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Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q38. Contention

Source context
Theme
contention as a species of strife opposed to peace, analyzed within the virtue-vice framework of charity
Soul-faculty
Consciousness Soul

Steiner

not engaged in the GA corpus

Cross-tradition

  • Stoic ethicsStoic analysis of eris (strife) as a passion disrupting the rational harmony of the hegemonikon offers a structural parallel to Aquinas's treatment of contention as a disorder of the will's orientation toward peace.
  • Buddhist ethics (kalaha / vivāda)Pali canonical texts enumerate quarrel (kalaha) and contention (vivāda) as arising from craving and wrong view, presenting a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's location of contention in disordered appetite.

Q38. Contention

Article 1

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be found in them, according to Luke 22:24: "And there was also a strife amongst" the disciples of Jesus, "which of them should . . . be the greatest." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod contentio non sit peccatum mortale. Peccatum enim mortale in viris spiritualibus non invenitur; in quibus tamen invenitur contentio, secundum illud Lucæ, xxii, Hostiensis quod quando sunt diversa jura et opiniones nec contra Deum nec contra bonos mores, humanior sententia est præferenda, cæteris paribus. Secunda causa discordiæ dicitur avaritia: « Quietissime viverent homines super terram, si hæc duo pronomina tollerentur : meum et tuum. » Seneca, lib. De quatuor virtutibus. « Propter pecuniarum possessionem universa bella nobis fiunt. » Plato in Phædone. « Certamen movistis, opes. » Lucanus, in lib. III. Videmus hoc per experientiam omni die, quando propter avaritiam filius discordat a patre, frater a fratre et amicus ab amico. Tertia causa est stultitia. Sunt namque multi stulti et leves qui credunt omnia quæ a susurro-nibus eis dicuntur. Susurratio siquidem aptissimum est instrumentum ad discordias seminandas. Quis-nam sufficeret enumerare discordias quæ exortæ sunt inter cives, inter vicinos, inter dominos, inter populos, inter uxorem et virum, inter fratrem et fratrem propter susurrantes. Sed culpables adhuc sunt illi qui a susurronibus sibi cavere aut nesciunt aut nolunt. Non loquimur de contentione quæ est oratio ad confutandum vel confirmandum accommodata, qui est color rhetoricus, ut dicit Tullius in Rhetorica; sed loquimur de contentione prout est vitium, et definitur secundum Alexandrum Alensem, in II Summ., hoc modo: « Contentio est impugnatio veritatis cum confidentia clamoris. » Est ergo contendere, verbis contra aliquem tendere. Hoc autem fieri potest tripliciter, ratione aemulationis, ratione disputationis, ratione litigationis. Primo potest aliquis contendere cum alio ratione aemulationis et invidiae. Nam aliqui sunt qui ita diligunt suos et gloriam eorum, ut non possint sine displicentia famam et virtutes aliorum audire, et dicentibus atque narrantibus obstant et contradicunt. Talis fuit contentio quæ fuit in Corinthiis conversis ad fidem, quos Paulus reprehendit, I Corinth., 1, dicens: Obsecro vos, fratres, per nomen Domini nostri Jesu Christi, ut idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata; sitis autem perfecti in eodem sensu, et in cadem scientia. Significatum est enim mihi de vobis, fratres mei, ab his qui sunt Clocs, quia contentiones sunt inter vos. Hoc autem dico quod unusquisque vestrum dicit: Ego sum Pauli, ego vero Cephæ, ego autem Christi. Divisus est Christus? Et cap. III: Cum enim sit inter vos zelus et contentio, nonne carnales estis, et secundum hominem ambulatis? Cum enim quis dicat: Ego quidem sum Pauli; alii autem: Ego Apollo: nonne homines estis? Quid ergo est Apollo? Quid vero Paulus? Ministri ejus cui credidistis. Et unicuique sicut Dominus dedit. Ego plantavi; Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incre- 24: Facta est contentio inter discipulos Jesu, quis eorum esset major. Ergo contentio non est peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.2] Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Philippians 1:17): "Some out of contention preach Christ," and afterwards he says (Philippians 1:18): "In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nulli bene disposito debet placere peccatum mortale in proximo. Sed dicit Apostolus ad Philipp., 1, 17: Quidam ex contentione Christum annuntiant; et postea subdit: Et in hoc gaudeo, sed et gaudebo. Ergo contentio non est peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.3] Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Samuel 14:1, "It came to pass one day," etc. says: "Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless they are first challenged to dispute." Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, contingit quod aliqui vel in judicio, vel in disputatione contendunt, non aliquo animo malignandi, sed potius intendentes bonum, sicut illi qui contra hæreticos disputando contendunt; unde Super illud I Reg., xiv: Accidit quadam die, etc., dicit Glossa ordin., col. 554, t. 1: « Catholici contra hæreticos contentionem non commovent, nisi prius ad certamen provocentur. » Ergo contentio non est peccatum mortale. mentum dedit. Itaque neque qui plantat est aliquid, neque qui rigat, sed qui incrementum dat Deus. Existimabant enim illi Corinthii quod qui a meliore et majore esset baptizatus, ille majorem gratiam assequeretur, quasi homines darent gratiam. Similiter etiam contendebant Romani et Judæi conversi ad fidem. Dicit enim Hieronymus in Prologo in Epistolam ad Romanos: « Romani qui ex Judæis et gentibus crediderunt, hi superba contentionevole bant se alterutrum superponere. » Nam Judæi dicebant: Nos sumus populus Dei quos ab initio dilexit et fovit. Nos circumcisi ex genere Abraham, sancta descendimus ex stirpe. Nos de Ægypto signis Dei et virtutibus liberati, mare sicco pertransivimus pede; nos per quadraginta annos experti sumus magnalia Dei. Nos soli digni sumus accipere legem et vocem Dei loquentis audire. Nobis promissus est Christus, ad quos ipse venisse testatur. Dicit enim Matth., xv: Non sum missus nisi ad oves quæ perierunt domus Israel, cum vos canes potius quam homines appellaverit. Non est ergo æquum ut vos hodie idola deserentes comparemini nobis. E contra gentiles dicebant: Quanto majora circa vos Dei beneficia narraveritis, tanto majoris criminis reos vos esse monstrabitis: semper enim his omnibus ingrati fuistis. Nam ipsis pedibus quibus pertransistis mare, postea ante idola ludebatis. Manna vobis fastidio fuit, et semper in deserto contra Deum murmastis. Sæpe Deum ad iram provocastis, et ad ultimum Christum in lege et prophetis promissum occidistis. Nos itaque vobis digniores sumus, qui ut de Christo audivimus, mox in eum credidimus. Ideo per prophetam de nobis Dominus ait: Populus quem non cognovi servivit mihi, psalm. xvii. Unde constat nos non ex industria, sed ex ignorantia deliquisse. His ergo altercantibus, apostolus medius inter eos omnes, eorum contentiones dirimens, ad unam concordiam eos adduxit, ostendens nullos eorum meritis suis esse salvatos, quia omnes Judæi et omnes gentiles sub peccato tenebantur, sed per Dei gratiam liberati sunt. Ideo dicitur: Non enim est personarum acceptio apud Deum, Rom., ii. Non

