Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q53. Imprudence
Source context
- Theme
- imprudence as the privative failure of practical reason in moral judgment
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian phronesis-ethicsAristotle's analysis of failures of practical wisdom (aphrosyne) in the Nicomachean Ethics provides a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's treatment of imprudence as the defect of phronesis, both locating the fault in a disorder of deliberative reason rather than in appetite alone.
- Platonic moral psychologyPlato's account of the soul misled by false appearances (Republic, Book IX) offers a structural parallel: imprudence arises when the rational faculty fails to govern the lower parts, mirroring Aquinas's view that imprudence disorders the directive function of prudence over the moral life.
Q53. Imprudence
Article 1
[II-II.q.53.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non fuerit necessarium Christum resurgere. Dicit enim Damascenus in lib. IV Orth. fid., cap. ult., col. 1219, t. 1: « Resurrection est secunda ejus quod dissolutum est et cecidit, animalis surrectio. » Sed Christus non cecidit per peccatum, nec corpus ejus est dissolutum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo proprie convenit ei resurgere.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.arg.2] Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, quicumque resurgit, ad aliquid altius promovetur, quia surgere est sursum moveri. Sed corpus Christi remansit post mortem divinitati unitum; et ita non potuit in aliquid altius promo- 2 In 3 Ita cum Mss. edit. veteres. Garcia, et edit. Pat.: « satisfactionis. » Nicolai, « sanctificationis. » Juxta Pelbartum Christus descendit ad Purgatorium, et inde omnes animas liberavit, ut dicitur Act. ii.: « Solutis inferni doloribus. » veri. Ergo non competebat sibi resurgere.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.arg.3] Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ea quæ circa humanitatem Christi sunt acta, ad nostram salutem ordinantur. Sed sufficiebat ad salutem nostram passio Christi, per quam sumus liberati a pœna, et culpa, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non ergo fuit necessarium quod Christus a mortuis resurgeret.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.sc] The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Proverbs 21:20, "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the imprudent [Douay: 'foolish'] man shall spend it." Therefore imprudence is a sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Luc. ult., 26: Oportebat Christum pati, et resurgere a mortuis.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.co] Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man's negligence in striving to have prudence.
Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. On this way imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necessarium fuit Christum resurgere, propter quinque. Primo quidem ad commendationem divinæ justitiæ, ad quam pertinet exaltare illos qui se propter Deum humiliant, secundum illud Luc., 1, 52: Deposuit potentes de sede, et exaltavit humiles. Quia igitur Christus propter charitatem et obedientiam Dei se humiliavit usque ad mortem crucis, oportebat quod exaltaretur a et usque ad gloriosam resurrectionem: unde ex ejus persona dicitur in psal. cxxxviii, 4: Tu cognovisti, id est, approbasti, sessionem meam, id est, humilitatem, et passionem et resurrectionem meam, id est, glorificationem in resurrectione sicut Glossa interl. exponit. Secundo, ad fidei nostræ instructionem, quia per ejus resurrectionem confirmata est fides nostra circa divinitatem Christi, quia, ut dicitur II ad Cor., ult. 4, Etsi crucifixus est ex infirmitate, sed vivit ex virtute Dei. Et ideo I ad Corinth., xv, 14, dicitur: Si Christus non resurrexit, inanis est prædicatio nostra, inanis est et fides vestra: et in psal. xxix, 10, dicitur: Quæ utilitas in sanguine meo, id est, in effusione sanguinis mei, dum descendo, quasi per quosdam gradus malorum, in corruptionem? quasi dicat, « Si enim statim non resurgo, corruptumque fuerit corpus meum, nemini annuntiabo, nullum lucrabor, » ut Glossa exponit. Tertio ad sublevationem nostræ spei: quia dum videmus Christum resurgere, qui est caput nostrum, speramus et nos resurrecturos. Unde dicitur I ad Corinth., xv, 12: Si Christus prædicatur quod resurrexit a mortuis, quomodo quidam dicunt in vobis, quoniam resurrectio mortuorum non est! et Job, xix, 25, dicitur: Scio, scilicet per certitudinem fidei, quod redemptor meus id est, Christus, vivit a mortuis resurgens et ideo in novissimo die de terra resurrecturus sum; reposita est hæc spes mea in sinu meo. Quarto, ad informationem vitæ fidelium, secundum illud Rom., vi, 4: Quomodo Christus surrexit a mortuis per gloriam Patris; ita et nos in novitate vitæ ambulemus; et infra: Christus resurgens ex mortuis jam non moritur: ita et vos existimate vos mortuos quidem esse peccato: viventes autem Deo. Quinto, ad complementum nostræ salutis: quia sicut per hoc quod mala sustinuit moriendo, ut nos liberaret a malis; ita glorificatus est resurgendo, ut nos promoveret ad bona, secundum illud Rom., iv, 25: Traditus est propter delicta nostra, et resurrexit propter justificationem nostram.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.ad.1] No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "he who sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended."
