Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q44. The precepts of charity
Source context
- Theme
- precepts governing the exercise and ordering of charity as a theological virtue
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Buddhist ethics (ahimsa / metta precepts)Buddhist precepts of compassion (metta) and non-resistance to evil structurally parallel Aquinas's precepts enjoining love of neighbor and forbearance, though grounded in karmic law rather than infused charity ordered to God.
- Vedantic duty (dharma)The Vedantic concept of dharma as obligatory right action toward others exhibits cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's view that charity, as a virtue, generates binding precepts, though the metaphysical grounding differs entirely.
Q44. The precepts of charity
Article 1
[II-II.q.44.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of the virtues as stated above (Question 23, Article 8), while the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod de charitate non debeat dari aliquod præceptum. Charitas enim imponit modum actibus omnium virtutum, de quibus dantur præcepta, cum sit forma virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Sed modus non est in præcepto, ut communiter dicitur. Ergo de charitate non sunt danda præcepta.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.arg.2] Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost" (Romans 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Corinthians 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, charitas, quæ in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum diffunditur, facit nos liberos; quia ubi Spiritus Domini, ibi libertas; ut dicitur II ad Corinth., III, 17. Sed obligatio quæ ex præceptis nascitur, libertati opponitur, quia necessitatem imponit. Ergo de charitate non sunt danda præcepta. feriant ruinæ. Pro pauculis, si qui sunt, scandalo pusillorum laborantibus quia regnum suum temporale a latronibus papa etiam ab eo spoliatus defendit, innumeri, non solum pusilli sed et fortes scandalizarentur si vim inferentibus depositum quod custodire tenetur libenter concederet. Quoad bona temporalia cujus sumus domini, propter scandalum pusillorum, vel sunt totaliter dimittenda, ea tribuendo, aut ea non repetendo, si penes alios sunt (intellige si non sint gravis momenti); — scandalum tamen, ut non dimittantur illa bona, sedari potest per instructionem aut monitionem. Quod si post instructionem duret, ordinarie tunc est ex malitia, et pharisicum, et propter scandalum pharisicum non sunt dimittenda bona nostra temporalia. Guilhelmus: « Quid si dictat mihi conscientia quod iste scandalizabitur, nisi dedero ei librum meum; aut si repetiero ab eo sub judice res mihi ablatas ab eo; numquid propter vitandum scandalum ejus, teneor ei dare rem meam, aut cessare a repetitione, posito etiam quod mihi revelatum sit ipsum scandalizandum ex hoc? Respondeo: si status meus vel familiae meæ non est in tuto, si careo re mea, et ero in periculum incidendi in impatientiam aut murmurationem contra Deum, non teneor rem meam dare, aut a petitione cessare, cum debeam me plus diligere et meos quam extraneum; propter hoc enim excusatur qui indigens est, et ab alio accipit ad usuram, et ille qui ab infideli recipit juramentum per idola, ut sit securus ab eo. Si autem in tuto sit status meus et familiae meæ, licet hujusmodi re caruero, ita quod ex hoc nullum mihi vel familiae meæ imminet periculum, credo quod teneor dare rem petitam propter evitandum ejus scandalum, si tamen credam eum ea re esse bene usurum; alias non, quia in hoc casu dare ei rem illam, esset dare gladium in manu furiosi. Unde credo quod propter vitandum ejus scandalum debeo cessare a repetitione, cum sine periculo possim re illa carere. » Circa nonum articulum Speculi moralis, scilicet quæ movere debent ad scandalum fugiendum, considerandum est primo, de scandalo activo; et secundo, de scandalo passivo. Scandalum activum vitandum est propter blasphemiam divini nominis, propter nocumentum multiplex proximum, propter infamiam et augmentum nefandi criminis, propter incrementum et cumulum tormentorum. Multi, visis vel auditis scandalis, vulnerantur in mentibus, pervertuntur in moribus. De scandalo passivo « sciendum quod fatuitas illorum qui malum exemplum accipiunt et mutantur ab his quos male vident agere, apparet in multis, videlicet et in male eligendo, et in malo agendo. In eligendo quidem, quia bonos et bona visa contemnunt, malos autem eligunt imitari, qui præponunt conversationem malorum conversationi bonorum, qui potius sequuntur eorum opera, vitia vel exempla quam virtutes, magis volunt esse degeneres quam generosi, deformes quam formosi, perniciosi quam fructiferi, tenebrosi quam lucidi. Dilexerunt homines tenebras magis quam lucem, Joan., III. Eligunt lignum mortiferum, et lignum vitæ dimittunt, sicut Adam suæ uxoris exemplo. Dimittunt mel, et gustant fel. Dimittunt panem, et sumunt lapidem. Dimittunt piscem, et sumunt scorpionem. Eligunt malos in vasa sua, bonos autem foras dimittunt. Sequuntur lupum, et dimittunt pium pastorem. Sequuntur Judam proditorem, et dimittunt Salvatorem. Quærunt sibi exempla corruptionis, cum invenire possent exempla veritatis. Fatui sunt in agendo quia faciunt ea quæ damnant et damnando judicant in aliis. » Hæc compendio ex Speculo morali, lib. III, part. III, dist. xvii, circa fin.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.arg.3] Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which the precepts are directed, as shown above (I-II, 90, 2; I-II, 100, 09). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of the decalogue.
