Q26. The order of charity

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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q26. The order of charity

Source context

Theme: Hierarchical ordering of love's objects according to proximity, virtue, and ontological grade
Soul-faculty: Intellectual Soul

Steiner

GA 68a, 1907-04-09Steiner distinguishes a real order of rank within love, noting that charity functions not against law but as the highest fulfillment of law through free will, implying a graduated hierarchy among the objects of love.

Cross-tradition

Neoplatonism (Proclus / Plotinus)Proclean and Plotinian emanation establishes a graded series of beings from the One outward, and the soul's love is ordered by proximity to its source — a structural parallel to Aquinas's graduated ordo caritatis from God through self to neighbor.
Rabbinic ethics (ahavat re'a / ahavat Yisrael)Rabbinic sources differentiate concentric circles of obligation in love — self, family, community, humanity — exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's argument that well-ordered charity begins with those most intimately united to the self.

Article 1

[II-II.q.26.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues. Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod quilibet sacerdos parochialis possit indulgentiam dare. Indulgentia enim habet efficaciam ex abundantia meritorum Ecclesiæ. Sed non est aliqua congregatio in quanon sit aliqua abundantia meritorum. Ergo quilibet sacerdos potest facere indulgentias, si habeat plebem subjectam: et similiter quilibet prælatus.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.arg.2] Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prælatus quilibet gerit personam totius multitudinis, sicut unus homo gerit personam suam. Sed quilibet potest alteri communicare bona sua, pro altero satisfaciendo. Ergo et prælatus potest communicare bona multitudinis sibi commissæ, et sic videtur quod possit indulgentias dare.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.arg.3] Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to charity.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad officium mediatoris pertinet interpellare ad unum eorum inter quos est mediator, pro altero. Sed Spiritus sanctus, sicut dicitur Rom., viii, 26, *Postulat. interpellat* pro nobis ad Deum gemitibus inenarrabilibus. Ergo Spiritus sanctus est mediator inter Deum et homines. Non ergo est proprium Christo.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.sc] It is written (Canticles 2:4): "He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me."

[II-II.q.26.a.1.sc] Sed contra, minus est excommunicare quam indulgentias dare. Sed hoc non potest sacerdos parochialis. Ergo nec illud.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.co] As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms "before" and "after" are used in reference to some principle. Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some kind. But it has been said above (23, 1; 25, 12) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod indulgentiae effectum habent, secundum quod opera satisfactoria unius alteri computantur, non solum ex vi charitatis, sed etiam ex intentione operantis aliquo modo directa ad ipsum. Sed intentio alicujus potest ad alterum dirigi tripliciter; aut in speciali, aut in generali, aut in singulari. In singulari quidem, sicut cum quis pro alio satisfacit determinate: et sic quilibet potest alteri sua communicare. In speciali autem, sicut cum quis orat pro congregatione sua, et familiaribus et benefactoribus; et ad hoc etiam ordinat sua opera satisfactoria: et sic ille qui congregationi præest, potest opera illa alii communicare, applicando intentionem illorum qui sunt de congregatione sua ad hunc determinate. Sed in generali, sicut cum quis opera sua ordinat ad bonum Ecclesiæ in generali: et sic ille qui præest Ecclesiæ generaliter, potest opera illa non communicare, applicando intentionem suam ad hunc, vel illum. Et quia homo est pars congregationis, et congregatio est pars Ecclesiæ, ideo in intentione privati boni includitur intentio boni congregationis, et boni totius Ecclesiæ. Etideo ille qui præest Ecclesiæ, potest communicare ea quæ sunt congregationis et hujus hominis; et ille qui præest congregationi, potest communicare ea quæ sunt hujus hominis; sed non convertitur. Sed neque prima communicatio, neque secunda, indulgentia dicitur, sed solum tertia, propter duo; primo quia per illas communicationes quam vis homo solvatur a reatu pœnæ quantum ad Deum, tamen non solvitur a debito faciendi satisfactionem injunctam, ad quam obligatus est ex præcepto Ecclesiæ; sed per tertiam communicationem homo etiam ab hoc debito solvitur; secundo quia in una persona, vel in una congregatione non est indeficientia meritorum, ut sibi, et omnibus aliis valere possint; unde iste non absolvitur a pœnæ debita pro toto, nisi tantum determinate pro eo fiat, quantum debeat. Sed in Ecclesia tota est indeficientia meritorum, præcipue propter meritum Christi. Et ideo solus ille qui præficitur Ecclesiæ, potest indulgentiam elargiri: Sed cum Ecclesia sit congregatione fidelium, congregatio autem hominum sit duplex, scilicet œconomica, sicut illi qui de una familia sunt, et politica, sicut illi qui sunt de uno populo: Ecclesia assimilatur congregationi politicæ, quia ipse populus Ecclesia dicitur; sed conventus diversi, vel parochiae in una diæcesi assimilantur congregationi in diversis familiis, vel in diversis officiis. Et ideo solus episcopus propri praelatus Ecclesiae dicitur: et ideo ipse solus quasi sponsus annulum Ecclesiae recipit: et ideo solus ipse habet potestatem plenam in dispensatione sacramentorum, et jurisdictionem in foro causarum quasi persona publica, allii autem, secundum quod ab eo eis committitur. Sed sacerdotes qui plebibus praeficiuntur, non sunt simpliciter praelati, sed quasi coadjutores: unde in consecratione sacerdotum episcopus dicit: « Quanto fragiliores sumus, tanto magis auxiliis his indigemus: » et propter hoc etiam non omnia sacramenta dispensant. Unde sacerdotes parochiales vel abbates, aut alii hujusmodi praelati non possunt indulgentias dare. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.ad.1] Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above (Question 23, Article 6). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and action, as was shown above (23, 7, ad 2; I-II, 1, ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the First Principle.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod prophetæ et sacerdotes veteris legis 2 dicti sunt mediatores inter Deum et homines dispositive et ministerialiter, inquantum scilicet prænuntiabant et præfigurabant verum et perfectum Dei et hominum mediorem. Sacerdotes vero novi Testamenti possunt dici mediatores Dei et hominum, inquantum sunt ministri veri mediatoris, vice ipsius salutaria sacramenta hominibus exhibentes.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.ad.2] Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod angeli boni, ut Augustinus dicit in IX De civ. Dei, cap. xiii, § 3, col. 267, t. 7, non recte possunt dici mediatores inter Deum et homines: « Cum enim utrumque habeant commune cum Deo, et beatitudinem, et immortalitatem, nihil autem horum cum hominibus et miseris et mortalibus; quo modo non potius remoti sunt ab hominibus, Deoque conjuncti, quam inter utrosque medii constituti? » Dionysius tamen 3 Liber Contra Felicianum Vigilio Tapsensi dicit eos esse medios, quia secundum gradum naturæ sunt infra Deum, et supra homines constituti, et mediatoris officium exercent, non quidem principaliter et perfective, sed ministerialiter et dispositive. Unde Matth., iv, ii, dicitur quod accesserant angeli et ministrabant ei, scilicet Christo. Dæmones autem habent communem cum Deo immortalitatem, cum hominibus autem miseriam: ad hoc enim se interponit medium dæmon immortalis et miser, ut ad immortalitatem beatam transire non sinat, sed perducat ad miseriam immortalem: unde est sicut malus medius, qui separat amicos. Christus autem habuit communem cum Deo beatitudinem, cum hominibus autem mortalitatem: et ideo ad hoc se interposuit medium, ut mortalitate transacta, et ex mortuis faceret immortales, quod in se resurgendo monstravit, et ex miseris beatos efficeret; unde nunquam ipse discessit. Et ideo ipse est bonus mediator qui reconciliat inimicos.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.ad.3] Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.

[II-II.q.26.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus, cum sit per omnia Deo æqualis, non potest dici medius vel mediator inter Deum et homines, sed solus Christus, qui licet secundum divinitatem æqualis sit Patri, tamen secundum humanitatem minor est Patre, ut supra dictum est. Unde Super illud ad Galat., III: Mediator unius non est, dicit Glossa: « Christus est mediator, non Pater, nec Spiritus sanctus. » Dicitur autem Spiritus sanctus interpellare pro nobis, quia ipse interpellare nos facit.

Article 2

[II-II.q.26.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 4:20): "He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod diaconus non possit indulgentias concedere 2, vel alius nisi sacerdos, quia remissio peccatorum est effectus clavium. Sed non habet claves nisi solus sacerdos. Ergo ipse solus potest indulgentias dare.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.arg.2] Further, likeness causes love, according to Sirach 13:19: "Every beast loveth its like." Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, plenior remissio pœnæ est in indulgentiis quam in foro pœni-tentiali. Sed hoc non potest nisi sacerdos. Ergo nec illud.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.arg.3] Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love God more than our neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Christus dicitur mediator, inquantum reconciliavit nos Deo; quod quidem fecit auferendo peccatum quod nos separabat a Deo. Sed auferre peccatum convenit Christo, non inquantum est homo, sed inquantum est Deus. Ergo Christus, inquantum est homo, non est mediator, sed inquantum est Deus.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.sc] A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God's sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.sc] Sed contra, eidem confertur dispensatio thesauri Ecclesiae cui committitur regi-men Ecclesiae. Sed hoc committur quandoque non sacerdoti. Ergo potest indulgentias facere: nam ex dispensatione thesauri Ecclesiae efficaciam habent.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.co] Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness.

Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod potestas concedendi indulgentias sequitur jurisdictionem, ut supra dictum est. Et quia diaconi, et alii non sacerdotes, possunt habere jurisdictionem vel commissam, sicut legati, vel ordinariam, sicut electi; ideo possunt indulgentias concedere etiam non sacerdotes, quamvis non possint absolvere in pœnitentiali foro; quod est ordinis. Et per hoc patet solutio ad objecta; indulgentias enim concedere pertinet ad clavem jurisdictionis, et non ad clavem ordinis.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.ad.1] A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. On this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because "the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not," as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod si subtrahatur divina natura a Christo, subtrahetur per consequens ab eo singularis plenitudo gratiarum, quæ convenit ei, inquantum est unigenitus a Patre, ut dicitur Joan., i. Ex qua quidem plenitudine habet ut sit super omnes homines constitutus, et propinquius ad Deum accedens.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.ad.2] The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Christus secundum quod Deus, est per omnia æqualis Patri; sed etiam in humana natura excedit alios homines; et ideo secundum quod homo, potest esse mediator; non autem secundum quod Deus.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.ad.3] Considered in His substance, God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God's goodness equally with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.

[II-II.q.26.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet auctoritative peccatum auferre conveniat Christo, secundum quod est Deus; tamen satisfacere pro peccato humani generis convenit ei, secundum quod est homo. Et secundum hoc dicitur Dei et hominum mediator:

Article 3

[II-II.q.26.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect. Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than God.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod etiam episcopus non possit indulgentias elargiri, quia thesaurus Ecclesiae est communis toti Ecclesiae. Sed id quod est commune toti Ecclesiae, non potest dispensari nisi per illum qui toti Ecclesiae præest. Ergo solus Papa potest indulgentias concedere.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.arg.2] Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love God more than himself.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus potest remittere pœnæ a jure determinatas, nisi ille qui habet potestatem jus condendi. Sed pœnæ satisfactoria sunt pro peccatis determinæ in jure. Ergo remittere hujusmodi pœnæ potest solus Papa, qui conditor est juris.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.arg.3] Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quantum aliquis diligit Deum, tantum diligit frui eo. Sed quantum aliquis diligit frui Deo, tantum diligit seipsum; quia hoc est summum bonum quod aliquis sibi velle potest. Ergo homo non plus debet ex charitate Deum diligere quam seipsum.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God more than himself.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.sc] Sed contra est consuetudo Ecclesiae, secundum quam episcopi dant indulgentiam.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.co] The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Papa habet plenitudinem pontificalis potestatis, quasi rex in regno. Sed episcopi assumuntur in partem sollicitudinis, quasi judices singulis civitatibus præpositi: propter quod eos solos in suis litteris Papa « fratres » vocat; reliquos autem omnes vocat « filios. » Et ideo potestas facendi indulgentias plene residet in Papa, quia potest facere, prout vult, causa tamen existente legitima. Sed in episcopis est taxata secundum ordinationem Papæ. Et ideo possunt facere secundum quod eis est taxatum; et non amplius. Et per hoc patet solutio ab objecta.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.ad.1] The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur de amicabilibus quæ sunt ad alterum, in quo bonum, quod est objectum amicitia, inventur secundum aliquem particularem modum: non autem de amicabilibus quæ sunt ad alterum in quo bonum prædictum inventur secundum rationem totius.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.ad.2] The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod bonum totius diligit quidem pars, secundum quod est sibi conveniens; non autem ita quod bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita quod seipsam refert in bonum totius.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.ad.3] That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.

[II-II.q.26.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod aliquis velit frui Deo, pertinet ad amorem quo Deus amatur amore concupiscentiae. Magis autem amamus Deum amore amicitiae quam amore concupiscentiae, quia majus est in se bonum Dei quam bonum quod participare possumus fruendo ipso. Et ideo simpliciter homo magis diligit Deum ex charitate quam seipsum.

Article 4

[II-II.q.26.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of charity is God, as stated above (2; 25, 1,12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo ex charitate non magis debeat diligere seipsum quam proximum. Principale enim objectum charitatis est Deus, ut supra dictum est. Sed quandoque homo habet proximum magis Deo conjunctum quam sit ipse. Ergo magis debet aliquis taem diligere quam seipsum.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.arg.2] Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor's sake, according to Proverbs 12:26: "He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just." Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, detrimentum illius quem magis diligimus, magis vitamus. Sed homo ex charitate sustinet detrimentum pro proximo, secundum illud Proverb., xxii, 26: Qui negligit damnum propter amicum, justus est. Ergo homo debet ex charitate magis alium diligere quam seipsum.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (1 Corinthians 13:5) "charity seeketh not its own." Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, I ad Cor., xxii, 5, dicitur quod charitas non quærit quæ sua sunt. Sed illud maxime amamus cujus bonum maxime quærimus. Ergo per charitatem aliquis non amat seipsum magis quam proximum.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.sc] It is written (Leviticus 19:18, Matthew 22:39): "Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Leviticus 19:18: 'friend') as thyself." Whence it seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for another.

But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Levit., xix, et Matth., xxii, 39: Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Ex quo videtur quod dilectio hominis ad seipsum est sicut exemplar dilectionis quæ habetur ad alterum. Sed exemplar, potius est quam exemplatum. Ergo homo ex charitate magis debeat diligere seipsum quam proximum.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.co] There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above (Question 25, Article 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above (25, 1,12), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in homine duo sunt, scilicet natura spiritualis et natura corporalis. Per hoc autem homo dicitur diligere seipsum, quod diligit se secundum naturam spiritualem, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc debet homo magis se diligere post Deum, quam quemcumque alium. Et hoc patet ex ipsa ratione diligendi; nam, sicut supra dictum est, Deus diligitur ut principium boni, super quo fundatur dilectio charitatis; homo autem seipsum diligit ex charitate secundum rationem qua est particeps prædicti boni; proximus autem diligitur secundum rationem societatis in isto bono. Consociatio autem est ratio dilectionis secundum quamdam unionem in ordine ad Deum. Unde sicut unitas potior est quam unio; ita quod homo ipse participet bonum divinum, est potior ratio diligendi quam quod alius associetur ipsi in hac participatione. Et ideo homo ex charitate debet magis seipsum diligere quam proximum; et hujus signum est quod homo non debet subire aliquod malum peccati, quod contra-riatur participationi beatitudinis, ut proximum liberet a peccato.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.ad.1] The love of charity takes its quantity not only from its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dilectio charitatis non solum habet quantitatem ex parte objecti, quod est Deus, sed ex parte diligentis, qui est ipse homo charitatem habens; sicut et quantitas cujuslibet actionis dependet quodammodo ex ipso subjecto. Et ideo licet proximus melior, sit Deo propinquior; quia tamen non est ita propinquus charitatem habenti, sicut ipse sibi, non sequitur quod magis debeat aliquis proximum quam seipsum diligere.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.ad.2] A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend's sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. On spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod detrimenta corporalia debet homo sustinere propter amicum; et in hoc ipso seipsum magis diligit secundum spiritualem mentem, quia hoc pertinet ad perfectionem virtutis, quae est bonum mentis. Sed in spiritualibus non debet homo pati detrimentum peccando, ut proximum liberet a peccato, sicut dictum est.

[II-II.q.26.a.4.ad.3] As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, "'charity seeks not her own,' means that it prefers the common to the private good." Now the common good is always more lovable to the individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter's own partial good, as stated above (Article 3).

[II-II.q.26.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in Regula, § 8, col. 1382, t. 1, cum dicitur: « Charitas non quærit quæ sua sunt, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis anteponit. » Semper autem commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium bonum; sicut etiam ipsi parti est magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale sui ipsius, ut dictum est.

