Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q29. Peace
Source context
- Theme
- peace as an infused virtue ordered by charity toward right relation with God and neighbor
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 54, 1905-10-12Steiner identifies genuine peace as inseparable from spiritual knowledge, arguing that the spiritual-scientific movement is the only adequate basis for a true peace movement.
- GA 180, 1918-01-13Steiner distinguishes sharply between political or national peace and real peace, insisting the two must not be conflated and that only inner spiritual orientation grounds the latter.
- GA 268Steiner's meditative verses in this volume cultivate inner peace as a soul condition arising from alignment with divine being, structurally parallel to Aquinas's pax as the tranquillity of right order.
Cross-tradition
- Augustinian theology (pax as tranquillitas ordinis)Augustine's definition of peace as the tranquillity of order — which Aquinas explicitly inherits in Q29 — positions peace as the proper end of all rightly ordered love, a parallel that Aquinas formalizes into the virtue-theological framework of the Secunda Secundae.
- Vedanta (shanti)Shanti in Vedantic tradition denotes a stillness that arises not from absence of conflict but from the soul's established rootedness in Brahman, showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that true peace is an effect of charity rather than mere external cessation of strife.
Q29. Peace
Article 1
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pax sit idem quod concordia. Dicit enim Augustinus, De civitate Dei, lib. XIX, cap. xiii, col. 640, t. 7: « Pax hominum est ordinata concordia. Sed non loquimur nunc nisi de pace hominum. Ergo pax est idem quod concordia.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.2] Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, concordia est quædam unio voluntatum. Sed ratio pacis in tali unione consistit; dicit enim Dionysius, xi cap. De tatem. Adepta etiam dignitate, quietudo vel pax non sequitur, sed magis ac magis crescit ambitio. Secundo quædam est pax sophistica, puta in vulgaribus amicitiis et mundanis, quoniam inter amicissimos videmus quando graves inimicitias suboriri, quæ pristinam dulcedinem abolentes in-expressibilem amaritudinem pariunt. Homo pacis meæ in quo sperabam magnificabit super me supplantationem, Psalm. Tertio pax quædam est diabolica quam se dicunt habere peccatores, quando possunt voluptates suas adimplere; sed non est pax impiis, Isa., xlvii. Quomodo pacem potest habere qui gladium portat in corde, qui jacet in spinis, qui latrones habet in domo, qui pacis actori resistit: Quis enim ei resistit et pacem habuit? Job, iii. Bona pax est interna, fraterna, superna, cum seipso, cum proximis, cum Deo. Deus est pacis lator, pacis dator, aemulator, propugnator, pra-miator, princeps et Deus. — Pax interna est affectuose quærenda, et studiose servanda, et custoditur in puritate conscientiae, in fervore dilectionis, in claritate sapientiae, in dulcore devotionis. — Pax fraterna est pax hominis ad hominem, de qua: Pacem habete inter vos, Marc., ix. Debemus servare unitatem in conveniendo, sanctitatem in exemplando, patientiam in tolerando, et prudentiam in declinando, quia si sunt aliqui sic protervi, rationis expertes, et omnis justitiae inimici, quod non possint ad pacem adduci, nec rationem reddendo, nex exhortando, nec corripiendo, nec etiam patiendo, tunc, si vis habere pacem, necesse habes talium consortium, convictum, commercia et colloquia declinare. Fraterna pax est duplex, domestica et politica. Pacem domesticam debet paterfamilias procurare et fovere in domo sibi commissa. Pax vero politica est pax reipublicae, quæ summe desiderari debet, et tanto vehementius debet optari, diligentius observari, quanto plura bona ex ipsa provenient et pluribus, et quanto ex ejus contrario plura mala procedunt. Ad hoc autem ut in reipublica sit pax, requiruntur ad Deum reverentia cum timore, in principe providentia cum amore, in subditis obedientia cum honore. — Pax superna duplex est, inchoata et consummata. Prima est quam habemus ad Deum in Ecclesia militante; secunda est quam speramus nos habituros in Deo, et cum Deo, in Ecclesia triumphante. div. nom., § 1, col. 947, t. 1, quod « pax est omnium unitiva, et consensus operativa. » Ergo pax est idem quod concordia.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.3] Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Corinthians 16:33): "God is not the God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quorum est idem oppositum, et ipsa sunt idem. Sed idem opponitur concordiae et paci, scilicet dissensio; unde dicitur I ad Cor., xiv, 33: Non est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis. Ergo pax est idem quod concordia.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.sc] There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isaiah 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.sc] Sed contra est, quod concordia potest esse aliquorum impiorum in malo. Sed non est pax impiis, ut dicitur Isa., xlviii, 22. Ergo pax non est idem quod concordia.