Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q29. Peace
Source context
- Theme
- peace as an infused virtue ordered by charity toward right relation with God and neighbor
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 54, 1905-10-12Steiner identifies genuine peace as inseparable from spiritual knowledge, arguing that the spiritual-scientific movement is the only adequate basis for a true peace movement.
- GA 180, 1918-01-13Steiner distinguishes sharply between political or national peace and real peace, insisting the two must not be conflated and that only inner spiritual orientation grounds the latter.
- GA 268Steiner's meditative verses in this volume cultivate inner peace as a soul condition arising from alignment with divine being, structurally parallel to Aquinas's pax as the tranquillity of right order.
Cross-tradition
- Augustinian theology (pax as tranquillitas ordinis)Augustine's definition of peace as the tranquillity of order — which Aquinas explicitly inherits in Q29 — positions peace as the proper end of all rightly ordered love, a parallel that Aquinas formalizes into the virtue-theological framework of the Secunda Secundae.
- Vedanta (shanti)Shanti in Vedantic tradition denotes a stillness that arises not from absence of conflict but from the soul's established rootedness in Brahman, showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's claim that true peace is an effect of charity rather than mere external cessation of strife.
Q29. Peace
Article 1
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Peace among men is well ordered concord." Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit de virgine desponsata nasci. Desponsatio enim ad carnalem copulam ordinatur. Sed mater Domini nunquam voluit carnali copula uti, quia hoc derogaret virginitati mentis ipsius. Ergo non debuit esse desponsata.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.2] Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quod Christus ex virgine nasceretur miraculum fuit: unde Augustinus dicit in Epist. cxxxvii ad Volusianum, §8, col. 549, t. 2: « Ipsa Dei virtus per inviolatæ matris virginea viscera membra infantis eduxit, quæ postea per clausa ostia membra juvenis introduxit. Hic si ratio quæritur, non erit mirabile; si exemplum poscitur, non erit singulare. » Sed miracula quæ $^5$ fiunt ad confirmationem fidei debent esse manifesta. Cum igitur per desponsationem hoc miraculum fuerit obumbratum, videtur non fuisse conveniens quod Christus de desponsata nasceretur.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.3] Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Corinthians 16:33): "God is not the God of dissension but of peace." Therefore peace is the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Ignatius martyr, ut Hieronymus dicit Super i Matth., col. 24, t. 7, hanc causam assignavit desponsationis matris Dei, « ut partus ejus celaretur diabolo; dum eum putat non de Virgine, sed de uxore generatum. » Quæ quidem causa nulla esse videtur, tum quia diabolus ea quæ corporaliter fiunt, perspicacitate sui sensus cognoscit; tum etiam quia postmodum per multa evidentia signa dæmones aliqualiter Christum cognoverunt; unde dicitur Marci, 1, 24, quod homo in spiritu immundo exclamavit dicens: Quid nobis et tibi, Jesu Nazarene? Venisti ante tempus perdere nos? Scio quod $^*$ sis sanctus Dei. Non ergo videtur conveniens fuisse quod mater Dei esset desponsata.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.sc] There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Isaiah 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., 1, 48: Cum esset desponsata mater Jesu Maria Joseph; et Luc., 1, 26: Missus est angelus Gabriel ad Mariam virginem desponsatam viro, cui nomen erat Joseph.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.co] Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.