But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, charitas est præcipua inter omnes virtutes, ad quas ordinantur præcepta, ut ex supra dictis patet. Si ergo de charitate darentur aliqua præcepta, deberent poni inter præcipua præcepta, quæ sunt præcepta decalogi. Non autem ponuntur. Ergo nulla præcepta sunt de charitate danda.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.sc] Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Deuteronomy 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity, which is the love of God.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.sc] Sed contra, illud quod Deus requirit a nobis cadit sub præcepto. Requirit autem Deus ab homine ut diligat eum, ut dicitur Deut., x. Ergo de dilectione charitatis, quæ est dilectio Dei, sunt danda præcepta.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.co] As stated above (16, 1; I-II, 99, 1), a precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. On every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Timothy 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." For all the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions--such are the virtues that regulate the passions--or at least to the possession of a good conscience--such are the virtues that regulate operations--or to the having of a right faith--such are those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God's justice, through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man's affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Matthew 22:39.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, præceptum importat rationem debiti. Intantum ergo aliquid cadit sub præcepto, inquantum habet rationem debiti. Est autem aliquid debitum dupliciter: uno modo per se, alio modo propter aliud. Per se quidem debitum est in unoquoque negotio id quod est finis, quia habet rationem per se boni. Propter aliud autem est debitum id quod ordinatur ad finem; sicut medico per se debitum est ut sanet, propter aliud autem ut medicinam det ad sanandum. Finis autem spiritualis vitæ est ut homo uniatur Deo, quod fit per charitatem; et ad hoc ordinantur, sicut ad finem, omnia quæ pertinent ad spiritualem vitam. Unde et Apostolus dicit, I ad Tim., 1, 5: Finis præcepti est charitas de corde puro, et conscientia bona, et fide non ficta. Omnes enim virtutes, de quarum actibus dantur præcepta, ordinantur vel ad purificandum cor a turbinibus passionum, sicut virtutes quæ sunt circa passiones, vel saltem ad habendam bonam conscientiam, sicut virtutes quæ sunt circa operationes; vel ad habendam rectam fidem, sicut illa quæ pertinent ad divinum cultum; et hæc tria requiruntur ad diligendum Deum. Nam cor impurum a Dei dilectione abstrahitur, propter passionem inclinantem ad terrena; conscientia vero mala facit horrere divinam justitiam propter timorem pœnæ; fides autem ficta trahit affectum in id quod de Deo fingitur, separans a Dei veritate. In quolibet autem genere id quod est per se, potius est eo quod est propter aliud, et ideo maximum præceptum est de charitate, ut dicitur Matth., xxii.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.ad.1] As stated above (I-II, 100, 10) when we were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special precepts.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de præceptis agere-tur, modus dilectionis non cadit sub illis præceptis quæ dantur de aliis actibus virtu-tum; puta sub hoc præcepto: Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam, non cadit, quod hoc ex charitate fiat; cadit tamen actus dilectionis sub præceptis specialibus.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.ad.2] The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod obligatio præcepti non opponitur libertati, nisi in eo cujus mens aversa est ab eo quod præcipitur; sicut patet in his qui ex solo timore præcepta custodiunt. Sed præceptum dilectionis non potest impleri nisi ex propria voluntate; et ideo libertati non repugnat.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.ad.3] All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are included in all of them.
[II-II.q.44.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnia præcepta decalogi ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi; et ideo præcepta charitatis non fuerunt connumeranda inter præcepta decalogi; sed in omnibus includuntur.
Article 2
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated above (1, Objection 3). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above (Question 33, Article 5). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod de charitate non fuerint danda duo præcepta. Præcepta enim legis ordinantur ad virtutem, ut supra dictum. Sed charitas est una virtus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ergo de charitate non fuit dandum nisi unum præceptum.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.2] Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut Augustinus dicit in I De doctr. christ., cap. xxvii, col. 29, t. 3, charitas in proximo non diligit nisi Deum. Sed ad diligendum Deum sufficienter ordinamur per hoc præceptum: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum. Ergo non oportuit addere aliud præceptum de dilectione proximi.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.3] Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Luke 15:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, diversa peccata diversis præceptis opponuntur. Sed non peccat aliquis prætermittens dilectionem proximi, si non prætermittat dilectionem Dei; quinimo dicitur Luc., xiv, 26: Si quis venit ad me, et non odit patrem suum et matrem, non potest meus esse discipulus. Ergo non est aliud præceptum de dilectione Dei et de dilectione proximi.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.4] Further, the Apostle says (Romans 13:8): "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law." But a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, Apostolus dicit ad Rom., xiii, 8: Qui diligit proximum, legem implevit. Sed non impletur lex nisi per observantiam omnium præceptorum. Ergo omnia præcepta includuntur in dilectione proximi. Sufficit ergo unum præceptum de dilectione proximi. Non ergo debent esse duo præcepta charitatis.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.sc] It is written (1 John 4:21): "This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother."
