Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q63. Respect of persons
Source context
- Theme
- partiality in distributive justice — awarding goods or honors based on personal attachment rather than merit or dignity
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian distributive justiceAristotle's account of distributive justice in Nicomachean Ethics V requires proportional allocation according to merit, structurally paralleling Aquinas's argument that respect of persons violates commutative proportion by privileging accidental features over the relevant ground of distribution.
- Hebrew Biblical lawLeviticus 19:15 prohibits judging with partiality toward the great or the poor, providing the scriptural basis Aquinas cites as establishing respect of persons as a sin against justice rather than merely against charity.
Q63. Respect of persons
Article 1
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [Cf. I, 29, 3, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sacramentum non imprimat aliquem characterem in anima. Character enim significare videtur quoddam signum distinctivum. Sed distinctio membrorum Christi ab aliis fit per æternam prædestinationem, quæ non ponit aliquid in prædestinato, sed solum in Deo prædestinante, ut in prima parte habitum est; dicitur enim II Timoth., II, 49: Firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc. Novit Dominus qui sunt ejus. Ergo sacramenta non imprimunt characterem in anima.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.2] Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely.
But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea character signum est distinctivum. Signum autem, ut Augustinus dicit in II De doctrina christ., c. 1, col. 35, t. 3, est « quod præter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, facit aliud aliquid in co-gitationem venire. » Nihil autem est in anima quod aliquam speciem sensibus ingerat. Ergo videtur quod in anima non imprimatur aliquis character per sacramenta.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.3] Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Matthew 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulgate: 'field' ['Bed' is the reading of Luke 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, a quibusdam character sic definitur: « Character est signum sanctum communionis fidei, et sanctæ ordinationis datum a hierarcha. » Signum autem est in genere relationis, non autem in genere potestatis. Non ergo character est spiritualis potestas.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.sc] Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Deuteronomy 1:17: "Neither shall you respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in II Ethic., cap. v, in princ.: « Tria sunt in anima, potentia, habitus, et passio. » Sed character non est passio, quia passio cito transit, character autem indelebilis est, ut infra dicetur. Similiter etiam non est habitus, quia nullus habitus est qui se possit ad bene et male habere; character autem ad utrumque se habet: utuntur enim eo quidam bene, alii vero male: quod in habitibus non contingit: nam habitu virtutis nullus utitur male, et habitu malitiæ nullus bene. Ergo relinquitur quod character sit potentia.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.co] Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God [Vulgate: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, sacramenta novæ legis characterem imprimunt, inquantum per ea deputantur homines ad cultum Dei secundum ritum christianæ religionis. Unde Dionysius in cap. 11 Eccles. hierarch., § 4, col. 399, t. 1, cum dixisset quod « Deus in quodam signo tradit sui participationem accedenti ad baptismum, » subjungit: « Perficiens eum divinum et communica-torem divinorum. » Divinus autem cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina, vel in tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quædam potentia: nam ad tradendum aliquid aliis requiritur quædam potentia activa; ad recipiendum autem requiritur potentia passiva. Et ideo character importat quamdam potentiam spiritualem ordinatam ad ea quæ sunt divini cultus. Sciendum tamen quod hæc spiritualis potentia est instrumentalis, sicut etiam supra dictum est de virtute quæ est in sacramentis. Habere enim sacramenti characterem competit ministris Dei: minister autem habet se per modum instrumenti, ut Philosophus dicit in I Politic., cap. 11, a princ. Et ideo sicut virtus quæ est in sacramentis, non est in genere per se, sed per reductionem, eo quod est quiddam fluens et incompletum, ita etiam character non proprie est in genere vel specie, sed reducitur ad secundam speciem qualitatis.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.1] In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod figura est quædam terminatio quantitatis: unde, proprie loquendo, non est nisi in rebus corporeis; in spiritualibus autem dicitur metaphorice. Non autem ponitur aliquid in genere vel specie, nisi per id quod de eo proprie prædicatur. Et ideo character non potest esse in quarta specie qualitatis, licet hoc quidam posuerunt.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.2] Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in tertia specie qualitatis non sunt nisi sensibiles passiones, vel sensibiles qualitates. Character autem non est lumen sensibile; et ideo non est in tertia specie qualitatis, ut quidam dixerunt.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.3] There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. On such a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will, according to Matthew 20:14-15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way."
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod relatio, quæ importatur in nomine signi, oportet quod supra aliquid fundetur. Relatio autem hujus signi, quod est character, non potest fundari immediate super essentiam animæ, quia sic conveniret omni animæ naturaliter. Et ideo oportet aliquid poni in anima super quod fundetur talis relatio; et hoc est essentia characteris; unde non oportebit quod sit in genere relationis, sicut quidam posuerunt.
