Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q55. Vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance
Source context
- Theme
- pseudo-prudential vices — cunning, guile, fraud, craftiness, and anxious solicitude — as distortions of practical reason's proper ordering
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIAristotle distinguishes deinotes (mere cleverness) from phronesis (genuine practical wisdom), providing the philosophical substratum Aquinas draws on to classify cunning as a structural counterfeit of prudence.
- Stoic ethicsStoic analysis of pleonexia and the corrupted will toward self-advantage maps structurally onto Aquinas's treatment of craftiness and fraud as misdirected self-concern that bypasses right reason.
Q55. Vices opposed to prudence by way of resemblance
Article 1
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod resurrectio Christi debuerit omnibus manifestari. Sicut enim publico peccato debetur pœna publica, secundum illud I Tim., v, 20: Peccantes coram omnibus argue, ita merito publico debetur præmium publicum. Sed « claritas resurrectionis est præmium humilitatis passionis, » ut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. civ, § 3, col. 1903, t. 3. Cum ergo passio Christi fuerit omnibus manifesta, eo publice patiente, videtur quod gloria resurrectionis ipsius omnibus manifestari debuerit.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.2] Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, "for no man ever hated his own flesh" (Ephesians 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut passio Christi ordinatur ad nostram salutem, ita et ejus resurrection, secundum illud Rom., iv, 25: Resurrexit propter justificationem nostram. Sed illud quod ad communem utilitatem pertinet, omnibus debet manifestari. Ergo resurrection Christi omnibus debuit manifestari, et non specialiter quibusdam.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.3] Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illi quibus manifestata est resurrection Christi, fuerunt resurrectionis testes: unde dicitur Act., III, 45: Quem Deus suscitavit a mortuis, cujus nos testes sumus. Hoc autem testimonium ferebant publice prædicando: quod qui dem non convenit mulieribus, secundum illud I ad Cor., xiv, 34: Mulieres in ecclesiis taceant; et I ad Timoth., II, 12: Docere mulieri non permitto. Ergo videtur quod inconvenienter resurrection Christi manifestata fuerit primo mulieribus, quam omnibus communiter.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.sc] No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to Wisdom 14:9, "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike." Now it is written (Romans 8:7): "The prudence [Vulgate: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God." Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Act., x, 40: Quem Deus suscitavit tertia die, et dedit eum manifestum fieri, non omni populo, sed testibus præordinatis a Deo.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.co] As stated above (Question 47, Article 13), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above (I-II, 02, 5). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod eorum quæ cognoscuntur quædam cognoscuntur communi lege naturæ, quædam autem cognoscuntur ex speciali munere gratiae, sicut ea quæ divinitus revelantur: quorum quidem, ut Dionysius dicit in lib. Cælest. hier., cap. iv, § 3, col. 182, t. 4, « haec est lex divinitus instituta, ut a Deo immediate superioribus revelentur, quibus mediantibus deferantur ad inferio-res, » sicut patet in ordinatione cælestium spirituum. Ea vero quæ pertinent ad futuram gloriam, communem hominum cognitionem exceedunt, secundum illud Isa., lxiv, 4: Oculus non vidit, Deus, absque te, quæ præparasti expectantibus te. Et ideo hujusmodi ab homine non cognoscuntur, nisi divinitus revelata, sicut Apostolus dicit I ad Cor., ii, 10: Nobis revelavit Deus per spiritum suum. Quia igitur Christus resurrexit gloriosa resurrectione, ideo ejus resurrection non omni populo manifestata est, sed quibusdam quorum testimonio deferretur in aliorum notitiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.1] Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above (47, 1; 49, 6), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod passio Christi peracta est in corpore adhuc habente naturam passibilem, quæ communi lege nota est omnibus: et ideo passio Christi omni populo immediate manifestari potuit. Resurrection autem Christi facta est per gloriam Patris, ut Apostolus dicit Rom., vi. Et ideo immediate manifestata est, non omnibus sed quibusdam. Quod autem publice peccantibus pœna publica imponitur, intelligendum est de pœna præsentis vitæ; et similiter publica merita publice præmiari oportet, ut alii provocentur. Sed pœnæ et præmia futuræ vitæ non publice omnibus manifestantur, sed specialiter illis qui ad hoc præordinati sunt a Deo.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.2] The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod resurrection Christi, sicut est ad communem omnium salutem, ita in notitiam omnium pervenit: non quidem sic quod immediate omnibus manifestaretur, sed quibusdam, per quorum testimonium deferretur ad omnes.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.3] The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Luke 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh.
We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called "wisdom," as stated above (47, 2, ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above (45, 1, ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom.
