Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q30. Mercy
Source context
- Theme
- mercy as a virtue disposing the soul toward compassionate response to another's misery
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 90b, 1905-12-02Steiner cites the Beatitude 'blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy' (Matt. 5:7) in the context of inner development of soul qualities leading to self-knowledge and God-knowledge.
- GA 41aSteiner associates the fifth Beatitude — 'blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy' — with the development of the intellectual soul.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle treats pity (eleos) as a pain felt at undeserved misfortune in another; Aquinas reframes this Aristotelian analysis by situating mercy within charity as a theological virtue directed toward the good of the neighbor, a structural re-grounding of the classical account.
- Hebrew Scripture / Hesed traditionThe Hebrew concept of hesed (loving-kindness/mercy) as a divine attribute proclaimed to Moses (Exod. 33–34) provides the scriptural background against which Aquinas's philosophical treatment of mercy as participation in divine goodness operates.
- Buddhist karuṇāBuddhist karuṇā (compassion) designates the wish to remove the suffering of beings; cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's misericordia lies in both identifying the alleviation of another's misery as the defining motion of the virtue, though the metaphysical grounding differs entirely.
Q30. Mercy
Article 1
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (19, 1; I-II, 79, 1, ad 4; I, 48, 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium B. Virgini annuntiari quod in ea fiendum erat. Annuntiatio enim ad hoc solum necessaria esse videbatur ut Virginis consensus haberetur. Sed consensus ejus non videtur necessarius fuisse, quia conceptus Virginis prænuntiatus fuit prophetia prædestinationis, « quæ sine nostro completur arbitrio, » ut dicit Glossa ord., Matth., 1, v. 22, col. 71, t. 2. Non ergo necessarium fuit quod talis annuntiatio fieret.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.2] Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, B. Virgo Incarnationis fidem habebat, sine qua nullus esse poterat in statu salutis: quia, ut dicitur Rom., 111, 22: Justitia Dei per fidem Jesu Christi in omnes. Sed de eo quod aliquis per certitudinem credit, non indiget ulterius instrui. Ergo B. Virgini non fuit necessarium ut ei incarnatio Filii Dei annuntiaratur.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.3] Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut B. Virgo corporaliter Christum concepit, ita et quælibet sancta anima concipit ipsum spiritualiter; unde Apostolus dicit Gal., 1v, 19: Filioli mei, quos iterum parturio, donec formetur Christus in vobis. Sed illis qui spiritualiter debent Christum concipere, talis conceptio non annuntiatur. Ergo nec B. Virgini fuit annuntiandum quod esset in utero conceptura Filium Dei.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the motive of mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod habetur Luc., 1, 34: quod Angelus dixit ei: Ecce concipies in utero, et paries filium.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.co] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a man's compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness. Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to "misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly."
[II-II.q.30.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod congruum fuit B. Virgini annuntiari quod esset Christum conceptura. Primo quidem ut servaretur congruus ordo conjunctionis Filii Dei ad Virginem: ut scilicet prius mens ejus de ipso instrueretur quam carne eum conciperet. Unde Augustinus dicit in lib. De virginitate, cap. 111, col. 398, t. 6: « Beatior est Maria percipiendo fidem Christi quam concipiendo carnem Christi, » et postea subdit: « Materna propinquitas nihil Mariæ profuisset, nisi felicius Christum corde quam carne gestasset. » Secundo, ut posset esse certior testis hujus sacramenti, quando super hoc divinitus erat instructa. Tertio, ut voluntaria sui obsequii munera Deo offerret, ad quod se promptam obtulit diens: Ecce ancilla Domini. Quarto, ut ostenderetur esse quoddam spirituale matrimonium inter Filium Dei et humanam naturam. Et ideo per annuntiationem expectabatur consensus Virginis loco totius humanæ naturæ.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.1] It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate," and again it is written (Matthew 9:36) that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod prophetia prædestinationis completur sine nostro arbitrio causante, non tamen sine nostro arbitrio consentiente.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.2] Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Sirach 30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [Cf. 106, 3, ad 1].