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.4] Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job 39:32: "Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?" And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him (Job 42:7): "You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job hath." Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Job videtur cum Deo contendisse, secundum illud Job, xxxix, 32: Numquid qui contendit cum Deo, tam facile conquiescit? Et tamen Job non peccavit mortaliter: quia Dominus de eo dicit: Non estis locuti coram me rectum, sicut servus meus Job, ut habetur Job, ult., 7. Ergo contentio non semper est peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.sc] It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2 Timothy 2:14): "Contend not in words." Moreover (Galatians 5:20) contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Galatians 5:21) "they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God." Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod contrariatur præcepto Apostoli, qui dicit II ad Timoth., ii, 14: Noli verbis contendere; et ad Galat., v, contentio numeratur inter opera carnis, quæ qui* agunt, regnum Dei non possidebunt, ut ibidem dicitur. Sed omne quod excludit a regno Dei, et quod contrariatur præcepto, est peccatum mortale. Ergo contentio est peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.co] To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, this is called "contentio," which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he says that "it consists in developing a speech from contrary things," for instance: "Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end."

Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"--or whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy.

Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29 defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Timothy 2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers."

[II-II.q.38.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod contendere est contra aliquem tendere. Unde sicut discordia contrarietatem quamdam importat in vo- est enim distinctio; omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gloria, alias gratia Dei, Rom., iii. Nam idem Dominus omnium dives in omnes qui invocant illum. Omnis qui credit in illum non confundetur. Non est distinctio Judæi et Græci, Rom., x. Sic et discipuli Joannis Baptistæ forte contendebant de illo et Christo. Sic et quotidie contendunt aliqui de præ-dicatoribus, de doctoribus, de fundatoribus religio-num et de sanctis. Secundo potest quis contendere contra alium ratione disputationis, quæ, secundum Alexandrum, si fieret pro declaratione mentis, et servato modo debito, nullum esset peccatum. Sed, si fieret ex quadam titillatione honoris et gloriæ, veniale peccatum esset, sicut fuit in apostolis de quibus dicitur: Facta est contentio inter eos quis eorum videre-tur esse major, Luc., xxii. Nondum enim erant spirituales, sicut dicit ibi Glossa. Ideo Dominus compescuit eos. Sed numquid licitum est disputare cum hæreticis? Jamjam solutionem hujus dubii attulimus. Sed ad hoc respondet Alexander, in II, quod hæreticus aut est ab Ecclesia præcisus propter pertinaciam suam, aut non. Si primo modo, tunc non est cum eo habendum consilium, juxta illud: Non sedi cum consilio vanitatis, ps. xxv. Hæreticum hominem post primam et secundam correptionem devita, ad Tit., cap. iii. Unde hæretici post damnationem non vocantur ad consilium, sicut patet XXIV, q. i, c. « Majores. » Si vero hæretici adhuc sunt corrigibles, licitum est contendere et disputare cum eis ut ad fidem revocentur, vel ut falsitas eorum aliis manifestetur. Hoc autem intelligendum est de probatis in doctrina, quia periculosum esset simplicibus cum hæreticis disputare. Tertio potest quis contendere contra alium ratione litigationis, sicut faciunt multi qui omnem sententiam proximi quærunt infringere, et clamorosis vocibus multiplicationeque verborum volunt vincere, et si contentio fiat propter notabilem impugnationem veritatis, aut injuriam vel damnum proximi, sicut facere solent procuratores et advocati, peccatum est mortale. luntate, ita