[II-II.q.55.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod mulieri non permittitur publice docere in Ecclesia; permittitur autem ei privatim aliquos domestica admonitione instruere. Et ideo, sicut Ambrosius dicit Sup. xxiv Luc., col. 1939, t. 2, « ad eos femina mittitur qui domestici sunt, » non autem mittitur ad hoc quod resurrectionis testimonium ferat ad populum. Ideo autem primo mulieribus apparuit, ut mulier, quæ primo nuntium mortis ad hominem detulit, primo etiam vitam resurgentis Christi in gloria nuntiaret. Unde Cyrillus dicit, lib. XII In Joan., c. xx, v. 17, col. 698, t. 7: « Femina, quæ quondam mortis fuit ministra, venerandum resurrectionis mysterium prima percipit et nuntiat. Adeptum est igitur femineum genus et ignominiæ absolutionem, et maledictionis repudium. » Similiter etiam per hoc ostenditur quod, quantum ad statum gloriæ pertinet, nullum detrimentum patietur femineus sexus: sed si majori charitate fervebunt, majori etiam gloria ex visione divina potientur; eo quod mulieres, quæ Dominum arctius amaverunt, intantum ut ab ejus sepulcro discipulis etiam recedentibus non recederent, primo viderunt Dominum in gloria resurgentem.
Article 2
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Romans 8:7). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod conveniens fuisset quod discipuli viderent Christum resurgere. Ad discipulos enim pertinebat resurrectionem Christi testificari, secundum illud Act., iv, 33: Virtute magna reddebant Apostoli testimonium resurrectionis Jesu Christi Domini nostri. Sed certissimum est testimonium de visu. Ergo conveniens fuisset ut ipsam resurrectionem Christi viderent.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.2] Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Romans 8:7), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad certitudinem fidei habendam discipuli ascensionem Christi viderunt, secundum illud Act., 1, 9: Videntibus illis elevatus est. Sed similiter oportet de resurrectione Christi certam fidem habere. Ergo videtur quod discipulis videntibus debuerit Christus resurgere.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.3] Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, resurrection Lazari quoddam indicium fuit futuræ resurrectionis Christi. Sed discipulis videntibus Dominus Lazarum suscitavit. Ergc videtur quod etiam Christus resurgere debuerit discipulis videntibus.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.sc] That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [Cf. Proverbs 6:30. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci ult., 9: Resurgens * Dominus mane prima sabbati, apparuit primo Mariæ Magdalenæ. Sed Maria Magdalena non vidit eum resurgere; sed cum eum quæreret in sepulcro, audivit ab angelo: Surrexit, non est hic. Ergo nullus vidit eum resurgere.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.co] As stated above (47, 2, ad 1; 13), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above (I-II, 01, 5).
If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dicit Apostolus Rom., xiii, 4, Quæ a Deo sunt * ordinata sunt. Est autem hic ordo divinitus institutus ut ea quæ supra homines sunt, hominibus per angelos revelentur, ut patet per Dionysium, cap. iv Cæl. hier., § 2, col. 179, t. 4. Christus autem resurgens non rediit ad vitam communiter hominibus notam, sed ad vitam quamdam immortalem, et Deo conformem, secundum illud Roman., vi, 10: Quod enim vivit, vivit Deo. Et ideo ipsa Christi resurrection non debuit immediate ab hominibus videri, sed eis ab angelis nuntiari. Unde Hilarius dicit Super Matth., cap. ult., § 9, col. 1076, t. 4, quod « ideo angelus prior resurrectionis est index, ut quodam famulatu paternæ voluntatis resurrection nuntiaretur.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.1] The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apostoli potuerunt testificari Christi resurrectionem etiam de visu; quia Christum post resurrectionem viventem oculata fide viderunt, quem mortuum sciverant. Sed sicut ad visionem beatam pervenitur per auditum fidei, ita ad visionem Christi resurgentis pervenerunt homines per ea quæ prius ab angelis audierunt.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.2] Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ascensio Christi quantum ad terminum a quo non transcendebat hominum communem notitiam, sed solum quantum ad terminum ad quem. Et ideo discipuli potuerunt videre ascensionem Christi quantum ad terminum a quo, id est, secundum quode elevabatur a terra; non autem viderunt ipsam quantum ad terminum ad quem; quia non viderunt quomodo recipetur in cælo. Sed resurrection Christi transcendebat communem notitiam et quantum ad terminum a quo, secundum quode anima rediit ab inferis, et corpus de sepulcro clauso exivit, et quantum ad terminum ad quem, secundum quod est adeptus vitam gloriosam. Et ideo non debuit resurrection fieri sic quod ab homine videretur.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.3] Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter.
[II-II.q.55.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Lazarus resuscitatus est, ut rediret ad vitam qualem prius habuerat, quæ communem notitiam hominum non transcendit. Et ideo non est similis ratio.
