. Nihil ergo inconveniens in eo continetur.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.co] As the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:6), "he that cometh to God, must believe that He is." Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of faith that the symbol [The Greek symballein] takes its name.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Apostolus dicit ad Hebr., xi, 6, oportet credere accedentem ad Deum. Credere autem non potest aliquis, nisi ei veritas quam credat, proponatur. Et ideo necessarium fuit fidei veritatem in unum colligi, ut facilius posset omnibus proponi, ne aliquis per ignorantiam fidei a veritate deficeret. Et ab hujusmodi sententiarum fidei collectione nomen symboli est acceptum.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.1] The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura diffuse continetur, et variis modis, et in quibusdam obscure; ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex sacra Scriptura requiritur longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenire omnes illi quibus necessarium est cognoscere fidei veritatem: quorum plerique aliis negotiis occupati studio vacare non possunt. Et ideo fuit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacræ Scripturæ aliquid manifestum summarie colligeretur, quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum; quod quidem non est additum sacræ Scripturæ, sed po-tius ex sacra Scriptura assumptum.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.2] The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in omnibus symbolis eadem fidei docetur veritas; sed ibi oportet populum diligentius instrui de fidei veritate, ubi errores insurgunt, ne fides simplicium per hæreticos corrumpatur. Et hæc fuit causa quare necesse fuit edere plura symbola, quæ in nullo alio differunt, nisi quod in uno plenius explicantur quæ in alio continentur implicite, secundum quod exigebat hæreticorum instantia.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.3] The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they should endeavor to acquire it.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod confessio fidei traditur in symbolo quasi ex persona totius Ecclesiae, quæ per fidem unitur. Fides autem Ecclesiae est fides formata. Talis enim fides inventur in omnibus illis qui sunt numero et merito de Ecclesia. Et ideo confessio fidei in symbolo traditur, secundum quod convenit fidei formatæ, ut etiam si qui fideles fi-dem formatam non habent, ad hanc formam pertingere studeant.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.4] No error about the descent into hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod de descensu ad inferos nullus error erat exortus apud hæreticos, et ideo non fuit necesssarium ali-quam explicationem circa hoc fieri; et propter hoc non reiteratur in symbolo Patrum, sed supponitur tanquam prædeterminatum in symbolo apostolorum. Non enim symbolum sequens abolet præcedens, sed potius illud exponit, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.5] If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod si dicatur: « In sanctam Ecclesiam catholicam, » hoc est intelligendum secundum quod fides nostra refertur ad Spiritum sanctum, qui sanctificat Ecclesiam, ut sit sensus: « Credo in Spiritum sanctum sanctificantem Ecclesiam. » Sed melius est, et secundum communio-rem usum, ut non ponatur ibi « in, » sed simpliciter dicatur: « sanctam Ecclesiam catholicam, » sicut etiam Leo papa dicit.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.6] Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.
[II-II.q.1.a.9.ad.6] Ad sextum dicendum, quod quia symbolum Patrum est declarativum symboli apostolorum, et etiam fuit conditum fide jam manifestata, et Ecclesia pacem habente, propter hoc publice in missa cantatur. Symbolum autem apostolorum, quod tempore persecutionis editum fuit, fide nondum publicata, occulte dicitur in prima et in completorio, quasi contra tenebras errorum pra-teritorum et futurorum.