[II-II.q.44.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan., iv, 21: Hoc mandatum habemus a Deo, ut qui diligit Deum, diligat et fratrem suum.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.co] As stated above (I-II, 91, 3; I-II, 94, 2) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above (23, 07, ad 2; 26, 1, ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est cum de præceptis ageretur, hoc modo se habent præcepta in lege, sicut propositiones in scientiis speculativis; in quibus conclusiones virtute continentur in primis principiis. Unde qui perfecte cognosceret principia secundum totam suam virtutem, non opus haberet ut ei conclusiones seorsum proponerentur. Sed quia non omnes qui cognoscunt principia, sufficiunt considerare quidquid in principiis virtute continentur, necesse est propter eos ut in scientiis ex principiis conclusiones deducantur. In operabilibus autem, in quibus præcepta legis nos dirigunt, finis habet rationem principii, ut supra dictum est. Dilectio autem Dei finis est ad quem dilectio proximi ordinatur. Et ideo non solum oportet dari præcepta de dilectione Dei, sed etiam de dilectione proximi, propter minus capaces, qui non de facili considerarent unum horum præceptorum sub alio contineri.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.1] Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet charitas sit una virtus, habet tamen duos actus, quorum unus ordinatur ad alium sicut ad finem. Præcepta autem dantur de actibus virtutum; et ideo oportuit esse plura præcepta charitatis.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.2] God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus diligitur in proximo, sicut finis in eo quod est ad finem; et tamen oportuit de utroque explicite dari præcepta, ratione jam dicta.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.3] The means derive their goodness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the same source and from no other
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod id quod est ad finem, habet rationem boni ex ordine ad finem; et secundum hoc etiam recedere ab eo habet rationem mali, et non aliter.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.4] Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.
[II-II.q.44.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod in dilectione proximi includitur dilectio Dei, sicut finis in eo quod est ad finem, et e converso; et tamen oportuit utrumque præceptum explicite dari ratione jam dicta.
Article 3
[II-II.q.44.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown above (25, 12; 26), it seems that there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sufficiant duo præcepta charitatis. Præcepta enim dantur de actibus virtutum. Actus autem secundum objecta distinguuntur. Cum ergo homo quatuor debeat ex charitate diligere, scilicet Deum, seipsum, proximum et corpus proprium, ut ex supra dictis patet, videtur quod quatuor debeant esse præcepta charitatis; et sic duo non sufficient.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.arg.2] Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, charitatis actus non solum est dilectio, sed gaudium, pax, beneficentia. Sed de actibus virtutum sunt danda præcepta. Ergo duo præcepta charitatis non sufficient.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.arg.3] Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut ad virtutem pertinet facere bonum, ita et declinare a malo. Sed ad faciendum bonum inducimur per præcepta affirmativa, ad declinandum a malo per præcepta negativa. Ergo de charitate fuerunt danda præcepta non solum affirmativa, sed etiam negativa; et sic duo præcepta prædicta charitatis non sufficiunt.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 22:40): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
[II-II.q.44.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Matth., xxii, 40: In his duobus mandatis tota* lex pendet, et prophetæ.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.co] Charity, as stated above (Question 23, Article 1), is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): "Charity is not possible between less than two": and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of charity (25, 4). Now since good is the object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor for God's sake, as for the sake of our end
[II-II.q.44.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod charitas, sicut supra dictum est, est amicitia quædam. Amicitia autem ad alterum est; unde Gregorius dicit in quadam homil., xvii in Evang., § 1, col. 4139, t. 2: « Charitas haberi minus quam inter duos non potest. » Quomodo autem ex charitate aliquis seipsum diligat, supra dictum est. Cum autem dilectio et amor sit boni, bonum autem sit vel finis, vel id quod est ad finem; convenienter de charitate duo præcepta sufficiunt: unum quidem quo inducimur ad Deum diligendum sicut finem; aliud autem quo inducimur ad diligendum proximum propter Deum sicut propter finem.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.ad.1] As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), "though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as regards the second and fourth," i.e. love of oneself and of one's own body. "For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him." And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in I De doctr. christ., cap. xxiii, col. 27, t. 3, « cum quatuor sint ex charitate diligenda, de secundo et quarto, » id est de dilectione sui et corporis proprii, « nulla præcepta danda erant. Quantumcumque enim homo excidat a veritate, remanet illi dilectio sui, et dilectio corporis sui. » Modus autem diligendi præcipiendus est homini, ut scilicet se ordinate diligat, et corpus proprium; quod quidem fit per hoc quod homo diligit Deum et proximum.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.ad.2] As stated above (28, 4; 29, 3), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were given about each act--about joy (Philippians 4:4): "Rejoice in the Lord always"--about peace (Hebrews 12:14): "Follow peace with all men"--about beneficence (Galatians 6:10): "Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men"--and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod alii actus charitatis consequuntur ex actu dilectionis sicut effectus ex causa, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde in præceptis dilectionis virtute includuntur præcepta de aliis actibus. Et tamen propter tardiores inveniuntur de singulis explicite præcepta tradita. De gaudio quidem Philipp., iv, 4: Gaudete in Domino semper; de pace autem ad Hebr., xii, 44: Pacem sequimini cum omnibus; de beneficentia autem ad Galat., ult., 40: Dum tempus habemus, operemur bonum ad omnes; 1 Ibidem explicat S. Gregorius cur binos ad prædicationem discipulos miserit Christus, Luc., x: « Quia duo sunt præcepta charitatis, Dei videlicet amor et proximi. » 2 Nam de beneficentiae partibus, quoad justum, de singulis beneficentiae partibus inveniuntur præcepta tradita in sacra Scriptura, ut patet diligenter consideranti.