[II-II.q.53.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet Christus non ceciderit per peccatum, cecidit tamen per mortem, quia sicut peccatum est casus a justitia, ita mors est casus a vita; unde ex persona Christi potest intelligi quod dicitur Mich., vii, 8: Ne læteris inimica mea, super me, quia, cecidi; consurgam. Similiter etiam licet corpus Christi non fuerit dissolutum per incinerationem, ipsa tamen separatio animæ a corpore dissolutio quædam fuit.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.ad.2] This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Divinitas erat carni Christi post mortem unita unione personali, non autem unione naturæ, sicut anima unitur corpori ut forma ad constituendam humanam naturam. Et ideo per hoc quod corpus ejus unitum est animæ, promotum est in altiorem statum naturæ, non autem in altiorem statum personæ.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.ad.3] Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists.
[II-II.q.53.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod passio Christi operata est nostram salutem, proprie loquendo, quantum ad remotionem malorum; resurrectio autem quantum ad inchoationem et exemplar bonorum.
Article 2
[II-II.q.53.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod imprudentia non sit speciale peccatum. Quicumque enim peccat, agit contra rationem rectam, quæ est prudentia. Sed imprudentia consistit in hoc quod aliquis agit contra prudentiam, ut dictum est. Ergo imprudentia non est speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.arg.2] Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is.
But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Act., ii, 24, dicit Petrus quod impossibile erat Christum detineri ab inferno et morte. Sed quamdiu aliquis est mortuus, detinetur a morte. Ergo videtur quod Christi resurrection non debuerit differri usque ad tertiam diem, sed statim eadem die resurgere; præcipue cum Glossa supra inducta, dicat nullam esse utilitatem in effusione sanguinis Christi si non statim resurgeret.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.arg.3] Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above (Q48;49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, dies incipere videtur ab ortu solis qui sua præsentia diem causat. Sed ante ortum solis Christus resurrexit: dicitur enim Joan., xx, 4, quod una sabbati Maria Magdalene venit mane, cum adhuc tenebræ essent, ad monumentum; et tamen Christus jam resurrexerat, quia sequitur, Et vidit lapidem sublatum a monumento. Non ergo resurrexit Christus tertia die.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.sc] Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above (Article 1). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one special vice.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth., xx, 17: Tradent eum gentibus ad illudendum, et flagellandum, et crucifigendum, et tertia die resurget.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.co] A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. On the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.
If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above (48; 50, 07), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of "counsel" to which euboulia (deliberating well) corresponds, "precipitation" or "temerity" is a species of imprudence; by defect of "judgment," to which synesis (judging well according to common law) and gnome (judging well according to general law) refer, there is "thoughtlessness"; while "inconstancy" and "negligence" correspond to the "command" which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in "thoughtlessness"; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to "precipitation"; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to "negligence" and "inconstancy."
