Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q30. Mercy
Source context
- Theme
- mercy as a virtue disposing the soul toward compassionate response to another's misery
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
- GA 90b, 1905-12-02Steiner cites the Beatitude 'blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy' (Matt. 5:7) in the context of inner development of soul qualities leading to self-knowledge and God-knowledge.
- GA 41aSteiner associates the fifth Beatitude — 'blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy' — with the development of the intellectual soul.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle treats pity (eleos) as a pain felt at undeserved misfortune in another; Aquinas reframes this Aristotelian analysis by situating mercy within charity as a theological virtue directed toward the good of the neighbor, a structural re-grounding of the classical account.
- Hebrew Scripture / Hesed traditionThe Hebrew concept of hesed (loving-kindness/mercy) as a divine attribute proclaimed to Moses (Exod. 33–34) provides the scriptural background against which Aquinas's philosophical treatment of mercy as participation in divine goodness operates.
- Buddhist karuṇāBuddhist karuṇā (compassion) designates the wish to remove the suffering of beings; cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's misericordia lies in both identifying the alleviation of another's misery as the defining motion of the virtue, though the metaphysical grounding differs entirely.
Q30. Mercy
Article 1
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (19, 1; I-II, 79, 1, ad 4; I, 48, 6), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod malum non proprie sit motivum ad misericordiam. Ut enim supra ostensum est, culpa est magis malum quam pœna. Sed culpa non est provocativum ad misericordiam, sed magis ad indignationem. Ergo malum non est misericordiae provocativum.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.2] Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "harshness does not call for pity but drives it away." Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ sunt crudelia, seu dira, videntur quemdam excessum mali habere. Sed Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., cap. viii, a med., quod « dirum est aliud a miserabili, et expulsivum miserationis. » Ergo malum, inquantum hujusmodi, non est motivum ad misericordiam. « Nullius opera indigere se putat qui suam alteri denegat. Qui perituro succurrere potest, et non succurrit, occidit. » Ovidius, De Ponto: « Regia crede mihi res est succurrere lapsis. » Galtherus, in Alexandreide: « ..... Leviter veniunt, leviterque recedunt Blandiri dociles lacrymæ, solasque propinqui Impendunt lacrymas, miseris arentibus illis, Cum lacrymis arescit amor pietasque tuorum Verus amor miserum qui non fastidit amicum. Desperare solent alios in tempore duro Esse miserturos aliis qui ipsi misereri Non vellent, si fata darent contraria fila. » Hæc de misericordia Speculum doctrinale Vincentii, lib. IV, cap. LXVII. Misericordia non solum virtus est, sed est beati-tudo quinta: Beati misericordes, quoniam ipsi misericordiam consequentur. Deus summe misericors est et nos ad misericordiam invitants semetipsum proponit in exemplum: Estote misericordes, sicut et Pater vester misericors est, Luc., vi. Quamvis autem effectus divinæ misericordiae provocativum.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.3] Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, signa malorum non vere sunt mala. Sed signa malorum provocant ad misericordiam, ut patet per Philosophum in II Rhetor., loc. cit. Ergo malum non est secundum proprium provocativum misericordiæ.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.sc] Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the motive of mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit in II lib. Orth. fid., cap. xiv, col. 934, t. 4, quod « misericordia est species tristitiæ. » Sed motivum ad tristitiam est malum. Ergo motivum ad misericordiam est malum.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.co] As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another's distress, impelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its name "misericordia" from denoting a man's compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another's unhappiness. Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), "happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss." Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.
Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.
Accordingly the motive of "mercy," being something pertaining to "misery," is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will's natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing." Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity "when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it." Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly."