For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Galatians 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conveniens fuit Christum de desponsata virgine nasci, tum propter ipsum, tum propter matrem, tum etiam propter nos. Propter ipsum quidem Christum quadruplici ratione. Primo quidem ne ab infidelibus tamquam illegitime natus abjiceretur. Unde Ambrosius dicit, l. II Super Luc., § 2, col. 1633, t. 2: «Quid Judæis, quid Herodiposset adscripti, si natum viderentur ex adulterio persecuti? » Secundo, ut consueto modo ejus genealogia per virum describeretur. Unde dicit Ambrosius, Super III Luc., § 3 et 4, col. 1672, t. 2: «Qui 2 in sæculum venit, sæculi debuit more describi. Viri autem persona quæritur, qui in senatu et reliquiis curiis civitatum generis asserit dignitatem. Consuetudo etiam nos instituit Scripturarum, quæ semper viri originem quærit. » Tertio ad tutelam pueri nati, ne diabolus contra eum vehementius nocumenta procuraret. Et ideo Ignatius dicit ipsam fuisse desponsatam, « ut partus ejus diabolo celaretur. » Quarto, ut a Joseph nutriretur: unde et pater ejus dictus est, quasi nutritius. Fuit etiam conveniens ex parte Virginis. Primo quidem, quia per hoc redditur immunis a pœna, « ne scilicet lapidaretur a Judæis tamquam adultera, » ut Hieronymus dicit, loc. sup. cit. Secundo, ut per hoc ab infamialiberaretur. Unde dicit Ambrosius Super I Luc., § 1, col. 1633, t. 2, quod « desponsata est, ne temeratæ virginitatis adureretur infamia, cui gravis alvus corruptelæ videretur insigne præferre. » Tertio uteia Joseph ministerium exhibetur, ut Hieronymus dicit loc. cit. Ex parte etiam nostra hoc fuit conveniens. Primo quidem, quia testimonio Joseph comprobatum est Christum ex virgine natum. Unde Ambrosius dicit Super Luc., loc. cit.: « Locupletior testis pudoris maritus adhibetur, qui posset et dolere injuriam, et vindicare opprobrium, si non agnosceret sacramentum. » Secundo, quia ipsa verba Virginis matris magis credibilia redduntur suam virginitatem asserentis. Unde Ambrosius dicit Super Luc., ibid: « Fides Mariæ verbis major adsciscitur, et mendacii causa removetur. Videretur enim culpam obumbrare voluisse mendacio innupta prægnans. Causam autem mentiendi desponsata non habuit, cum conjugii præmium et gratia nuptiarum partus sit feminarum: » quæ quidem duo pertinent ad firmitatem fidei nostræ. Tertio, ut tolleretur excusatio virginibus, quæ propter suam incautelam non vitant infamiam. Unde Ambrosius dicit., ibid., § 1: « Non decuit virginibus sinistra opinione viventibus velamen excusationis relinqui quod infamata mater quoque Domini videretur. » Quarto, quia per hoc designatur 5 universa Ecclesia, quæ « cum virgo sit, desponsata tamen est uni viro Christo, » ut Augustinus dicit in lib. De sancta virginitate, cap. xii, col. 401, t. 6. Potest etiam et quinta ratio esse, quod mater Domini fuit desponsata et virgo, quia in persona ipsius et virginiitas et matrimonium honoratur contra hæreticos alteri horum detrahentes.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod B. Virgo mater Dei ex familiari instinctu Spiritus sancti credenda est desponsari voluisse, confidens de divino auxilio quod nunquam ad carnalem copulam perveniret; hoc tamen divino commisit arbitrio, unde in nullo detrimentum passa est virginitas.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.2] If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit Super Lucam, loc. cit., § 1, « maluit Dominus aliquos de suo ortu quam de matris pudore dubitare. Sciebat enim teneram esse virginis verecundiam, et lubricam famam pudoris; nec putavit ortus sui fidem matris injuriis adstruendam. » Sciendum tamen, quod miraculorum Dei quædam sunt de quibus est fides, sicut miraculum virginei partus et resurrectionis Domini, et etiam sacramenti altaris: et ideo Dominus voluit ista occultiora esse, ut fides eorum magis meritoria esset: quædam vero miracula sunt ad fidei comprobationem, et ista debent esse manifesta.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.3] A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.