[II-II.q.53.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, resurrectio Christi necessaria fuit ad instructionem fidei nostræ. Est autem fides nostra et de divinitate et humanitate Christi: non enim sufficit alterum sine altero credere, ut ex prædictis patet. Et ideo ad hoc quod confirmaretur fides de veritate divinitatis ipsius, oportuit quod cito resurgeret, et ejus resurrectio non differretur usque ad finem mundi. Ad hoc autem quod confirmaretur fides de veritate humanitatis, et mortis ejus, oportuit moram esse inter mortem et resurrectionem. Si enim statim post mortem resurrexisset, videri posset quod ejus mors vera non fuerit, et per consequens nec resurrectio vera. Ad veritatem autem mortis Christi manifestandam sufficiebat quod usque ad tertium diem ejus resurrectio differretur; quia non contingit quin infra hoc tempus in homine, qui mortuus videtur, cum vivat, appareant aliqua indicia vitæ. Per hoc etiam quod tertia die resurrexit, commendatur perfectio ternarii, qui est numerus omnis rei, utpote habens principium, medium et finem, ut dicitur in I De Cælo, text. 2. Ostenditur etiam secundum mysterium quod Christus una morte sua corporali quæ fuit lux propter justitiam, duas nostras mortes destruxit, scilicet corporis et animæ, quæ sunt tenebrosæ propter pecatum; et ideo una die integra et duabus noctibus permansit in morte, ut Augustinus dicit in IV De Trinit., cap. vi, t. 8. Per hoc etiam significatur quod per resurrectionem Christi tertium tempus incipiebat; nam primum fuit ante legem, secundum sub lege, tertium sub gratia. Incæpit etiam in Christi resurrectione tertius status sanctorum: nam primus fuit sub figuris legis, secundus sub veritate fidei, tertius erit in æternitate gloriæ quam Christus inchoavit resurgendo.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.ad.1] This argument considers generality by participation.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod caput et membra conformantur in natura, sed non in virtute; excellentior est enim virtus capitis quam membrorum. Et ideo ad demonstrandam excellentiam virtutis Christi conveniens fuit ipsum tertia die resurgere, aliorum resurrectione dilata usque ad finem mundi.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.ad.2] Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod detentio coactionem quamdam importat. Christus autem nulla necessitate mortis tenebatur adstrictus, sed erat inter mortuos liber; et ideo aliquamdiu in morte man-sit, non quasi detentus, sed propria voluntate, quamdiu judicavit hoc esse necessarium ad instructionem fidei nostræ. Dicitur autem statim fieri quod fit brevi interposito tempore,
[II-II.q.53.a.2.ad.3] When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take what is not one's own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various species: for instance, if one man were to take another's property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were to take another's property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above.
[II-II.q.53.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, Christus resurrexit circa diluculum illucescente jam die, ad significandum quod per suam resurrectionem nos ad lucem gloriæ inducebat; sicut mortuus est advesperascente jam die et recedente in tenebras, ad ostendendum quod per suam mortem destrueret tenebras culpæ et pœnæ. Et tamen dicitur tertia die resurrexisse, accipiendo diem pro die naturali, qui continet spatium viginti quatuor horarum; et sicut dicit Augustinus in IV De Trinit., cap. vi, col. 894, t. 8, «nox usque ad diluculum, quo Domini resurrectione declarata est, ad tertium diem pertinet; quia Deus, qui dixit de tenebris lucem clarescere, ut per gratiam novi Testamenti, et participationem resurrectionis Christi audiremus: Fuistis aliquando tenebræ, nunc autem lux in Domino, insinuat nobis quodammodo quod a nocte dies sumat initium; sicut enim primi dies propter futurum hominis lapsum a luce in noctem, ita isti propter hominis reparationem a tenebris ad lucem computantur. » Et ita patet quod etiam simedianocte resurrexisset, posset dici eum die tertia resurrexisse, intelligendo de die naturali. Nunc autem cum diluculo surrexerit, potest dici quod tertia die surrexit, etiam accipiendo diem artificialem, quæ causatur ex præsentia solis, quia jam sol incipiebat aerem illustrare. Unde et Marci ult., 2, dicitur quod mulieres venerunt ad monumentum, orto jam sole; quod non est contrarium ei quod Joannes dicit: Dum adhuc tenebræ essent, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. III De consensu Evangelist., cap. xxiv, col. 4198, t. 3, « quia die surgente, reliquiæ tenebrarum tanto magis extenuantur quanto magis oritur lux. » Quod autem dicit Marcus: Orto jam sole, non sic accipiendum est, tamquam jam sol ipse videretur super terram, sed tamquam eo proximo veniente in has partes.