[II-II.q.44.a.3.ad.3] To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Leviticus 12:17): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart"; against sloth (Sirach 6:26): "Be not grieved with her bands"; against envy (Galatians 5:26): "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another"; against discord (1 Corinthians 1:10): "That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you"; and against scandal (Romans 14:13): "That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way."
[II-II.q.44.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod plus est operari bonum, quam vitare malum; et ideo in præceptis affirmativis virtute includuntur præcepta negativa. Et tamen explicite inveniuntur præcepta data contra vitia charitati opposita; nam contra odium dicitur Levit., xix, 17: Ne oderis fratrem tuum in corde tuo; contra acediam dicitur Eccli., vi, 26: Ne acedieris vinculis ejus; contra invidiam Galat., v, 26: Non efficiamur inanis gloriæ cupidi, invicem provocantes, invicem invidentes; contra discordiam vero I ad Cor., i, 40: Idipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata; contra scandalum autem ad Rom., xiv, 13: Ne ponatis offendiculum fratri, vel scandalum.
Article 4
[II-II.q.44.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is not a matter of precept, as shown above (1, ad 1; I-II, 100, 09). Now the words "with thy whole heart" signify the mode of the love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter mandetur quod Deus diligatur ex toto corde. Modus enim virtuosi actus non est in præcepto, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed hoc quod dicitur, ex toto corde, importat modum divinæ dilectionis. Ergo inconvenienter præcipitur quod Deus ex toto corde diligatur.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.arg.2] Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, « totum et perfectum est cui nihil deest, » ut dicitur in III Phys., text. 63. Si ergo in præcepto cadit quod Deus ex toto corde diligatur, quicumque facit aliquid quod non pertinet ad Dei dilectionem, agit contra præceptum, et per consequens peccat mortaliter. Sed peccatum veniale non pertinet ad Dei dilectionem. Ergo peccatum veniale erit mortale; quod est inconveniens.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.arg.3] Further, to love God with one's whole heart belongs to perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), "to be whole is to be perfect." But that which belongs to perfection is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, diligere Deum ex toto corde est perfectionis; quia, secundum Philoso-agitur Eccl., xii, 2; et v. 6, quoad humilem; Eccl., xiv, 13, quoad amicum; Matth., v, 44, quoad imicum; Luc., vi, 35, quoad mutuo indigentem; Prov., iii, 27, quoad omnes. 3 Sic cod.; non ut in Parm.: « motus. » phum, lib. III Physic., text. 64, « totum et perfectum idem sunt. » Sed ea quæ sunt perfectionis, non cadunt sub præcepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo non debet præcipi quod Deus ex toto corde diligatur.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.sc] It is written (Deuteronomy 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."
[II-II.q.44.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Deut., vi, 5: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.co] Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love of God.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod cum præcepta dentur de actibus virtutum, hoc modo aliquis actus cadit sub præcepto, secundum quod est actus virtutis. Requiritur autem ad actum virtutis, non solum quod cadat super debitam materiam, sed etiam quod vestiatur debitis circumstantiis, quibus fit proportionatus tali materiæ. Deus autem est diligentus sicut finis ultimus, ad quem omnia sunt referenda. Et ideo totalitas quædam fuit designanda, circa præceptum de dilectione Dei.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.ad.1] The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words "with thy whole heart."