Article 3
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to Proverbs 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus post resurrectionem debuerit continue cum discipulis conversari. Ad hoc enim discipulis post resurrectionem apparuit, ut eos de fide resurrectionis certificaret, et consolationem perturbatis afferret secundum illud Joan., xx, 20: Gavisi sunt discipuli viso Domino. Sed magis fuissent certificati et consolati si eis continue suam præsentiam exhibuisset. Ergo videtur quod continue cum eis debuerit conversari.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is written (Proverbs 13:16): "The crafty [Douay: 'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Christus resurgens a mortuis non statim ascendit in cælum, sed post dies quadraginta, ut habetur Act., 1. Illo autem tempore intermedio in nullo alio loco potuit convenientius esse quam ubi discipuli ejus erant pariter congregati. Ergo videtur quod continue cum eis conversari debuerit.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.3] Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ipso die resurrectionis dominicæ quinquies Christus apparuisse legitur, ut Augustinus dicit, lib. III De consensu Evangelistarum, cap. ult., § 82, col. 1213, t. 3: primo quidem mulieribus ad monumentum; secundo, eisdem regredientibus a monumento in itinere; tertio, Petro; quarto, duobus euntibus in castellum; quinto, pluribus in Jerusalem, ubi non erat Thomas. Ergo etiam videtur quod et aliis diebus ante suam ascensionem ad minus pluries debuerit apparere.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.sc] The Apostle says (2 Corinthians 4:2): "We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God." Therefore craftiness is a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Joan., xxvi, 29, dicitur quod post dies octo Christus discipulis apparuit. Non ergo continue conversabatur cum eis.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.co] Prudence is "right reason applied to action," just as science is "right reason applied to knowledge." On speculative matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa re-surrectionem Christi duo erant discipulis declaranda; scilicet ipsa veritas resurrectionis, et gloria resurgentis. Ad veritatem autem resurrectionis manifestandam sufficit quod pluries eis apparuit, et cum eis familiariter est locutus, et comedit et bibit, et se eis palpandum præbuit. Ad gloriam autem resurgentis manifestandam noluit continue conversari cum eis sicut prius fecerat, ne videretur ad talem vitam resurrexisse, qualem prius habuerat. Unde Luc., ult., 44, dicitur eis: Hæc sunt verba quæ locutus sum ad vos, cum adhuc essem vobiscum. Tunc quidem erat cum eis præsentia corporali; sed ante cum eis fuerat non solum corporali præsentia, sed etiam per similitudinem mortalitatis. Unde Beda prædicta verba exponens, In xxiv Luc., v. 44, col. 634, t. 3, dicit: « Cum adhuc essem vobiscum, id est, cum adhuc essem in carne mortali, in qua estis et vos. Tunc quidem in eadem carne resuscitatus erat, sed cum illis in eadem mortalitate non erat. »
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.1] As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod frequens Christi apparitio sufficiebat ad certificandum discipulos de veritate resurrectionis. Conversatio autem continua eos potuisset ducere in errorem, ut ad similem vitam eum resurrexisse credent, quam prius habuerat. Consolationem autem de continua sui præsentia eis in alia vita repromisit, secundum illud Joan., xvi, 22: Iterum videbo vos, et gaudebit cor vestrum, et gaudium vestrum nemo tolet a vobis.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.2] Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Christus non ideo non continue conversabatur cum discipulis, quia reputaret se alibi convenientius esse; sed quia discipulis instruendis convenientius judicabat, si non continue conversaretur cum eis, ratione prædicta. Incognitum autem est quibus in locis intermedio tempore corporaliter esset, cum hoc Scriptura non tradat, et in omni loco sit dominatio ejus.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.3] Under "worldly prudence" Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.
[II-II.q.55.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ideo prima die frequentius apparuit, quia per plura indicia erant admonendi, ut a principio fidem resurrectionis reciperent; postquam autem jam eam receperant, non oportebat eos jam certificatos tam frequentibus apparitionibus instrui. Unde in Evangelio non legitur quod post primum diem eis apparuerit, nisi quinquies. Ut enim Augustinus dicit in lib. III De consensu Evang., cap. ult., col. 1213, t. 3, post primas quinque apparitiones sexto eis apparuit, ubi vidit eum Thomas: septimo, ad mare Tiberiadis in captione piscium; octavo, in monte Galileæ, secundum Matthæum; nono, quod dicit Marcus, novissime recumbentibus, quia jam non erant in terra, cum illo convivaturi; decimo, in ipso die ascensionis, non jam in terra, sed elevatus in nube, cum in cælum ascenderet. Sed non omnia scripta sunt, sicut Joannes fatetur. Crebra enim erat ejus cum eis conversatio priusquam ascendisset in cælum; et hoc ad consolationem ipsorum. Unde et I Cor., xv, 6, dicitur quod visus est plus quam quingen-tis fratribus simul; deinde visus est Jacobo: de quibus apparitionibus in Evangelio non habetur mentio.
