Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q63. Respect of persons
Source context
- Theme
- partiality in distributive justice — awarding goods or honors based on personal attachment rather than merit or dignity
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian distributive justiceAristotle's account of distributive justice in Nicomachean Ethics V requires proportional allocation according to merit, structurally paralleling Aquinas's argument that respect of persons violates commutative proportion by privileging accidental features over the relevant ground of distribution.
- Hebrew Biblical lawLeviticus 19:15 prohibits judging with partiality toward the great or the poor, providing the scriptural basis Aquinas cites as establishing respect of persons as a sin against justice rather than merely against charity.
Q63. Respect of persons
Article 1
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [Cf. I, 29, 3, ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod personarum acceptio non sit peccatum. In nomine enim personæ intelligitur personæ dignitas. Sed considerare dignitates personarum pertinet ad distributivam justi-tiam. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.2] Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely.
But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in rebus humanis personæ sunt principaliores quam res, quia res sunt propter personas, et non e converso. Sed rerum acceptio non est peccatum. Ergo multo minus acceptio personarum.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.3] Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Matthew 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulgate: 'field' ['Bed' is the reading of Luke 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, apud Deum nulla potest esse iniquitas vel peccatum. Sed Deus videtur personas accipere, quia interdum duorum hominum unius conditionis unum assumit per gratiam, et alterum relinquit in peccato, secundum illud Luc., xvII, 34: Erant duo in lecto: unus assumetur, et alius* re-linquetur. Ergo acceptio personarum non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.sc] Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Deuteronomy 1:17: "Neither shall you respect any man's person." Therefore respect of persons is a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.sc] Sed contra, nihil prohibetur in lege divina nisi peccatum. Sed personarum acceptio prohibetur Deut., 1, 47, ubi dicitur: Non accipietis cujusquam personam. Ergo personarum acceptio est peccatum.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.co] Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Ephesians 6:9, "There is no respect of persons with God [Vulgate: 'Him']," says that "a just judge regards causes, not persons." For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod personarum acceptio oppositur justitiæ distributive. Consistit enim aequalitas distributive justitiæ in hoc quod diversis personis diversa tribuntur, secundum proportionem ad dignitates personarum. Si ergo aliquis consideret illam proprietatem personæ propter quam aliquid quod ei confertur est ei debitum, non est acceptio personæ, sed causæ; unde Glossa interl., super illud ad Ephes., vi: Personarum acceptio non est apud eum, dicit quod « Deus judex justus causas discernit, non personas. » Puta si aliquis promoveat aliquem ad magisterium propter sufficientiam scientia, hic attenditur causa debita, non persona; si autem aliquis consideret in eo cui aliquid confert, non id propter quod id quod ei datur, esset ei proportionatum vel debitum, sed solum hoc quod estiste homo, puta Petrus vel Martinus, hic est acceptio personæ, quia non attribuitur ei cujusque circumstantiæ omissio contrariatur virtuti; pro determinato est habendum, quod oportet illam circumstantiam observare. » Sic cod.; in edit.: « id. » aliquid propter aliquam causam quæ faciat eum dignum, sed simpliciter attribuitur personæ. Ad personam autem refertur quæ-cumque condition non faciens ad causam, propter quam sit dignus hoc dono: puta si aliquis promoveat aliquem ad praelationem vel magisterium, quia est dives, vel quia est consanguineus suus, est acceptio personæ. Contingit tamen aliquam conditionem personæ facere eam dignam respectu unius rei, et non respectu alterius; sicut consanguinitas facit aliquem dignum ad hoc quod instituatur heres patrimonii, non autem ad hoc quod conferatur ei praelatio ecclesiastica. Et ideo eadem condition personæ in uno negotio considerata facit acceptanceem personæ, in alio autem non facit. Sic ergo patet quod personarum acceptio opponitur justitia distributive in hoc quod praeter proportionem agitur. Nihil autem opponitur virtuti nisi peccatum. Unde consequens est quod personarum acceptio sit peccatum.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.1] In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in distributiva justitia considerantur conditiones personarum quæ faciunt ad dignitatis vel debiti causam; sed in acceptancee personarum considerantur conditiones quæ non faciunt ad causam, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.2] Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod personæ proportionantur et dignæ redduntur aliquibus quæ eis distribuuntur, propter aliquas res quæ pertinent ad conditionem personæ; et ideo hujusmodi conditiones sunt attendendæ, tanquam propriæ causæ. Cum autem considerantur ipsæ personæ, attenditur non causa ut causa; et ideo patet quod quamvis personæ sint digniores simpliciter, non tamen sunt digniores quoad hoc.