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.co] Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Galatians 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod pax includit concordiam, et aliquid addit. Unde ubicumque est pax, ibi est concordia; non tamen ubicumque est concordia, ibi est pax, si no men pacis proprie sumatur. Concordia enim proprie sumpta est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum consensum conveniunt. Contingit autem unius hominis cor tendere in diversa, et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo secundum diversas potentias appetitivas; sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in contrarium rationalis appetitus, secundum illud ad Gal., v, 17: Caro concupiscit adversus spiritum. Alio modo inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit, quæ simul assequi non potest. Unde necesse est esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus. Unio autem horum motuum est quidem de ratione pacis; non enim homo habet pacatum cor, quamdiu, etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen adhuc restat ei aliquid volendum, quod simul ha- Ex versione Joannis Sarrasini. Corderius: « Hæc enim est quæ cuncta conjungit, et universorum concordiam ac connexionem gignit efficitque. » Ita codices; in Parm. et edit.: « quamdiu non habet id quod vult, etsi. » — Parm. addit: « sibi. » — Parm. addit: « sibi. » Concordia est animorum indisrupta quædam et unita complexio. Pax est animorum in bono concordantium ordinata complexio. Varro in Sent.: « Alit concordiam mores ad cohabitantium animos formare. » Ex Proverbiis sapientium: « Principium discordiae est aliquid ex communi suum facere. Quietissime namque viverent homines, si duo verba de medio tollerentur, meum scilicet et tuum. ... Ab alio itaque semper incipiat dissensio, a te vero reconciliatio. » Sallustius, in Bello jugurthino: « Concordia parvæ res crescunt, discordia maximæ dilabuntur. » Seneca, De moribus: « Pacem habete cum hominibus, cum vitiis bellum. » Fulgentius, in libro Mitilogiarum: « Sapientes viri majorem cum vitiis quam cum inimicis pugnam gerunt. » Didymus, Ad Alexandrum: « Nos bella non bere non potest. Hæc autem unio non est de ratione concordiae. Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax autem supra hanc unionem importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de pace quæ est unius hominis ad alium; et hanc pacem dicit esse concordiam, non quamlibet, sed ordinatam, ex eo scilicet quod unus homo concordat cum alio secundum illud quod utrique convenit. Si enim homo concordat cum alio non spontanea voluntate, sed quasi coactus timore alicujus mali imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax; quia non servatur ordo utriusque concordantis, sed perturbatur ab aliquo timorem inferente. Et propter hoc submittit, quod « pax est tranquillitas ordinis; » quæ quidem tranquillitas consistit in hoc quod omnes motus appetitivi ejus sint consentientes.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.2] If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod si homo simul cum alio homine in idem consentiat, non tamen consensus ejus est omnino unius, nisi etiam sibi invicem omnes motus appetitivi ejus sint consentientes.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.3] A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod paci opponitur duplex dissensio; scilicet dissensio hominis ad seipsum, et dissensio hominis ad alterum. Concordiae autem opponitur hæc sola secunda dissensio.
Article 2
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non omnia appetant pacem. Pax enim, secundum Dionysium, cap. xi De div. nom., § 1, col. 947, t. 1, est « unitiva consensus. » Sed in his quæ cognitione carent, non potest uniri consensus. Ergo hujusmodi pacem appetere non possunt.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.2] Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, appetitus non fertur simul ad contraria. Sed multi sunt appetentes bella et dissensiones. Ergo non omnes appetunt pacem.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.3] Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matthew 10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, solum bonum est appetibile. Sed quædam pax videtur esse mala : alioquin Dominus non diceret Matth., x, 34 : Non veni pacem mittere. Ergo non omnia pacem appetunt.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.4] Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mark 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse summum bonum, quod est ultimus finis. Sed pax non est hujusmodi, quia etiam in statu viæ habetur; alioquin frustra Dominus mandaret, Marc., 1x, 49 : Pacem habete inter vos. Ergo non omnia pacem appetunt.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
[II-II.q.29.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX De civitate Dei, cap. xii, col. 637, t. 7, quod « omnia pacem appetunt. » Et idem etiam dicit Dionysius, cap. xi De divin. nom., § 3, col. 951, t. 1.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.co] From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."