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod B. Virgo expressam fidem habebat Incarnationis futuræ: sed cum esset humilis, non tam alta de se sapiebat: et ideo super hoc erat instruenda.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.3] Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod spiritualem conceptionem Christi, quæ est per fidem, præcedit annuntiatio, quæ est per fidei prædicationem, secundum quod fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom., x, 17. Nec tamen propter hoc aliquis pro certo scit se gratiam habere; sed scit veram fidem esse quam acceptit.
Article 2
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Psalm 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod B. Virgini non debuerit annuntiatio fieri per angelum. Supremis enim angelis fit revelatio immediate a Deo, ut Dionysius dicit vii cap. Cælest. hierarch., §3, col. 210, t. 4. Sed mater Dei est super omnes angelos exaltata. Ergo videtur quod immediate a Deo debuerit illi annuntiari Incarnationis mysterium, et non per angelum.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.2] Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si in hoc oportebat servari communem ordinem, secundum quem divina hominibus per angelos revelantur, similiter divina ad mulierem per virum deferuntur: unde et Apostolus dicit I Corinth., xiv, 34: Mulieres in ecclesiis taceant: si quid autem volunt discere, domi viros suos interrogent. Ergo videtur quod B. Virgini debuerit annuntiari mysterium Incarnationis per aliquem virum, præsertim quia Joseph vir ejus super hoc fuit ab angelo instructus, ut legitur Matth., 1.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.3] Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus potest congrue annuntiare quod ignorat. Sed etiam supremi angeli non plene cognoverunt Incarnationis mysterium: unde dicit Dionysius, vii cap. Cælest. hierarch., ibid., ex eorum persona esse intelligendam quæstionem quæ ponitur Isa., Lxiii, 4: Quis est iste qui venit de Edom? Ergo videtur quod per nullum angelum potuit convenienter annuntiatio Incarnationis fieri.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.sc] Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (35, 1, ad 2). Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc., 1, 26: Missus est Gabriel angelus a Deo, etc.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.co] Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated above (Article 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as one's own.
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says (Romans 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep."
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod conveniens fuit matri Dei annuntiari per angelum divinæ Incarnationis mysterium, propter tria. Primo quidem, ut in hoc etiam servaretur divina ordinatio, secundum quam mediantibus angelis divina ad homines perveniunt; unde Dionysius dicit iv cap. Cælest. hierarch., § 4, col. 182, t. 1, quod « divinum Jesu benignitatis mysterium angeli primo edocti sunt; postea per ipsos ad nos cognitionis gratia transi-vit. Sic ergo divinissimus Gabriel Zachariam quidem docuit, prophetam Joannem ex ipso nasciturum; Mariam autem, quomodo in ipsa fieret thearchicum ineffabilis Dei formationis mysterium. » Secundo, hoc fuit conveniens reparationi humanæ, quæ futura erat per Christum; unde Beda dicit in Homil. in festo Annunt., col. 9, t. 5: « Aptum humanæ restaurationis principium ut angelus a Deo mitteretur ad Virginem partu consecrandam divino, quia prima perditionis humanæ fuit causa, cum serpens a diabolo mitte-batur ad mulierem spiritu superbiæ decipiendam. » Tertio, quia hoc congruebat virginitati matris Dei; unde 5 Hieronymus dicit in Serm. Assump., § 5, col. 126, t. 14: « Bene angelus ad Virginem mittitur: quia semper est angelis cognata virginitas. Profecto, in carne præter carnem vivere, non terrena vita est, sed cæ-lestis. »
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.1] God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod mater Dei superior erat angelis quantum ad dignitatem, ad quam divinitus eligebatur; sed quantum ad statum præsen-tis vitæ, inferior erat angelis, quia et ipse Christus ratione passibilis vitæ modico quam angeli minoratus est, ut dicitur Hebr., 11, 9. Sed tamen quia Christus simul fuit viator et comprehensor, quantum ad cognitionem divinorum non indigebat ab angelis instrui. Sed mater Dei nondum erat in statu comprehensorum: et ideo de divino conceptu per angelos instruenda erat.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.2] Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. On like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut 4 Augustinus dicit in Serm. de Assump-tione, cap. iv, col. 1144, t. 6: « B. Virgo Maria vera aestimatione a quibusdam generalibus excipitur: quia nec conceptus multiplicavit, nec sub viri, id est, mariti, potestate fuit, quae integerrimis visceribus de Spiritu sancto Christum suscepit. » Et ideo non debuit mediante viro instrui de mysterio Incarnationis, sed mediante angelo. Propter quod etiam ipsa est prius instructa quam Joseph: nam ipsa instructa est ante conceptum, Joseph autem post ejus conceptum.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.3] Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Proverbs 27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not compassionate but disdainful."