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.3] There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. On such a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will, according to Matthew 20:14-15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way."
[II-II.q.63.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod duplex est datio: una quidem pertinens ad justitiam, qua scilicet aliquis dat alicui quod ei debetur; et circa tales dationes attenditur personarum acceptio. Alia est datio ad liberalitatem pertinens; qua scilicet gratis datur alicui quod ei non debetur, et talis est collatio munerum gratia, per quam peccatores assumuntur a Deo; et in hac donatione non habet locum personarum acceptio, quia qui libet absque injustitia potest de suo dare quantum vult et cui vult, secundum illud Matth., xx, 14 et 45: An non licet mihi quod volo facere? Tolle quod tuum est, et vade.
Article 2
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod in dispensatione spiritualium locum non habeat personarum acceptio. Conferre enim dignitatem ecclesiasticam seu beneficium alicui propter consanguinitatem, videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere, quia consanguinitas non est causa faciens hominem dignum ecclesiastico beneficio. Sed hoc non videtur esse peccatum, cum hoc ex consuetudine prælati Ecclesiæ faciant. Ergo peccatum personarum acceptionis non videtur locum habere in dispensatione spiritualium.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.2] Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James 2:2-3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, præferre divitem pauperi videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere, ut patet Jacobi, 11. Sed facilius dispensatur cum divitibus et potentibus, quod in gradu prohibito contrahant matrimonium, quam cum aliis. Ergo peccatum personarum'acceptionis non videtur locum habere circa dispensationem spiritualium.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.3] Further, according to jurists [Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, secundum jura, sufficit eligere bonum, non autem requiritur quod aliquis eligat meliorem. Sed eligere minus bonum ad aliquid altius, videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum in spiritualibus.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.4] Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, secundum Statuta Ecclesiæ, cap. « Cum dilectus » de electione, etc., eligendus est aliquis de gremio Ecclesiæ. Sed hoc videtur ad acceptanceem personarum pertinere, quia quandoque sufficientiores alibi invenirentur. Ergo personarum acceptio non est peccatum in spiritualibus.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.sc] It is written (James 2:1): "Have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons." On these words a gloss of Augustine says: "Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?" [Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.]
[II-II.q.63.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Jacobi, 11, 4: Nolite in personarum acceptancee habere fidem Domini nostri Jesu Christi; ubi dicit Glossa Augustini: « Quis ferat, si quis divi tem eligat ad sedem honoris Ecclesiæ, contempto paupere instructiore et sanctiore? »
[II-II.q.63.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), respect of persons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it must be observed that a person's worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Corinthians 12:7, "The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit," it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less worthy.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, acceptio personarum est peccatum, in quantum contrariatur justitiæ. Quanto autem in majoribus aliquis justitiam transgreditur, tanto gravius peccat. Unde cum spiritualia sint temporalibus potiora, gravius peccatum est personas accipere in dispensatione spiritualium quam in dispensatione temporalium. Et quia personarum acceptio est cum aliquid personæ attribuitur præter proportionem dignitatis ipsius, considerare oportet quod dignitas alicujus personæ potest attendi dupliciter: uno modo simpliciter et secundum se, et sic majoris dignitatis est ille qui magis abundat in spiritualibus gratiae donis; alio modo per comparisonem ad bonum commune; contingit enim quandoque quod ille qui est minus sciens, potest magis conferre ad bonum commune propter potentiam vel industriam sæcularem, vel propter aliquid hujusmodi. Et quia dispensationes spiritualium principalius ordinantur ad utilitatem communem, secundum illud I Cor., xii, 7: Unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad utilitatem, ideo quandoque absque acceptancee personarum in dispensatione spiritualium illi qui sunt simpliciter minus boni, melioribus præferuntur, sicut etiam et Deus gratias gratis datas quandoque concedit minus bonis.