[II-II.q.29.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in III De Trinit., cap. vii et viii, col. 875, t. 8, diabolus multa poest virtute suæ naturæ, a quibus tamen prohibetur virtute divina. Et hoc modo poest dici quod virtute naturæ suæ diabolus 2 Series propositionum apud Migne intervercognoscere poterat matrem Dei non fuisse corruptam, sed virginem; prohibebatur tamen a Deo cognoscere modum partus divini. Quod autem postmodum eum aliqualiter cognovit diabolus esse Filium Dei, non obstat: quia jam tempus erat ut Christus suam virtutem contra diabolum ostenderet et persecutionem ab eo concitatam pateretur. Sed in infantia oportebat impediri malitiam diaboli, ne eum acrius persequeretur, quando Christus nec pati disposuerat, nec virtutem suam ostendere, sed in omnibus aliis infantibus se similem exhibebat. Unde Leo Papa, in Serm. iv de Epiph., cap. 111, col. 247, t. 1, dicit quod « Magi viderunt et adoraverunt puerum Jesum quantitate parvulum, alienæ opis indigum, fandi impotem, et in nullo ab humanæ infantiae generalitate dissimilem. » Ambrosius tamen Super Lucam, loc. cit., § 3, videtur hoc magis referre ad membra diaboli. Præmissa enim hac ratione, scilicet de fallendo principem mundi, subdit: « Sed tamen magis fefellit principes sæculi: dæmonum enim malitia facile etiam occulta deprehendit; at vero qui sæcularibus vanitatibus occupantur, scire divina non possunt. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inter Mariam et Joseph non fuerit verum matrimonium. Dicit enim Hieronymus Contra Helvidium, § 4, col. 187, t. 2, quod Joseph Mariæ custos fuit potius quam maritus ejus. Sed si fuisset verum matrimonium, vere Joseph maritus ejus fuisset. Ergo videtur quod non fuerit verum matrimonium inter Mariam et Joseph.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.2] Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Super illud Matth., 1: Jacob genuit Joseph virum Mariæ, dicit Hieronymus, col. 23, t. 7: « Cum virum audieris, suspicio tibi non subeat nuptiarum: sed recordare consuetudinis Scripturarum, quod sponsi viri, et sponsæ vocentur uxores. » Sed verum matrimonium non efficitur ex sponsalibus, sed ex nuptiis. Ergo non fuit verum matrimonium inter B. Virginem et Joseph.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.3] Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Matthew 10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Matth., 1, 49, dicitur: Joseph vir ejus cum esset justus, et nollet eam traducere, scilicet in domum suam ad cohabitationem assiduam, voluit eam occulte dimittere, id est, tempus nuptiarum mutare, ut Remigius exponit 5. Ergo videtur quod nondum nuptiis celebratis, nondum esset verum matrimonium; præsertim cum post matrimonium contractum non liceat alicui sponsam dimittere.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.4] Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mark 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not desire peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse summum bonum, quod est ultimus finis. Sed pax non est hujusmodi, quia etiam in statu viæ habetur; alioquin frustra Dominus mandaret, Marc., 1x, 49: Pacem habete inter vos. Ergo non omnia pacem appetunt.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).
[II-II.q.29.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. II De consensu Evangelistarum, cap. 1, col. 1074, t. 3: « Non erat fas ut Joseph ob hoc a conjugio Mariæ separandum Evangelista putaret, quod non ex ejus concubitu, sed virgo peperit Christum. Hoc enim exemplo magnifice insinuatur fidelibus conjugatis, etiam servata pari consensu continentia, posse permanere vocarique conjugium, non permixto corporis sexu. »
[II-II.q.29.a.2.co] From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."