Article 5

[II-II.q.26.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor's body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor's body more than his own.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod homo non magis debeat diligere proximi requirit ut quilibet primo se diligat; nam quomodo alteri bonus est qui sibi nequam est? Eccl., xiv. Et Christus dixit ad mulieres quae plangebant et lamentabantur eum: super vos ipsas flete, Luc., xxiii. Multi sunt similes istis mulieribus quae alios plorant, et se magis miseros non plorant, peccatis aliorum compatiuntur, et de suis non curant, sicut dicit August. in lib. Confessionum, de seipso: « Flebam quondam Didonem morituram, et meipsum mortuum non flebam. » Et hoc provenit ex eo quod curiosius perscrutantur facta aliorum quam sua, quod est omnino contrarium charitati. Charitas enim incipit a se. Unde Eccl., xxx: Miserere animæ tuæ placens Deo, et contine, et congrega cor tuum in sanctitate ejus; Jerem., L1, 6, 45: Salvet unusquisque animam suam; Matth., xvi, 26: Quid prodest homini si mundum universum lucretur, animæ vero suæ detrimentum patiatur; Luc., iv, 23: Medice, cura teipsum. Et Judæi contra Christum dicebant: Alios salvos fecit, seipsum non potest salvum facere. Matth., xxvii, 42, et Marc., xv, 31. — Homo charitatem habet erga seipsum quando vult sibi vitam æternam, et ad hunc finem operatur. Porro sibi primum' vitam illam velle debet. Sunt tamen duo textus qui contra doctrinam istam militare videntur, primus Exod., xxii, et alter Epist. ad Rom., ix. Moyses etenim sic Deum deprecatur: Aut dimitte eis hanc noxam, aut, si non facis, dele me de libro tuo quem scripsisti, et Apostolus dicit: Optabam esse anathema a Christo pro fratribus meis. Ex his textibus quidam inferunt licitum esse pro salute aliorum, non solum velle perpetuo carere gloria, salva tamen amicitia Dei, sed etiam velle carere gratia Dei, modo hujus carentia non proveniat ex peccato. — Carere gratia Dei nihil aliud est quam carere amicitia Dei. Porro dicunt licitum esse ex charitate velle carere gratia Dei. Certe tales non admittunt idem esse charitatem et gratiam. Charitas tamen gratiam consequitur etiam in doctrina eorum qui distinctionem ponunt inter charitatem et gratiam.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.arg.2] Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his neighbor's, as stated above (Article 4). Now a man's own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neighbor.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homo plus debet diligere posset Deus fine meo me bene merentem in æternum destituere absque ulla crudelitate et injustitia, forsitan optare possem pro salute aliorum carere gloria, salva tamen amicitia Dei. Sed hoc fieri non potest; et insuper renuntiando beatitudini meæ perpetuæ legem naturæ meæ violarem; nam ipsa natura mea beatitudinem appetit perpetuam; et licet non appetat illam ex se secundum modum supernaturalem et ut supernaturalem, imponit nihilominus mihi obligationem volendi ipsam beatitudinem supernaturalem primo pro meipso, quando scio me ad beatitudinem illam esse a Deo ordinatum. Quod si non mihi licet velle gloria privari pro salute aliorum, nec mihi licet velle carere gratia Dei, modo carentia hæc ex peccato non proveniat: quia vel carentia illa me constituit extra ordinem supernaturalem, in ordine scilicet mere naturali, et hoc est quod volo; vel me in ordine supernaturali relinquit ad finem supernaturalem semper destinatum, et hoc est solummodo quod opto. Si primum, non mihi licet velle privari fine meo quem scio esse beatitudinem supernaturalem, et hoc fine volo privari si absque fictione volo extra ordinem supernaturalem constitui; si secundum, non mihi licet velle in ordine supernaturali esse deordinatum; nam tunc deordinatio illa esset voluntaria ac libera; atqui omnis deordinatio voluntaria ac libera in deordinato illicita est, et peccaminosa in ipso. Carere tamen gratia in homine qui ad finem supernaturalem remanet ordinatus deordinatio quædam est, siquidem nemo hunc finem sine gratia attingere potest; ergo non mihi licet hanc gratia carentiam optare, quia peccaminosa est eo ipso quod est voluntaria et libera. Cæterum de Moysis oratione Hugo a S. Charo dicit: « Hoc de impetu animi, non de ratione dictum quidam intelligunt. Vel forte ex magna confidentia hoc dixit, ut innuit Interlin., loquens per imposibile, quasi dicat: Sicut imposibile est quod me deleas, sic oro non posse fieri quin dimittas. Augustinus disjunctivam dici ponit pro conditionali sic: aut dele me, aut dimitte eis, id est: si non deles me, dimitte eis. Omnis enim disjunctiva transformari potest in conditionalem, altera parte negata, vel etiam in argumentationem prædicto modo. » De Paulo autem idem habet: Optabam anathema fieri. Videtur quod male optaret, quia plus se diligeret quam ipsos. Solutio. Optabam, id est « optarem, » ut ponatur præteritum imperfectum indicativi pro futuro subjunctivi, qui ex natura sua impetrat conditionem. Unde dicendum: optarem, id est, si esset possibile. Sic Gal., iv: Si fieri potuisset, oculos vestros cruissetis, et dedissetis mihi. Vel optabam fieri anathema, id est divisus, id est tribulationibus expositus: hoc est enim animam propriam quam animam proximi, ut dictum est. Sed corpus proprium propinquius est animæ nostræ quam proximus; ergo plus debemus diligere corpus proprium quam proximum.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.arg.3] Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neighbor's safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to John 15:13: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Therefore a man is not bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, unusquisque exponit id quod minus amat, pro eo quod magis amat. Sed non omnis homo tenetur exponere corpus proprium pro salute proximi; sed hoc est perfectorum, secundum illud Joan., xv, 13: Majorem charitatem nemo habet quam ut* animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Ergo homo non tenetur ex charitate plus diligere proximum quam corpus proprium.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.sc] Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that "we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body."

[II-II.q.26.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit De doct. christ., lib. 1, cap. xxvii, col. 29, t. 3, quod « plus debemus diligere proximum quam corpus proprium. »

[II-II.q.26.a.5.co] Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above (2; 25, 12). Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness which is the reason for loving one's neighbor, is a greater reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one's own body. Therefore, as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod illud magis est ex charitate diligendum quod habet pleniorem rationem diligibilis ex charitate, ut dictum est. Consociatio autem in plena participatione beatitudinis, quæ est ratio diligendi proximum, est major ratio diligendi quam participatio beatitudinis per redundantiam, quæ est ratio diligendi proprium corpus. Et ideo proximum quantum ad salutem animæ magis debemus diligere quam proprium corpus. quodammodo dividi. Unde super illud: Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti me? dicit Glossa: « Clamat caro in separatione a divinitate, id est ab auxilio divinitatis. Ideo Paulus pro salute superna anathema esse optavit, imitari volens Dominum suum, quia et ipse cum non esset maledictum, factus est pro nobis maledictum, ut dicitur Galat., III. » Notandum quod unusquisque teneatur diligere proximum non solum quoad salutem æternam ipsi procurandam, sed etiam in certis casibus quoad ipsi vitam conservandam temporalem. Sic quando in extrema necessitate corporali proximus constituitur, tenetur quis bona fortunæ non absolute sibimetipsi necessaria exponere ut vitam temporalem proximi liberet a laqueo mortis imminentis. Nil enim sunt respectu vitæ proximi etiam temporalis bona fortunæ qualiacumque. Qui habuerit substantiam hujus mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habere, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo, quomodo charitas Dei manet in illo? I Joan., III. Perde pecuniam propter fratrem et amicum, Eccle., xxix; immo propter inimicum qui sub nomine fratris hic intelligitur. Sed de his in quæst. « De eleemosyna.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.ad.1] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, which is his predominant part.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, in IX Ethic., cap. viii, circa med., « unumquodque videtur esse id quod est præcipuum in ipso. » Unde cum dicitur proximus magis esse diligendus quam corpus proprium, intelligitur hoc quantum ad animam, quae est potior pars ejus.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.ad.2] Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor's soul is more closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod corpus nostrum est propinquius animæ nostræ quam proximus, quantum ad constitutio nem propriæ naturæ; sed quantum ad participationem beatitudinis, major est consocia-tio animæ proximi ad animam nostram quam etiam corporis proprii.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.ad.3] Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor's welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor's welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.

[II-II.q.26.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cuilibet homini imminet cura proprii corporis; non autem imminet cuilibet homini cura de salute proximi, nisi forte in casu necessitas; et ideo non est de necessitate charitatis quod homo proprium corpus exponat pro salute proximi, nisi in casu quo tenetur ejus saluti providere; sed quod aliquis sponte ad hoc se offerat, pertinet ad perfectionem charitatis.