[II-II.q.30.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX De civit. Dei, cap. v, col. 261, t. 7, « misericordia est alienæ miseriæ in nostro corde compassio, qua utique, si possumus, subvenire compellimur. » Dicitur enim misericordia ex eo quod aliquis habet miserum cor super miseria alterius. Miseria autem felicitati opponitur. Est autem de ratione beatitudinis sive felicitatis ut aliquis potiatur eo quod vult. Nam, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIII De Trinit., cap. v, col. 1020, t. 8, « beatus est qui habet omnia quæ vult, et nihil male vult. » Et ideo e contrario ad miseriam pertinet ut homo patiatur quæ non vult. Tripliciter autem aliquis vult aliquid : uno quidem modo appetitu naturali, sicut omnes homines volunt esse et vivere; alio modo homo vult aliquid per electionem ex aliqua præmeditatione; tertio modo homo vult aliquid non secundum se, sed in causa sua; puta qui vult comedere nociva, quodammodo dicimus eum velle infirmari. Sic ergo motivum misericordia est tanquam ad miseriam pertinens. Primo quidem illud quod contrariatur appetitui naturali voluntatis, scilicet mala corruptiva et contristantia; quorum contraria homines natu-volo et non sacrificium, Ose., vi. Judicium sine misericordia fiet illi qui non fecerit misericordiam, Jac., III. Homo homini servat iram, et a Deo quærit medelam. In hominem similem sibi non habet misericordiam, et pro delictis suis deprecabitur, Eccl., XXVIII. Serve nequam, omne debitum dimisi tibi quoniam rogasti me, nonne oportuit et te misereri conservi tui, sicut et ego tui misertus sum, Matth., XVIII. Estote invicem misericordes, I Petr., III. Induite vos sicut sancti Dei et dilecti viscera misericordia, Col., III. Quis horum trium videtur tibi proximus fuisse illi qui incidit in latrones? Qui fecit misericordiam in illum, Luc., x. Honorat Dominum qui miseretur pauperis, Prov., XIV. Misericordia et veritate redimitur iniquitas, Prov., XVI. Fæneratur Domino qui miseretur pauperi, Prov., XIX. Quomodo potueris ita esto misericors; si multum tibi fuerit abundanter tribue. Si autem exiguum, illud libenter impartiri stude, raliter appetunt; unde Philosophus dicit in II Rhetor., cap. viii, in princ., quod « misericordia est tristitia quædam super apparenti malo corruptivo vel contristativo. » Secundo, hujusmodi magis efficiuntur ad misericordiam provocantia, si sint contra voluntatem electionis; unde et Philosophus ibidem dicit quod « illa mala sunt miserabilia quorum fortuna est causa, » ut puta cum aliquod malum evenit, unde sperabatur bonum. Tertio autem sunt adhuc magis miserabilia, si sunt contra totam voluntatem; puta si aliquis semper sectatus est bona, et eveniunt ei mala. Et ideo Philosophus dicit in eodem libro, ibid., quod « misericordia est maxime super malis ejus qui indignus patitur. »
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.1] It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner's will, it may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate," and again it is written (Matthew 9:36) that Jesus "seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd."
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod de ratione culpæ est quod sit voluntaria; et quantum ad hoc non habet rationem miserabilis, sed magis rationem puniendi. Sed quia culpa potest esse aliquo modo pœna, inquantum scilicet habet aliquid annexum quod est contra voluntatem peccantis, secundum hoc potest habere rationem miserabilis; et secundum hoc miseremur et compatimur peccantibus; sicut Gregorius dicit in quadam homil., XXXIV in Evang., § 2, col. 1246, t. 2, quod « vera justitia non habet dedignationem, » scilicet ad peccatores, « sed compassionem; » et Matth., 1x, 36, dicitur: Videns Jesus turbas misertus est eis, quia erant vexati, et jacentes, sicut oves non habentes pastorem.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.2] Since pity is sympathy for another's distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Sirach 30:24): "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God" [Cf. 106, 3, ad 1].
Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher says that "harshness drives pity away."
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quia misericordia est compassio miseriæ alterius, proprie misericordia est ad alterum, non autem ad seipsum, nisi secundum quamdam similitudinem; sicut et justitia, secundum quod in homine considerantur diversæ par- Tob. Qui pronus est ad misericordiam benedicetur, Prov., XXII. His perlectis, quis nunc credere posset christianos nomine misericordiae fuisse abusos ad designandum pugionem vel cultellum brevem, quo accingebantur milites ad dextrum latus? « Manus in eum injecerunt, et, extractis misericordiis, im misericordissimi eum immisericorditer jugulave-runt. » Lambertus Ardensis. Ita cod. Camer. et Alcan. et alii; Parm. quidem dicit de cod. Camer. et Alcan. quod optime omittunt: « magis; » et nihilominus eadem editio addit: « magis. » — Parm.: « proprie. » — Ita codices. Editi omnes: « Quod vult, et quod pertinet ad justitiam. » — Beatus igitur non est nisi qui et habet omnia quæ vult, et nihil vult male. » Migne. — Vera justitia compassionem habet, falsa justitia dedignationem. » Migne. tes, ut dicitur V Ethic., cap. ult. Et secundum hoc dicitur Eccli., xxx, 24: Miserere animæ tuæ placens Deo. Sicut ergo misericordia non est proprie ad seipsum, sed dolor, puta cum patimur aliquid crudele in nobis; ita etiam, si sint aliquæ personæ ita nobis conjunctæ, ut sint quasi aliquid nostri, puta filii, aut parentes, in eorum malis non miseremur, sed dolemus, sicut in vulneribus propriis: et secundum hoc Philosophus dicit quod « dirum est expulsivum miserationis. »
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.3] Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.