Article 3
[II-II.q.53.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod Christus non primo resurrexerit: nam in veteri Testamento per Eliam et Elisæum aliqui resuscitati leguntur, secundum illud Hebr., xi, 35: Acceperunt mulieres de resurrectione mortuos suos; similiter et Christus ante passionem suam tres mortuos suscitavit. Non ergo Christus fuit primus resurgentium.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.arg.2] Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Matth., xxvii, 52, inter alia miracula quæ in passione Christi acciderunt, narratur quod monumenta aperta sunt et multa corpora sanctorum qui dormierant surrexerunt. Non Christus ergo fuit primus resurgentium.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.arg.3] Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Christus per suam resurrectionem est causa nostræ resurrectionis, ita per suam gratiam est causa nostræ gratiae, secundum illud Joan., 1, 16: De plenitudine ejus nos omnes accepimus. Sed alii prius tempore gratiam ha-buerunt quam Christus, sicut omnes patres veteris Testamenti. Ergo etiam aliqui prius ad resurrectionem corporalem pervenerunt quam Christus.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.sc] It is written (Proverbs 4:19): "The way of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be precipitate.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor., xv, 20: Christus resurrexit a mortuis, primitiæ dormientium; Glossa interl.: « quia prius tempore et dignitate surrexit. »
[II-II.q.53.a.3.co] Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod resurrectio est reparatio a morte in vitam. Dupliciter autem aliquis eripitur a morte: uno modo solum a morte in actu, ut scilicet aliquis vivere incipiat qualitercumque, postquam mortuus fuerat; alio modo ut aliquis liberetur non solum a morte, sed etiam a necessitate, et, quod plus est, a possibilitate moriendi. Et hæc est vera et perfecta resurrectio: quia quamdiu aliquis vivit subjectus necessitati moriendi, quodammodo mors ei dominatur, secundum illud Rom., viii, 10: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum. Illud etiam quod possibile est esse, secundum quid dicitur esse, id est potentialiter. Et sic patet quod illa resurrectio qua quis eripitur solum ab actuali morte, est resurrectio imperfecta. Loquendo igitur de resurrectione perfecta, Christus est primus resurgentium, quia ipse resurgendo primo pervenit ad vitam penitus immortalem, secundum illud Rom., vi, 9: Christus resurgens ex mortuis jam non moritur. Sed resurrectione imperfecta quidam alii resurrexerunt ante Christum, ad præmonstrandum quasi in quodam signo resurrectionem ipsius. Et sic patet responsio ad primum: quia et illi qui suscitati in veteri Testamento sunt, et illi qui suscitati sunt a Christo, sic redierunt ad vitam ut iterum morientur.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.ad.1] Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above (Question 52, Article 2), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod consilii rectitudo pertinet ad donum consilii et ad virtutem prudentiae; licet diversimode, ut supra dictum est; et ideo præcipitatio utrique contrariatur.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.ad.2] Things are said to be done rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to the first.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod de illis qui resurrexerunt cum Christo, duplex est opinio; quidam enim asserunt quod redierunt ad vitam tamquam non iterum morituri, quoniam magis illis esset tormentum, si iterum morirentur, quam si non resurgent. Et secundum hoc intelligendum erit, sicut Hieronymus dicit Super xxvii Matth., v. 53, col. 213, t. 7, quod « non ante surrexerint, quam resurgeret Dominus. » Unde et Evangelista dicit quod exeuntes de monumentis post resurrectionem ejus venerunt in sanctam 1 In Hanc sententiam tenent S. Ignatius martyr, civitatem, et apparuerunt multis. Sed Augustinus in Epistola clxiv ad Evodium, § 9, col. 712, t. 2, hanc opinionem commemorans, dicit: « Scio quibusdam videri morte Domini Christi jam talem resurrectionem præstitam justis qualis nobis in fine promittitur; qui si non iterum repositis corporibus dormierunt, videndum est quomodo intelligatur Christus primogenitus a mortuis, si eum in illa resurrectione tot præcesse-runt. Quod si respondetur hoc esse dictum per anticipationem, ut monumenta illo terræ motu aperta intelligantur, cum Christus in cruce penderet, resurrexisse autem justorum corpora non tunc, sed cum ille prior resurrexisset, illud adhuc restat quod moveat, quomodo Petrus non de David, sed de Christo asseruit fuisse prædictum, carnem ejus non vidisse corruptionem, per hoc quod apud eos erat monumentum David; et sic illos non convincebat, si corpus David ibi jam non erat; quia etsi ante in recenti sua morte resurrexisset, nec caro ejus vidisset corruptionem, posset nihilominus illud monumentum manere. Durum autem videtur ut David non fuerit in illa resurrectione justorum, si eis jam æterna donata est, eujus Christus ex semine commendatur. Periclitabitur etiam illud quod ad Hebræos de justis antiquis dicitur: Ne sine nobis consummarentur; » si jam in illa resurrectionis incorruptione constituti sunt, quæ nobis perficiendis in fine promittitur. » Sic ergo Augustinus sentire videtur quod resurrexerint iterum morituri. Ad quod etiam videtur pertinere quod Hieronymus dicit Super Matth., loc. sup. cit., quod « sicut Lazarus resurrexit, sic et multa corpora sanctorum resurrexerunt, ut Dominum ostenderent resurgentem. » Quamvis hoc in Sermone de Assumptione, § 2, col 123, t. 14 op. Hieron., sub dubio relinquat, rationes tamen Augustini multo efficaciores videntur.