Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q55. Vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance
Source context
- Theme
- pseudo-prudential vices — cunning, guile, fraud, craftiness, and anxious solicitude — as distortions of practical reason's proper ordering
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIAristotle distinguishes deinotes (mere cleverness) from phronesis (genuine practical wisdom), providing the philosophical substratum Aquinas draws on to classify cunning as a structural counterfeit of prudence.
- Stoic ethicsStoic analysis of pleonexia and the corrupted will toward self-advantage maps structurally onto Aquinas's treatment of craftiness and fraud as misdirected self-concern that bypasses right reason.
Q55. Vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance
Article 1
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia carnis non sit peccatum. Prudentia enim est nobilior virtus quam aliæ virtutes morales, utpote omnium regi-tiva. Sed nulla justitia vel temperantia est peccatum. Ergo neque aliqua prudentia est peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man ever hated his own flesh" (Ephesians 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prudenter operari ad finem qui licite amatur, non est peccatum. Sed caro licite amatur; nemo enim unquam carnem suam odio habuit, ut habetur ad Ephes., v, 29. Ergo prudentia carnis non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.3] Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut homo tentatur a carne, ita etiam tentatur a mundo et a diabolo. Sed non ponitur inter peccata aliqua prudentia mundi, vel etiam diaboli. Ergo neque debet poni inter peccata aliqua prudentia carnis.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.sc] No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to Wisdom 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike." Now it is written (Romans 8:7): "The prudence [Vulgate: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.sc] Sed contra, nullus est inimicus Deo nisi propter iniquitatem, secundum illud Sap., xiv, 9: Similiter odio sunt Deo, impius et impietas ejus. Sed sicut dicitur ad Rom., viii, 7: Prudentia* carnis inimica est Deo. Ergo prudentia carnis est peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 47, Article 13), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above (I-II, 02, 5). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudentia est circa ea quæ sunt ad finem totius vitæ. Et ideo prudentia carnis proprie dicitur, secundum quod aliquis bona carnis habet ut ultimum finem suæ vitæ. Manifestum est autem quod hoc est peccatum; per hoc enim homo deordinatur circa ultimum finem, qui non consistit in bonis corporis, sicut supra habitum est. Et ideo prudentia carnis est peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.1] Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above (47, 1; 49, 6), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod justitia et temperantia in sui ratione important id unde virtus laudatur, scilicet aqualitatem et concupiscentiarum refrenationem; et ideo nunquam accipiuntur in malo. Sed nomen prudentiae sumitur a providendo, sicut supra dictum est, quod etiam ad mala extendi po-test. Et ideo licet prudentia simpliciter dicta in bono accipiatur, aliquo tamen addito po-test accipi in malo; et secundum hoc dicitur prudentia carnis esse peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.2] The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod caro est propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumentum propter principale agens. Et ideo sic licite diligitur caro, ut ordinetur ad bonum animæ sicut ad finem. Si autem in ipso bono carnis constituatur ultimus finis, erit inordinata et illicita dilectio; et hoc modo ad amorem carnis ordinatur prudentia carnis.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.3] The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh.
We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called "wisdom," as stated above (47, 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (45, 1, ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod diabolus non tentat nos per modum appetibilis, sed per modum suggerentis. Et ideo cum prudentia importet ordinem ad aliquem finem appetibilem, non ita dicitur « prudentia diaboli, » sicut prudentia respectu alicujus mali finis, sub cujus ratione tentat nos mundus et caro, inquantum scilicet proponuntur nobis ad appetendum bona mundi vel carnis. Et ideo dicitur « prudentia carnis, » et etiam « prudentia mundi, » secundum illud Lucæ, xvi, 8: Filii hujus sæculi prudentiores sunt in generatione sua, etc.; Apostolus autem totum comprehendit sub « prudentia carnis, » quia etiam exteriores res mundi appetitus propter carnem. Potest tamen dici quod quia prudentia quodammodo dicitur « sapientia, » ut supra dictum est, ideo secundum tres tentationes potest intelligi triplex prudentia. Unde Jacobi, 111, dicitur sapientia esse terrena, animalis et diabolica, ut supra expositum est, cum de sapientia ageretur.