Article 10
[II-II.q.1.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above (Article 9). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above (Article 7). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non pertineat ad summum pontificem fidei symbolum ordinare. Nova enim editio symboli necessaria est propter explicationem articulorum fidei, sicut dictum est. Sed in Veteri Testamento articuli fidei magis ac magis explicabantur secundum temporum successionem, propter hoc quod veritas fidei magis manifestabatur secundum majorem propinquitatem ad Christum, ut supra dictum est. Cessante ergo tali causa in nova lege, non debet fieri major explicatio articulorum fidei. Ergo non videtur ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinere nova editio symboli. 2. Praeterea, illud quod est sub anathemate interdictum ab universali Ecclesia, non subest potestati hominis alicujus. Sed nova symboli editio interdicta est sub anathemate auctoritate universalis Ecclesia; dicitur enim in gestis primæ ephesinæ synodi, p. II, act. vi, in decreto de fide, quod «perfecto symbolo nicœnæ synodi, decrevit sancta synodus aliam fidem nulli licere proferre, vel conscribere, vel compo-nere praeter definitam a sanctis Patribus qui Ita codices et editi veteres libri, quibus adhærent etiam Patav. edit.; Nicolaï demit vocem «primæ.» Sequens articulus in Speculo morali legitur: « Ad decimum, scilicet de comparatione symboli apostolorum ad alia duo symbola, dicendum quod illorum trium unum dicitur symbolum apostolo-rum, aliud symbolum nicæni concilii, et aliud symbolum Athanasii. Symbolum apostolorum in conclavi ab apostolis ante dispersionem eorum fuit compositum ad veritatis brevem et necessariam expressionem. Sic enim dicitur Hebr., 11: Accedentem oportet credere; non potest autem aliquis cre-dere nisi veritas quam credit proponatur eidem. Et ideo necesse fuit veritatem fidei in unum colligi, ut facilius posset omnibus proponi, ne aliquis per ignorantiam a fidei veritate deficeret, et ab hujus-modi collectione sententiarum nomen symboli est acceptum. In sacra namque Scriptura veritas fidei diffuse valde, et in aliquibus locis obscure, et modis variis continetur, ita quod ad eliciendum certam fidei veritatem longum studium et exercitium requiritur, ad quod vix possunt pervenire omnes illi quibus necessarium est cognoscere fidei veritatem, quorum plerique aliis negotiis occupati studio vacare non possunt, et ideo fuit expediens ut, ex Scripturæ sacræ sententiis, summarie colligeretur aliquid manifestum quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Symbolum vero nicænum, quod dicitur in missa, fuit factum in concilio ad istius symboli explana-tionem et ad quarumdam hæresum confutationem. Symbolum autem Athanasii compositum fuit maxime ad confutandum hæresim arianam. Unde multum fuit Athanasius sollicitus ibi diligenter exprimere unitatem essentiæ cum distinctione et aequalitate personarum. In omnibus ergo symbolis eadem fidei veritas edocetur. Sed ibi oportet populum diligentius instrui de fidei veritate ubi insurgunt errores, ne fides simplicium per hæreticos corrumpatur. Et hæc fuit causa quare necesse fuit plura condere symbola, quæ in nullo alio differunt, nisi quod in uno plenius explicantur quæ in alio implicite continentur, secundum quod hæretico-rum instantia requirebat. Inter omnia autem symbolum apostolorum est principalius et dicitur esse propinquitatem ad Christum, ut supra dictum est. Cessante ergo tali causa in nova lege, non debet fieri major explicatio articulorum fidei. Ergo non videtur ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinere nova editio symboli. 2. Praeterea, illud quod est sub anathe-mate interdictum ab universali Ecclesia, non subest potestati hominis alicujus. Sed nova symboli editio interdicta est sub anathe-mate auctoritate universalis Ecclesia; dicitur enim in gestis primæ ephesinæ synodi, p. II, act. vi, in decreto de fide, quod «perfecto symbolo nicœnæ synodi, decrevit sancta synodus aliam fidem nulli licere proferre, vel conscribere, vel compo-nere praeter definitam a sanctis Patribus qui majus, non quia plus contineat in quantitate Scripturæ, sed quia articulos fidei continet plenius; omnes enim articului continentur in eo; et quia de sententia plus continet in virtute, et quia conditionum fuit ab apostolis, qui majores fuerunt auctoritate quam Patres illi qui nicænum symbolum condiderunt, et quam Athanasius, qui tertium symbolum composuit. Quia autem symbolum apostolorum fuit conditum tempore veritatis nondum publicatæ, ideo sub-misse dicitur. In prima tamen et completorio dicitur ad signandum confessionem fidei maxime fuisse necessariam in primitiva Ecclesia, et fore necessariam in temporibus ultimis; et ad signandum confessionem fidei, in baptismo et in morte, et in prosperitate et in adversitate. Symbolum autem Nicæni concilii factum fuit tempore veritatis propalatæ concussæ et praevalentis; ideo dicitur alta voce post noctem finitam in prima hora diei. Ista autem praedicta symbola, symbola dicuntur, quia multæ sententiæ in quolibet eorum simul collectæ sunt. Unde dicitur symbolum a « syn, » quod est « simul, » et « bolæ » quod est sententia. Et sic patet quod symbolum Nicæni concilii et Athanasii ex rationabili causa condita sunt; et si insurgeret