Article 2
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod in dispensatione spiritualium locum non habeat personarum acceptio. Conferre enim dignitatem ecclesiasticam seu beneficium alicui propter consanguinitatem, videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere, quia consanguinitas non est causa faciens hominem dignum ecclesiastico beneficio. Sed hoc non videtur esse peccatum, cum hoc ex consuetudine prælati Ecclesiæ faciant. Ergo peccatum personarum acceptionis non videtur locum habere in dispensatione spiritualium.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.2] Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James 2:2-3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præferre divitem pauperi videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere, ut patet Jacobi, 11. Sed facilius dispensatur cum divitibus et potentibus, quod in gradu prohibito contrahant matrimonium, quam cum aliis. Ergo peccatum personarum'acceptionis non videtur locum habere circa dispensationem spiritualium.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.3] Further, according to jurists [Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum jura, sufficit eligere bonum, non autem requiritur quod aliquis eligat meliorem. Sed eligere minus bonum ad aliquid altius, videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum in spiritualibus.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.4] Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, secundum Statuta Ecclesiæ, cap. « Cum dilectus » de electione, etc., eligendus est aliquis de gremio Ecclesiæ. Sed hoc videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere, quia quandoque sufficientiores alibi invenirentur. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum in spiritualibus.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.sc] It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words a gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.]
[II-II.q.63.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jacobi, 11, 4: Nolite in personarum acceptancee habere fidem Domini nostri Jesu Christi; ubi dicit Glossa Augustini: « Quis ferat, si quis divi tem eligat ad sedem honoris Ecclesiæ, contempto paupere instructiore et sanctiore? »
[II-II.q.63.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), respect of persons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Corinthians 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less worthy.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, acceptio personarum est peccatum, in quantum contrariatur justitiæ. Quanto autem in majoribus aliquis justitiam transgreditur, tanto gravius peccat. Unde cum spiritualia sint temporalibus potiora, gravius peccatum est personas accipere in dispensatione spiritualium quam in dispensatione temporalium. Et quia personarum acceptio est cum aliquid personæ attribuitur præter proportionem dignitatis ipsius, considerare oportet quod dignitas alicujus personæ potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter et secundum se, et sic majoris dignitatis est ille qui magis abundat in spiritualibus gratiae donis; alio modo per comparisonem ad bonum commune; contingit enim quandoque quod ille qui est minus sciens, potest magis conferre ad bonum commune propter potentiam vel industriam sæcularem, vel propter aliquid hujusmodi. Et quia dispensationes spiritualium principalius ordinantur ad utilitatem communem, secundum illud I Cor., xii, 7: Unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, ideo quandoque absque acceptancee personarum in dispensatione spiritualium illi qui sunt simpliciter minus boni, melioribus præferuntur, sicut etiam et Deus gratias gratis datas quandoque concedit minus bonis.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.1] We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Corinthians 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to their deserts.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod circa consanguineos prælati distinguendum est; aut avehendis solvitur. Huic affine est quod datur principi ex rebus venditis, sive mobilibus, sive immobilibus. « Pedagium, » seu « guidagium » est id quod solvitur a transeuntibus equo, curru, navi, etc., pro pontium et viarum conservatione, custodia et securitate. Antiquitus is cujus erat jus pedagii tenebatur reddere indemnem eum qui inter duos so les in via publica fuisset a latronibus spoliatus. Tres conditiones communiter requiruntur ut justum sit tributum: auctoritas legitima, justa causa et debita proportio. Defraudare justa tributa, sive petantur sive non, est, secundum Sylvestrum, Cajetanum, Soto, Bannem, Covarruvias, Lessium, Sylvium, Layman, Cabassutium, etc., ex genere suo peccatum mortale contra justitiam non tantum legalem, sed etiam commutativam, et obligat ad restitutionem. Sed forsitan quædam leges tributales sunt mere pœnales, et non obligant ad restitutionem, neque ad mulctam ante sententiam judicis; vel proportionem excedunt, et tunc, ait Sylvius, q. Lxvi, a. 8, concl. 7: « Si quis fraudet de illis et vectigalibus quantum bona fide existimat se plus æquo gravari, neque peccat, neque tenetur ad restitutionem: quod meminisse oportet confessarios, quando agitur de fraudatorum vectigalium restitutione injungenda.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.2] Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to such persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dispensatio matrimonii contrahendi principaliter fieri consuevit propter fædus pacis firmandum: quod quidem magis est necessarium communi utilitati circa personas excellentes; et ideo cum eis facilius dispensatur absque peccato acceptionis personarum.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.3] In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.4] The man who is taken from among the members of a particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason it was commanded (Deuteronomy 17:15): "Thou mayest not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother."