Article 2
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Romans 8:7). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod prudentia carnis sit peccatum mortale. Rebellare enim divinæ legi est peccatum mortale; quia per hoc Deus contemnitur. Sed prudentia carnis... legi Dei non est subjecta, ut habetur Rom., viii, 7. Ergo prudentia carnis est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.2] Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Romans 8:7), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, omne peccatum in Spiritum sanctum est peccatum mortale. Sed prudentia carnis videtur esse peccatum in Spiritum sanctum; non enim potest esse subjecta legi Dei, ut dicitur Rom., viii, et ita videtur esse peccatum irremissibile; quod est proprium peccati in Spiritum sanctum. Ergo prudentia carnis est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.3] Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, maximo bono maximum malum opponitur, ut patet in VIII Ethic., c. x, circa princ. Sed prudentia carnis opponitur prudentiae quae est præcipua inter virtutes morales. Ergo prudentia carnis est præcipua inter peccata mortalia; et ita est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.sc] That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [Cf. Proverbs 6:30. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.sc] Sed contra, illud quod diminuit peccatum non importat de se rationem peccati mortalis. Sed caute prosequi ea quae pertinent ad curam carnis, quod videtur ad prudentiam carnis pertinere, diminuit peccatum. Ergo prudentia carnis de sui ratione non importat peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.co] As stated above (47, 2, ad 1; 13), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II, 01, 5).
If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, prudens dicitur aliquis dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter, scilicet in ordine ad finem totius vitæ; alio modo secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad finem aliquem particularem, puta sicut dicitur aliquis prudens in negotiatione, vel in aliquo hujusmodi. Si ergo prudentia carnis accipiatur secundum absolutam prudentiae rationem, ita scilicet quod in cura carnis constituatur ultimus finis totius vitæ, sic est peccatum mortale, quia per hoc homo avertitur a Deo, cum imposibile sit esse plures fines ultimos, ut supra habitum est. Si vero prudentia carnis accipiatur secundum rationem particularis prudentiae, sic prudentia carnis est peccatum veniale. Contingit enim quandoque quod aliquis inordinate afficitur ad aliquod delec- Venustiani dicebant quod libertati carnis indulgendum est, quia ex ea impune flagitia omnia pullulant. tabile carnis absque hoc quod avertatur a Deo per peccatum mortale; unde non constituit finem totius vitæ in delectatione carnis; et sic adhibere studium ad hanc delectationem consequendam, est peccatum veniale, quod pertinet ad prudentiam carnis. Si vero aliquis actu curam carnis referat in finem honestum, puta cum aliquis studet comestioni propter corporis sustentationem, non vocatur prudentia carnis, quia sic utitur homo cura carnis ut ad finem.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.1] The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus loquitur de prudentia carnis, secundum quod finis totius vitæ humanæ constituitur in bonis carnis, et sic est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.2] Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod prudentia carnis non importat peccatum in Spiritum sanctum. Quod enim dicitur, quod non potest esse subjecta legi Dei, non sic est intelligendum, quasi ille qui habet prudentiam carnis, non possit converti et subjici legi Dei; sed quia ipsa prudentia carnis legi Dei non potest esse subjecta, sicut nec injustitia potest esse justa, nec calor potest esse frigidus, quamvis calidum possit esse frigidum.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.3] Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod omne peccatum opponitur prudentiae, sicut et prudentia participatur in omni virtute. Sed non ideo oportet quod quodlibet peccatum prudentiae oppositum sit gravissimum, sed solum quando opponitur prudentiae in aliquo maximo.