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut patet ex auctoritate Dionysii inducta, angeli incarnationis mysterium cognoverunt; sed tamen interrogabant, perfectius scire cupientes a Christo hujus mysterii rationes, quae sunt incomprehensibles omni creato intellectui. Unde Maximus martyr dicit: « Quod angeli noverint futuram incarnationem ambigere non oportet. Latuit autem eos investigabilis Domini conceptio atque modus, qualiter totus in genitore, totus manebat in om-nibus, nec non et in virginea cellula. »
Article 3
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way." Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod angelus annuntians non debuerit Virgini apparere visione corporali. « Dignior enim est intellectualis visio quam corporalis, » ut Augustinus dicit XII Super Genes. ad litt., c. xxiv, § 51, col. 474, t. 3, et præcipue ipsi angelo est magis conveniens; nam visione intellectuali videtur angelus in sua substantia; visione autem corporali videtur in assumpta figura corporea. Sed sicut ad annuntiandum conceptum divinum decebat venire summum nuntium; ita etiam videtur quod decuerit esse summum genus visionis. Ergo videtur quod angelus annuntians apparuerit Virgini visione intellectuali.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.2] Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, visio imaginaria videtur etiam esse nobilior quam visio corporalis, sicut imaginatio est altior potentia, quam sensus. Sed angelus apparuit Joseph in somnis secundum imaginarium visionem, ut patet Matth., i et ii. Ergo videtur quod etiam apparere debuerit B. Virgini imaginaria visione et non corporali.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.3] Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above (28, 4; 29, 4). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, corporalis visio spiritualis substantiae videntes stupefacit: unde et de ipsa Virgine cantatur: « Expavescit Virgo de lumine. » Sed melius fuisset quod a tali turbatione mens ejus esset præservata. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod hujusmodi annuntiatio fieret per visionem corporalem.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.4] Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, cum misericordia ad vim appetitivam pertineat, non est virtus intellectualis, nec est virtus theologica, cum non habeat Deum pro objecto; similiter etiam non est virtus moralis, quia nec est circa operationes, hoc enim pertinet ad justitiam, nec est circa passiones, non enim reducitur ad aliquam duodecim medietatum, quas Philosophus ponit in II Ethic., c. vii vel viii. Ergo misericordia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus in quodam sermone 1, § 2, col. 2108, t. 5, inducit B. Virginem sic dicentem: « Venit ad me Gabriel archangelus facie rutilans, veste coruscans, ingressu mirabilis. » Sed hæc non possunt pertinere nisi ad corpoream visionem. Ergo corporea visione angelus annuntians B. Virgini apparuit.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.co] Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant." And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, 59, A4,5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod angelus annuntians apparuit matri Dei corporea visione: et hoc conveniens fuit: primo quidem quantum ad id quod annuntiabatur. Venerat enim angelus annuntiare incarnationem invisibis Dei 2: unde etiam conveniens fuit ut ad hujus rei declarationem invisibilis creaturæ formam assumet, in qua visibiliter appareret; cum etiam omnes apparitiones veteris Testamenti ad hanc apparitionem ordinentur 3, qua Filius Dei in carne apparuit. Secundo, fuit congruum dignitati matris Dei, quæ non solum in mente, sed in corporeo ventre erat Dei Filium receptura: et ideo non solum mens ejus, sed etiam sensus corporei erant visione angelica refovendi. Tertio, congruit certitudini ejus quod annuntiabatur. Ea enim quæ sunt oculis subjecta certius apprehendimus quam ea quæ imaginamur. Unde Chrysostomus dicit Super Matth., hom. iv, § 5, col. 332, t. 14, quod « angelus non in somnis, imo visibiliter Virgini astitit: nam quia magnam valde revelationem accipiebat ab angelo, egebat ante tantæ rei eventum visione solemni. »
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.1] The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectualis visio est potior quam visio imaginaria vel corporalis, si sit sola. Sed ipse Augustinus dicit lib. XII Super Genes. ad litt., cap. 1x, col. 461, t. 3, quod excellentior est prophetia quæ habet simul intellectualem et imaginarium visionem, quam illa quæ habet alteram tantum. B. autem Virgo non solum percepit visionem corporalem, sed etiam intellectualem illuminationem. Unde talis apparitio nobilior fuit. Fuisset tamen nobilior, si ipsum angelum intellectuali visione in sua substantia vidisset. Sed hoc non patiebatur status hominis viatoris quod angelum per essentiam videret.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.2] The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (36, 3).
