Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q62. Restitution
Source context
- Theme
- obligatory restoration of unjustly taken goods as a condition of justice and rectified social order
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Roman Law (restitutio in integrum)Roman legal doctrine of restitutio in integrum treats restoration of a prior rightful state as the proper remedy for unjust deprivation, providing a jurisprudential analogue to Aquinas's moral-theological grounding of restitution in commutative justice.
- Rabbinic jurisprudence (teshuvah and hashavat avedah)Rabbinic law distinguishes the return of lost or wrongfully held property (hashavat avedah) as a positive commandment structurally parallel to Aquinas's insistence that restitution is a precondition of moral rectification, not merely a counsel.
Q62. Restitution
Article 1
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod sacramenta non sint causa gratiae. Non enim idem videtur esse signum et causa, eo quod ratio signi videtur magis effectui competere. Sed sacramentum est signum gratiae. Non igitur est causa ejus.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.2] Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullum corporale agere potest in rem spiritualem, eo quod agens honorabilius est patiente, ut Augustinus dicit, XII Super Genes. ad litt., cap. xvi, col. 467, t. 3. Sed subjectum gratiae est mens hominis, quæ est res spiritualis. Non ergo sacramenta possunt gratiam causare.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.3] Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative than of distributive justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod est proprium Dei, non debet alicui creaturæ attribui. Sed causare gratiam est proprium Dei, secundum illud psal. lxxxiii, 12: Gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus. Cum ergo sacramenta consistant in quibusdam verbis et rebus creatis, non videtur quod possint gratiam causare.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.sc] Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. lxxx, col. 1 840, t. 3, quod « aqua » baptismalis « corpus tangit et cor abluit. » Sed cor non abluitur nisi per gratiam. Ergo causat gratiam, et pari ratione alia Ecclesiæ sacramenta.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.co] To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere sacramenta novæ legis per aliquem modum gratiam causare. Manifestum est enim quod per sacramenta novæ legis homo Christo incorporatur; sicut de baptismo dicit Apostolus Galat., III, 27: Quotquot * in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis. Non autem efficitur homo membrum Christi nisi per gratiam. Quidam tamen dicunt quod non sint causa gratiae aliquid operando, sed quia Deus, sacramentis adhibitis, in anima gratiam operatur: et ponunt exemplum de illo qui afferens denarium plumbeum accipit centum libras ex regis ordinatione; non quod denarius ille aliquid operetur ad habendam prædictæ pecuniæ quantitatem; sed hoc operatur sola voluntas regis. Unde et Bernardus dicit in quodam Sermone de cœna Domini, § 2, col. 214, t. 3: « Sicut investitur canonicus per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per annulum, sic divisiones gratiarum diversæ sunt traditæ sacramentis. » Sed si quis recte consideret, iste modus non transcendit rationem signi; nam denarius plumbeus non est nisi quoddam signum regiæ ordinationis de hoc quod pecunia recipiatur ab isto: similiter liber est quoddam signum, quo designatur traditio canonicatus. Secundum hoc igitur sacramenta novæ legis nihil plus essent. quam signa gratiae: cum tamen ex multis sanctorum auctoritatibus habeatur quod sacramenta novæ legis non solum significant, sed causant gratiam. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod duplex est causa agens, principalis et instrumentalis. Principalis quidem operatur per virtutem suæ formæ cui assimilatur effectus, sicut ignis suo calore calefacit: et hoc modo nihil potest causare gratiam, nisi Deus, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quædam participata similitudo divinæ naturæ, secundum illud II Petri, 1, 4: Magna * nobis, et pretiosa promissá donavit, ut divinæ simus consortes naturæ. Causa vero instrumentalis non agit per virtutem suæ formæ, sed solum per motum quo movetur a principali agente. Unde effectus non assimilatur instrumento, sed principali agenti; sicut lectus non assimilatur securi, sed arti, quæ est in mente artificis. Et hoc modo sacramenta novæ legis gratiam causant; adhibentur enim ex divina ordinatione hominibus ad gratiam in eis causandam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIX Contra Faustum, cap. xvi, col. 357, t. 8: « Hæ commnia, » scilicet sacramentalia, « fiunt et transeunt; virtus tamen, » scilicet Dei, « quæ per ista operatur jugiter manet. » Hoc autem proprie dicitur instrumentum, per quod aliquis operatur: unde et Tit., III, 5, dicitur: Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.1] That which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not restitution properly so called.