Article 3
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to Proverbs 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod astutia non sit speciale peccatum. Verba enim sacræ Scripturæ non inducunt aliquem ad peccandum. Inducunt autem ad astutiam, secundum illud Proverb., 1, 4: Ut detur parvulis astutia. Ergo astutia non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is written (Proverbs 13:16): "The crafty [Douay: 'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Prov., xii, 16, dicitur: Astutus omnia agit cum consilio. Aut ergo ad Ita cum Garcia omnes posteriores editiones; codices et edit. Rom.: « Finis constituitur in bonis carnis totius vitæ humanæ, » ordine verbo-rum inverso.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.3] Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Gregorius, X Moral., c. xxix, § 48, col. 947, t. 4, exponens illud Job, xii: Deridetur justi simplicitas, dicit: « Hu jus mundi sapientia est cor machinationibus tegere, sensum verbis velare; quæ falsa sunt, vera ostendere; quæ vera sunt, falsa demonstrare. » Et postea subdit: « Hæc prudentia usu a juvenibus scitur, a pueris pretio discitur. » Sed ea quæ prædicta sunt, videntur ad astutiam pertinere. Ergo astutia non distinguitur a prudentia carnis vel mundi; et ita non videtur esse speciale peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (2 Corinthians 4:2): "We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Apostolus dicit, II ad Cor., iv, 2: Abdicamus occulta dedecoris, non ambulantes in astutia, neque adulterantes verbum Dei. Ergo astutia est quod-dam peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.co] Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as science is "right reason applied to knowledge." On speculative matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod prudentia est « recta ratio agibilium, » sicut scientia est « recta ratio scibilium. » Contingit autem contra rectitudinem scientiæ dupliciter pecari in speculativis: uno quidem modo quando ratio inducitur ad aliquam conclusionem falsam, quæ apparet vera; alio modo ex eo quod ratio procedit ex aliquibus falsis, quæ videntur esse vera, sive sint ad conclusionem veram, sive ad conclusionem falsam. Ita etiam aliquod peccatum potest esse contra prudentiam, habens aliquam similitudinem ejus dupliciter: uno modo, quia studium rationis ordinatur ad finem qui non est vere bonus, sed apparens, et hoc pertinet ad prudentiam carnis; alio modo inquant aliquis ad finem aliquem consequendum vel bonum, vel malum, utitur non veris viis, sed simulatis et apparentibus; et hoc pertinet ad peccatum astutia. Unde est quoddam peccatum prudentiae oppositum et a prudentia carnis distinctum.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.1] As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IV Contra Jul., cap. iii, § 20, col. 748, t. 10, sicut prudentia abusive quando in malo accipitur, ita et astutia quando in bono; et hoc propter similitu- Astutia aliquando propter similitudinem, sed impropria, vocatur prudentia: ut detur parvulis astutia, Prov., i. dinem unius ad alterum. Proprie tamen astutia in malo accipitur, sicut et Philosophus dicit in VI Ethic., cap. xii, ad fin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.2] Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod astutia potest consiliari et ad finem bonum, et ad finem malum; nec oportet ad finem bonum falsis viis pervenire, et simulatis, sed veris. Unde etiam astutia, si ordinetur ad bonum finem, est peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.3] Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Gregorius sub « prudentia mundi » accepit omnia quae possunt ad falsam prudentiam pertinere. Unde etiam sub hac comprehenditur astutia.
Article 4
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Corinthians 12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod dolus non sit peccatum ad astutiam pertinens. Peccatum enim in perfectis viris non invenitur, et præcipue mortale. Inveniur autem in eis aliquis dolus, secundum illud II ad Cor., xii, 16: Cum essem astutus, dolo vos cepi. Ergo dolus non est semper peccatum.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.2] Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Psalm 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, dolus maxime ad linguam pertinere videtur, secundum illud psal. v, 11: Linguis suis dolose agebant. Astutia autem, sicut et prudentia, est in ipso actuationis. Ergo dolus non pertinet ad astutiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (Proverbs 12:20): "Guile [Douay: 'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Proverb., xii, 20, dicitur: Dolus in corde cogitantium mala. Sed non omnis malorum cogitatio pertinet ad astutiam. Ergo dolus non videtur ad astutiam pertinere.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.sc] Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Ephesians 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod astutia ad circumveniendum ordinatur, secundum illud Apostoli ad Ephes., iv, 14: In astutia ad circumventionem erroris, ad quod etiam dolus ordinatur. Ergo dolus pertinet ad astutiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 3), it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad astutiam pertinet assumere vias non veras, sed simulatas et apparentes, ad aliquem finem prosequendum vel bonum vel malum. Assumptio autem harum viarum potest dupliciter considerari: uno quidem modo in ipsa excogitatione viarum hujusmodi; et hoc proprie pertinet ad astutiam, sicut etiam excogitatio rectarum viarum ad debitum finem pertinet ad prudentiam. Alio modo potest considerari talium viarum assumptio secundum executionem operis: et secundum hoc pertinet ad dolum. Et ideo dolus importat quamdam executionem astutia; et secundum hoc ad astutiam pertinet.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.1] Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut astutia proprie accipitur in malo, abusive autem in bono; ita etiam et dolus, qui est astutiae executio.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.2] The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Psalm 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Sirach 19:23, "His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, according to Psalm 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long."