[II-II.q.44.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sub præcepto quod datur de actu alicujus virtutis, non cadit modus quem habet ille actus ex alia superiori virtute; cadit tamen sub præcepto modus ille qui pertinet ad rationem propriæ virtutis; et talis modus significatur, cum dicitur: Ex toto corde.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.ad.2] To love God with one's whole heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that a man's whole heart be always actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that a man's whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dupliciter contingit ex toto corde Deum diligere: uno quidem modo in actu, id est, ut totum cor hominis semper actualiter in Deum feratur, et ista est perfectio patriæ; alio modo, ut habitualiter totum cor hominis in Deum feratur, ita scilicet quod nihil contra Dei dilectionem cor hominis recipiat; et hæc est perfectio viæ; cui non contrariatur peccatum veniale, quia non tollit habitum charitatis, cum non tendat in oppositum objectum, sed solum impedit charitatis usum.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.ad.3] That perfection of charity to which the counsels are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.
[II-II.q.44.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod perfectio charitatis ad quam ordinantur consilia, est media inter duas perfectiones prædictas, ut scilicet homo, quantum possibile est, se abstrahat a rebus temporalibus etiam licitis, quæ occupando animum impediunt actualem motum cordis in Deum.
Article 5
[II-II.q.44.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart," to add, "and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength" (Deuteronomy 6:5). For heart does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and soul.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod inconvenienter Deut., vi, 5, super hoc quod dicitur: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, addatur: Et ex tota anima tua, et ex tota fortitudine tua. Non enim accipitur hic cor pro membro corporali; quia diligere Deum non est corporis actus. Oportet ergo quod cor accipiatur spiritualiter. Cor autem spiritualiter acceptum, vel est ipsa anima vel aliquid animæ. Superfluum ergo fuit utrumque ponere.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.arg.2] Further, a man's strength whether spiritual or corporal depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart," it was unnecessary to add, "with all thy strength."
[II-II.q.44.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fortitudo hominis præcipue dependet ex corde, sive spiritualiter hoc accipiatur, sive corporaliter. Ergo postquam dixerat: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo, superfluum fuit addere: Ex tota fortitudine tua.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.arg.3] Further, in Matthew 22:37 we read: "With all thy mind," which words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly worded in Deuteronomy 6.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Matth., xxii, 37, dicitur: In tota mente tua; quod hic non ponitur. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter hoc præceptum detur, Deut., vi.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.sc] stands the authority of Scripture.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.sc] Sed contra est auctoritas Scripturæ.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.co] This precept is differently worded in various places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Deuteronomy 6 three points are mentioned: "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole strength." On Matthew 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. "with thy whole heart" and "with thy whole soul," while "with thy whole strength" is omitted, but "with thy whole mind" is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. "with thy whole heart," and "with thy whole soul," and "with thy whole mind," and "with thy whole force" which is the same as "strength." Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of "strength" or "force" we read "with all thy might." [St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads "ex tota fortitudine tua" (Deuteronomy), "ex tota virtue tua" (Mark), and "ex omnibus tuis" (Luke), although the Greek in all three cases has ex holes tes ischyos, which the Douay renders "with thy whole strength."]
Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted by the "heart," because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect which is signified by "the mind," the lower appetitive power, signified by "the soul"; and the exterior executive power signified by "strength," "force" or "might." Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words "with thy whole heart"; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the words "with thy whole mind"; to regulate our appetite according to God, in the words "with thy whole soul"; and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with our whole "strength," "force" or "might."