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ille qui de gremio Ecclesiæ assumitur, ut in pluribus consuevit esse utilior quantum ad bonum commune, quia magis diligit Ecclesiam in qua est nutritus: et propter hoc etiam mandatur Deut., xvii, 15: Non poteris alterius gentis hominem regem facere, qui non sit frater tuus.
Article 3
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is written (Exodus 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to 1 Timothy 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in exhibitione honoris et reverentia non habeat locum peccatum acceptionis personarum. Honor enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam reverentia quædam alicui exhibita in testimonium virtutis, ut patet per Philosophum in I Ethic., cap. v et xii. Sed prælati et principes sunt honorandi, etiamsi sint mali, sicut etiam parentes, de quibus mandatur Exod., xx, 12: Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; et etiam domini sunt a servis honorandi, etiamsi sint mali, secundum illud I ad Timoth., vii, 4: Quicumque sunt sub jugo servi dominos suos* honore dignos arbitrentur. Ergo videtur quod acceptio personae non sit peccatum in exhibitione honoris. per concursum. Ita Azorius, Navarrus, Lessius, Sylvius, Cabassutius, etc. Sunt varii casus in quibus licet promovere dignos, praetermissis dignioribus, ad beneficia etiam curata: 1. Si promovendus debeat esse de gremio Ecclesiæ. 2. Si ipse fundator beneficii præsentet dignum. 3. Si vacent duo beneficia, unum simplex pinque, aliud parochiale tenue, potest reservari tenue parochiale digniori, propter utilitatem Ecclesiæ. 4. Si in electione votum meum non prodesset digniori, prositque minus digno, ut indignus vel longe minus dignus non eligatur, tunc possum eligere primum minus dignum. 5. Si a patrono laico præsentetur minus dignum. 6. Si resignatur aut permutatur beneficium, resignans aut permutans non tenetur præferre digniorem digno: sic Cajetanus, Lessius, Serra, etc. Sed Soto, Navarrus, Sylvius, Pontas et alii putant taem resignantem aut permutantem peccare mortaliter si agatur de beneficio habente curam animarum, aut dignitatem magni momenti. Promoto indigno, tam promovens quam promotus tenetur restituere Ecclesiæ omnia damna quæ ipsi obveniunt. Qui promovet minus dignum, prætermisso digniore, tenetur per se loquendo restituere Ecclesiæ: sed Ecclesia ad illam non obligat; tenetur restituere digniori prætermisso, si sit manifeste dignior, quando promotio fit per concursum, non vero extra concursum. Minus autem dignus promotus nec resignare debet beneficium, nec restituere digniori tenetur, quando promotio facta est ex concursu. Qualitates ad beneficia rite obtinenda necessaria sunt: 1. probitas morum; 2. scientia competens; 3. aetas legitima; 4. thorus legitimus, et filius ex
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is commanded (Leviticus 19:32): "Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according to Daniel 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [Vulgate: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, character habet rationem signi. Est autem signum gratia, quæ per sacramentum confertur: gratia autem infunditur animæ a tota Trinitate; unde dicitur in psal. lxxxiii, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus. Ergo videtur quod character sacramentalis non debeat specialiter attribui Christo.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.3] Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . . with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ad hoc aliquis characterem accipit, ut eo a cæteris distinguatur. Sed distinctio sanctorum ab aliis fit per charitatem, quæ « sola distinguit inter filios regni et filios perditionis, » ut Augustinus dicit, XV De Trinit., cap. xviii, col. 1082, t. 8; unde et ipsi perditionis filii characterem bestiæ habere dicuntur, ut patet Apoc., xiii. Charitas autem non attribuitur Christo, sed magis Spiritui sancto, secundum illud Rom., v, 5: Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis; vel etiam Patri, secundum illud II ad Corint., ult., 13: Gratia Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et charitas Dei. Ergo videtur quod character sacramentalis non sit attribuendus Christo.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.sc] A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod quidam definiunt characterem: « Character est distinctio a charactere æterno impressa animæ rationali, secundum imaginem, consignans trinitatem creatam Trinitati creanti et recreanti, et distinguens a non configuratis secundum statum fidei. » Sed character æternus est ipse Christus, secundum illud Hebr., i, 3: Qui cum sit splendor gloriæ, et figura, vel character, substantiæ ejus. Ergo videtur quod character sit proprie attribuendus Christo.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.co] To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing the community over which they are placed, according to Proverbs 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble ['Lapillus' or 'calculus' whence the English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community: and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wisdom 4:8-9, "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, character proprie est signaculum quoddam, quo aliquid insignitur, ut ordinandum 1 in aliquem finem: sicut charactere insignitur denarius ad usum commutationum; et milites charactere insigniuntur, quasi ad militiam deputati. Homo autem fidelis ad duo deputatur: primo quidem et principaliter ad fruitionem gloriæ; et ad hoc insignitur signaculo gratia, secundum illud Ezech., ix, 4: Signa Thau super frontes virorum gementium et dolentium; et Apocal., vii, 3: Nolite nocere terræ et mari, neque arboribus, quoadusque signemus servos Dei nostri in frontibus corum. Secundo autem deputatur quisque fidelis ad recipiendum vel tradendum aliis ea quæ pertinent ad cultum Dei; et ad hoc proprie deputatur character sacramentalis. Totus autem ritus christianæ religionis derivatur a sacerdotio Christi. Et ideo manifestum est quod character sacramentalis specialiter est character Christi, cujus sacerdotio configurantur fideles secundum sacramentales characteres, qui nihil aliud sunt quam quædam participationes sacerdotii Christi ab ipso Christo derivatæ.