[II-II.q.30.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut ex spe et memoria malorum sequitur delectatio, ita ex spe et memoria malorum sequitur tristitia; non tamen tam vehemens, sicut ex sensu præsentium. Et ideo signa malorum, inquantum repræsentant nobis mala miserabilia sicut præsentia, commovent ad miserandum.
Article 2
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Psalm 144:9): "His tender mercies are over all His works." But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod defectus non sit ratio miserendi ex parte miserentis. Proprium enim Dei est misereri, unde dicitur in psalm. cxliv, 9: Miserationes ejus super omnia opera ejus. Sed in Deo nullus est defectus. Ergo defectus non potest esse ratio miserendi.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.2] Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si defectus est ratio miserendi, oportet quod illi qui sunt maxime cum defectu, maxime misereantur. Sed hoc est falsum; dicit enim Philosophus in II Rhet., cap. viii, circa princ., quod « qui ex toto perierunt, non miserentur. » Ergo videtur quod defectus non sit ratio miserendi ex parte miserentis.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.3] Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless." Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sustinere aliquam contumeliam ad defectum pertinet. Sed Philosophus dicit, ibidem, quod « illi qui sunt in contumeliativa dispositione, non miserentur. » Ergo defectus ex parte miserentis non est ratio miserendi.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.sc] Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on (35, 1, ad 2). Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod misericordia est tristitia quædam. Sed defectus est ratio tristitia; unde infirmi facilius contristantur, ut infra dicetur. Ergo ratio miserendi est defectus miserentis.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.co] Since pity is grief for another's distress, as stated above (Article 1), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another's distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one's own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another's distress, in so far as one looks upon another's distress as one's own.
Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend's hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend's hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons "grieving with one's friend" as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says (Romans 12:15): "Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep."
Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another's evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.
Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another's defect as one's own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum misericordia sit compassio super miseria aliena, ut dictum est, ex hoc contingit quod aliquis misereatur, ex quo contingit quod de miseria aliena doleat. Quia autem tristitia seu dolor est de proprio malo, intantum aliquis de miseria aliena tristatur aut dolet, inquantum miseriam alienam apprehendit ut suam. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo secundum unionem affectus: quod fit per amorem. Quia enim amans reputat amicum tanquam seipsum, malum ipsius reputat tanquam suum malum; et ideo dolet de malo amici sicut de suo. Et inde est quod Philosophus in IX Ethic., c. iv, circa princ., inter alia amicabilia ponit hoc quod est condolere amico; et Apostolus dicit ad Rom., xii, 15: Gaudere cum gaudentibus, flere cum flentibus. Alio modo contingit secundum unionem realem, utpote cum malum aliquorum propinquum est, ut ab eis ad nos transeat; et ideo Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. viii, quod homines miserentur super illos qui sunt eis conjuncti, et similes; quia per hoc fit eis æstimatio quod ipsi etiam possint similia pati. Et inde est etiam quod senes et sapientes qui considerant se posse in mala incidere, et debiles et formidolosi, sunt magis misericordes. E contrario autem illi, qui reputant se esse felices, et intantum potentes quod nihil mali putant se posse pati, non ita commiserentur. Sic ergo semper defectus est ratio miserendi, vel inquantum aliquis defectum alicujus reputat suum propter unionem amoris, vel propter possibilitatem similia patiendi.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.1] God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deus non miseretur nisi propter amorem, inquantum amat nos tanquam aliquid sui.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.2] Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. On like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi qui jam sunt in infinitis malis, non timent se ulterius pati aliquid; et ideo non miserentur; similiter etiam nec illi qui valde timent; quia tantum intendunt propriæ passioni, quod non intendunt miseriæ alienæ.