Chrysostom [The quotation is from an anonymous author's unfinished work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom's works], on the other hand, takes "heart" and "soul" in the contrary sense; and Augustine (On Christian Doctrine I:21) refers "heart" to the thought, "soul" to the manner of life, and "mind" to the intellect. Again some explain "with thy whole heart" as denoting the intellect, "with thy whole soul" as signifying the will, "with thy mind" as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), "heart" signifies the vegetative soul, "soul" the sensitive, and "mind" the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.44.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc præceptum diversimode invenitur traditum in diversis locis; nam, sicut dictum est Deut., vi, ponuntur tria scilicet ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota fortitudine. Matth., xxii, ponuntur duo horum, scilicet ex toto corde, et in tota anima; et omittitur ex tota fortitudine, sed additur in tota mente; sed Marc., xii, ponuntur quatuor, scilicet ex toto corde, et ex tota anima, et ex tota mente, et ex tota virtute, quæ est idem fortitudini; et hæc etiam quatuor tanguntur Luc., x; nam loco fortitudinis seu virtutis, ponitur: Ex omnibus viribus tuis. Et ideo horum quatuor est ratio assignanda; nam quod alicubi unum horum omittitur, hoc est quia unum intelligitur ex aliis. Est ergo considerandum quod dilectio est actus voluntatis, quæ hic significatur per cor; nam sicut cor corporale est principium omnium corporalium motuum, ita etiam voluntas, et maxime quantum ad intentionem finis ultimi, qui est objectum charitatis, est principium omnium spiritualium motuum. Tria autem sunt principia actuum quæ moventur a voluntate : scilicet intellectus, qui significatur per mentem; vis appetitiva inferior, quæ significatur per animam, et vis executiva exterior, quæ significatur per fortitudinem seu virtutem, sive vires. Præcipitur ergo nobis ut tota nostra intentio feratur in Deum, quod est ex tota corde; et quod intellectus noster subdatur Deo, quod est ex tota mente; et quod appetitus noster reguletur secundum Deum, quod est ex tota anima; et quod exterior actus noster obediat Deo, quod est ex tota fortitudine, vel virtute, vel viribus Deum diligere. Chrysostomus tamen, Sup. Matth., hom. xlii in Oper. imperf., a med., accipit e contrario cor et animam, quam dictum sit. Augustinus vero, in I De doct. christ., c. xxii, col. 27, t. 3, refert cor ad cogitationes, et animam ad vitam; mentem ad intellectum. Quidam autem dicunt: ex tota corde, id est, intellectu; anima, id est, voluntate; mente, id est memoria. Vel secundum Gregorium Nyssenum, lib. De hominis opific., cap. viii, col. 146, t. 4, per cor significat animam vegetabilem; per animam sensitivam; per mentem, intellectivam: quia hoc quod nu- Non est Chrysostomi. Vel potius Pelagium hæreticum in quadam professione fidei ad Damasum papam missa, ut jam dictum est. Multi volunt his particulis: ex tota corde, ex tota mente, ex tota anima, ex tota fortitudine, unum et idem significari, scilicet amorem Dei super omnia, easque apponi solummodo ad majorem explicationem et energiam. Id colligunt ex eo quod Scriptura interdum tres particulas, aliquando duas, aliquando quatuor ponit, quodque non semper eadem, nec eodem ordine ponuntur; nam Deuter., vi, exprimitur cor, anima et fortitudo, apud Matth., cor, anima et mens, apud Marçum, cor, anima, mens et virtus, apud Lucam, cor, anima, vires et mens: quæ varietas signum est non esse magnum mysterium in distinctione harum particularum, sed perinde esse sive istæ, sive illæ ponantur. Ita Sylvius, post Hilarium, Hieronymum, Ambrosium et alios plures Patres. Augustinus tamen et Bernardus discrimen po-nunt inter has clausulas. Nota Lucam ponere quatuor in modo dilectionis Dei; tamen Moyses, Deuter., vi, et Matth., xxii, non ponunt nisi tria. Sed forte Lucas attendit quatuor rationes, propter quas diligendus est Deus, et propter quamlibet super omnia. Prima quia est creator ad esse; secunda, quia conservator in esse; tertia, quia recreator in bene esse; quarta, quia glorificator in optimo esse. Vel quatuor ad tria reducuntur, ut istud membrum ex totis viribus referatur ad quodlibet aliorum trium quasi modus; ut sit sensus: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex totis trimur, sentimus, et intelligimus, debemus ad Deum referre. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 6
[II-II.q.44.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [Pelagius, Exposit. Cath. Fid.] "accursed is he who says that God has commanded anything impossible." But God gave this commandment, as is clear from Deuteronomy 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod hoc præceptum de dilectione Dei possit servari in via. Quia, secundum Hieronymum, in Expositione catholicæ fidei, « maledictus qui dicit Deum aliquid impossibile præcepisse. » Sed Deus hoc præceptum dedit, ut patet Deut., vi. Ergo hoc præceptum potest in via impleri.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.arg.2] Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than "a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Corinthians 1:8): "(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime," and (1 Timothy 3:10): "Let them minister, having no crime."
[II-II.q.44.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque non implet præceptum, peccat mortaliter: quia, secundum viribus (totius cordis), ex totis viribus (totius animæ), ex totis viribus (totius mentis). Ex tota corde, quia Dominus, ex tota anima, quia Deus, ex omni mente, quia tuus. Aliter exponitur: ex tota corde, id est ex tota intellectu, ut omnis intellectus tuus subditus sit intellectui de Deo; ex tota anima, id est ex tota voluntate, ut omnis voluntas tua subdita sit voluntati divinæ; ex omni mente, id est tota memoria. Quod autem sequitur ex omnibus viribus tuis hoc modo impletur in via. Vel sic secundum Augustinum: ex tota corde, id est, toto intellectu, sine errore; ex tota anima, id est tota voluntate, sine contrarietate. Ibi voluntas se totam colligit, ubi nihil est ei contrarium; ex tota mente, id est memoria, sine difficultate vel sine oblivione. Hæc non possunt impleri in via. — B. Bernardus: tota corde, id est sapient; tota anima, id est dulciter; tota mente, fortiter. — Chrysostomus: tota corde, ut cor tuum ad nullius rei dilectionem magis sit inclinatum quam Dei; tota anima, ut certissimum animum habeas in veritate, et firmum in fide; tota mente, ut omnes sensus tui Deo vacent, intellectus, cogitatio, sapientia, memoria. — Quidam sic: tota corde, ut omnes cogitiones in Deum dirigas; tota