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod executio astutiae ad decipiendum, primo quidem et principaliter fit per verba, quae præcipuum locum tenent inter signa quibus homo significat aliquid alteri, ut patet per Augustinum in I lib. De doctr. christ., cap. ii, col. 20, t. 3; et ideo dolus maxime attribuitur locutioni. Contingit tamen esse dolum et in factis, secundum illud psal. civ, 25: Et dolum fecerunt* in servos ejus. Est etiam dolus in corde, secundum illud Eccli., xix, 23: Interiora ejus plena sunt dolo; sed hoc est, secundum quod aliquis dolos excogitat, secundum illud ps. xxxvii, 13: Et dolos tota die meditabantur.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.3] Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quicumque cogitant aliquod malum facere, necesse est quod excogitent aliquas vias ad hoc quod suum propositum impleant; et ut plurimum excogitant vias dolosas, quibus facilius propositum consequantur; quamvis contingat quandoque quod absque astutia et dolo aliqui aperte et per violentiam malum operentur: sed hoc, quia difficilius fit, in paucioribus accidit.
Article 5
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Corinthians 6:1, "Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod fraus ad astutiam non pertineat. Non enim est laudabile quod aliquis decipi se patiatur; ad quod astutia tendit. Est autem laudabile quod aliquis patiatur fraudem, secundum illud I ad Cor., vi, 7: Quare non magis fraudem patimini? Ergo fraus non pertinet ad astutiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.2] Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, fraus pertinere videtur ad illicitam acceptionem vel retentionem exteriorum rerum: dicitur enim Act., v, 4, quod vir quidam nomine Ananias cum Saphira uxore sua vendidit agram, et fraudavit de pretio agri. Sed illicite usurpare vel retinere res exteriores pertinet ad injustitiam vel illiberalitatem. Ergo fraus non pertinet ad astutiam, quæ opponitur prudentiæ.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.3] Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Proverbs 1:18) concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus astutia utitur contra seipsum. Sed aliquorum fraudes sunt contra seipsos: dicitur enim Proverb., i, 48, de quibusdam, quod moliuntur fraudes contra animas suas. Ergo fraus non pertinet ad astutiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.sc] The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.sc] Sed contra, fraus ad deceptionem ordinatur, secundum illud Job, xiii, 9: Numquid decipietur, ut homo, vestris fraudulentiis? Ad idem etiam ordinatur astutia. Ergo fraus ad astutiam pertinet.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.co] Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile" belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dolus consistit in executione astutiæ, ita etiam et fraus. Sed in hoc differre videntur, quod dolus pertinet universaliter ad executionem astutiæ, sive fiat per verba, sive per facta; fraus autem magis proprie pertinet ad executionem astutiæ, secundum quod fit per facta.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.1] The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Apostolus non inducit fideles ad hoc quod decipiantur in cognoscendo, sed ad hoc quod effectum deceptionis patienter tolerent in sustinendis injuriis fraudulenter illatis.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.2] The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod executio astutiæ potest fieri per aliquod aliud vitium, sicut et executio prudentiæ fit per virtutes; et hoc modo nihil prohibet defraudationem pertinere ad avaritiam, vel illiberalitatem.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.3] Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Psalm 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illi qui fraudes faciunt, ex eorum intentione non moliuntur aliquid contra seipsos, vel contra animas suas: sed ex justo Dei judicio provenit ut id quod contra alios moliuntur, contra eos retorqueatur, secundum illud psal. vii, 16: Incidit in foveam quam fecit.