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.3] Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Proverbs 27:4: "Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that "false godliness," i.e. of the proud, "is not compassionate but disdainful."
[II-II.q.30.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illi qui sunt in contumeliativa dispositione, sive quia sint contumeliam passi, sive quia velint contu- Scilicet ex metu. — Sic cod.; in Parm.: « ex presenta. » — Nicolaï: « perfectum. » — In meliam inferre, provocantur ad iram et ad audaciam; quæ sunt quædam passiones virilitatis, extollentes animum hominis ad arduum; unde inferunt homini aestimationem quod sit aliquid in futurum passurus. Unde tales, dum sunt in hac dispositione, non miserentur, secundum illud Proverb., XVII, 4: Ira non habet misericordiam, neque erumpens furor. Et ex simili ratione superbi non miserentur, quia contemnunt alios, et reputant eos malos; unde reputant quod digne patiantur quidquid patiuntur. Unde et Gregorius dicit, Hom. xxxiv in Evang., § 2, col. 1246, t. 2, quod « falsa justitia, » scilicet superborum, « non habet compassionem, sed dedignationem. »
Article 3
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way." Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod misericordia non sit virtus. Principale enim in virtute est electio, ut patet per Philosophum in II Ethic., cap. iv, vel v, a med. Electio autem est « appetitus præconsiliati, » ut in eodem lib. dicitur. Id ergo quod impedit consilium, non potest dici virtus. Sed misericordia impedit consilium, secundum illud Sallustii, in Catil., in princ. Orat. Cæsar. : « Omnes homines qui de rebus dubiis consultant, ab ira et misericordia vacuos esse decet; non enim animus facile verum providet, ubi ista officiunt. » Ergo misericordia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.2] Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil quod est contrarium virtuti, est laudabile. Sed nemesis contra-riatur misericordiae, ut Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. ix, in princ. Nemesis autem est passio laudabilis, ut dicitur in II Rhet., ibid. Ergo misericordia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.3] Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above (28, 4; 29, 4). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, gaudium et pax non sunt speciales virtutes, quia consequuntur ex charitate, ut supra dictum est. Sed etiam misericordia consequitur ex charitate; sic enim ex charitate flemus cum flentibus, sicut gaudemus cum gaudentibus. Ergo misericordia non est specialis virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.4] Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, cum misericordia ad vim appetitivam pertineat, non est virtus intellectualis, nec est virtus theologica, cum non habeat Deum pro objecto; similiter etiam non est virtus moralis, quia nec est circa operationes, hoc enim pertinet ad justitiam, nec est circa passiones, non enim reducitur ad aliquam duodecim medietatum, quas Philosophus ponit in II Ethic., c. vii vel viii. Ergo misericordia non est virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.sc] Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: 'Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy mercy.'" Therefore mercy is a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in IX De civit. Dei, c. v, col. 260, t. 7: « Longe melius, et humanius, et priorum sensibus accommodatius Cicero in Cæsaris laude locutus est, ubi ait: Nulla de virtutibus tuis nec admirabilior, nec gratior misericordia est. » Ergo misericordia est virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.co] Mercy signifies grief for another's distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one person's evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "this movement of the mind" (viz. mercy) "obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant." And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above (I-II, 59, A4,5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod misericordia importat dolorem de miseria aliena. Iste autem dolor potest nominare uno quidem modo motum appetitus sensitivi, et secundum hoc misericordia passio est, et non virtus; alio vero modo potest nominare motum appetitus intellectivi, secundum quod alicui displicet malum alterius. Hic autem motus potest esse secundum rationem regulatus; et potest secundum hunc motum ratione regulatum regulari motus inferioris appetitus. Unde Augustinus dicit in IX De civit. Dei, cap. v, col. 261, t. 7, quod « iste motus animi, » scilicet misericordia, « servit rationi, quando ita præbetur misericordia, ut justitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur pœnitenti. » Et quia ratio virtutis humanæ consistit in hoc quod motus animi ratione reguletur, ut ex superioribus patet, consequens est misericordiam esse virtutem.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.1] The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas illa Sallustii intelligitur de misericordia secundum quod est passio ratione non regulata; sic enim impedit consilium rationis, dum facit a justitia discedere. Ita mss. et editi passim. Theologi negantem particulam omissam a scribis putant; unde habet editio Patav. 1712: « Non sit aliquid, » etc. Nemesis, quæ etiam Rhamnusia et Adrastia dicta, habita fuit dea « ultrix facinorum impio-rum, bonorumque præmiatrix, quam theologi veteres fingentes justitiæ filiam, ex abdita quadam aternitate tradunt omnia despectare terrena, » ait Ammianus Marcellinus, lib. XIV, cap. II. Nomen vero traxit àπò τοῦ ἐκάστου διανεμμήσεως, id est « a distributione quae unicuique fit, » ait Aristot., lib. De mundo. Vide Gregor. Gyraldum, Histor. deorum, lib. I, syntagmate xvi.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.2] The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another's evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: "both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on (36, 3).