Article 4
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Corinthians 12:16, "Being crafty I caught you by guile." Therefore guile is not always a sin.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus non debuerit discipulis in alia effigie apparere. Non enim potest apparere secundum veritatem, nisi quod est. Sed in Christo non fuit nisi una effigies. Si ergo Christus in alia effigie apparuit, non fuit apparitio vera, sed ficta: quod est inconveniens; quia, ut Augustinus dicit in lib. LXXXIII Quæst., qu. xiv, col. 14, t. 6, « si fallit Christus, veritas non est; est autem veritas Christus. » Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuerit discipulis in alia effigie apparere.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.2] Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Psalm 5:11, "They dealt deceitfully with their tongues." Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nihil potest in alia effigie apparere quam habeat, nisi oculi intuen-tium aliquibus præstigiis detineantur. Hu- 1 Deest in Habe-tur autem: « In Galilæa enim secundum transmigrationis etc, » jusmodi autem praestigia cum fiant magi-cis artibus, non conveniunt Christo, secundum illud II ad Corinth., vi, 15: Quæ conventio Christi ad Belial?. Ergo videtur quod non debuerit in alia effigie apparere.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (Proverbs 12:20): "Guile [Douay: 'Deceit'] is in the heart of them that think evil things." But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut per sacram Scripturam nostra fides certificatur, ita discipuli certificati sunt de fide resurrectionis per Christi apparitiones. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in Epistola xxviii ad Hieronymum, cap. iii, col. 112, t. 2, si vel unum mendacium in sacra Scriptura recipiatur, infirmabitur tota sacræ Scripturæ auctoritas. Ergo si vel in una apparitione Christus discipulis apparuit aliter quam esset, infirmabitur quidquid discipuli post resurrectionem viderunt in Christo, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo debuit in alia effigie apparere.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.sc] Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Ephesians 4:14, "By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive": and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Marci, ult., 12: Post hæc duobus ex eis ambulantibus ostensus est in alia effigie euntibus in villam.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 3), it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, resurrectionio Christi manifestanda fuit hominibus per modum quo eis divina revelantur. Innotescunt autem divina hominibus diversimode, secundum quod diversimode sunt affecti. Nam illi qui habent mentem bene dispositam, secundum veritatem divina percipiunt; illi autem qui non habent mentem bene dispositam, divina percipiunt cum quadam confusione dubietatis vel erroris: animalis enim homo non percipit ea quæ sunt Spiritus Dei, ut dicitur I ad Corinth., ii, 14. Et ideo Christus quibusdam ad credendum dispositis post resurrectionem apparuit in sua effigie, illis autem in alia effigie apparuit, qui jam videbantur circa fidem tepescere; unde dicebant, Lucæ, ult., 24: Nos autem sperabamus quia ipse esset redempturus Israel. Unde Gregorius dicit in Homil. xxiii in Evang., § 1, col. 1182, t. 2, quod « talem se exhibuit eis in corpore, qualis apud illos erat in mente: quia enim adhuc in eorum cordibus peregrinus erat a fide, ire se longius finxit, » scilicet ac si esset peregrinus.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.1] Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. II De quæstionib. evang., quæst. ult., col. 1362, t. 3, « non omne quod fingimus mendacium est; sed quando id fingimus quod nihil significat, tunc est mendacium; cum autem fictio nostra refertur ad aliquam significationem, non est mendacium, sed aliqua figura veritatis, alioquin omnia quæ a sapientibus et sanctis viris, vel etiam ab ipso Domino figurate dicta sunt, mendacia deputabuntur, quia secundum usitatum intellectum non subsistit veritas talibus dictis. Sicut autem dicta, ita etiam facta finguntur sine mendacio, ad aliquam rem significandam. » Et ita factum est hic, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.2] The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Psalm 104:25, "And to deal deceitfully with his servants." Guile is also in the heart, according to Sirach 19:23, "His interior is full of deceit," but this is to devise deceits, according to Psalm 37:13: "They studied deceits all the day long."
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. III De consensu Evang., cap. xxv, § 72, col. 1206, t. 3, « Dominus poterat transformare carnem suam, ut alia revera esset effigies ab illa quam solebant intueri; quandoquidem et ante passionem suam transformatus est in monte, ut facies ejus claresceret, sicut sol. Sed non ita nunc factum est. Non autem incongruenter accipimus, hoc impedimentum in oculis eorum a Satana factum fuisse ne agnosceret Jesus. » Unde Luc., ult., 16, dicitur quod oculi eorum tenebantur, ne eum agnoscerent.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.3] Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence.
[II-II.q.55.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa sequeretur, si ab alienæ effigiei aspectu non fuissent reducti ad vere videndum Christi effigiem. Sicut enim Augustinus dicit, III De cons. Evang., § 72, col. 1206, t. 3, « a Christo facta est permissio, » ut scilicet prædicto modo oculi eorum tenerentur, « usque ad sacramentum panis; ut unitate corporis ejus participata, removeri intelligatur impedimentum inimici, ut Christus possit agnosci. » Unde ibidem subditur quod « aperti sunt oculi eorum, et cognoverunt eum; non quod ante clausis oculis ambularent: sed inerat aliquid quo non sinerentur agnoscere quod videbant; » quod scilicet caligo et aliquis humor efficere solet.