Article 6

[II-II.q.26.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod unus proximus non sit magis diligendus percipio nisi quod sub sensibus corporalibus cadit. Nullo sensu talia percipiuntur ut talia. Expressio quidem horum inter homines sub sensibus cadit, sed non hæc ipsa. Non tamen in Scyllam incidendum est ut vitetur Charybdis, et in Scyllam eo modo incideret qui nil admitteret nisi spiritum et substantias spirituales. De corporibus nullam curam habere, esset etiam in Scyllam incidere. Spiritus existit, et existentia existentia corporis, secundum viam saltem logicam, anteriori. Nam spiritus solus, utpote solus ex natura sua activus, rerum formas materialium primo concipere potuit, easque postea concretas in materia producere. Sed existit et materia, suaque dignitate potitur. Homo igitur justus corpori suo debitum cultum tribuit, illudque præparat ad redundantiam beati-tudinis æternam animæ sanctæ ad ipsum. In ordine ad æternam beatitudinem, licet anima proximi dilectione majori digna sit, utpote melius ac perfectius beatitudine fruens æterna, corpus tamen suum effective magis quis diligere debet quam animam proximi, quia corpus uniuscujusque in beati-tudine æterna animam uniuscujusque sequitur; et ideo corporis proprii beatitudinem æternam pro salute æterna proximi exponere, nil aliud esset quam animæ propriæ salutem pro salute animæ proximi deserere: et hoc omnino illicitum est. Mortificate ergo membra vestra quæ sunt super terram, et ea variis, si ita vobis non displicuerit, pro Christo et anima vestra, pœnitentiæ afflictionibus non ex præcepto impositis castigate, ut expeditior sit spiritus contra quem caro concupiscit, destructo corpore peccati; sed ad salvandas aliorum animas proprium corpus operationi Satanæ non tradatis, id est iniquitatibus ipsum non maculetis. Si tamen agatur solummodo de vita illius mere physica et de proximorum salute, anteponatur proximorum salus. Hoc est charitatis præceptum. Præceptum nihilominus istud, cum sit affirmativum, obligat quidem semper, sed non pro semper. Proinde triplex distinguenda est necessitas spiritualis proximi, extrema, gravis, et communis. Extrema necessitas est quando proximus est in æternum periturus nisi adjuvetur, ut si infans est sine baptismo moriturus. Gravis necessitas est quando proximus potest absolute salvari, quamvis valde difficile, ut si quis morti proximus et in peccato mortali existens, petat confessionem, sine qua potest absolute salvari sola contritione, sed longe difficilius quam sacramento. Communis necessitas est in qua communiter versantur peccatores qui communes peccandi occasiones incurrunt. In extrema necessitate quilibet tenetur proprii corporis exponere vitam pro salute æterna proximi, si sit spes quod juvari possit. Sic cum pestis lues immanis apud Massiliam sæviret, adolescens quidam vagientem infantem audiens domum ex qua clamores prodibant penetravit, inventique mulierem peste morientem quæ mox partu filium ediderat, ipsumque regenerationis aqua abluere non potuerat nec poterat; sese devovit adolescens, et vitam puerulo præbens æternam ipse lethalem morbum mercedem acceptit in terris. Non tenebatur quidem ad penetrandum interiora domus, quia conditionem gementis ignorabat infantis; sed hujus conditionis certior effectus, tenebatur propriam sui corporis mortis discrimini derelinquere vitam pro salute proximi æterna. In necessitate gravi tenentur solum ii quibus incumbit ex officio cura animarum. Sic tempore pestis mediolanensis, S. Carolus Borromæus, mediolanensis archiepiscopus, et tempore pestis massiliensis de qua supra R. D. de Belzunce, massiliensis episcopus, ut sacramentum pœnitentiæ suis diæcesanis administrarent, quotidie proprium exposuere vitam: et ad id tenebantur. Tenebanturne pariter ad administrandam peste laborantibus sacramenta Eucharistiae et extremæunctionis? Distinguendum est de Eucharistia: vel ægrri confessione indigebant, vel erant confessi. Si primum, cum tenebantur pastores eorum confessiones audire, nec novum aliquod notabile periculum ex administratione sacramenti Eucharistiae incurrebant, poterant et debebant hoc sacramentum administrare. Hæc tamen sententia non ab omnibus admittitur, et est solummodo probabilior, ut aiunt. Nam quis dicere posset eos non fuisse obligatos nisi ad administrationem sacramenti pœnitentiæ, et non ad auditionem integram confessionum? unde administrando sacramentum Eucharistiae, tunc novum aliquod notabile periculum incurrissent, ad quod pro sacramento illo in tali casu non tenebantur. Quod si ægrri erant confessi, quidam, inter quos Sylvius, Marchantius, Suarez, Chapeauville et alii, volunt pastores ad Eucharistian illis administrandam fuisse obligatos; alii, inter quos Diana, Gabriel, Dicastillus, etc., contrarium docent, et hanc ultimam sententiam testatur Diana fuisse a Gregorio XIII, in quadam epistola ad S. Carolum Borromæum, approbatam. Cæterum primæ sententiæ patroni concedunt excusari pastorem si ex una parte ægrotus paulo ante communicavit, aut ex regulari vita ipsius, et ex confessione legitima moraliter ut certum conjici potest ipsum esse in statu gratiae, et si ex altera parte cum prima conjungenda instet magnum periculum vitæ pro pastore. Item, si ex morte pastoris gravis in populo jactura sequeretur, cum alter nec cito, nec de facili posset haberi. Insuper utraque sententia admittit Eucharistiam administrari posse in tali casu cum aliquo instrumento, modo periculum lapsus absit. De sacramento extremæunctionis distinguendum est pariter. sorte junguntur. » Ergo proximum unus non est magis diligendus quam alius.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.arg.2] Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ubi una et eadem est ratio diligendi diversos, non debet esse inæqualis dilectio. Sed una et eadem est ratio diligendi omnes proximos, scilicet Deus, ut patet per Augustinum in I De doct. christ., c. xxvii, col. 29, t. 3. Ergo omnes proximos æqualiter diligere debemus.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.arg.3] Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, amare est velle bonum alicui, ut patet per Philosophum in II Rhet., c. iv, in princ. Sed omnibus proximis æqualale bonum volumus, scilicet vitam æternam. Ergo omnes proximos æqualiter debemus diligere.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.sc] One's obligation to love a person is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Leviticus 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above. Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod tanto unusquisque magis debet diligi, quanto gravius peccat qui contra ejus dilectionem operatur. Sed gravius peccat qui agit contra dilectionem aliquorum proximum, quam qui agit contra dilectionem aliorum; unde Levit., xx, 9, præcipitur quod qui maledixerit patri aut matri, morte moriatur; quod non præcipitur de his qui alios homines maledicunt. Ergo quosdam proximum debemus magis diligere quam alios.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.co] There have been two opinions on this question: for some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all including our enemies.

But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.

We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (Article 1), wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex opinio circa hoc fuit: quidam enim dixerunt quod omnes proximi sunt æqualiter ex charitate diligendi quantum ad affectum, sed non quantum ad exteriorem effectum; ponentes ordinem dilectionis esse intelligendum secundum exterioria beneficia, quæ magis debemus impendere proximis quam alienis; non autem secundum interiorem affectum, quem æqualiter debemus impendere omnibus, etiam inimicis. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur: non enim Vel ægrotus supponitur accepisse absolutionem certam; et tunc juxta communiorem sententiam pastor non tenetur ad ministrandum ipsi cum propria vitae periculo sacramentum extremæ unctionis. Vel de absolutione ægroto data, quia hanc v. g. recepit sensibus privatus sine confessione formali et explicita, dubitatur, et aliam absolutionem ipsi largiri pastor non potest, quia v. g. remanet ægrotus destitutus a sensibus; et tunc videtur teneri pastor ad ministrandum sacramentum extremæ unctionis, quia ægrotus forte attritus est et per hoc sacramentum salvabitur, sine quo damnabitur. Quando vero proximus in necessitate solummodo communi constituitur, nemo pro salute æterna ejus proprii corporis tenetur exponere vitam. Advertendum est non censeri in extrema necessitate positos, secundum opinionem quorumdam theologorum magni nominis, eos qui ex propria malitia se in periculum damnationis injiciunt, ut minus est inordinatus affectus charitatis, qui est inclinatio gratiae, quam appetitus naturalis, qui est inclinatio naturæ; utraque enim inclinatio ex divina sapientia procedit. Videmus autem in naturalibus quod inclinatio naturalis proportionatur actui vel motui qui convenit naturæ uniuscujusque; sicut terra habet majorem inclinationem gravitatis quam aqua, quia competit ei esse sub aqua. Oportet ergo quod etiam inclinatio gratiae, quae est affectus charitatis, proportionetur his quae sunt exterius agenda; ita scilicet ut ad eos intensiorem charitatis affectum habeamus, quibus convenit nos magis beneficos esse. Et ideo dicendum est, quod etiam secundum affectum oportet magis unum proximum quam alium diligere. Et ratio est, quia cum principium dilectionis sit Deus, et ipse diligens; necesse est quod secundum propinquitatem major ad alterum istorum principiorum major sit dilectionis affectus. Sicut enim supra dictum est, in omnibus in quibus invenitur aliquod principium, ordo attenditur secundum comparisonem ad illud principium.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.ad.1] Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. On this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally.

Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod dilectio potest esse inæqualis dupliciter: uno modo ex parte ejus boni quod amico optamus; et quantum ad hoc omnes homines æque diligimus ex charitate, quia omnibus optamus bonum idem in genere, scilicet beatitudinem æternam. Alio modo dicitur major dilectio propter intensiorem actum dilectionis; et sic non oportet omnes æque diligere. Vel aliter dicendum, quod dilectio inæqualiter potest ad aliquos haberi dupliciter: uno modo ex eo quod quidam diliguntur, et alii sunt qui bellum injustum ingrediuntur, æduellum suscipiunt et similes qui possunt ex seipsis a periculo recedere. Pace tantorum virorum, hæc opinio quoad bellum mihi displicet. Nam tumultus seditionis, in civitate bella civilia movente, evidenter ut injustus apparere potest sæpius pastoribus animarum, et sic ab omnibus honestis judicari. Pastores non obligari ad sequendas tunc ubique turbas, seque in medio concitationis assidue et ex officio morti exponendum concedo libenter; sed si morjens quidam seditiosus illorum petit ministerium, et id sciant, nec absque propriæ gravi discrimine vitae animæ fraternæ succurrere possint, quid pastores agere deberent? Licitumne esset eis in hoc mundo animas suas salvas facere, animasque ovium suarum damnationi æternæ obnoxias et misericordiam implorantes derelinquere? In — Sic omnes cod.; non ut in Parm. et contra sensus exigentiam: « effectus. » non diliguntur; et hanc inæqualitatem oportet servare in beneficentia, quia non possumus omnibus prodesse; sed in benevolentia dilectionis talis inæqualitas haberi non debet. Alia vero est inæqualitas dilectionis ex hoc quod quidam plus aliis diliguntur. Augustinus ergo non intendit hanc excludere inæqualitatem, sed primam, ut patet ex his quæ de beneficentia dicit.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.ad.2] Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non omnes proximi æqualiter se habent ad Deum, sed quidam sunt ei propinquiores per majorem bonitatem; qui sunt magis diligendi ex charitate, quam aliii qui sunt minus eis propinqui.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.ad.3] This argument considers the quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish our friends.

[II-II.q.26.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de quantitate dilectionis ex parte boni quod amicis optamus.

Article 7

[II-II.q.26.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason, according to Luke 14:26: "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father," etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod magis debeamus diligere meliores, quam nobis conjunctiores. Illud enim vide-tur esse magis diligendum quod nulla ratione debet odio haberi, quam illud quod aliqua ratione est odiendum; sicut et albius est quod est nigro impermixtius. Sed personæ nobis conjunctæ, sunt secundum aliquam rationem odiendæ, secundum illud Luc., xiv, 26: Si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem, etc. Homines autem boni nulla ratione sunt odiendi. Ergo videtur quod meliores sunt magis amandi quam conjunctiores.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.arg.2] Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, per charitatem homo maxime conformatur Deo. Sed Deus diligit magis meliorem. Ergo et homo per charitatem magis debet meliorem diligere quam sibi conjunctiorem. Ita cum cod. Tarrac. et Alcan. edit. passim; edit. Rom. aliæque; « et aliquem diligunt. » — — — Sic cod.; in — Ita cum codd. Tarrac. Alcan., aliisque passim; al.: « motum. » Charitatis objectum multiplex est. In multiplicitate ordo inveniri debet, quando res a Deo regulantur. Porro charitas a Deo regulata est. Ergo

[II-II.q.26.a.7.arg.3] Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with better men than with those who are more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men more than those who are more closely connected with us.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum unamquamque amicitiam illud est magis amandum quod magis pertinet ad id supra quod amicitia fundatur; amicitia enim naturali magis diligimus eos qui sunt nobis magis secundum naturam conjuncti, puta parentes vel filios. Sed amicitia charitatis fundatur super communicatione beatitudinis, ad quam magis pertinent meliores quam nobis conjunctiores. Ergo ex charitate magis debemus diligere meliores quam nobis conjunctiores.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.sc] It is written (1 Timothy 5:8): "If any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." Now the inward affection of charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Timoth., v, 8: Si quis suorum, et maxime domesticorum, curam non habet, fidem negavit, et est infideli deterior. Sed interior charitatis affectio debet respondere exteriori affectui. Ergo charitas magis debet haberi ad propinquiores quam ad meliores.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.co] Every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.

Now the object of charity's love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God's justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of love; for there are different species of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love.

On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them.

Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above (24, 4,10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness.

Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the art which is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod omnis actus oportet quod proportionetur et objecto et agenti. Sed ex objecto habet speciem, ex virtute autem agentis habet modum suæ intensionis; sicut motus habet speciem ex termino ad quem est, sed intensionem velocitatis habet ex dispositione mobilis, et virtute moventis. Sic ergo dilectio speciem habet ex objecto, sed intensionem habet ex parte ipsius diligentis. Objectum autem charitativæ dilectionis Deus est; homo autem diligens est. Diversitas ergo dilectionis quæ est secundum charitatem, quantum ad speciem, est attendenda in proximis diligendis secundum comparisonem ad Deum, ut scilicet ei qui est Deo propinquior, majus bonum ex charitate velimus; quia licet bonum quod omnibus vult charitas, scilicet beatitudo æterna, sit unum secundum se, habet tamen diversos gradus secundum diversas beatitudinis participationes: et hoc ad charitatem pertinet ut velit justitiam Dei servari, secundum quam meliores perfectius beatitudinem participant. Et hoc pertinet ad speciem dilectionis; sunt enim diversæ dilectionis species secundum diversa bona quæ optamus his quos diligimus. Sed intensio dilectionis est attendenda per est in charitate aliquis ordo: Ordinavit in me charitatem, Cant., II, 3. Charitatis principia sunt Deus et persona diligens, quia omnia charitas in Deo diligit, et quia ille qui diligit manifeste sui actus principium est. Res autem ordinatæ sunt secundum relationes suas ad principia. Unde attendi debet ordo charitatis penes relationes dilectorum ad Deum et ad diligentis personam. comparationem ad ipsum hominem qui diligit; et secundum hoc illos qui sunt sibi propinquiores, intensiori affectu diligit homo ad illud bonum ad quod eos diligit, quam meliores ad majus bonum. Est etiam ibi alia differentia attendenda: nam aliqui proximi sunt propinqui nobis secundum naturalem originem, a qua discedere non possunt, quia secundum eam sunt id quod sunt. Sed bonitas virtutis, secundum quam aliqui appropinquant Deo, potest accedere et recedere, augeri et minui, ut ex supra dictis patet; et ideo possum ex charitate velle quod iste qui est mihi conjunctus, sit melior alio, et sic ad majorem beatitudinis gradum pervenire possit. Est autem et alius modus quo plus diligimus ex charitate magis nobis conjunctos, quia pluribus modis eos diligimus. Ad eos enim qui non sunt nobis conjuncti, non habemus nisi amicitiam charitatis; ad eos vero qui sunt nobis conjuncti, habemus aliquas alias amicitias secundum modum conjunctionis eorum ad nos. Cum autem bonum super quod fundatur quælibet alia amicitia honesta, ordinetur sicut ad finem ad bonum super quod fundatur charitas, consequens est ut charitas imperet actui cujuslibet alterius amicitiae; sicut ars quæ est circa finem, imperat arti qui est circa ea quæ sunt ad finem. Et sic hoc ipsum quod est diligere aliquem, quia consanguineus vel conjunctus est, vel quia concivis, vel propter quodcumque hu- Ita codd. Alcan. et Tarrac., optime; Al.: « omnes.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.ad.1] We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: "A men's enemies are they of his own household."

[II-II.q.26.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in propinquis nostris non præcipimur odire quod propinquis nostri sunt, sed hoc solum quod impediunt nos a Deo; et in hoc non sunt propinqui, sed inimici, secundum illud Michææ, vii, 6: Inimici hominis domestici ejus.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.ad.2] Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, as stated above (I-II, 19, 10), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod charitas facit hominem conformari Deo secundum proportionem, ut scilicet ita se habeat homo ad id quod suum est, sicut Deus ad id quod suum est. Quædam enim possumus ex charitate velle, quia sunt nobis convenientia; quæ tamen Deus non vult, quia non convenit ei ut ea velit; sicut supra habitum est, cum de bonitate voluntatis ageretur.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.ad.3] Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.

[II-II.q.26.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod charitas non solum elicit actum dilectionis secundum rationem objecti, sed etiam secundum rationem diligentis, ut dictum est. Ex quo contingit quod magis conjunctus magis amatur.