[II-II.q.29.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod homo aliquid appetit, consequens est ipsum appetere ejus, quod appetit, assecutionem; et per consequens remotionem eorum quæ assecutionem impedire possunt. Potest autem impediri assecutio boni desiderati per contrarium appetitum vel suiipsius vel alterius; et utrumque tollitur per pacem, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo necesse est quod omne appetens appetat pacem, inquantum scilicet omne appetens appetit tranquille et sine impedimento pervenire ad id quod appetit, in quo consistit ratio pacis, quam Augustinus, lib. XIX De civit. Dei, c. xiii, col. 640, t. 7, definit « tranquillitatem ordinis. »
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.1] Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod pax importat unionem non solum appetitus intellectualis, seu rationalis, aut animalis, ad quos potest pertinere consensus, sed etiam appetitus naturalis; et ideo Dionysius dicit quod « pax est operativa et consensus et connaturalitatis; » ut in consensu importetur unio appetituum ex cognitione procedentium, per connaturalitatem autem importetur unio appetituum naturalium.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.2] Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi etiam qui bella quærunt et dissensiones, non desiderant nisi pacem, quam se habere non existimant. Ut enim dictum est, non est pax si quis cum alio concordet contra id quod ipse magis vellet. Et ideo homines quærunt hanc concordiam rumpere bellando, tanquam defectum pacis habentem, ut ad pacem perveniant, in qua nihil eorum voluntati repugnet. Et propter hoc omnes bellantes quærunt per bella ad pacem aliquam pervenire perfectiorem quam prius haberent.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.3] Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wisdom 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pax consistit in quietatione et unione appetitus. Sicut autem appetitus potest esse simpliciter boni, vel boni apparentis; ita etiam et pax potest esse et vera, et apparens. Vera quidem pax non potest esse nisi circa appetitum veri boni; quia omne malum, etsi secundum aliquid appareat bonum, unde ex aliqua parte appetitum quietat; habet tamen multos defectus, ex quibus appetitus remanet inquietus et perturbatus. Unde pax vera non Prudentius: Pax plenum virtutis opus, pax summa laborum, Pax belli exacti, pretiumque periclit. Nil placidum est sine pace Deo; nesc munus ad aram Cum cupias offerre probat, si turbida ferrem. Meritorum clausula pax est; non inflata tumet; Non invidet aemula facti. Omnia perpetitur patiens atque omnia credit. Nunquam læsa dolet, cuncta offensacula donat. Occasum lucis venia præcurrere gestit. Cato: Ira odium generat, concordia nutrit amorem. Ex his conclude non eodem modo philosophos concordiam a pace distinctam habuisse ac D. Thomas. Nam pax, juxta D. Thomam, importat et unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium, et, super hanc unionem, etiam unius appetentis unionem. Sed, juxta præallagata philosophorum dicta, concordia est animorum indisrupta quædam et unita connexio, pax autem est animorum in bono concordantium ordinata tranquillitas; non importat igitur pax illa philosophica supra unionem concordiae unionem etiam unius appetentis; sed solam in bono concordiam animorum notioni concordiae philosophi illi addunt, ut pax constituatur. 1 Parm. : « qui. » 2 Hinc Augustinus, lib. XIX De civit. Dei, c. xiii, postquam præmisit nullum esse qui pacem nolit, subdit : « Quandoquidem et ipsi qui bella volunt, nihil aliud quam vincere volunt : ad gloriosam ergo pacem bellando cupiunt pervenire. » 3 Sic cod. ; non ut in Parm. : « puta. » potest esse nisi in bonis et bonorum. Pax autem, quæ malorum est, est pax apparens, et non vera; unde dicitur Sap., xiv, 22: In magno viventes inscientiæ bello, tot et tam magna mala pacem appellant.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.4] Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Psalm 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum vera pax non sit nisi de bono; sicut dupliciter habetur verum bonum, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte, ita est duplex pax vera. Una qui dem perfecta, quæ consistit in perfecta fruitione summi boni per quam omnes appetitus uniuntur quietati in uno; et hic est ultimus finis creaturæ rationalis, secundum illud psal. cxlvii, 14: Qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Alia vero est pax imperfecta, quæ habetur in hoc mundo; quia, etsi principalis animæ motus quiescat in Deo, sunt tamen aliqua repugnantia et intus, et extra, quæ perturbant hanc pacem.
Article 3
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pax non sit proprius effectus charitatis. Charitas enim non habetur sine gratia gratum faciente. Sed pax a quibusdam habetur qui non habent gratiam gratum facientem, sicut et gentiles aliquando habent pacem. Ergo pax non est effectus charitatis.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.2] Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud non est effectus charitatis cujus contrarium cum charitate esse potest. Sed dissensio, quæ contrariatur paci, potest esse cum charitate; videmus enim quod etiam sacri doctores, ut Hieronymus et Augustinus, in aliquibus opinionibus dissenserunt. Paulus etiam et Barnabas dissensisse leguntur, Act., xv. Ergo videtur quod pax non sit effectus charitatis.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.3] Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isaiah 32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem non est proprius effectus diversorum. Sed pax est effectus justitiæ; secundum illud Isa., xxxii, 17: Et erit opus justitiæ pax. Ergo non est effectus charitatis.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.sc] It is written (Psalm 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law."