Article 5
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Corinthians 6:1, "Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Christus veritatem resurrectionis non debuerit argumentis declarare. Dicit enim Ambrosius, lib. I De fide, cap. xiii, § 84, 1 Vide etiam Ep. xL, c. iii, col. 155, t. 2. col. 570, t. 3: « Tolle argumenta ubi fides quæritur. » Sed circa resurrectionem Christi quæritur fides. Non ergo habent ubi locum argumenta.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.2] Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that "a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land." Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Gregorius dicit Homil. xxvi in Evang., § 4, col. 4197, t. 2: « Fides non habet meritum, ubi humana ratio præbet experimentum. » Sed ad Christum non pertinebat meritum fidei evacuare. Ergo ad eum non pertinebat resurrectionem per argumenta confirmare.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.3] Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Proverbs 1:18) concerning some "that they practice frauds [Douay: 'deceits'] against their own souls." Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Christus in mundum venit, ut per eum homines beatitudinem adipiscantur, secundum illud Joan., x, 10: Ego veni ut vitam habeant et abundantius habeant. Sed per hujusmodi ostensiones argumentorum videtur humanæ beatitudini impedimentum præstari; dicitur enim Joan., xx, 29; Beati qui non viderunt et crediderunt. Ergo videtur quod Christus non debuerit per aliqua argumenta resurrectionem suam manifestare.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.sc] The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13:9, "Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: 'deceitful'] dealings?" Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Act., 1, 3, quod apparuit discipulis Christus per dies quadraginta in multis argumentis, loquens de regno Dei.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.co] Just as "guile" consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does "fraud." But they seem to differ in the fact that "guile" belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas "fraud" belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod argumentum dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque dicitur argumentum quæcumque ratio rei dubiæ faciens fidem; quandoque autem dicitur argumentum aliquod sensibile signum quod inducitur ad alicujus veritatis manifestationem: sicut etiam Aristoteles in libris suis aliquando utitur nomine argumenti, ut lib. De rhetorica ad Alex., cap. xiv et xv. Primo igitur modo accipiendo argumentum, Christus non probavit discipulis suam resurrectionem per argumenta, quia talis probatio argumentativa processisset ex aliquibus principiis, quæ si non essent nota discipulis, nihil per ea eis manifestaretur, quia ex ignotis non potest aliquid fieri notum; si autem essent eis nota, non transcenderent rationem humanam, et ita non essent efficacia ad fidem resurrectionis adstruendam, quæ rationem humanam excedit; oportet enim principia ex eodem genere assumi, ut dicitur in I Poster., text. 20. Probavit autem eis resurrectionem suam per aucto-ritatem sacræ Scripturæ, quæ est fidei fundamentum, cum dixit: Oportet impleri omnia quæ scripta sunt in lege, et psalmis, et prophetis de me, ut habetur Luc., ult., 44. Si autem accipiatur secundo modo argumentum, sic dicitur Christus suam resurrectionem argumentis declarasse, inquantum per quædam evidentia signa se vere resurrexisse ostendit. Unde in Græco, ubi nos habemus in multis argumentis, loco argumenti ponitur, tecmerion quod est signum evidens ad probandum. Quæ quidem signa resurrectionis Christus ostendit discipulis propter duo: primo quidem quia non erant corda eorum disposita ad hoc quod de facili fidem resurrectionis acciperent. Unde ipse dicit eis Luc., ult., 25: O stulti et tardi corde ad credendum! et Marc., ult., 14, Exprobravit illis incredulitatem eorum et duritiam cordis. Secundo ut per hujusmodi signa eis ostensa efficacius eorum testimonium redderetur, secundum illud I Joan., 1: Quod vidimus, et audivimus, et manus nostræ contrectaverunt..., hoc testamur.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.1] The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Ambrosius ibi loquitur de argumentis secundum rationem humanam procedenti bus: quæ invalida sunt ad ea quæ sunt fidei ostendenda, sicut ostensum est.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.2] The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod meritum fidei est ex hoc quod homo ex mandato Dei credit quod non videt. Unde illa sola ratio meritum excludit, quæ facit videri per scientiam id quod credendum proponitur; et talis est ratio demonstrativa. Hujusmodi autem rationes Christus non induxit ad resurrectionem suam declaram.
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.3] Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Psalm 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."
[II-II.q.55.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, meritum beatitudinis, quod causat fides, non totaliter excluditur, nisi homo nollet credere nisi ea quæ videt. Sed quod aliquis ea quæ non videt credat per aliqua signa visa, non totaliter fidem evacuat, nec meritum ejus; sicut et Thomas cui dictum est, Joan., xx, 29: Quia vidisti me, credidisti, aliud vidit, et aliud credidit; vidit vulnera, et credidit Deum. Est autem perfectioris fidei qui non requirit hujusmodi auxilia ad credendum. Unde ad argumentum defectus fidei in quibusdam Dominus dicit Joan., iv, 48: Nisi signa et prodigia videritis, non creditis. Et secundum hoc potest intelligi quod illi qui sunt tam prompti animi ut credant Deo, etiam Migne. Migne. 3 τεχμηριον, id est conjectura, sed firmior, evidensignis non visis, sint beati per comparationem ad illos qui non credunt nisi talia videant.