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.1] We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate's kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Corinthians 4:1, "Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God." Sometimes however the prelate's kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to their deserts.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod circa consanguineos prælati distinguendum est; aut avehendis solvitur. Huic affine est quod datur principi ex rebus venditis, sive mobilibus, sive immobilibus. « Pedagium, » seu « guidagium » est id quod solvitur a transeuntibus equo, curru, navi, etc., pro pontium et viarum conservatione, custodia et securitate. Antiquitus is cujus erat jus pedagii tenebatur reddere indemnem eum qui inter duos so les in via publica fuisset a latronibus spoliatus. Tres conditiones communiter requiruntur ut justum sit tributum: auctoritas legitima, justa causa et debita proportio. Defraudare justa tributa, sive petantur sive non, est, secundum Sylvestrum, Cajetanum, Soto, Bannem, Covarruvias, Lessium, Sylvium, Layman, Cabassutium, etc., ex genere suo peccatum mortale contra justitiam non tantum legalem, sed etiam commutativam, et obligat ad restitutionem. Sed forsitan quædam leges tributales sunt mere pœnales, et non obligant ad restitutionem, neque ad mulctam ante sententiam judicis; vel proportionem excedunt, et tunc, ait Sylvius, q. Lxvi, a. 8, concl. 7: « Si quis fraudet de illis et vectigalibus quantum bona fide existimat se plus æquo gravari, neque peccat, neque tenetur ad restitutionem: quod meminisse oportet confessarios, quando agitur de fraudatorum vectigalium restitutione injungenda.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.2] Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to such persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod dispensatio matrimonii contrahendi principaliter fieri consuevit propter fædus pacis firmandum: quod quidem magis est necessarium communi utilitati circa personas excellentes; et ideo cum eis facilius dispensatur absque peccato acceptionis personarum.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.3] In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.4] The man who is taken from among the members of a particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason it was commanded (Deuteronomy 17:15): "Thou mayest not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother."
[II-II.q.63.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod ille qui de gremio Ecclesiæ assumitur, ut in pluribus consuevit esse utilior quantum ad bonum commune, quia magis diligit Ecclesiam in qua est nutritus: et propter hoc etiam mandatur Deut., xvii, 15: Non poteris alterius gentis hominem regem facere, qui non sit frater tuus.
Article 3
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than "reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is written (Exodus 20:12): "Honor thy father and thy mother." Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to 1 Timothy 6:1: "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor." Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in exhibitione honoris et reverentia non habeat locum peccatum acceptionis personarum. Honor enim nihil aliud esse videtur quam reverentia quædam alicui exhibita in testimonium virtutis, ut patet per Philosophum in I Ethic., cap. v et xii. Sed prælati et principes sunt honorandi, etiamsi sint mali, sicut etiam parentes, de quibus mandatur Exod., xx, 12: Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuam; et etiam domini sunt a servis honorandi, etiamsi sint mali, secundum illud I ad Timoth., vii, 4: Quicumque sunt sub jugo servi dominos suos* honore dignos arbitrentur. Ergo videtur quod acceptio personae non sit peccatum in exhibitione honoris. per concursum. Ita Azorius, Navarrus, Lessius, Sylvius, Cabassutius, etc. Sunt varii casus in quibus licet promovere dignos, praetermissis dignioribus, ad beneficia etiam curata: 1. Si promovendus debeat esse de gremio Ecclesiæ. 2. Si ipse fundator beneficii præsentet dignum. 3. Si vacent duo beneficia, unum simplex pinque, aliud parochiale tenue, potest reservari tenue parochiale digniori, propter utilitatem Ecclesiæ. 4. Si in electione votum meum non prodesset digniori, prositque minus digno, ut indignus vel longe minus dignus non eligatur, tunc possum eligere primum minus dignum. 5. Si a patrono laico præsentetur minus dignum. 6. Si resignatur aut permutatur beneficium, resignans aut permutans non tenetur præferre digniorem digno: sic Cajetanus, Lessius, Serra, etc. Sed Soto, Navarrus, Sylvius, Pontas et alii putant taem resignantem aut permutantem peccare mortaliter si agatur de beneficio habente curam animarum, aut dignitatem magni momenti. Promoto indigno, tam promovens quam promotus tenetur restituere Ecclesiæ omnia damna quæ ipsi obveniunt. Qui promovet minus dignum, prætermisso digniore, tenetur per se loquendo restituere Ecclesiæ: sed Ecclesia ad illam non obligat; tenetur restituere digniori prætermisso, si sit manifeste dignior, quando promotio fit per concursum, non vero extra concursum. Minus autem dignus promotus nec resignare debet beneficium, nec restituere digniori tenetur, quando promotio facta est ex concursu. Qualitates ad beneficia rite obtinenda necessaria sunt: 1. probitas morum; 2. scientia competens; 3. aetas legitima; 4. thorus legitimus, et filius ex