anima, ut omnes affectiones ad Deum retorqueas: tota mente, ut omnes operationes propter Deum facias. — Gregorius: ex tota corde, ex tota anima, ex tota mente, id est super omnia, et est inculcatio verborum quae significat excellentiam amoris. Hugo de Sancto Victore: ex tota corde, id est devotione, quoad virgines; ex tota anima, id est discretione, quoad confessores; ex tota mente, id est perseverantia, quoad martyres. Ambrosium, lib. De parad., cap. viii, § 39, col. 309, t. 4, peccatum nihil est aliud quam « transgressio legis divinæ, et cælestium inobedientia mandatorum. » Si ergo hoc præceptum non potest in via servari, sequitur quod nullus possit esse in vita ista sine peccato mortali; quod est contra id quod Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor., 1, 8: Confirmabit vos usque in finem sine crimine; et I ad Timoth., 10: Ministrent, nullum crimen habentes.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.arg.3] Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of salvation, according to Psalm 18:9: "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." Now it is useless to direct anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this precept in this life.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, præcepta dantur ad dirigendos homines in viam salutis, secundum illud psal. xviii, 9: Præceptum Domini lucidum, illuminans oculos. Sed frustra dirigitur aliquis ad impossibile. Non ergo impossibile est hoc præceptum in vita ista servari.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.sc] Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): "In the fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with all his heart.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in lib. De perfectione justitiæ, c. viii, col. 301, t. 10, quod « in plenitudine charitatis patriæ præceptum illud implebitur: Diliges Dominum Deum tuum, etc. Nam cum est adhuc aliquid carnalis concupiscentiæ, quod continendo frenetur, non omnimodo ex tota anima diligitur Deus. »
[II-II.q.44.a.6.co] A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the commander's intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be "all in all," according to 1 Corinthians 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod præceptum aliquod dupliciter potest impleri: uno modo perfecte, alio modo imperfecte; perfecte qui dem impletur præceptum, quando perveniitur ad finem quem intendit præcipiens; impletur autem, sed imperfecte, quando etsi non pertingat ad finem præcipientis, non tamen receditur ab ordine ad finem: sicut si dux exercitus præcipiat militibus ut pu-gnent, ille perfecte implet præceptum qui pugnando hostem vincit, quod dux intendit, ille autem implet, sed imperfecte, cujus pugna ad victoriam non pertingit, non tamen contra disciplinam militarem agit. Intendit autem Deus per hoc præceptum ut homo sibi totaliter uniatur; quod fiet in patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor., xv, 28. Et ideo plene et perfecte in patria implebitur hoc præceptum; in via autem impletur, sed imperfecte; et tamen in via tanto unus alio perfectius implet, quanto magis accedit per quamdam similitudinem ad patriae perfectionem.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.ad.1] This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa probat quod aliquo modo potest impleri in via, licet non perfecte.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.ad.2] Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut miles qui legitime pugnat, licet non vincat, non inde culpatur, nec pœnam meretur, ita etiam qui in via hoc præceptum non implet, nihil contra divinam directionem agens, non peccat mortaliter.
[II-II.q.44.a.6.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), "why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it out."
[II-II.q.44.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro De perfectione justitiæ, ubi supra, « cur non præciperetur homini ista perfectio, quamvis eam in hac vita nemo habeat ? Non enim recte curritur, si quo currendum est, nesciatur. Quomodo autem sciretur, si nullis præceptis ostenderetur ? »
Article 7
[II-II.q.44.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matthew 5:44. But the word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod inconvenienter detur præceptum de dilectione proximi. Dilectio enim charitatis ad omnes homines extenditur, etiam ad inimicos, ut patet Matth., v. Sed nomen proximi importat quamdam propinquitatem, quæ non videtur haberi ad omnes homines. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter detur hoc præceptum.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.arg.2] Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, secundum Philosophum in IX Ethic., cap. viii, a princ., « amicabilia quæ sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quæ sunt ad seipsum; » ex quo vide-tur quod dilectio suiipsius sit principium dilectionis proximi. Sed principium potius est eo quod est ex principio. Ergo non debet homo diligere proximum sicut seipsum.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.arg.3] Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his neighbor as himself.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo seipsum diligit naturaliter, non autem proximum. Inconvenienter ergo mandatur quod homo diligat proximum sicut seipsum.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.sc] It is written (Matthew 22:39): "The second" commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
[II-II.q.44.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., xxii, 39: Secundum præceptum simile est huic: Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.co] This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother" according to 1 John 4:21, or "friend," according to Leviticus 19:18, because all these words express the same affinity.