Article 6
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.1] It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Romans 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Psalm 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod argumenta quæ Christus induxit, non sufficienter manifestaverint veritatem resurrectionis ejus. Nihil enim ostendit Christus discipulis post resurrectionem quod etiam angeli hominibus apparentes vel non ostenderint, vel ostendere non potuerint: nam angeli frequenter in humana effigie se hominibus ostenderunt, et cum eis loquebantur, et conversabantur, et comedebant, ac si essenthomines veri, sicutpatet Gen., xviii de angelis quos Abraham suscepit hospitio; et in lib. Tobiæ de angelo qui eum duxit et reduxit. Et tamen angeli non habent vera corpora naturaliter sibi unita, quod requiritur ad resurrectionem. Non ergo signa quæ Christus discipulis exhibuit fuerunt sufficientia ad resurrectionem ejus manifestandam.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.2] Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thessalonians 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Christus resurrexit resurrectione gloriosa, id est habens simul humanam naturam cum gloria. Sed quædam Christus ostendit discipulis quæ videntur esse contraria naturæ humanæ: sicut quod ab oculis eorum evanuit, et quod ad eos januis clausis intravit; quædam autem videntur esse contraria gloriæ, puta quod manducavit et bibit, et quod habuit vulnerum cicatrices. Ergo videtur quod illa argumenta non fuerint sufficientia neque convenientia ad fidem resurrectionis ostendendam.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.3] Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Timothy 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, corpus Christi non erat tale post resurrectionem, ut tangi deberet ab homine mortali; unde et ipse dixit Magdalenæ, Joan., xx, 17: Noli me tangere; nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem meum: non ergo fuit conveniens quod ad manifestandam veritatem resurrectionnis suæ seipsum discipulis palpandum exhibet.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Christus qui est, Dei sapientia, suaviter et convenient disponit omnia, ut dicitur Sap., viii.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.co] Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Matthew 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matthew 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod Christus resurrectionem suam dupliciter manifestavit; scilicet testimonio et argumento, sive signo; et utraque manifestatio in suo genere fuit sufficiens. Est enim usus duplici testimonio ad manifestandam suam resurrectionem discipulis, quorum neutrum potest refelli: quorum primum est testimonium angelorum, qui mulieribus resurrectionem annuntiaverunt, ut patet per omnes evangelistas; aliud autem est testimonium Scripturarum, quas ipse proposuit ad ostensionem suæ resurrectionis, ut dicitur Luc., ult. Argumenta etiam fuerunt sufficientia ad ostendendam veram resurrectionem, et gloriosam. Quod autem fuerit vera resurrection, ostendit uno modo ex parte corporis; circa quod tria ostendit: primo quidem quod esset corpus verum et solidum, non corpus phantasticum vel rarum, sicut est aer. Et hoc ostendit per hoc quod corpus suum palpabile præbuit; unde ipse dicit Luc., ult., 39: Palpate et videte, quia spiritus carnem et ossa non habet, sicut me videtis habere. Secundo, ostendit quod esset corpus humanum, ostendendo eis veram effigiem, quam oculis intuerentur. Tertio, ostendit eis quod esset idem numero corpus quod prius habuerat, ostendendo eis vulnerum cicatrices; unde, ut legitur Luc., ult., 39, dixit eis: Videte manus meas et pedes meos, quia ego ipse sum. Alio modo ostendit eis veritatem suæ resurrectionis ex parte animæ iterato corpori unitæ. Et hoc ostendit per opera triplicis vitæ: primo quidem per opus vitæ nutritivæ in hoc quod cum discipulis manducavit et bibit, ut legitur Luc., ult. Secundo, per opera vitæ sensitivæ in hoc quod discipulis ad interrogata respondebat, et praesentes salutabat; quod ostendebat se et videre et audire. Tertio, per opera vitæ intellectivæ in hoc quod cum eo loquebantur et de Scripturis disserebant. Et ne quid deesset ad perfectionem manifestationis, ostendit etiam se habere divinam naturam per miraculum, quod fecit in piscibus capiendis, et ulterius per hoc quod eis videntibus ascendit in cælum: quia, ut dicitur Joan., III, 13, nemo ascendit in cælum, nisi qui descendit de cælo, Filius hominis, qui est in cælo. Gloriam etiam suæ resurrectionis ostendit discipulis per hoc quod ad eos januis clausis intravit; secundum enim quod Gregorius dicit in Hom. xxvi in Evangel., § 1, col. 4198, t. 2, « palpandam carnem Dominus præbuit, quam januis clausis introduxit, ut esse post resurrectionem ostenderet corpus suum et ejusdem naturæ et alterius gloriæ. » Similiter etiam ad proprietatem gloriæ pertinebat, quod subito ab oculis eorum evanuit, ut dicitur Luc., ult., quia per hoc ostendebatur quod in potestate ejus erat videri et non videri; quod pertinet ad conditionem corporis gloriosi, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.1] Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, licet singula argumentorum non suffice-rent ad manifestandam 1 Christi resurrectionem, tamen omnia simul accepta perfecte Christi resurrectionem manifestant, maxime propter Scripturæ testimonium, et angelorum dicta, et etiam ipsius Christi assertionem miraculis confirmatam. Angeli autem apparentes non asse-rebant se homines esse, sicut asseruit Christus vere se hominem esse. Et tamen aliter Christus manducavit, et aliter angeli. Nam quia corpora ab angelis assumpta non erant corpora viva, vel animata, non erat vera comestio, licet esset vera cibi contritio, et trajectio in interiorem partem corporis assumpti; unde et angelus dixit Tobiæ, xii, 18: Cum essem vobiscum... videbar quidem vobiscum manducare et bibere; sed ego cibo invisibili utor. Sed quia corpus Christi vere fuit animatum, vera fuit ejus comestio. Ut enim Augustinus dicit in XIII De civit. Dei, cap. xxii, col. 395, t. 7, « non potestas, sed egestas edendi corporibus re-surgentium auferetur. » Unde, sicut Beda dicit In xxiv Luc., v 41, col. 631, t. 3, « Christus manducavit potestate, non necessitate. »
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.2] The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Matthew 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, argumenta quædam induce-bantur a Christo ad probandum veritatem humanæ naturæ, quædam vero ad probandam gloriam resurgentis. Conditio autem naturæ humanæ, secundum quod in se consideratur, quantum scilicet ad statum præsentem, contrariatur conditioni gloriæ, secundum illud I ad Cor., xv, 43: Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute. Et ideo ea quæ inducuntur ad ostendendam conditionem gloriæ, videntur habere contrarietatem ad naturam, non simpliciter, sed secundum statum præsentem, et e converso. Unde Gregorius dicit in Hom. xxvi in Evang., § 1, col. 4198, t. 2, quod « duo mira, et juxta humanam rationem sibi valde contraria Dominus ostendit, dum post resurrectionem corpus suum et incórruptibile, et tamen palpabile demonstravit. »
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.3] In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.