Article 4
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (Article 1): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod character non sit in potentiis animæ sicut in subjecto. Character enim dicitur esse dispositio ad gratiam. Sed gratia est in essentia animæ sicut in subjecto, ut in secunda parte dictum est. Ergo videtur quod character sit in essentia animæ, non autem in potentiis.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.2] Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, potentia animæ non videtur esse subjectum alicujus, nisi habitus vel dispositionis. Sed character, ut dictum est, non est habitus vel dispositio, sed magis potentia, cujus subjectum non est nisi essentia animæ. Ergo videtur quod character non sit, sicut in subjecto, in potentia animæ, sed magis in essentia ipsius.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (Sirach 4:10): "In judging be merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, potentia animæ rationalis distinguuntur per cognitivas et appetitivas. Sed non potest dici quod character sit tantum in potentia cognitiva, neque etiam tantum in potentia appetitiva, quia non ordinatur neque ad cognoscendum tantum neque ad appetendum; similiter etiam non potest dici quod sit in utraque, quia idem accidens non potest esse in diversis subjectis. Ergo videtur quod character non sit in potentia animæ sicut in subjecto, sed magis in essentia. Character ex Thomistis communiter ac Scotistis non subjectatur in essentia animæ; sed ex Thomistis in intellectu, ex Scotistis in voluntate.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.sc] It is written (Proverbs 18:5): "It is not good to accept the person in judgment [Vulgate: 'It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."
[II-II.q.63.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb., xviii, 5: Accipere personam* in judicio non est bonum.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.co] As stated above (Question 60, Article 1), judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, judicium est actus justitiæ, prout judex ad æqualitatem justitiæ reducit ea quæ inæqualitatem oppositam facere possunt. Personarum autem acceptio inæqualitatem quamdam habet, inquantum attribui-tur alicui personæ præter proportionem suam, in qua consistit æqualitas justitiæ. Mercurium vocabant elevabatur, et viator unusquisque, ut neminem lateret Mercurius iste, lapides transeundo jaciebat ad pedes simulacri, unde mox fiebat acervus qui vulgo appellabatur acervus Mercurii. — Cæterum textus hebræus hic habet: sicut qui mittit lapidem in palma fundæ id est in latitudine media fundæ, ut contra naturam suam projiciatur sursum, ita qui contra rationem insipienti tribuit honorem. — Septuaginta autem interpretes vertunt: qui alligat lapidem in funda similis est ei qui dat imprudenti gloriam. Lapis etenim fundæ alligatus inutilis est pariter ac gloria data imprudenti. Et ideo manifestum est quod per personarum acceptionem judicium corrumpitur.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.1] A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. On this way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod judicium dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo quantum ad ipsam rem judicatam, et sic judicium se habet communiter ad commutativam et ad distributivam justitiam; potest enim judicio definiri qualiter aliquid commune sit distribuendum in multos, et qualiter alteri unus restituat quod ab eo acceptit. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam formam judicii, prout scilicet judex etiam in ipsa commutativa justitia ab uno accipit, et alteri dat; et hoc pertinet ad distributivam justitiam. Et secundum hoc in quolibet judicio locum habere potest personarum acceptio.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.2] When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above (58, 10, ad 3; 61, 2, ad 3).
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum punitur aliquis gravius propter injuriam in majorem personam commissam, non est personarum acceptio, quia ipsa diversitas personæ facit, quantum ad hoc, diversitatem rei, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.3] In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Exodus 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment."
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, character ordinatur ad ea quæ sunt divini cultus, qui quidem est quædam fidei protestatio per exteriora signa. Et ideo oportet quod character sit in cognitiva potentia animæ, in qua est fides.
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