Article 8

[II-II.q.26.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Proverbs 18:24): "A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother." Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): "The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood." Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit magis diligendus ille qui est magis nobis conjunctus secundum carnalem originem. Dicitur enim Prov., xviii, 24: Vir amicabilis* ad societatem magis amicus erit quam frater. Et Valerius Maximus dicit, lib. IV, c. vii, in princ., quod « amicitiæ vinculum prævalidum est, neque ulla ex parte sanguinis viribus inferius. Hoc etiam certius, et exploratius, quod illud nascendi sors fortuitum opus dedit; hoc uniuscujusque solido judicio incoacta voluntas contrahit. » Ergo illi qui sunt conjuncti sanguine, non sunt magis diligendi quam aliis.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.arg.2] Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): "I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace." Surely we ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Ambrosius, in I De offic., cap. vii, col. 34, t. 3: « Non minus vos diligo, quos in Evangelio genui, quam si conjugio suscepissem: non enim vehementior est natura ad diligendum quam gratia. Plus certe diligere debemus quos perpetuo nobiscum putamus futuros, quam quos tantum in hoc sæculo. » Non ergo consanguinei sunt magis diligendi his qui sunt aliter nobis conjuncti.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.arg.3] Further, "Love is proved by deeds," as Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of all.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, « probatio dilectionis exhibitio est operis, » ut Gregorius dicit in Hom. xxx in Evang., § 1, col. 1220, t. 2. Sed quibusdam magis debemus impendere dilectionis opera quam etiam consanguineis; sicut magis est obediendum in exercitu duci quam patri. Ergo illi qui sunt sanguine juncti, non sunt maxime diligendi.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.sc] The commandments of the decalogue contain a special precept about the honor due to our parents (Exodus 20:12). Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod specialiter in præceptis decalogi mandatur de honoratione parentum, ut patet Exod., xx. Ergo illi qui sunt nobis conjuncti secundum carnis originem, sunt a nobis specialius diligendi.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.co] As stated above (Article 7), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."

The same applies to other kinds of friendship.

If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, illi qui sunt nobis magis conjuncti, sunt ex charitate magis diligendi; tum quia intensius diliguntur, tum etiam quia pluribus rationibus diliguntur. Intensio autem dilectionis est ex conjunctione dilecti ad diligentem. Et ideo diversorum dilectio est mensuranda secundum diversam rationem conjunctionis, ut scilicet unusquisque diliga-tur magis in eo quod pertinet ad illam conjunctionem secundum quam diligitur. Et ulterius comparanda est dilectio dilectioni secundum comparisonem conjunctionis ad conjunctionem. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod amicitia consanguineorum fundatur in conjunctione naturalis originis, amicitia autem concivium in communicatione civili, et amicitia commilitantium in communicatione bellica. Et ideo in his quae pertinent ad naturam, plus debemus diligere consanguineos; in his autem quae pertinent ad civilem conversationem, plus debemus diligere concives, et in bellicis plus commilitones. Unde et Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. ii, a med., quod « singulis propria et congruentia sunt attribuenda. Sic autem et facere videntur; ad nuptias enim vocant cognatos; videbitur utique et nutrimenta parentibus oportere maxime sufficere et honorem paternum. » Et simile est etiam in aliis. Si autem comparemus etiam conjunctionem ad conjunctionem, constat quod conjunctionio naturalis originis est prior et immobilior, quia est secundum id quod pertinet ad substantiam; aliæ autem conjunctiones sunt supervenientes, et removeri possunt. Et ideo amicitia consanguineorum est stabilior; sed aliæ amicitia possunt esse potiores secundum illud quod est proprium unicuique amicitiae.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.ad.1] In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quia amicitia sociorum propria electione contrahitur in his quae sub nostra electione cadunt, puta in agendis; præponderat hæc dilectio dilectioni consanguineorum, ut scilicet magis cum illis consentiamus in agendis. Amicitia tamen consanguineorum est stabilior, utpote naturalior existens; et prævalet in his quae ad naturam spectant; unde magis eis tenemur in provisione necessariorum.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.ad.2] Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Ambrosius loquitur de dilectione quantum ad beneficia quae pertinent ad communicationem gratiae, scilicet de instructione morum. In hoc enim magis debet homo subvenire filiis spiritualibus, quos spiritualiter genuit, quam filiis corporalibus, quibus tenetur magis providere in corporalibus subsidiis.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.ad.3] The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply but relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in battle.

[II-II.q.26.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex hoc duci exercitus magis obeditur in bello patri, non probatur quod simplicite — minus diligatur, sed quod minus diligitur secundum quid, id est secundum dilectionem bellicæ communicationis.

Article 9

[II-II.q.26.a.9.arg.1] It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Corinthians 12:14): "Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children." Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.arg.1] Ad nonum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo ex charitate magis debeat diligere filium quam patrem. Illum enim magis debemus diligere cui magis debemus benefacere. Sed magis demus benefacere filius quam parentibus; dicit enim Apostolus II ad Corinth., xii, 14: Non* debent filii parentibus thesaurizare, sed parentes filii. Ergo magis sunt diligendi filii quam parentes.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.arg.2] Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.arg.2] 2. Præterea, gratia perficit naturam. Sed naturaliter parentes plus diligunt filios quam ab eis diligantur, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. xii, parum a princ. Ergo magis debemus diligere filios quam parentes.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.arg.3] Further, man's affections are conformed to God by charity. But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also ought to love our children more than our parents.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.arg.3] 3. Præterea, per charitatem affectus hominis Deo conformatur. Sed Deus magis diligit filios quam diligatur ab eis. Ergo etiam et nos magis debemus diligere filios quam parentes.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.sc] Ambrose [Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "We ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those of our household."

[II-II.q.26.a.9.sc] Sed contra est quod Ambrosius 1 dicit in Glossa ord., Sup. illud Cant., ii: Ordinavit in me charitatem, col. 1437, t. 4: « Primo Deus diligendus est, secundo parentes, deinde filii, post domestici. »

[II-II.q.26.a.9.co] As stated above (4, ad 1; 7), the degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object. On this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like God.

Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more closely connected with him, in which way a man's children are more lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love of a father for his children, is more like a man's love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Sirach 9:14: "Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him."

[II-II.q.26.a.9.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, gradus dilectionis ex duobus pensari potest: uno modo ex parte objecti; et secundum hoc id quod habet majorem rationem boni, est magis diligendum, et quod est Deo similius; et sic pater est magis diligendus quam filius; quia scilicet patrem diligimus sub ratione principii, quod habet rationem eminentioris boni, et Deo similioris. Alio modo computatur gradus dilectionis ex parte ipsius diligentis; et sic magis diligitur quod est conjunctius: et secundum hoc filius est magis diligendus quam pater, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. xii. Primo quidem, quia parentes diligunt filios ut aliquid sui existentes: pater autem non est aliquid filii; et ideo dilectio secundum quam pater diligit filium, similiar est dilectioni qua quis diligit seipsum. Secundo, quia parentes magis sciunt aliquos esse filios quam e converso. Tertio, quia filius est magis propinquus parenti, utpote pars existens, quam pater filio, ad quem habet habitinem principii. Quarto quia parentes diutius amaverunt: nam statim pater incipit diligere filium; filius autem tempore procedente incipit diligere patrem. Dilectio autem quanto est diuturnior, tanto est fortior, secundum illud Eccli., ix, 14: Non derelinquas amicum antiquum, novus enim non erit similis illi.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.ad.1] The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of care.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod principio debetur subjectio reverentiae 2 et honor; effectui autem proportionaliter competit recipere influentiam principii, et provisionem ipsius: et propter hoc parentibus a filius magis debetur honor, filius autem magis debetur cura provisionis.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.ad.2] It is natural for a man as father to love his children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod pater naturaliter plus diligit filium secundum rationem conjunctionis ad seipsum; sed secundum rationem eminentioris boni, filius naturaliter plus diligit patrem.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for his parents before all.

[II-II.q.26.a.9.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Au- 1 Non occurrit apud Ambrosium; Parm. affert Origenem, Homil. III in Cant. 2 Sic cod.; Parm.: « subjectio, reverentia.

Article 10

[II-II.q.26.a.10.arg.1] It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), "the female produces the body in generation." Now man receives his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in I, 90, 2;118. Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more than him.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.arg.1] Ad decimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo magis debeat diligere matrem quam patrem. Ut enim Philosophus dicit in I De generat. animalium, cap. xix, et lib. II, cap. iv, a med., « femina in generatione dat corpus. » Sed homo non habet animam a patre, sed per creationem a Deo, ut in I dictum est. Ergo homo plus habet a matre quam a patre. Plus ergo debet diligere matrem quam patrem.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.arg.2] Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows more surely than the father who are her children."