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.ad.3] Many things have to be considered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.
[II-II.q.53.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut ea quæ præcesserunt Christi adventum fuerunt præparatoria ad Christum, ita gratia est dispositio ad gloriam. Et ideo ea quæ sunt gloriæ, sive quantum ad animam, sicut perfecta Dei fruitio, sive quantum ad corpus, sicut resurrectio gloriosa, tempore debuerunt esse in Christo prius, sicut in auctore gloriæ; gratiam vero conveniebat prius esse in his quæ ordinabantur ad Christum.
Article 4
[II-II.q.53.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any sin, according to Psalm 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Matthew 10:19, "Take no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus non fuerit causa suæ resurrectionis. Quicumque enim suscitatur ab alio, non est suæ resurrectionis causa. Sed Christus suscitatus est ab alio, secundum illud Act., II, 24: Quem Deus suscitavit, solutis doloribus inferni; et Rom. vIII, 41, Qui suscitavit Jesum Christum a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia corpora nostra, etc. Ergo Christus non est causa suæ resurrectionis.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.arg.2] Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus dicitur mereri vel ab alio petit aliquid cujus ipse est causa. Sed Christus sua passione meruit resurrectionem, sicut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. civ, § 3, col. 1903, t. 3, quod « humilitas passionis meritum est gloriæ resurrectionis; » ipse etiam petiit 1 Post illa autem verba: « Sub dubio relinquat, » hæc in textu subjicit Nicolai: « Ubi multis « dubitari permittit an assumpta fuerit simul « cum corpore B. Virgo, an abierit relicto corpore, ab aliis nonnullis autem jam resuscitatam « adstrui, et beata cum Christo immortalitate « vestiri; » et subjungit: « Verumtamen quid « horum verius censeatur ambigimus. Melius « tamen Deo totum, cui nihil impossibile est, committimus, quam ut aliquid ea de re temere « definire velimus auctoritate nostra, sicut et de his quos cum Domino resurrexisse credimus, Evangelio teste, sed utrum redierint in pulverem terræ, certari non habemus; nisi quod « legimus quia multa corpora sanctorum qui dormierant, surrexerunt ac venerunt in sanctam civitatem, scilicet Hierusalem, et apparuerunt « multis. De quibus profecto nonnulli doctorum « senserunt, et in suis etiam scriptis reliquerunt, « quod jam in illis perpetua sit completa resurrectione. Fatentur enim quod veri testes non « essent, nisi et vera eorum esset resurrectione. « Quod sane factum et de aliis quibusdam locis « Scripturarum affirmare conantur, quod hi jam « cum Christo regnant resuscitati in æterna societate. Quod, quia Deo nihil impossibile est, non abnuimus factum; quamquam propter « cautelam, salva fide, pio magis desiderio id « opinari oporteat, quam inconsulte definire « quod sine periculo nescitur, quia non est necessarium ad salutem. » Tum statim sequitur: « Rationes tamen, etc. » 2 Parm.: mereri qui ab alio. » a Patre se resuscitari, secundum illud psal. xL, 14: Tu autem, Domine, miserere mei, et resuscita me. Ergo non fuit causa suæ resurrectionis.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.arg.3] Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. "counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and "command" [Cf. 47, 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Damascenus probat in IV lib. Orth. fid., cap. ult., col. 1219, t. 1, resurrection non est animæ, sed corporis, quod per mortem cadit. Corpus autem non potest sibi animam unire, quæ est eo nobilior. Ergo id quod resurrexit in Christo, non potuit esse causa suæ resurrectionis.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.sc] It is written (Proverbs 4:25): "Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Joan., x, 18: Nemo tollit animam meam a me, sed ego pono eam, et * iterum sumo eam. Sed nihil est aliud resurgere quam iterato animam sumere. Ergo videtur quod Christus propria virtute resurrexit.