Article 6
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.1] It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Romans 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Psalm 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod licitum sit sollicitudinem habere de temporalibus rebus. Ad præsidentem enim pertinet sollicitudem esse de his quibus præest, secundum illud Rom., xii, 8: Qui præest in sollicitudine. Sed homo præest ex divina ordinatione temporalibus rebus, secundum illud ps. viii, 8: Omnia subjecisti sub pedibus ejus; oves et boves, etc. Ergo homo debet habere sollicitudinem de rebus temporalibus.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.2] Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thessalonians 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, unusquisque sollicitus est de fine propter quem operatur. Sed licitum est hominem operari propter temporalia, quibus vitam sustentet: unde Apostolus dicit II ad Thessal., iii, 10: Si quis non vult operari, non manducet. Ergo licitum est sollicitari de rebus temporalibus.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.3] Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Timothy 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sollicitudo de operibus misericordiae laudabilis est, secundum illud II ad Timoth., i, 17: Cum Romam venisset, sollicite me quæsivit. Sed sollicitudo temporalium rerum quandoque pertinet ad opera misericordiae, puta cum quis sollicitudinem adhibet ad procurandum negotia pupillorum et pauperum. Ergo sollicitudo temporalium rerum non est illicita.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Matth., vi, 31: Nolite solliciti esse, dicentes: Quid manducabimus, aut quid bibemus, aut quo operiemur? Quæ tamen sunt maxime necessaria. qui per suam dissimulationem se et sua, vel alios et aliena tuentur. Ipse itaque sic diffinit: Dolum malum esse omnem calliditatem, fallaciam, machinationem ad circumveniendum, fallendum, decipiendum alterum adhibitam. Hæc diffinitio est vera. Non fuit autem prætor contentus dolum discinere ad avaritiam, vel illiberalitatem.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.co] Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Matthew 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matthew 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.1] Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.2] The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Matthew 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.3] In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.
Article 7
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written (Proverbs 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis debeat esse sollicitus in futurum. Dicitur enim Proverb., vi, 6: Vade ad formicam, o piger, et considera vias ejus, et discse sapientiam; quæ cum non habeat ducem, nec præceptorem, parat in æstate cibum sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat. Sed hoc est in futurum sollicitari. Ergo laudabilis est sollicitudo futurorum.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.2] Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of future things," as stated above (49, 6, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet. Sed prudentia præcipue est futurorum: præcipua enim pars ejus est providentia futurorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtuosum est sollicitari de futuris.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.3] Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the future.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque reponit aliquid in posterum conservandum, sollicitus est in futurum. Sed ipse Christus legitur Joan., xii, loculos habuisse ad aliquid conservandum, quos Judas deferebat; apostoli etiam conservabant pretia prædiorum, quæ ante pedes eorum ponebantur; ut legitur Act., iv. Ergo licitum est in futurum sollicitari.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this passage.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Matth., vi, 34: Nolite solliciti esse in crastinum. Cras autem ibi ponitur pro futuro, sicut dicit Hieronymus in hunc loc., col. 46, t. 7.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.co] No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Ecclesiastes 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nullum opus potest esse virtuosum, nisi debitis circumstantiis vestiatur; inter quas una est debitum tempus, secundum illud Eccle., viii, 6: Omni negotio tempus est, et opportunitas; quod non solum in exterioribus operibus, sed etiam in interiori sollicitudine locum habet. Unicuique enim tempori competit propria sollicitudo; sicut tempori æstatis competit sollicitudo metendi, tempori autumni sollicitudo vindemiæ. Si quis ergo tempore æstatis de vindemia jam esset solli- Ita edit. passim cum codd. Tarrac. et Alcan.; edit. Rom. cum aliis: « si sit moderata. » — In edit.: « sollicitus esse futurorum. » — Sic cod.; citus, superflue præoccuparet futuri temporis sollicitudinem. Unde hujusmodi sollicitudinem tanquam superfluam Dominus prohibet, dicens: Nolite solliciti esse in crastinum; unde subdit: Crastinus enim dies sollicitus erit sibiipsi, id est, suam propriam sollicitudinem habebit, quæ sufficiet ad animum affligendum. Et hoc est quod subdit: Sufficit diei malitia sua, id est, afflictio sollicitudinis.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.1] The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod formica habet sollicitudinem congruam tempori; et hoc nobis imitandum proponitur.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.2] Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad prudentiam pertinet providentia debita futurorum. Esset autem inordinata futurorum providentia vel sollicitudo, si quis temporalia, in quibus dicitur præteritum et futurum, tanquam fines quæreret; vel si superflua quæreret ultra præsentis vitæ necessitatem; vel si tempus sollicitudinis præoccuparet.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), "when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things."