contentio contrarietatem quam-dam importat in locutione; et propter hoc etiam cum oratio alicujus per contraria se diffundit, vocatur contentio; quæ ponitur unus color rhetoricus a Tullio, qui dicit, lib. IV Rhet., ad Heren., inter princ. et med.: « Contentio est cum ex contrariis rebus oratio efficitur hoc pacto : Habet assentatio, » id est, adulatio, « jucunda principia, eadem exitus amarissimos affert. » Contrarietas autem locutionis potest attendi dupliciter : uno modo quantum ad intentionem contratendentis; alio modo quantum ad modum. In intentione quidem considerandum est utrum aliquis contrarietur veritati, quod est vituperabile; vel falsitati, quod est laudabile. In modo autem considerandum est utrum talis modus contratariandi conveniat et personis et negotiis, quia hoc est laudabile; unde Tullius dicit in III Rhet., ad Heren., a med., quod « contentio est oratio acris ad confirmandum et confutandum accommodata; » vel excedat convenientiam personarum et negotiorum; et sic contentio est vituperabilis. Si ergo accipiatur contentio secundum quod importat impugnationem veritatis et inordinatum modum; sic est peccatum mortale; et hoc modo definit Ambrosius contentionem, dicens, Glossa ordin., ad Rom., 1, v. 29, col. 474, t. 2: « Contentio est impugnatio veritatis per confidentiam clamoris. » Si autem contentio dicatur impugnatio falsitatis cum debito modo acrimoniæ, sic contentio est laudabilis. Si autem accipiatur contentio secundum quod importat impugnationem falsitatis cum inordinato modo, sic potest esse peccatum veniale; nisi forte tanta inordinatio fiat in contendendo, quod ex hoc generetur scandalum aliorum. Unde et Apostolus, cum dixisset II ad Timoth., ii: Noli contendere verbis, subdit: Ad nihil enim utile est, nisi ad subversionem audientium.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.1] The disciples of Christ contended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in discipulis Christi non erat contentio cum intentione impugnandi veritatem, quia unusquis- Sic cod. ; in edit.: « contendentis. » Ita codd. Tarrac., Alcan. et Paris., cum editis passim; al.: « oratio alicujus. » Codices et editi habent Ambrosium: nil autem simile in Ambrosio legitur; in Aymone, vel in Anselmo, cujus nomini, ex errore Amanuensis, forte Ambrosius fuit substitutus, ad sunt similem sensum redolentia, sed non sub iisdem verbis. Vitium contentionis est abominabile propter que defendebat quod sibi verum videbatur; erat tamen in eorum contentione inordinatio, quia contendebant de quo non erat contendendum, scilicet de primatu honoris; nondum enim erant spirituales, sicut Glossa ordin. ibidem dicit, col. 338, t. 2; unde Dominus consequenter eos compescuit.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.2] Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known--since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illi qui ex contentione Christum prædicabant, reprehensibles erant: quia, quamvis non impugnant veritatem fidei, sed eam prædicarent, impugnabant tamen veritatem quantum ad hoc quod putabant se suscitare pressuram Apostolo veritatem fide prædicanti. Unde Apostolus non gaudebat de eorum contentione, sed de fructu qui ex hoc proveniebat, scilicet quod Christus annuntia-batur, quia ex malis etiam occasionaliter subsequuntur bona.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.3] Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. On this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum completam rationem contentionis, prout est peccatum mortale, ille in judicio contendit qui impugnat veritatem justitiæ; et in disputatione contendit, qui intendit impugnare veritatem doctrinæ. Et secundum hoc catholici non contendunt contra hæreticos, sed potius e converso. Si autem accipiatur contentio in judicio vel disputatione secundum imperfectam rationem, scilicet secundum quod importat quamdam acrimoniam locutionis, sic non semper est peccatum mortale.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.4] Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had said (13:3): "I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God": yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in mind or in speech.