[II-II.q.29.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod matrimonium sive conjugium dicitur verum ex hoc quod suam perfectionem attingit. Duplex est autem rei perfectio, prima et secunda; prima quidem rei perfectio consistit in ipsa forma, ex qua speciem sortitur: secunda vero perfectio consistit in operatione rei, per quam res aliqualiter suum finem attingit. Forma autem ma- 2 In trimonii consistit in quadam indivisibili conjunctione animorum, per quam unus conjugum indivisibiliter alteri fidem servare tenetur. Finis autem matrimonii est proles generanda et educanda: ad quorum primum pervenitur per concubitum conjugalem; ad secundum per alia opera viri et uxoris, quibus sibi invicem obsequuntur ad prolem nutriendam. Sic igitur dicendum est quod quantum ad primam perfectionem, omnino verum fuit matrimonium Virginis matris Dei et Joseph, quia uterque consensit in copulam conjugalem; non autem expresse in copulam carnalem, nisi sub conditione, si Deo placeret. Unde et angelus vocat Mariam conjugem Joseph, dicens ad Joseph, Matth., 1, 20: Noli timere accipere Mariam conjugem tuam: quod exponens Augustinus in lib. I De nuptiis et concupisc., cap. xi, col. 420, t. 10, dicit: « Conjux vocatur ex prima fide desponsationis, quam concubitu nec cognoverat nec fuerat cogniturus. » Quantum vero ad secundam perfectionem, quæ est per actum matrimonii, si hoc referatur ad carnalem concubitum, per quem proles generatur, non fuit illud matrimonium consummatum. Unde Ambrosius dicit Super i Luc., § 5, col. 1635, t. 2: « Non te moveat quod frequenter Mariam Scriptura vocat conjugem: non enim virginitatis ereptio, sed conjugii testificatio, nuptiarum celebratio declaratur. » Habuit tamen illud matrimonium etiam secundam perfectionem quantum ad prolis educationem. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. I De nupti. et concupisc., § 13, col. 421, t. 10: « Omne nuptiarum bonum impletum est in illis parentibus Christi, proles, fides et sacramentum. Prolem cognoscimus ipsum Dominum Jesum; fidem, quia nullum adulterium; sacramentum, quia nullum divortium; solus ibi nuptialis concubitus non fuit. »
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.1] Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and "connaturalness," the union of natural appetites.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Hieronymus accipit ibi maritum ab actu matrimonii consummati.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.2] Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nuptias Hieronymus vocat nuptialem concubitum.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.3] Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wisdom 14:22): "Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace."
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit Super Matth., Hom. 1 Op. 2 imperf., sub fin., « beata virgo sic fuit desponsata Joseph, quod etiam esset domi habita. Nam sicut in ea quæ in domo viri concipit, intelligitur conceptio maritalis, sic in ea quæ extra domum concipit, est suspecta conceptio. » Et ita non esset sufficienter provisum famæ B. Virginis per hoc quod fuit desponsata, nisi etiam fuisset domi habita. Unde quod dicitur: Et nollet eam traducere, melius intelligitur, id est, nollet eam diffamare in publicum, quam quod intelligatur de traductione in domum. Unde et Evangelista subdit quod voluit occulte dimittere eam. Quam vis tamen esset domi habita propter primam desponsationis fidem, nondum tamen intervenerat solemnis celebratio nuptiarum; propter quod etiam non-dum carnaliter convenerant. Unde sicut Chrysostomus dicit Hom. 1v in Matth., § 2, col. 326, t. 11 5, « non dicit Evangelista: Antequam duceretur in domum sponsi, etenim intus jam erat. Consuetudo enim fuit veteribus ut sponsæ in sponsorum domibus haberentur. » Et ideo etiam Angelus dicit: Ne timeas accipere Mariam conjugem tuam, id est, non timeas nuptias ejus solemniter celebrare. Licet alii dicant, quod nondum erat in domum introducta 4, sed solum desponsata. Primum tamen magis consonat Evangelio.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.4] Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one's desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Psalm 147:3: "Who hath placed peace in thy borders." The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.
[II-II.q.29.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod cum vera pax non sit nisi de bono; sicut dupliciter habetur verum bonum, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte, ita est duplex pax vera. Una qui dem perfecta, quæ consistit in perfecta fruitione summi boni per quam omnes appetitus uniuntur quietati in uno; et hic est ultimus finis creaturæ rationalis, secundum illud psal. cxlvii, 14: Qui posuit fines tuos pacem. Alia vero est pax imperfecta, quæ habetur in hoc mundo; quia, etsi principalis animæ motus quiescat in Deo, sunt tamen aliqua repugnantia et intus, et extra, quæ perturbant hanc pacem.