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Philosophus loquitur ibi de misericordia et nemesi, secundum quod utrumque est passio; et habent quidem contrarietatem ex parte aestimationis quam habent de malis alienis; de quibus misericors dolet, inquantum aestimat aliquem indigna pati; nemesiticus autem gaudet, inquantum aestimat aliquos digne pati, et tristatur, si indignis bene accidat; et utrumque est laudabile, et « ab eodem more descendens, » ut ibidem dicitur. Sed proprie misericordia opponitur invidia, ut infra dicetur.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.3] Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod gaudium et pax nihil adjiciunt super rationem boni, quod est objectum charitatis; et ideo non requirunt alias virtutes quam charitatem. Sed misericordia respicit quamdam specialem rationem, scilicet miseriam ejus cujus miseretur.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.4] Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because "they both proceed from the same character" (Rhet. ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they assume the character of a virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod misericordia, secundum quod est virtus, est virtus moralis circa passiones existens; et reducitur ad illam medietatem quæ dicitur nemesis; quia « ab eodem more procedunt, » ut in II Rhetor., cap. ix, in princ., dicitur. Has autem medietates Philosophus non ponit virtutes, sed passiones; quia etiam secundum quod sunt passiones, laudabiles sunt. Nihil tamen prohibet quin ab aliquo habitu electivo proveniant; et secundum hoc assumunt rationem virtutis.
Article 4
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the worship of God, according to Hosea 6:6 and Matthew 12:7: "I have desired mercy and not sacrifice." Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod misericordia sit maxima virtutum. Maxime enim ad virtutem pertinere videtur cultus divinus. Sed misericordia cultui divino præfertur, secundum illud Oseæ, vi, de Matth., xii, 7: Misericordiam volui*, et non sacrificium. Ergo misericordia est maxima virtus.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.2] Further, on the words of 1 Timothy 4:8: "Godliness is profitable to all things," a gloss says: "The sum total of a Christian's rule of life consists in mercy and godliness." Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, super illud I ad Tim., iv: Pietas ad omnia utilis est, dicit Glossa: « Omnis summa disciplinæ christianæ in misericordia et pietate est 1. » Sed disciplina christiana continet omnem virtutem. Ergo summa totius virtutis in misericordia consistit.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.3] Further, "Virtue is that which makes its subject good," according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it said (Psalm 144:9) that "His tender mercies are over all His works," and (Luke 6:36) Our Lord said: "Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful." Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, virtus est quæ bonum facit habentem, ut Philosophus dicit. Ergo tanto aliqua virtus est melior, quanto facit hominem Deo similiorem; quia per hoc melior est homo quod Deo est similiar. Sed hoc maxime facit misericordia; quia de Deo dicitur in psal. cxliv, 9: quod miserationes ejus sunt super omnia opera ejus; unde et Lucæ, vi, 36, Dominus dicit: Estote misericordes, sicut et Pater vester misericors est. Misericordia igitur est maxima virtutum.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.sc] The Apostle after saying (Colossians 3:12): "Put ye on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy," etc., adds (Colossians 3:14): "Above all things have charity." Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus, ad Col., iii, 14, cum dixisset: Induite vos, sicut dilecti* Dei, viscera misericordia, etc., postea subdit: Super omnia charitatem habete. Ergo misericordia non est maxima virtutum.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.co] A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. On itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].