necessitas, utpote si insurgerent novæ hæreses, adhuc posset Ecclesia facere aliud symbolum, ut trahi potest ex sententia Anselmi in libro De processione Spiritus sancti, bene ante finem. Sed nulli alii nisi romanæ Ecclesia hoc liceret, ad quam causae majores universalis Ecclesia referendæ sunt; unde ad ipsam solam pertinet congregatio generalium conciliorum, ut habetur dist. xvii, « Generalia : » et maxime ad ipsam referenda est dubitatio de via salutis, si ori-retur, ut habetur ead. dist., c. « Nec licuit. » — Hæc Speculum morale, et emendandum est in eo quod dicit Athanasium auctorem esse symboli quod ipsi tribuitur. Lutherus : nec articulos fidei, nec leges mo-rum papa statuere potest. in Nicæa congregati sunt cum Spiritu sancto; » et subditur anathematis pœna; et idem etiam reiteratur in gestis chalcedonensis synodi, p. II, act. v, sub fin. Ergo videatur quod non pertineat ad auctoritatem summi pontificis nova editio symboli.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.arg.2] Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first council of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this under pain of anathema. St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope. The same was repeated in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.arg.3] Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Athanasius non fuit summus pontifex, sed alexandrinus patriarcha; et tamen symbolum constituit quod in Ecclesia cantatur. Ergo non magis videtur pertinere editio symboli ad summum pontificem quam ad alios.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.sc] The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod editio symboli facta est in synodo generali. Sed hujusmodi synodus auctoritate solius summi pontificis potest congregari, ut habetur in Decret., dist. xvii, c. v, col. 95. Ergo editio symboli ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.co] As stated above (Objection 1), a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred," as stated in the Decretals [Dist. xvii, Can. 5. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Luke 22:32): "I have prayed for thee," Peter, "that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren." The reason of this is that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Corinthians 1:10: "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you": and this could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general council and so forth.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, nova editio symboli necessaria est ad vitandum insurgentes errores. Ad illius ergo auctoritatem pertinet editio symboli ad cujus auctoritatem pertinet finaliter determinare ea quæ sunt fidei, ut ab omnibus inconcussa fide teneantur. Hoc autem pertinet ad auctoritatem summi pontificis, ad quem majores et difficiliores Ecclesiae quæstiones referuntur, ut dicitur in Decretalibus, extra de baptismo, cap. « Majores. » Unde et Dominus, Luc., xxii, 32, Petro dicit, quem summum pontificem constituit : Ego rogavi pro te, Petre, ut non deficiat fides tua, et tu aliquando conversus confirma fratres tuos. Et hujus ratio est, quia una fides debet esse totius Ecclesiae, secundum illud I Cor., i, 10 : Idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata; quod servari non potest, nisi quæstio fidei de fide exorta determinaretur per eum qui toti Ecclesiae præest; ut sic ejus sententia a tota Ecclesiae firmiter teneatur. Et ideo ad solam auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet nova editio symboli, sicut et omnia alia quæ pertinent ad totam Ecclesiam, ut congregare synodum generalem, et alia hujusmodi.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.ad.1] The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Peter 3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in doctrina Christi et apostolorum veritas fidei est sufficienter explicata. Sed quia perversi homines apostolicam doctrinam et cæteras scripturas pervertunt ad sui ipsorum perditionem, sicut dicitur II Petr., ult., ideo necessaria fuit temporibus procedentibus explanatio fidei contra insurgentes errores.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.ad.2] This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prohibitio et sententia synodi se extendit ad privatas personas, quarum non est determinare de fide; non enim per hujusmodi sententiam synodi generalis ablata est potestas sequenti synodo novam editionem symboli facere, non quidem aliam fidem continentem, sed eamdem magis expositam. Sic enim quæliet synodus observavit, ut sequens synodus aliquid exponeret supra id quod præcedens synodus exposuerat, propter necessitatem alicujus hæresis insurgentis. Unde pertinet ad summum pontificem, cujus auctoritate synodus congregatur, et ejus sententia confirmatur.
[II-II.q.1.a.10.ad.3] Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.1.a.10.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Athanasius non composuit manifestationem fidei per modum symboli; sed magis per modum cujusdam doctrinæ, ut ex ipso modo loquendi apparet. Sed quia integram fidei veritatem ejus doctrina breviter continebat, auctoritate summi pontificis est recepta, ut quasi regula fidei habeatur.
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