Article 3
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod pax non sit proprius effectus charitatis. Charitas enim non habetur sine gratia gratum faciente. Sed pax a quibusdam habetur qui non habent gratiam gratum facientem, sicut et gentiles aliquando habent pacem. Ergo pax non est effectus charitatis.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.2] Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud non est effectus charitatis cujus contrarium cum charitate esse potest. Sed dissensio, quæ contrariatur paci, potest esse cum charitate; videmus enim quod etiam sacri doctores, ut Hieronymus et Augustinus, in aliquibus opinionibus dissenserunt. Paulus etiam et Barnabas dissensisse leguntur, Act., xv. Ergo videtur quod pax non sit effectus charitatis.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.3] Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Isaiah 32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, idem non est proprius effectus diversorum. Sed pax est effectus justitiæ; secundum illud Isa., xxxii, 17: Et erit opus justitiæ pax. Ergo non est effectus charitatis.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.sc] It is written (Psalm 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law."
[II-II.q.29.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in psal. cxviii, 165: Pax multa diligentibus legem tuam.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.co] Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above (Article 1). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity--the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object--the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)
[II-II.q.29.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplex unio est de ratione pacis, sicut dictum est. Quarum una est secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum in unum; alia vero est secundum unionem appetitus proprii cum appetitu alterius; et utramque unionem efficit charitas. Primam quidem unionem secundum quod Deus diligitur ex toto corde, ut scilicet omnia referamus in ipsum; et sic omnes appetitus nostri feruntur in unum. Aliam vero, prout diligimus proximum sicut nosipsos; ex quo contingit quod homo vult implere voluntatem proximi, sicut et suiipsius; et propter hoc inter amicabilia unum ponitur « identitas electionis, » ut patet in IX Ethic., cap. iv, a princ.; et Tullius dicit in lib. De amicitia, ante med., quod « amicorum est idem velle et nolle. »
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.1] Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod a gratia gratum faciente nullus deficit nisi propter peccatum; ex quo contingit quod homo sit aversus a fine debito in aliquo indebito finem constituens; et secundum hoc appetitus ejus non inhæret principaliter vero finali bono, sed apparenti. Et propter hoc sine gratia gratum faciente non potest esse vera pax, sed solum apparens.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.2] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. On like manner if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., cap. vi, in princ., ad amicitiam non pertinet concordia in opinionibus, sed concordia in bonis conferentibus ad vitam, præcipue in magnis; quia dissentire in aliquibus parvis quasi videtur non esse dissensus. Et propter hoc nihil prohibet aliquos charitatem habentes in opinionibus dissentire. Nec hoc repugnat paci; quia opiniones pertinent ad intellectum, qui præcedit appetitum, qui per pacem unitur. Similiter etiam existente concordia in principalibus bonis, dissensio in aliquibus parvis non est contra charitatem; procedit enim talis dissensio ex diversitate opinionum, dum unus æstimat hoc de quo est dissensio, pertinere ad illud bonum in quo conveniunt, et alius æstimat non pertinere. Et secundum hoc talis dissensio de minimis et de opinionibus repugnat quidem paci perfectæ, in qua plene veritas cognoscetur, et omnis appetitus complebitur; non tamen repugnat paci imperfectæ, qualis habetur in via.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.3] Peace is the "work of justice" indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is "a unitive force" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite's inclinations.
[II-II.q.29.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pax est opus justitiæ indirecte, in quantum scilicet removet prohibens; sed est opus charitatis directe quia secundum propriam rationem charitas pacem causat. Est enim amor « vis unitiva, » ut Dionysius dicit, iv cap. De divin. nomin., § 15, col. 714, t. 4. Pax autem est unio appetitivarum inclinationum.
JSON: /api/sources/opera-omnia-aquinas/summa-theologiae/secunda-secundae/q029.json