On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. ["The quality of mercy is not strained./'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliqua virtus potest esse maxima dupliciter: uno modo secundum se; alio modo per comparisonem ad habentem. Secundum se quidem misericordia maxima est; pertinet enim ad misericordiam quod aliis effundat, et, quod plus est, quod defectus aliorum sublevet; et hoc maxime superioris est. Unde et misereri ponitur proprium Deo; et in hoc maxime dicitur ejus omnipotentia manifestari. Sed quoad habentem misericordia non est maxima, nisi ille qui habet, sit maximus, qui nullum supra se habeat, sed omnes sub se. Ei enim qui supra se aliquem habet, majus est et melius conjungi superiori quam supplere defectum inferioris. Et ideo quantum ad hominem, qui habet Deum superiorem, charitas, per quam Deo unitur, est potior quam misericordia, per quam defectus proximorum supplet. Sed inter omnes virtutes quæ ad proximum pertinent, potissima est misericordia; sicut etiam est potioris actus: nam supplere defectum alterius, inquantum est hujusmodi, est superioris et melioris.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.1] We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Hebrews 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Deum non colimus per exteriora sacrificia aut munera propter ipsum, sed propter nos et propter proximos. Non enim indiget sacrificiis nostris; sed vult sibi ea offerri propter nostram devotionem et proximorum utilitatem. Et ideo misericordia, qua subvenitur defectibus aliorum, est sacrificium ei magis acceptum, utpote propinquius utilitatem proximorum inducens, secundum illud * Volo. 1 Parm.: « Glossa Ambrosii. » Vide col. 500, t. 4 Oper. Ambrosii, inter spuria. Hebr., ult., 16: Beneficentia et communionis nolite oblivisci; talibus enim hostiis promeretur Deus.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.2] The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod summa religionis christianæ in misericordia consistit, quantum ad exteriora opera; tamen affectio charitatis, qua conjungimur Deo, praeponderat et dilectioni, et misericordia in proximos.
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.3] Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.30.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per charitatem assimilamur Deo, tanquam ei per affectum uniti; et ideo potior est quam misericordia, per quam assimilamur Deo secundum similitudinem operationis. Effectus charitatis sunt vel interiores, vel extteriores. Effectus interiores sunt juxta Speculum morale numero quatuor, gaudium, pax, misericordia et zelus. Unde quæstio zeli locum habere deberet, juxta idem Speculum post quaestionem de misericordia. Et sciendum quod zelus multipliciter accipitur in Scriptura. Uno modo idem est quod invidia: Cum sint inter vos zelus et contentio, nonne carnales estis, et secundum hominem ambulatis? I Cor., III. Alio modo zelus idem est quod imitatio, et zelare idem est quod imitari: Noliæmulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes iniquitatem, Psalm. Item zelus idem est quod amor: Nolite zelare mortem in errore vitæ vestræ, neque acquiratis eam in operibus manuum vestrarum, Sap., I. — Item zelus dicitur intensus amor viri ad uxorem qui sustinere non potest alium ad ipsam accedere. Inde vir dicitur zelotipus vel zelotes, et mulier etiam dicitur zelotipa: Dolor cordis et luctus mulier zelotipa, Eccl., XXVI. — Item zelus idem est quod æmulatio cum quis ea quæ bona sunt nititur æmulari; unde quando videt alium meliorem se non dolet de bonitate illius, sed quia ipse non est ita bonus, et ideo quadam æmulatione sancta illum nititur imitari, vel etiam exceedere: Zelatus sum bonum et non confundar, Eccl., LI. — A similitudine amoris intensi qui est inter virum et uxorem, dicuntur viri sancti zelare pro salute animarum et pro honore divino. Unde zelus dicitur vehemens motus animi quo quis salutem animarum ferventer desiderat, et procurat, et contra peccatores movetur, pro eo quod contra animas suas et honorem divinum faciunt, vel salutem impediunt aliorum: et hoc modo zelus est effectus charitatis. Isto zelo motus Christus ejecit vendentes et ementes de templo, et nummulariorum effudit aes, et mensas subvertit, Joan., II. — Eodem zelo Dei Moyses motus filios Israel qui fecerant et adoraverant vitulum conflatilem occidit ex eis viginti tria millia, Exod., XXXII. — Item cum iratus esset Dominus contra filios Israel, quia fornicati erant cum filiabus Moab, Phinees iram ejus placavit, quia occidit illum impudentissimum qui, vidente Moyse et omni turba filiorum Israel, intravit ad scortum Madyaniten; unde dixit Dominus ad Moysen: Phineas avertit iram meam a filiis Israel, quia zelo meo commotus est contra ipsos, ut non ipse delerem filios Israel in zelo. Idcirco loquere ad eum: ecce do ei pacem fæderis mei, et erit tam illi
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