[II-II.q.26.a.10.arg.2] 2. Præterea, magis amantem debet magis diligere. Sed mater plus diligit filium quam pater; dicit enim Philosophus in IX Ethic., « Ille igitur usus qui dicitur Dei, quo nobis utitur, non ad ejus sed ad nostram utilitatem refertur, ad ejus autem tantummodo bonitatem. » Migne. Apud Ambrosium non occurrit. S. Thomas, in III Sent., docet patrem, absolute loquendo, in necessitate constitutum præferendum esse filio, quia pater diligitur ut causa, filius ut effectus; major est autem obligatio effectus ad causam quam causa ad effectum, dist. xxix, a. 7. Hanc doctrinam tradimus, et noilemus ullam contra eam objectionem afferre. Sed objectio doctrinam non tollit, nisi sit insolubilis absolute. Forsitan igitur opponi posset quod distinctio necessaria est inter causam primam et causas secundas, seu inter Deum et alios patres. Si de Deo agatur, licet ordo providentiæ illius exigat ut creaturam suam non destituat auxiliis, nil tamen creaturæ suæ debet; creatura autem omnia debet illi. Unde verificatur optime in hoc casu principium nostri doctoris: « Major est obligatio effectus ad causam quam causa ad effectum. » Sed si agatur de patre terreno quem Deus primo pro seipso et secundo pro filio suo fecit, ita ut aliquo sensu potius sint patres filiorum, quam filii parentum, siquidem filius sit finis quidam a cap. vii, et lib. VIII, cap. xii, quod « matres magis sunt amantes filiorum. Laboriosior enim est generatio matrum, et magis sciunt qui ipsarum sint filii, quam patres. » Ergo mater est magis diligenda quam pater.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.arg.3] Further, love should be more fond towards those who have labored for us more, according to Romans 16:6: "Salute Mary, who hath labored much among you." Now the mother labors more than the father in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written (Sirach 7:29): "Forget not the groanings of thy mother." Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his father.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ei debetur major dilectionis affectus, qui pro nobis plus laboravit, secundum illud Rom., ult., 6: Salutate Mariam, quæ multum laboravit in vobis. Sed mater plus laborat in generatione et educa-tione quam pater; unde dicitur Eccli., vii, 29: Gemitus matris tuæ ne obliviscaris. Ergo plus debet homo diligere matrem quam patrem.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.sc] Jerome says on Ezekiel 44:25 that "man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his own father," and mentions the mother afterwards.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Hieronymus, Super Ezech., cap. xliv, v. 25, col. 442, t. 5, quod « post Deum omnium patrem diligendus est pater; » et postea addit de matre.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.co] In making such comparisons as this, we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: "Good servants should be preferred to wicked children."

Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to be loved more.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in istis comparationibus id quod dicitur est intelligendum per se, ut videlicet intelligatur esse quæsitum de patre, inquantum est pater an sit plus diligendus quam mater, inquantum est mater. Potest enim in omnibus hujusmodi tanta esse distantia virtutis et malitiæ, ut amicitia solvatur vel minuatur, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. vii; et ideo, ut Ambrosius dicit in Glossa ord., col. 1437, t. 4, super illud: Ordinavit in me charitatem: « Boni domestici sunt ma-lis filii præponendi. » Sed, per se loquendo, pater magis est amandus quam mater. Amantur enim pater Deo ordinatus patris, non vero pater finis quidam a Deo ordinatus filii, non clare video quod filius effectus patris magis obligetur causæ ipsius patri, quam causa filii pater, ad filium ut ad finem quem-dam a Deo ordinatus, filio cui ordinatur, et qui ipsius est effectus. Naturaliter, ni fallor, amore majori parentes filios favent quam filii parentes. Res ea mensura disposuit Auctor ipse naturæ, quia voluit nos futurum inquirere. Futurum cum aspicimus parentes nobis in via non occurrunt; sed nos filii parentibus occurrimus in via, cum oculis et desideriis futurum amplexari conantur. Aliter nihilominus loquendum de parentibus ante nos in æterna felicitate locatis; hos enim futurum amplexando in Deo amplectimur. — Cæterum si obligatio mutua super præstita beneficia fundatur omnia filii parentibus debent; et inde major est obligatio filiorum absque ulla comparatione. — Theologi in hac quæstione idem sentiunt ac D. Thomas, et licet durior sit electio quando in naufragio, v. g., vel patri vel filio succurrere oporteat, nec duobus succurri possit efficaciter, ratio tamen dictat potius salvandum esse patrem. et mater ut principia quædam naturalis originis. Pater autem habet excellentiorem rationem principii quam mater; quia pater est principium per modum agentis, mater autem magis per modum patientis et materiæ. Et ideo, per se loquendo, pater magis est diligendus.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.ad.1] In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the body to receive that form.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in generatione hominis mater ministrat materiam corporis informem; formatur autem per virtutem formativam, quæ est in semine patris. Et quamvis hujusmodi virtus non possit creare animam rationalem, disponit tamen materiam corporalem ad hujusmodi formæ susceptionem.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.ad.2] This applies to another kind of love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother through being begotten of them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

[II-II.q.26.a.10.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc pertinet ad aliam rationem dilectionis. Alia enim est species amicitiæ qua diligimus amantem, et qua diligimus generantem. Nunc autem loquimur de amicitia quæ debetur patri et matri secundum generationis rationem. Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium.

Article 12

[II-II.q.26.a.12.arg.1] It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above all.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.arg.1] Ad duodecimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod homo magis debeat diligere benefactorem quam beneficiatum. Dicit enim Augustinus in lib. De catechizandis rudibus, cap. iv, col. 314, t. 6: « Nulla major est provocatio ad amandum quam prævenire amando; nimis enim durus est animus qui dilectionem, etsi non vult impendere, nolit rependere. » Sed benefactores præveniunt nos in beneficio charitatis. Ergo benefactores maxime debemus diligere.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.arg.2] Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to whom we are kind.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.arg.2] 2. Præterea, tanto aliquis est magis diligendus, quanto gravius homo peccat, si ab ejus dilectione desistat, vel contra eum agat. Sed gravius peccat qui benefactorem non diligit, vel contra eum agit, quam si diligere desinat eum cui hactenus benefecit. Ergo magis sunt amandi benefactores quam hi quibus benefacimus.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.arg.3] Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and then one's father, as Jerome says [Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25]. Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should be loved above all others.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter omnia diligenda maxime diligendus est Deus, et post eum pater, ut Hieronymus dicit, Super Ezech., c. xliv, v. 25, col. 442, t. 5. Sed isti sunt maxime benefactores. Ergo benefactor est maxime diligendus.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.sc] The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa."

[II-II.q.26.a.12.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. vii, in princ., quod « benefactores magis videntur amare beneficiatos quam e converso. »

[II-II.q.26.a.12.co] As stated above (A9,11), a thing is loved more in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. On the first way we ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father (9).

In the second way, however, we love those more who have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: "He was made by so and so." Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that we love "to be" and "to live," and these are made manifest in our "action." Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one's virtuous good than one's useful good, both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover's part to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to us.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, aliquid diligitur magis dupli-citer: uno modo quia habet rationem excellentioris boni; alio modo ratione majoris conjunctionis. Primo quidem modo inflicta ab hominibus si mater ipsa ab iisdem aliter salvari non posset. Nil contra matrem directe attentat iste innocens. Non est proprie impugnator, et licet sit cum matre moraliter et fere physice unum corpus, non videtur nihilominus legitimum et rectum quod a corpore materno, ut istud totum salvetur corpus, quasi membrum noxium rescindatur. Nam, etiam omissa consideratione vitæ supernaturalis cui ordinatur puer, vita naturali gaudet quæ comparari non potest vitæ qualiscumque corporalis membri absque detrimento vitæ totius corporis resecari a corpore habilis. Unde non est, ut diximus, paritas. Mater insuper debet parere filios; et hoc est officium ipsius, et ad id gravida mulier tenetur. Eodem modo ac miles usque ad mortem inclusive ex officio debet pro patria sua pugnare, quia talis est obligatio status et conditionis suæ; eodem modo benefactor est magis diligendus: quia cum sit principium boni in beneficiato, habet excellentioris boni rationem, sicut et de patre dictum est. Secundo autem modo magis diligimus beneficiatos, ut Philosophus probat in IX Ethic., cap. vii, per quatuor rationes. Primo quidem quia beneficiatus est quasi quoddam opus benefactoris; unde consuevit dici de aliquo: « Iste est factura illius. » Naturale est autem cuilibet ut diligat opus suum: sicut videmus quod poetæ diligunt poemata sua; et hoc ideo quia unumquodque diligit suum esse, et suum vivere, quod maxime manifestatur in suo agere. Secundo quia unusquisque naturaliter diligit illud in quo inspicit suum bonum. Habet quidem et benefactor in beneficiato aliquod bonum, et e converso; sed benefactor inspicit in beneficiato suum bonum honestum, et beneficiatus in benefactore suum bonum utile. Bonum autem honestum delectabilius consideratur quam bonum utile: tum quia est diuturnius; utilitas enim cito transit, et delectatio memoriæ non est sicut delectatio rei præsentis: tum etiam quia bona honesta magis cum delectatione recolimus, quam utilitates quae nobis ab aliis provenerunt. Tertio, quia ad amantem pertinet agere; vult enim et operatur bonum amato; ad amatum autem pertinet bonum pati; et ideo excellentioris est amare; et propter hoc ad benefactorem pertinet ut plus. Quarto quia difficilius est beneficia impendere quam recipere. Ea vero in quibus laboramus, magis diligimus; quae vero nobis de facili proveniunt, quodammodo contemnimus.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.ad.1] It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do through another.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in benefactore est ut beneficiatus provocetur ad ipsum amandum. Benefactor autem diligit mulier gravida usque ad mortem inclusive ex officio debet pro parturiendo filio sese devovere, quia talis est status et conditionis suæ lex. Addo quæ-dam attentari posse chirurgica ut, absque operatione ista nefanda quam embryotomiam appellant, saluti matris ac infantis provideatur, quamvis non sine magno periculo matris. Cæsar in exemplum longo ex tempore habetur. Quod si hæc matter sufferre renuat, non præcepto ad id compellenda est; sed tunc eventum cursui rerum naturali tradat, et homicidii scelus abhorreat; idem abhorreat, prohibatque pater. « Nulla est major ad amorem invitatio... qui dilectionem si nolebat impendere. » Migne. Sic cod.; in beneficiatum non quasi provocatus ab illo, sed ex seipso motus. Quod autem ex se est, potius est eo quod est per aliud.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.ad.2] The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod amor beneficiati ad benefactorem est magis debitus; et ideo contrarium habet rationem majoris peccati. Sed amor benefactoris ad beneficiatum est magis spontaneus; et ideo habet majorem promptitudinem.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.ad.3] God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.