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod imagietiam apud Migne numeratur. natio est quidem altior potentia quam sensus exterior; quia tamen principium humanæ cognitionis est sensus, ideo in eo consistit maxima certitudo; quia semper oportet quod principia cognitionis sint certiora. Et ideo Joseph, cui Angelus in somnis apparuit, non ita excellentem apparitionem habuit sicut B. Virgo.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.3] Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit Super i Luc., § 28, col. 1625, t. 2: « Perturbamur et a nostro alienamur affectu quando perstringimur alicujus superioris potestatis occursu. » Et hoc contingit non solum in visione corporali, sed etiam in visione imaginaria. Unde Genes., xv, 12, dicitur quod cum sol occu-buisset*, sopor irruit super Abraham et horror magnus et tenebrosus invasit eum. Talis tamen perturbatio hominis non tantum homini nocet, ut propter eam debeat angelica apparitio prætermitti. Primo quidem, quia ex hoc ipso quod homo supra seipsum elevatur, quod ad ejus pertinet dignitatem, pars ejus inferior debilitatur, ex quo provenit perturbatio prædicta: sicut etiam calore naturali ad interiora reducto, exteriora tremunt. Secundo, quia, sicut Origenes dicit Super Luc., hom. iv, col. 1810, t. 3, « Angelus apparens sciens humanam naturam, primum perturbationi medetur: unde tam Zachariæ quam Mariæ post turbationem dixit: « Ne timeas. » Et propter hoc, ut legitur in vita Antonii, in Vitis Patrum, lib. I, cap. xviii, col. 142, t. 1, « non difficilis est beatorum spirituum malorumque discretio. » Si enim post timorem successerit gaudium, a Domino venisse sciamus auxilium, quia securitas animæ præsentis majestatis indicium est. Si autem incussa formido permanserit, hostis est qui videtur. Ipsa etiam turbatio Virginis conveniens fuit verecundiæ virginali: quia, ut Ambrosius dicit Super Lucam, l. II, § 8, col. 1636, t. 2, « trepidare virginum est, et ad omnes viri ingressus pavere, omnes viri affatus vereri. » Quidam tamen dicunt, quod cum B. Virgo assueta esset visionibus angelo-rum, non turbata fuit in visione angeli, sed in admiratione eorum quæ ei ab an-gelo dicebantur, quia de se tam magnifica non cogitabat. Unde et Evangelista non dicit quod turbata fuerit in visione angeli, sed in sermone ejus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.4] Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they assume the character of a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod misericordia, secundum quod est virtus, est virtus moralis circa passiones existens; et reducitur ad illam medietatem quæ dicitur nemesis; quia « ab eodem more procedunt, » ut in II Rhetor., cap. ix, in princ., dicitur. Has autem medietates Philosophus non ponit virtutes, sed passiones; quia etiam secundum quod sunt passiones, laudabiles sunt. Nihil tamen prohibet quin ab aliquo habitu electivo proveniant; et secundum hoc assumunt rationem virtutis.
Article 4
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the worship of God, according to Hosea 6:6 and Matthew 12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod annuntiatio ejus non fuerit convenienti ordine perfecta. Dignitas enim matris Dei dependet ex prole concepta. Sed causa prius debet manifestari quam effectus. Ergo primo debuit angelus Virgini annuntiare conceptum prolis quam ejus dignitatem exponere, eam salutando.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.2] Further, on the words of 1 Timothy 4:8: "Godliness is profitable to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, probatio aut prætermitti debet in his quæ dubia non sunt, aut præmitti in his quæ dubia esse possunt. Sed angelus primo videtur annuntiasse id de quo Virgo dubitaret, et dubitando quæreret, dicens: Quomodo fiet istud? et postea probationem adjunxit tum ex exemplo Elisabeth, tum ex Dei omnipotentia. Ergo inconvenienti ordine annuntiatio per angelum est effecta.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.3] Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good," according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it said (Psalm 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, majus non potest probari sufficienter per minus. Sed majus fuit virginem parere quam vetulam. Ergo non fuit sufficiens probatio angeli probantis conceptum virginis ex conceptu senis.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.sc] The Apostle after saying (Colossians 3:12): "Put ye on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds (Colossians 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., xiii, 1: Quæ sunt, a Deo ordinata sunt. Angelus autem missus est a Deo ad hoc quod Virgini annuntiaret, ut dicitur Luc., 1. Ergo ordinatissime fuit annuntia'tio per Angelum completa.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.co] A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. On itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].