[II-II.q.55.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, Super Joan., tract. cxxi, § 3, col. 1957, t. 3, « hoc quod Dominus dixit: Noli me tangere, nondum enim ascendi ad Patrem meum, sic dictum est ut in illa femina figuraretur Ecclesia de gentibus quæ in Christum non credidit, nisi cum ascendisset ad Patrem. Aut sic in se credi voluit Jesus, hoc est, sic se spiritualiter tangi, quod ipse et Pater unum sunt; ejus quippe intimis sensibus quodammodo ascendit ad Patrem, qui sic in eo profecerit, ut Patri agnoscat æqualem. Hæc autem carnaliter adhuc in eum credebat, quæ sicut hominem flebat. » Quod autem Maria alibi legitur Christum tetigisse, quando simul cum aliis mulieribus accessit, et tenuit pedes ejus, « quæsitionem non facit, » ut Severianus 2 dicit « siquidem illud de figura est, hoc de sexu; illud de divina gratia, hoc de humana natura. » Vel sicut Chrys. dicit, Hom. Lxxxvi in Joan., § 2, col. 400, t. 14, volebat hæc mulier adhuc cum Christo conversari sicut et ante passionem, et præ gaudio nihil magnum cogitabat, quamvis caro Christi nulto melior facta fuerit resurgendo. Et ideo dixit: Nondum ascendi ad Patrem meum; quasi dicat: Non æstimes me jam terrenam vitam agere; quod enim in terris 2 Legitur apud Petrum Chrysologum in Serm. V. me vides, hoc est quia nondum ascendi ad Patrem meum, sed in promptu est quod ascendam. » Unde subditur: Ascendo ad Patrem meum, et Patrem vestrum.
Article 7
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written (Proverbs 6:6-8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis debeat esse sollicitus in futurum. Dicitur enim Proverb., vi, 6: Vade ad formicam, o piger, et considera vias ejus, et discse sapientiam; quæ cum non habeat ducem, nec præceptorem, parat in æstate cibum sibi, et congregat in messe quod comedat. Sed hoc est in futurum sollicitari. Ergo laudabilis est sollicitudo futurorum.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.2] Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of future things," as stated above (49, 6, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sollicitudo ad prudentiam pertinet. Sed prudentia præcipue est futurorum: præcipua enim pars ejus est providentia futurorum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtuosum est sollicitari de futuris.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.3] Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the future.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quicumque reponit aliquid in posterum conservandum, sollicitus est in futurum. Sed ipse Christus legitur Joan., xii, loculos habuisse ad aliquid conservandum, quos Judas deferebat; apostoli etiam conservabant pretia prædiorum, quæ ante pedes eorum ponebantur; ut legitur Act., iv. Ergo licitum est in futurum sollicitari.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.sc] Our Lord said (Matthew 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this passage.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit Matth., vi, 34: Nolite solliciti esse in crastinum. Cras autem ibi ponitur pro futuro, sicut dicit Hieronymus in hunc loc., col. 46, t. 7.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.co] No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Ecclesiastes 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod nullum opus potest esse virtuosum, nisi debitis circumstantiis vestiatur; inter quas una est debitum tempus, secundum illud Eccle., viii, 6: Omni negotio tempus est, et opportunitas; quod non solum in exterioribus operibus, sed etiam in interiori sollicitudine locum habet. Unicuique enim tempori competit propria sollicitudo; sicut tempori æstatis competit sollicitudo metendi, tempori autumni sollicitudo vindemiæ. Si quis ergo tempore æstatis de vindemia jam esset solli- Ita edit. passim cum codd. Tarrac. et Alcan.; edit. Rom. cum aliis: « si sit moderata. » — In edit.: « sollicitus esse futurorum. » — Sic cod.; citus, superflue præoccuparet futuri temporis sollicitudinem. Unde hujusmodi sollicitudinem tanquam superfluam Dominus prohibet, dicens: Nolite solliciti esse in crastinum; unde subdit: Crastinus enim dies sollicitus erit sibiipsi, id est, suam propriam sollicitudinem habebit, quæ sufficiet ad animum affligendum. Et hoc est quod subdit: Sufficit diei malitia sua, id est, afflictio sollicitudinis.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.1] The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod formica habet sollicitudinem congruam tempori; et hoc nobis imitandum proponitur.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.2] Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ad prudentiam pertinet providentia debita futurorum. Esset autem inordinata futurorum providentia vel sollicitudo, si quis temporalia, in quibus dicitur præteritum et futurum, tanquam fines quæreret; vel si superflua quæreret ultra præsentis vitæ necessitatem; vel si tempus sollicitudinis præoccuparet.