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a "holy" love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbor may be a "righteous" love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a "true" love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
[II-II.q.44.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc præceptum convenienter traditur; tangitur enim in eo et diligendi ratio, et dilectionis modus. Ratio quidem diligendi tangitur ex eo quod « proximus » nominatur; propter hoc enim « Quid est enim peccatum, nisi prævaricatio legis divinæ et cælestium inobedientia mandato- ex charitate diligere debemus alios, quia sunt nobis proximi, et secundum naturalem Dei imaginem, et secundum capacitatem gloriæ. Nec refert utrum dicatur proximus vel frater, ut habetur I Joan., iv, vel amicus, ut habetur Levit., xix, quia per omnia hæc eadem affinitas designatur. Modus autem dilectionis tangitur, cum dicitur: Sicut teipsum; quod non est intelligendum quantum ad hoc quod aliquis proximum sibi aequaliter diligat, sed similiter sibi, et hoc tripliciter: primo quidem ex parte finis, ut scilicet aliquis diligat proximum propter Deum, sicut seipsum propter Deum debet diligere, ut sic sit dilectio proximi sancta; secundo ex parte regulæ dilectionis, ut scilicet aliquis non condescendat proximo in aliquo malo, sed solum in bonis, sicut et suæ voluntati satisfacere debet homo solum in bonis; ut sic sit dilectio proximi justa. Tertio ex parte rationis dilectionis, ut scilicet non diligat aliquis proximum propter propriam utilitatem, vel delectationem, sed ea ratione quod velit proximo bonum, sicut vult bonum sibi ipsi, ut sic dilectio proximi sit vera; nam cum quis diligit proximum propter suam utilitatem vel delectationem, non vere diligit proximum, sed seipsum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 8
[II-II.q.44.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod ordo charitatis non cadat sub præcepto. Quicumque enim transgreditur præceptum, injuriam facit. Sed si aliquis diligat aliquem quantum debet, et alterum quemcumque plus diligat, nulli facit injuriam. Ergo non transgreditur præceptum. Ordo ergo charitatis non cadit sub præcepto.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.arg.2] Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given above (Article 26) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not included in the precept.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea quæ cadunt sub præcepto, sufficienter nobis traduntur in sacra Scriptura. Sed ordo charitatis, qui supra positus Quæ dicta sunt de præcepto speciali diligendi interne Deum dicenda sunt de præcepto speciali diligendi interne proximum. Hinc sequentes propositiones ab Innocentio XI damnatæ sunt: « Non tenemur diligere proximum actu interno est, nusquam traditur nobis in sacra Scriptura. Ergo non cadit sub præcepto.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.arg.3] Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ordo distinctionem quamdam importat. Sed indistincte præcipitur dilectio proximi, cum dicitur: Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum. Ergo ordo charitatis non cadit sub præcepto.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.sc] Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us first of all by His Law, according to Jeremiah 31:33: "I will give My Law in their heart [Vulgate: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Canticles 2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity comes under the precept of the Law.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.sc] Sed contra, illud quod Deus in nobis facit per gratiam, instruit per legis præcepta, secundum illud Jerem., xxxi, 33: Dabo legem meam in cordibus* eorum. Sed Deus causat in nobis ordinem charitatis, secundum illud Cantic., ii, 4: Ordinavit in me charitatem. Ergo ordo charitatis sub præcepto legis cadit.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.co] As stated above (4, ad 1), the mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown above (25, 12; 26, 1 and 2). It is therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, modus qui pertinet ad rationem virtuosi actus, cadit sub præcepto quod datur de actu virtutis. Ordo autem charitatis pertinet ad ipsam rationem virtutis, cum accipiatur secundum proportionem dilectionis ad diligibile, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde manifestum est quod ordo charitatis debet cadere sub præcepto.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.ad.1] A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice to the one he ought to love more.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod homo plus satisfacit ei quem plus diligit; et ita si minus diligeret aliquis eum quem plus debet diligere, plus vellet satisfacere illi cui minus satisfacere debet; et sic fieret injuria illi quem plus deberet diligere.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.ad.2] The order of those four things we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. On like manner where we are commanded (1 John 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again when we are commanded (Galatians 6:10) to "work good . . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith," and when a man is blamed (1 Timothy 5:8) if he "have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house," it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to us.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ordo qua-tuor diligendorum ex charitate in sacra Scriptura exprimitur. Nam cum mandatur quod Deum ex toto corde diligamus, datur intelligi quod Deum super omnia debemus diligere. Cum autem mandatur, quod aliquis diligat proximum sicut seipsum, præfertur dilectio suiipsius dilectioni proximi; similiter etiam cum mandatur, I Joan., Ⅲ, 16, quod debemus pro fratribus animas ponere, id est, vitam corporalem, datur intelligi quod proximum plus debemus diligere quam corpus proprium; similiter etiam cum mandatur ad Gal., ult., quod maxime bonum operemur ad domesticos fidei; et I ad Tim., v, vituperatur qui non habet curam suorum, et maxime domesticorum, datur intelligi quod inter proximos, meliores et magis propinquos magis debemus diligere. et formali. » Est decima. « Præcepto proximum diligendi possumus satis-facere per solos actus externos. » Est undecima.
[II-II.q.44.a.8.ad.3] It follows from the very words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.44.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod dicitur: Diliges proximum tuum, datur consequenter intelligi quod illi qui sunt magis proximi, sunt magis diligendi.
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