On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. ["The quality of mercy is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod annuntiatio congruo ordine per angelum est perfecta. Tria enim angelus intendebat circa virginem. Primo quidem reddere mentem ejus attentam ad tantæ rei considerationem; quod quidem fecit, eam salutando quadam nova et insolita salutatione. Unde Origenes dicit Super Lucam, Hæc de Zacharia dicit Origines, loco citato; B. vero Virgini applicari possunt, de cujus perturbatione videnda est Homilia vi, col. 1816. Ita cum melioris notæ Mss. editi passim, aliquo tantum admixto typographico errore, utrobique, « prætermitti, » vel « præmitti, » hom. vi, col. 1816, t. 3, quod « si scivisset, ad alium quempiam similem factum esse sermonem, utpote quæ habebat legis scientiam, nunquam quasi peregrina eam talis salutatio terruisset. » In qua quidem salutatione præmisit idoneitatem ejus ad conceptum in hoc quod dixit: Gratia plena; expressit conceptum in hoc quod dixit: Dominus tecum; et prænuntiavit honorem consequentem, cum dixit: Benedicta tu in mulieribus. Secundo autem intendebat eam instruere de mysterio incarnationis quod in ea erat implendum; quod quidem fecit prænuntiando conceptum et partum, dicens: Ecce concipies in utero, etc., et ostendendo dignitatem prolis conceptæ cum dixit: Hic erit magnus, etc., et etiam demonstrando modum conceptionis, cum dixit: Spiritus sanctus superveniet in te. Tertio, intendebat animum ejus inducere ad consensus: quod quidem fecit exemplo Elisabeth, et ratione ex divina omnipotentia sumpta.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.1] We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Hebrews 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod animo humili nihil est mirabilius quam auditus suæ excellentiæ, admiratio autem maxime attentionem animi facit; et ideo angelus volens mentem Virginis attentam reddere ad auditum tanti mysterii, ab ejus laude incæpit.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.2] The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Ambrosius expresse dicit Super Lucam, l. II, § 15, col. 1639, t. 2, quod B. Virgo de verbis angeli non dubitavit. Dicit enim: « Quanto temperantior est Mariæ responsio quam verba sacerdotis. Hæc ait: Quomodo fiet istud? Ille respondit, Unde hoc sciam? Negat ille se credere qui negat se scire; ista se facere profitetur, nec dubitat esse faciendum quod quomodo fieri possit inquirit. » Augustinus tamen videtur dicere quod dubitaverit: dicit enim in lib. Quæstionum veteris et novi Testamenti 1, quæst. LI, col. 2250, t. 3: « Ambigenti Mariæ de conceptu possibilitatem angelus prædicat. » Sed talis dubitatio magis est admirationis quam incredulitatis: et ideo probationem Angelus inducit non ad auferendam infidelitatem, sed magis ad removendam ejus admirationem. 1 Liber Quæst. veteris et novi Testamenti Augustino, quovis critico annuente, ex diu abjudi catus fuit. Attamen reliquimus in textu nomen Augustini, ob intelligentiam litteræ; nam D. Thomas, si genuinum hujus operis auctorem, quem dicunt Hilarium diaconum secta Lucife-
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.3] Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Ambrosius dicit in 2 Hexameron ob hoc multæ steriles pepererunt, ut partus credatur Virginis. Et ideo conceptus Elisabeth sterilis inducitur, non quasi sufficiens argumentum, sed quasi quoddam figurale exemplum. Et ideo ad confirmationem hujus exempli subditur argumentum efficax ex omnipotentia divina.
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