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.3] As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), "when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things."
[II-II.q.55.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit in lib. II De serm. Domini in monte, cap. xvii, § 57, col. 1294, t. 3, « cum viderimus aliquem servum Dei providere, ne ista necessaria sibi desint, non judicemus eum de crastino esse sollicitum; nam et ipse Dominus propter exemplum loculos habere dignatus est; et in actibus apostolorum scriptum est, ea quæ ad victum sunt necessaria procurata esse in futurum propter imminentem famem. Non ergo Dominus improbat, si quis humano more ista procuret, sed si quis propter ista militet Deo. »
Article 8
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above (Question 43, Article 6) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored" and that "he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning."
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod hujusmodi vitia non oriantur ex avaritia. Quia, sicut dictum est, per luxuriam maxime ratio patitur defectum in sua rectitudine. Sed hujusmodi vitia non opponuntur rationi rectæ, scilicet prudentiae. Ergo hujusmodi vitia maxime ex luxuria oriantur, præsertim cum Philosophus dicat in VII Ethicor., cap. vi, circa med., quod « Venus est dolosa, et ejus corrigia est va-
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.2] Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above (Question 47, Article 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, prædicta vitia habent quamdam similitudinem prudentiae, ut dictum est. Sed ad prudentiam, cum sit in ratione, majorem propinquitatem habere videntur vitia magis spiritualia; ut superbia et inanis gloria. Ergo hujusmodi vitia magis videntur ex superbia oriri quam ex avaritia.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.3] Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, homo insidiis utitur non solum in diripiendis bonis alienis, sed etiam in machinando aliorum cædes, quorum primum pertinet ad avaritiam, secundum ad iram. Sed insidiis uti pertinet ad astuiam, dolum et fraudem. Ergo prædicta vitia non solum oriuntur ex avaritia, sed etiam ex ira.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.sc] Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., cap. xLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2, ponit fraudem filiam avaritia.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.co] As stated above (3; 47, 13), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, prudentia carnis et astutia cum dolo et fraude quamdam similitudinem habent cum prudentia in aliquali usu rationis. Præcipue autem inter alias virtutes morales usus rationis rectæ apparet in justitia, quæ est in appetitu rationali. Et ideo usus rationis indebitus etiam maxime apparet in vitiis oppositis justitiae; opponitur autem ipsi maxime avaritia. Et ideo prædicta vitia maxime ex avaritia oriuntur.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.1] On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the Philosopher says that "Venus is full of guile," he is referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds that "Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man" [Cf. Iliad xiv, 214-217.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod luxuria propter vehementiam delectationis et concupiscentiae totaliter opprimit rationem, ne prodeat in actum. In prædictis autem vitiis aliquis usus rationis est, licet inordinatus. Unde prædicta vitia non oriuntur directe ex luxuria. Quod autem Philosophus « Venere dem dolosam » appellat, hoc dicit secundum quamdam similitudinem, inquantum scilicet hominem subito surripit, sicut et in dolis agitur; non tamen per astutias, sed magis per violentiam concupiscentiae et delectationis; unde et subdit quod « Venus furatur intellectum multum sapientis. »
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.2] To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex insidiis agere, ad quamdam pusillanimitatem pertinere videtur. Magnanimus enim in omnibus vult manifestus esse, ut Philosophus dicit in IV Ethic., cap. III, a med. Et ideo quia superbia quamdam similitudinem magnaniimitatis habet, vel fingit; inde est quod non directe ex superbia hujusmodi vitia oriuntur, quæ utuntur fraude et dolis; magis autem hoc pertinet ad avaritiam, quæ propriam utilitatem quærit, parvipendens excellentiam.
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.3] Anger's movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [Cf. Ethic. vii, 6.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.55.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ira habet subitum motum; unde præcipitanter agit, et absque consilio, quo utuntur prædicta vitia, licet inordinate. Quod autem aliqui insidiis utantur ad cædes aliorum, non provenit ex ira, sed magis ex odio; quia iracundus appetit esse manifestus in nocendo, ut dicit Philosophus in II Rhetor., cap. iv, circa fin.
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