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. II De serm. Domini in monte, cap. xvii, § 57, col. 1294, t. 3, « cum viderimus aliquem servum Dei providere, ne ista necessaria sibi desint, non judicemus eum de crastino esse sollicitum; nam et ipse Dominus propter exemplum loculos habere dignatus est; et in actibus apostolorum scriptum est, ea quæ ad victum sunt necessaria procurata esse in futurum propter imminentem famem. Non ergo Dominus improbat, si quis humano more ista procuret, sed si quis propter ista militet Deo. »
Article 8
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above (Question 43, Article 6) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning."
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hujusmodi vitia non oriantur ex avaritia. Quia, sicut dictum est, per luxuriam maxime ratio patitur defectum in sua rectitudine. Sed hujusmodi vitia non opponuntur rationi rectæ, scilicet prudentiae. Ergo hujusmodi vitia maxime ex luxuria oriantur, præsertim cum Philosophus dicat in VII Ethicor., cap. vi, circa med., quod « Venus est dolosa, et ejus corrigia est va-
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.2] Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prædicta vitia habent quamdam similitudinem prudentiae, ut dictum est. Sed ad prudentiam, cum sit in ratione, majorem propinquitatem habere videntur vitia magis spiritualia; ut superbia et inanis gloria. Ergo hujusmodi vitia magis videntur ex superbia oriri quam ex avaritia.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.3] Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo insidiis utitur non solum in diripiendis bonis alienis, sed etiam in machinando aliorum cædes, quorum primum pertinet ad avaritiam, secundum ad iram. Sed insidiis uti pertinet ad astuiam, dolum et fraudem. Ergo prædicta vitia non solum oriuntur ex avaritia, sed etiam ex ira.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2, ponit fraudem filiam avaritia.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.co] As stated above (3; 47, 13), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, prudentia carnis et astutia cum dolo et fraude quamdam similitudinem habent cum prudentia in aliquali usu rationis. Præcipue autem inter alias virtutes morales usus rationis rectæ apparet in justitia, quæ est in appetitu rationali. Et ideo usus rationis indebitus etiam maxime apparet in vitiis oppositis justitiae; opponitur autem ipsi maxime avaritia. Et ideo prædicta vitia maxime ex avaritia oriuntur.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.1] On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man" [Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod luxuria propter vehementiam delectationis et concupiscentiae totaliter opprimit rationem, ne prodeat in actum. In prædictis autem vitiis aliquis usus rationis est, licet inordinatus. Unde prædicta vitia non oriuntur directe ex luxuria. Quod autem Philosophus « Venere dem dolosam » appellat, hoc dicit secundum quamdam similitudinem, inquantum scilicet hominem subito surripit, sicut et in dolis agitur; non tamen per astutias, sed magis per violentiam concupiscentiae et delectationis; unde et subdit quod « Venus furatur intellectum multum sapientis. »
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.2] To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex insidiis agere, ad quamdam pusillanimitatem pertinere videtur. Magnanimus enim in omnibus vult manifestus esse, ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. III, a med. Et ideo quia superbia quamdam similitudinem magnaniimitatis habet, vel fingit; inde est quod non directe ex superbia hujusmodi vitia oriun- tur, quæ utuntur fraude et dolis; magis autem hoc pertinet ad avaritiam, quæ propriam utilitatem quærit, parvipendens excellentiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.3] Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [Cf. Ethic. vii, 6.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ira habet subitum motum; unde præcipitanter agit, et absque consilio, quo utuntur prædicta vitia, licet inordinate. Quod autem aliqui insidiis utantur ad cædes aliorum, non provenit ex ira, sed magis ex odio; quia iracundus appetit esse manifestus in nocendo, ut dicit Philosophus in II Rhetor., cap. iv, circa fin.
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