[II-II.q.29.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. cxviii, 165: Pax multa diligentibus legem tuam.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.co] Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (Article 1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)
[II-II.q.29.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex unio est de ratione pacis, sicut dictum est. Quarum una est secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum in unum; alia vero est secundum unionem appetitus proprii cum appetitu alterius; et utramque unionem efficit charitas. Primam quidem unionem secundum quod Deus diligitur ex toto corde, ut scilicet omnia referamus in ipsum; et sic omnes appetitus nostri feruntur in unum. Aliam vero, prout diligimus proximum sicut nosipsos; ex quo contingit quod homo vult implere voluntatem proximi, sicut et suiipsius; et propter hoc inter amicabilia unum ponitur « identitas electionis, » ut patet in IX Ethic., cap. iv, a princ.; et Tullius dicit in lib. De amicitia, ante med., quod « amicorum est idem velle et nolle. »
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.1] Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod a gratia gratum faciente nullus deficit nisi propter peccatum; ex quo contingit quod homo sit aversus a fine debito in aliquo indebito finem constituens; et secundum hoc appetitus ejus non inhæret principaliter vero finali bono, sed apparenti. Et propter hoc sine gratia gratum faciente non potest esse vera pax, sed solum apparens.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.2] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. On like manner if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. vi, in princ., ad amicitiam non pertinet concordia in opinionibus, sed concordia in bonis conferentibus ad vitam, præcipue in magnis; quia dissentire in aliquibus parvis quasi videtur non esse dissensus. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet aliquos charitatem habentes in opinionibus dissentire. Nec hoc repugnat paci; quia opiniones pertinent ad intellectum, qui præcedit appetitum, qui per pacem unitur. Similiter etiam existente concordia in principalibus bonis, dissensio in aliquibus parvis non est contra charitatem; procedit enim talis dissensio ex diversitate opinionum, dum unus æstimat hoc de quo est dissensio, pertinere ad illud bonum in quo conveniunt, et alius æstimat non pertinere. Et secundum hoc talis dissensio de minimis et de opinionibus repugnat quidem paci perfectæ, in qua plene veritas cognoscetur, et omnis appetitus complebitur; non tamen repugnat paci imperfectæ, qualis habetur in via.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.3] Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pax est opus justitiæ indirecte, in quantum scilicet removet prohibens; sed est opus charitatis directe quia secundum propriam rationem charitas pacem causat. Est enim amor « vis unitiva, » ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De divin. nomin., § 15, col. 714, t. 4. Pax autem est unio appetitivarum inclinationum.
Article 4
[II-II.q.29.a.4.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example: "Have peace among you" (Mark 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pax sit virtus. Præcepta enim non dantur nisi de actibus virtutum. Sed dantur præcepta de habenda pace, ut patet Marci, ix, 49: Pacem habete inter vos. Ergo pax est virtus.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according to Matthew 5:9: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." Therefore peace is a virtue.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, non meremur nisi per actus virtutum. Sed facere pace est meritorium, secundum illud Matth., v, 6: Beati pacifici, quoniam filii Dei vocabuntur. Ergo pax est virtus.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Galatians 5:20). Therefore peace is a virtue.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, vitia virtutibus opponuntur. Sed dissensiones, quæ opponuntur paci, numerantur inter vitia, ut patet ad Galat., v. Ergo pax est virtus.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.sc] On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.sc] Sed contra, virtus non est finis ultimus, sed via in ipsum. Sed pax est quodammodo finis ultimus, ut Augustinus dicit, XIX De civ. Dei, c. xi, col. 637, t. 7. Ergo pax non est virtus.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.co] I answer that, As stated above (Question 28, Article 4), when a number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.
Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above (Article 3), there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (28, 4).
[II-II.q.29.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum omnes actus se invicem consequantur, secundum eamdem rationem ab agente procedentes, omnes hujusmodi actus ab una virtute procedunt; nec habent singuli singulas virtutes a quibus procedant, ut patet in rebus corporalibus. Quia enim ignis calefaciendo liquefacit et rarefacit, non est in igne alia virtus liquefactiva, et alia rarefactiva; sed omnes actus hos operatur
[II-II.q.29.a.4.ad.1] Reply to Objection 1. We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above (I-II, 69, 1,3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
[II-II.q.29.a.4.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
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