[II-II.q.38.a.1.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod contentio ibi sumitur communiter pro disputatione. Dixerat enim Job, cap. xiii, 3: Ad omnipotentem loquar, et disputare cum Deo cupio, non tamen intendens neque veritatem impugnare, sed inquirere; neque circa hanc inquisitionem aliqua inordinatione vel animi vel vocis uti.

Article 2

[II-II.q.38.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that contention is not a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?" Now zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod contentio non sit filia inanis gloriæ. Contentio enim affinitatem habet ad zelum; unde dicitur I ad Cor., III, 3: Cum sit inter vos zelus et contentio, nonne carnales estis, et secundum hominem ambulatis? Zelus autem ad invidiam pertinet. Ergo contentio ex invidia magis oritur.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.arg.2] Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, contentio cum clamore quod dam est. Sed clamor ex ira oritur, ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral., cap. XLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2. Ergo etiam contentio oritur ex ira.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.arg.3] Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Corinthians 8:1: "Knowledge puffeth up." Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention is not a daughter of vainglory.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, inter alia scientia videtur esse materia superbiæ et inanis gloriæ, secundum illud I ad Cor., VIII, 4: Scientia inflat. Sed contentio plerumque provenit ex defectu scientiae, per quam veritas cognoscitur, non impugnatur. Ergo contentio non est filia inanis gloriæ.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.sc] stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).

[II-II.q.38.a.2.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Gregorii, XXXI Moral., loc. cit.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 37, Article 2), discord is a daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper to pride and vainglory to seek one's own glory. And just as people are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the same reason as discord.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, discordia est filia inanis gloriæ, eo quod discordantium uterque in sensu proprio stat, et unus alteri non acquiescit. Proprium autem superbiæ est, et inanis gloriæ, propriam excellentiam quærere. Sicut ejus jurgia provocat; et XVI: Vir insipiens fodit malum, et in labiis ejus ignis ardescit; et XVII: Semper jurgia quærit malus; angelus autem crudelis mittetur contra eum. II. Secundo abominanda est contentio propter honore. Est quidem homo qui contentiones fugit dignus honore. Honor est homini qui separat se a contentionibus; omnes autem stulti miscent se contumcliis, Prov., XX. Stultas autem et sine disciplina quæstiones devita, sciens quod generant lites. Servum autem Domini non oportet litigare, sed man-suetum esse ad omnes, docibilem, patientem, cum modestia corripientem eos qui resistunt veritati, II Timoth., II. — Quanti autem meriti sit apud Deum non contendere, clarum esse potest per illud quod legitur in Vitis patrum, quod, orante sancto Machario, vox insonuit ad eum dicens: Nondum ad mensuram duarum mulierum venisti quæ habiant in proxima civitate. Cumque quæsivisset Macharius et invenisset eas, conversationem earum interrogavit. Ipsæ vero dixerunt quod erant mulieres duorum fratrum, et per quinque annos simul fuerant, nec verbum contentiosum fecerant, nec unquam aliqua earum dicto vel facto aliam contristaverat. Quod audiens Macharius bene aedificatus recessit. autem discordantes aliqui sunt ex hoc quod stant corde in propriis, ita contendentes sunt aliqui ex hoc quod unusquisque verbo id quod sibi videtur defendit. Et ideo eadem ratione ponitur contentio filia inanis gloriæ, sicut et discordia.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.ad.1] Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he clings to his own opinion, as stated above (37, 2, ad 1).

[II-II.q.38.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod contentio, sicut et discordia, habet affinitatem cum invidia quantum ad recessum ejus a quo aliquis discordat, vel cum quo contendit; sed quantum ad id in quo sistit ille qui contendit, habet convenientiam cum superbia et inani gloria, inquantum scilicet in proprio sensu statur, ut supra dictum est.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.ad.2] The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod clamor assumitur in contentionem, de qua loquimur, ad finem impugnandæ veritatis; unde non est principale in contentione. Et ideo non oportet quod contentio ex eodem derivetur ex quo derivatur clamor.

[II-II.q.38.a.2.ad.3] Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the "per se" and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of pride.

The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ

[II-II.q.38.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod superbia et inanis gloria occasionem sumunt præcipue a bonis etiam sibi contrariis, puta cum de humilitate aliquis superbit; est enim hujusmodi derivatio non per se, sed per accidens; secundum quem modum nihil prohibet contrarium a contrario oriri. Et ideo nihil prohibet ea quæ ex superbia vel inani gloria per se et directe oriuntur, causari ex contrariis eorum ex quibus occasionaliter superbia oritur.

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