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is commanded (Leviticus 19:32): "Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man." But this seems to savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according to Daniel 13:5: "Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [Vulgate: 'Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.']." Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Levit., xix, 32, præcipitur: Coram cano capite consurge, et honora personam senis. Sed hoc videtur ad acceptionem personarum pertinere: quia quando senes non sunt virtuosi, secundum illud Dan., xiii, 5: Egressa est iniquitas a senioribus* populi: Ergo acceptio personarum non est peccatum in exhibitione honoris.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.3] Further, on the words of James 2:1, "Have not the faith . . . with respect of persons," a gloss of Augustine [Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] says: "If the saying of James, 'If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,' etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?" Yet it is respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): "Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God's image, but wealth," so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, super illud Jac., ii: Nolite in personarum acceptione habere fidem, dicit Glossa Augustini: « Si hoc quod Jacobus dicit: Si introierit in conventu vestro vir habens annulum aureum, etc., intelligatur de quotidianis concessibus, quis hic non peccat, si tamen peccat? » Sed hæc est acceptio personarum, divites propter divitias honorare; dicit enim Gregorius in quadam hom., xxviii in Evang., § 2, col. 1214, t. 2: « Superbia nostra retunditur, quia in hominibus non naturam, qua ad imaginem Dei facti sunt, sed divitias veneramur; » et sic cum divitiæ non sint debita causa honoris, pertinebit hoc illegitimo thoro conceptus aut natus, si sit procreatus ex personis habilibus ad matrimonium, seu nullo impedimento dirimente irretitis, fit legitimus per subsequens matrimonium quod, secundum jura habet in hoc casu vim quamdam retro-activam; 5. tonsura clericalis collata a proprio episcopo, vel ab altero cum litteris ejus dimissorialibus; 6. ccelibatus; 7. immunitas ab excommunicatione majori, suspensione, interdicto et irregularitate; 8. immunitas ab hæresi in se et in parentibus usque ad secundam generationem in linea paterna, et usque ad primam in linea materna; 9. determinata intentio suscipiendi officium beneficio annexum, seu, si nullum sit annexum, perseverandi in statu clericali. Pluralitas beneficiorum a jure positivo prohibetur. Sed congregatio concilii 13 januarii 1594 declavit posse retineri consuetudo permittens ut in eadem Ecclesia dignitas cum canonicatu per eumdem obtineatur, v. g. cum canonicatu decanatus, præpositura, etc. Quæ diximus de collatione bonorum spiritualium, juxta sententiam probabiliores et communiorem contra Cajetanum dicenda esse videntur de collatione officiorum sæcularium.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.sc] A gloss on James 2:1, says: "Whoever honors the rich for their riches, sins," and in like manner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing honor.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in Glossa super illud: Nolite in personarum acceptione, Jac., ii: « Quicumque divitem propter divitias honorat, peccat; » et pari ratione si aliquis honoretur propter alias causas, quae non faciunt dignum honore; quod pertinet ad acceptionem personarum. Ergo acceptio personarum in exhibitione honoris est peccatum.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.co] To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another's: thus princes and prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing the community over which they are placed, according to Proverbs 26:8, "As he that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool." For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, "the heap of Mercury" signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble ['Lapillus' or 'calculus' whence the English word 'calculate'] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he stand in God's place or represent the whole community: and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wisdom 4:8-9, "venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age." The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.
Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.