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.co] Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, per mortem non fuit separata divinitas nec ab anima Christi nec ab ejus carne. Potest igitur tam anima Christi mortui, quam ejus caro considerari dupliciter: uno modo ratione divinitatis; alio modo ratione ipsius naturæ creatæ. Secundum igitur unitæ divinitatis virtutem et corpus resumpsit animam quam deposuerat, et anima corpus resumpsit quod dimiserat. Et hoc est quod de Christo dicitur II ad Corinth., ult., iv, quod etsi crucifixus est ex infirmitate nostra, sed vivit ex virtute Dei. Si autem consideremus corpus et animam Christi mortui secundum virtutem naturæ creatæ, sic non potuerunt sibi invicem reuniri, sed oportuit Christum resuscitari a Deo.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.ad.1] Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because "as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God," according to 2 Chronicles 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God's assistance, he would seem to tempt God.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod eadem est divina virtus et operatio Patris et Filii; unde hæc duo sese consequuntur, quod Christus sit suscitatus divina virtute Patris et sui ipsius.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.ad.2] All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum quod Christus orando petiit et meruit suam resurrectionem, inquantum homo, non autem inquantum Deus.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.ad.3] Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.
[II-II.q.53.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod corpus secundum naturam creatam non est potentius anima Christi; est tamen ea potentius secundum virtutem divinam, quæ etiam rursus secundum divinitatem unitam est potentior corpore secundum naturam creatam. Et ideo secundum virtutem divinam corpus et anima mutuo se resumpserunt, non autem secundum virtutem naturæ creatæ.
Article 5
[II-II.q.53.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod inconstantia non sit vitium sub imprudentia contentum. Inconstantia enim videtur in hoc consistere, quod homo non persistat in aliquo difficili. Sed persistere in difficilibus pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ergo inconstantia magis opponitur fortitudini quam prudentiae.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.arg.2] Further, it is written (James 3:16): "Where jealousy [Douay: 'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work."
But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Jacobi, m, 16, dicitur: Ubi zelus et contentio, ibi inconstantia et omne opus pravum. Sed zelus ad invidiam pertinet. Ergo inconstantia non pertinet ad imprudentia, sed magis ad invidiam.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.arg.3] Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of "incontinency" in pleasurable matters, and of "effeminacy" or "squeamishness" in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ille videtur esse inconstans, qui non perseverat in eo quod proposuerat; quod quidem pertinet in delectationibus ad incontinentem, in tristitiis autem ad mollem, sive delicatum, ut dicitur in VII Ethicor., cap. vii. Ergo inconstantia non pertinet ad imprudentia.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.sc] It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod ad prudentiam pertinet præferre majus bonum minus bono. Ergo desistere a meliori pertinet ad imprudentia. Sed hoe est inconstantia. Ergo inconstantia pertinet ad imprudentia.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.co] Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod inconstantia importat recessum quemdam a bono proposito definito. Hujusmodi autem recessus principium quidem habet a vi appetitiva; non enim aliquis recedit a priori bono proposito, nisi propter aliquid quod sibi inordinate placet. Sed iste recessus non consummatur nisi per defectum rationis, quæ fallitur in hoc quod repudiat id quod recte acceptaverat. Et quia cum possit resistere impulsui passionum, si non resistat, hoc est ex debilitate ipsius, quæ non tenet se firmiter in bono concepto; ideo inconstantia quantum ad sui consummationem pertinet ad defectum rationis. Sicut autem omnis rectitudo rationis practicæ pertinet aliqualiter ad prudentiam, ita omnis defectus ejusdem pertinet ad imprudentiam. Et ideo inconstantia secundum sui consummationem ad imprudentiam pertinet. Et sicut præcipitatio est ex defectu circa actum consilii, et inconsideratio circa actum judicii; ita inconstantia circa actum præcepti. Ex hoc enim dicitur aliquis esse inconstans, quod ratio deficit in præcipiendo ea quæ sunt consiliata et judicata.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.ad.1] The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonum prudentiae participatur in omnibus virtutibus moralibus: et secundum hoc persistere in bono pertinet ad omnes virtutes morales, præcipue tamen ad fortitudinem, quæ patitur majorem impulsum ad contrarium.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.ad.2] Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod invidia et ira quæ est contentionis principium, faciunt inconstantiam ex parte appetitivæ virtutis, ex qua est principium inconstantiæ, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.ad.3] Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also.