[II-II.q.26.a.12.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus etiam plus nos diligit quam nos eum diligamus; et parentes plus diligunt filios quam ab eis diligantur. Nec tamen oportet quod quoslibet beneficiatos plus diligamus quibuslibet benefactoribus. Benefactores enim a quibus maxima beneficia recepimus, scilicet Deum et parentes, præferimus his quibus aliqua minora beneficia impendimus. Conclusio — Benefactor quadam ratione magis, et quadam ratione minus quam beneficii receptor, est diligendus.

Article 13

[II-II.q.26.a.13.arg.1] It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): "Perfect charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less." Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who are better more than either himself or those who are connected with him.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.arg.2] Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God's will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille magis amatur cui majus bonum volumus. Sed quilibet in patria existens vult majus bonum ei qui plus bo- « Hæc est perfecta justitia, qua potius potiora, et minus minora diligimus. » Migne. Ita Nicolaï, edit. Patav. cum mss.; al.: « meliorem. » Distinguendum est inter beneficiatos; alii enim sunt beneficiati ex lege naturæ; alii ex electione libera benefactoris. Sic filii sunt respectu parentum ex lege naturæ beneficiati, non vero respectu mei quicumque per me bonis ac divitiis temporalibus augeretur, si mihi nullius carnalis conjunctionis vinculo ligaretur. De illis ultimis beneficiatis hic agitur; et satis evidens est hominem debere magis benefactores quam tales beneficiatos diligere. Debet enim benefactoribus gratitudinem, nilque debet beneficiatis talibus. Secus si ageretur de beneficiatis carnaliter junctis.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.arg.3] Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God's sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Corinthians 15:28: "That God may be all in all." Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.arg.3] 3. Præterea, tota ratio dilectionis in patria Deus erit: tunc enim implebitur quod dictur I ad Cor., xv, 28: Ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus. Ergo magis diligetur qui est Deo propinquior; et ita aliquis magis diliget meliorem quam seipsum, et ita extraneum quam conjunctum.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.sc] Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above (A2,3,4) is derived from nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others. Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.sc] Sed contra est quod natura non tollitur per gloriam, sed perficitur. Ordo autem charitatis supra positus, ex ipsa natura procedit. Omnia enim naturaliter plus se quam alia amant. Ergo iste ordo charitatis remanebit in patria.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.co] The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be necessary, because, as we stated above (A7,9), the degrees of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. On the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above (A7,9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end according to his capacity.

As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, necesse est ordinem charitatis remanere in patria quantum ad hoc quod Deus est super omnia diligendus. Hoc enim simpliciter erit tunc quando homo perfecte eo fruetur. Sed de ordine suiipsius ad alios distinguendum videtur: quia, sicut supra dictum est, dilectionis gradus distingui potest, vel secundum differentiam boni quod quis alii exoptat, vel secundum intensionem dilectionis. Primo quidem modo plus diliget meliores quam seipsum, minus vero minus bonos. Volet enim quilibet beatus unumquemque habere quod ipsi debetur secundum divinam justitiam, propter perfectam conformitatem voluntatis humanæ ad divinam. Nec tunc erit tempus proficiendi per meritum ad majus præmium; sicut nunc accidit, quando potest homo melioris et virtutem et præribus quam cuivis benefactori quantumvis insigni; » ergo beneficiatis carnaliter junctis. Hoc tamen discrete intelligendum est, si agatur, ut jam antea monuimus, de consanguineis remotioribus. Per accidens etiam aliquis benefactor magis diligendus esset beneficiato etiam proximiori carnaliter juncto: v. g. si te a morte eripuit quam filius inferre volebat: hoc nihilominus sub dubio aliquo tradere libet.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.ad.1] This argument should be granted as to those who are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since perfect charity directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as stated above.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quantum ad conjunctos sibi ratio illa concedenda est; sed quantum ad seipsum, oportet quod aliquis plus se quam alios diligat, tanto magis quanto perfectior est charitas; quia perfectio charitatis ordinat hominem perfecte in Deum, quod pertinet ad dilectionem suiipsius, ut dictum est.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.ad.2] This argument considers the order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de ordine dilectionis secundum gradum boni quod aliquis vult amato.

[II-II.q.26.a.13.ad.3] God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love himself more than all else after God.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.26.a.13.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod unicuique erit Deus tota ratio diligendi, eo quod Deus est totum hominis bonum. Dato enim per impossibile quod Deus non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi. Et ideo in ordine dilectionis oportet quod post Deum homo maxime diligat seipsum. Conclusio — Ordo charitatis, quo Deus super omnia diligendus est, necessario manet in patria; ibi tamen quilibet homo beatus, ex parte quidem boni quod alteri optatur, proximum meliorem magis quam seipsum diliget, ex parte autem diligentis, seipsum intensius quam proximum ama-bit. Sic cod.; edit.: « modis. » — — Ita mss. et editi passim; cod. Cam.: « ad perfectionem suiipsius. » Opinio quorumdam dicentium quod quilibet in cælo tantum diligit proximum quantum se, et tantum gaudebit de bonis proximi quantum de proprio, ut dicit Anselmus, non est satis probabilis, nec tenenda. Nec ibi intendit Anselmus negare gradum, scilicet, quin in cælo post Deum quis præ aliis seipsum prædiligat; sed solummodo exprimere intendit charitatis perfectionem in patria; quisque enim tunc non minus diligit alium quam seipsum, id est non minus perfecte quam debet, licet post Deum seipsum intensive prædiligat. Charitas nunquam excidit sive prophetiæ evacuabuntur, sive linguaæ cessabunt, sive scientia destructur. Ex parte enim cognoscimus, et ex parte prophetamus. Cum autem venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est, I Cor., xiii. Glossa: « Nunquam excidit neque in hoc sæculo, neque in futuro. Ex parte enim; ostendit quod evacuabitur prophetia, donum linguarum, et scientia, et similiter fides et spes, quia habent aliquid vanita-tatis et imperfectionis. Et hoc est cum dicit: sive linguaæ, etc. Ex parte, id est imperfecte. Cujus sunt duæ causæ. Una est imperfectio nostri intellectus, qui modo est ad spiritualia quasi oculus noctuæ ad solem, propter quem multa nobis apparent in re-bus spiritualibus quæ non sunt in eis; sicut oculus lippus videt quasi circulum circa candelam, cum ibi non sit, sed est quidam humor in ipso oculo. Alia causa est quia quod videt intellectus noter, non valet videre in lumine sed in tenebris. Omnis enim creatura in se est tenebra, et ideo cum videt Deum in creatura, imperfecte cognoscit eum; sed videbit omnia in veritate sua, et tunc perfecte cognoscet Deum in Deo, et omnia alia in eo. Sed modo omnis creatura vanitati subjecta est, Rom., viii. Probat per exemplum quod imperfectio quæ modo est in prædictis evacuabitur adveniente perfectione. Sicut enim cognitio parvuli imperfecta est in comparatione ejusdem in statu viri, et evacuatur tunc: similiter est de nostra cognitione quæ modo est quasi parvuli. » Hugo a S. Charo: « Eadem ratione debet dici quod evacuabitur charitas, quia modo ex parte est, id est, imperfecte diligimus Deum respectu futuræ dilectionis, sicut dicit Glossa inferius: dicit enim: charitas modo ex parte est, id est imperfecte respectu futuri status; ergo evacuabitur sicut fides et spes; et iterum ex parte dici debet. Solutio. Quædam virtutes ex propria natura imperfectionem habent; ut fides ex propria natura sua habet quod sit de eo quod non videtur, et spes similiter, quia quod videt quis sperat? et ideo evacuabuntur, et ex parte dicuntur. Charitas autem est tum de eo quod videt, tum de eo quod non videt, et ei accidit

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