[II-II.q.63.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod honor est quoddam testimonium de virtute ejus qui honoratur; et ideo sola virtus est debita causa honoris. Sciendum tamen quod aliquis potest honorari non solum propter virtutem propriam, sed etiam propter virtutem alterius; sicut principes et prælati honorantur, etiamsi sint mali, inquantum gerunt personam Dei et communitatis cui praeficiuntur, secundum illud Proverb., xxvi, 8: Sicut qui immittit lapidem in acervum Mercurii, ita qui tribuit insipienti honorem. Quia enim gentiles rationem attribueant Mercurio, acervus Mercurii dicitur cumulus ratiocinii, in quo mercator quando mittit unum lapillum loco centum marcarum. Ita etiam honoratur insipiens, qui ponitur loco Dei, et loco totius communitatis; et eadem ratione parentes et domini sunt honorandi propter participationem divinæ dignitatis, qui est omnium pater et dominus. Senes autem sunt honorandi propter signum virtutis, quod est senectus, licet hoc signum quando deficiat. Unde, ut dicitur Sap., iv, 8: Senectus venerabilis est, non diuturna, neque annorum numero computata; cani autem sunt sensus hominis, et ætas senectutis vita immaculata. Divites autem honorandi sunt propter hoc quod majorem locum in communitatibus obtinent. Si autem solum intuitu divitiarum hono- Sic cod.; in edit.: « ratiocinationem. » Editio tamen gothica Nurrembergensis ann. 1496 habet: « rationem. » Eamdem expositionem hujus textus tradit Nicolaus de Lyra, qui tamen aliam interpretationem non omittit, dicendo: qui mittit lapidem ad ædificandum templum Mercurio; et sensus est: Sicut qui Mercurium cultu honorat inani ita, etc. Porro, ut videtur, melius intelligentur hæc verba, si simpliciter sumerentur, dicendo: Sicut qui immittit lapidem in acervum Mercurii, non ad ædificandum Mercurio templum, sed ad exhibendum ipsi honorem, ita, etc. — Mercurius etenim viis apud antiquos præerat, et ideo juxta vias frequenter simulacrum quoddam capitis humani quod rentur, erit peccatum acceptionis personarum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
Article 4
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated above (Article 1): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in judiciis locum non habeat peccatum acceptionis personarum. Acceptio enim personarum opponitur distributivæ justitiæ, ut dictum est. Sed judicia maxime videntur ad justitiam commutativam pertinere. Ergo personarum acceptio non habet locum in judiciis.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.2] Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, pœnæ secundum aliquod judicium insliguntur. Sed in pœnis accipiuntur personæ absque peccato; quia gravius puniuntur qui inferunt injuriam in personas principum, quam qui in personas aliorum. Ergo personarum acceptio non habet locum in judiciis.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (Sirach 4:10): "In judging be merciful to the fatherless." But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Eccli., iv, 10, dicitur: In judicando esto pupillis misericors. Sed hoc videtur esse accipere personam pauperis. Ergo acceptio personarum in judiciis non est peccatum.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.sc] It is written (Proverbs 18:5): "It is not good to accept the person in judgment [Vulgate: 'It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.']."
[II-II.q.63.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb., xviii, 5: Accipere personam* in judicio non est bonum.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.co] As stated above (Question 60, Article 1), judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, judicium est actus justitiæ, prout judex ad æqualitatem justitiæ reducit ea quæ inæqualitatem oppositam facere possunt. Personarum autem acceptio inæqualitatem quamdam habet, inquantum attribui-tur alicui personæ præter proportionem suam, in qua consistit æqualitas justitiæ. Mercurium vocabant elevabatur, et viator unusquisque, ut neminem lateret Mercurius iste, lapides transeundo jaciebat ad pedes simulacri, unde mox fiebat acervus qui vulgo appellabatur acervus Mercurii. — Cæterum textus hebræus hic habet: sicut qui mittit lapidem in palma fundæ id est in latitudine media fundæ, ut contra naturam suam projiciatur sursum, ita qui contra rationem insipienti tribuit honorem. — Septuaginta autem interpretes vertunt: qui alligat lapidem in funda similis est ei qui dat imprudenti gloriam. Lapis etenim fundæ alligatus inutilis est pariter ac gloria data imprudenti. Parm. addit.: « aliquid. » Et ideo manifestum est quod per personarum acceptionem judicium corrumpitur.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.1] A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. On this way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod judicium dupliciter potest considerari: uno modo quantum ad ipsam rem judicatam, et sic judicium se habet communiter ad commutativam et ad distributivam justitiam; potest enim judicio definiri qualiter aliquid commune sit distribuendum in multos, et qualiter alteri unus restituat quod ab eo acceptit. Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam formam judicii, prout scilicet judex etiam in ipsa commutativa justitia ab uno accipit, et alteri dat; et hoc pertinet ad distributivam justitiam. Et secundum hoc in quolibet judicio locum habere potest personarum acceptio.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.2] When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above (58, 10, ad 3; 61, 2, ad 3).
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod cum punitur aliquis gravius propter injuriam in majorem personam commissam, non est personarum acceptio, quia ipsa diversitas personæ facit, quantum ad hoc, diversitatem rei, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.3] In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Exodus 23:3 would apply: "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment."
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.63.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod homo in judicio debet pauperi subvenire quantum fieri potest, tamen sine kæsione justitiae: alioquin habet locum illud quod dicitur Exod., xxiii, 3: Pauperis quoque non misereberis in judicio.
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