[II-II.q.53.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod continentia et perseverantia non videntur esse in vi appetitiva sed solum in ratione. Continens enim patitur quidem perversas concupiscentias, et perseverans graves tristitias, quod designat defectum appetitivæ virtutis; sed ratio firmiter persistit, continentis quidem contra concupiscentias, perseverantis autem contra tristitias. Unde continentia et perseverantia videntur esse species constantiæ ad rationem pertinentis, ad quam etiam pertinet inconstantia.
Article 6
[II-II.q.53.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (5, ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from lust.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prædicta vitia non oriantur ex luxuria. In constantia enim oritur ex invidia, ut dictum est. Sed invidia est vitium distinctum a luxuria. Ergo prædicta vitia non oriantur ex luxuria.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.arg.2] Further, it is written (James 1:8): "A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways." Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Jacobi, 1, 8, dicitur: Vir duplex animo inconstans est in omnibus viis suis. Sed duplicitas non videtur ad luxuriam pertinere, sed magis ad dolositatem, quæ est filia avaritiae, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2. Ergo prædicta vitia non oriantur ex luxuria.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.arg.3] Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, prædicta vitia pertinent ad defectum rationis. Sed vitia spiritualia propinquiora sunt rationi quam vitia carnalia. Ergo prædicta vitia magis oriuntur ex vitiis spiritualibus quam ex vitiis carnalibus.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.sc] Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from lust.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., loc. cit., ponit prædicta vitia ex luxuria oriri.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.co] As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) "pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence," and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above (A2,5), it follows that they arise chiefly from lust.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. v, et lib. VII, cap. xI, « delectatio maxime corrumpit aestimationem prudentiæ; » et præcipue delectatio quæ est in venereis quæ totam animam absorbet, et trahit ad sensibilem delectationem. Perfectio autem prudentiæ et cujuslibet intellectualis virtutis consistit in abstractione a sensibilibus. Unde cum prædicta vitia pertineant ad defectum prudentiæ et rationis practicæ, sicut habitum est, sequitur quod ex luxuria maxime oriantur.
[II-II.q.53.a.6.ad.1] Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all."
[II-II.q.53.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod invidia et ira causant inconstantiam, pertrahendo rationem ad aliud; sed luxuria causat inconstantiam, totaliter extinguendo judicium rationis. Unde Philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., cap. vi, in princ., quod « incontinens iræ audit quidem rationem, sed non perfecte; incontinens autem concupiscentiae totaliter eam non audit. »
[II-II.q.53.a.6.ad.2] Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that "love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce."
[II-II.q.53.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam duplicitas animi est quoddam consequens ad luxuriam, sicut et inconstantia; prout duplicitas animi importat vertibilitatem animi ad diversa. Unde et Terentius, in Eunucho, act. I, scena 1, dicit quod « in amore est bellum, et rursus pax et induciæ. »
[II-II.q.53.a.6.ad.3] Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.53.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod vitia carnalia intantum magis extinguunt judicium rationis, in quantum longius abducunt a ratione. omittit: « quæ est in venereis. »
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