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod causa principalis non proprie potest dici signum effectus, licet occulti, etiamsi ipsa sit sensibilis et manifesta; sed causa instrumentalis, si sit manifesta, potest dici signum effectus occulti, eo quod non solum est causa, sed etiam quodammodo effectus, inquantum movetur a principali agente. Et secundum hoc sacramenta novæ legis simul sunt causæ et signa; et inde est quod, sicut communiter dicitur, « efficiunt quod figurant. » Ex quo etiam patet quod habent perfecte rationem sacramenti, inquantum ordinantur ad aliquid sacrum, non solum per modum signi, sed etiam per modum causæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.2] In so far as the word restitution denotes something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod instrumentum habet duas actiones: unam instrumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute principalis agentis; aliam autem habet actionem propriam, quæ competit ei secundum propriam formam; sicut securi competit scindere ratione suæ acuitatis, facere autem lectum, inquantum est instrumentum artis; non autem perficit instrumentalem actionem, nisi exercendo actionem propriam, scindendo enim 1 Edit. Vivès. 2 Plenius in textu D. Bernardi. » Manichæi negabant sacramenta justificare. Armeni contendebant per sacramenta deleri pecata, non conferri gratiam. Messaliani vim justi- * Maxima et pretiosa nobis... ut per hæc efficiamini divinæ consortes. facit lectum. Et similiter sacramenta corporalia per propriam operationem, quam exercent circa corpus quod tangunt, efficiunt operationem instrumentalem ex virtute divina circa animam, sicut aqua baptismi abluendo corpus secundum propriam virtutem abluit animam inquantum est instrumentum virtutis divinæ; nam ex anima et corpore unum fit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit quod « corpus tangit, et cor abluit. »
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.3] Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit de eo quod est causa gratia per modum principalis agentis; hoc enim est proprium Dei, ut dictum est.
Article 2
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation.
But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod gratia sacramentalis non addat aliquid super gratiam virtutum et donorum. Per gratiam enim virtutum et donorum perficitur anima sufficienter, et quantum ad essentiam animæ et quantum ad potentias ejus, ut patet ex his quæ in secunda parte dicta sunt. Sed gratia ordinatur ad animæ perfectionem. Ergo gratia sacramentalis non potest aliquid addere super gratiam virtutum et donorum.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.2] Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, defectus animæ ex peccatis causantur. Sed omnia peccata sufficienter excluduntur per gratiam virtutum et donorum, quia nullum est peccatum quod non contrarietur alicui virtuti. Gratia ergo sacramentalis, cum ordinetur ad defectus animæ tollendos, non potest aliquid addere super gratiam virtutum et donorum.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.3] Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omnis additio vel subtractio in formis variat speciem, ut dictur VIII Metaphys., text. 10. Si ergo gratia sacramentalis addat aliquid super gratiam virtutum et donorum, sequitur quod æquivoce dicatur gratia; et sic nihil certum nobis ostenditur ex hoc quod sacramenta dicuntur gratiam causare.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.4] Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, ille qui impedit aliquem ab aliquo bono consequendo, videtur illud ei auferre, quia « quod modicum deest, quasi nibil deesse videtur, » ut Philosophus dicit in II Physic., text. 56. Sed cum aliquis impedit aliquem ut non consequatur præbendam, vel aliquid hujusmodi, non videtur quod tenatur ei ad restitutionem præbendæ: quia quandoque non posset. Non ergo restituere ablatum, est de necessitate salutis.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."
[II-II.q.62.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod si gratia sacramentalis non addit aliquid super gratiam donorum et virtutum, frustra sacramenta habentibus et dona et virtutes conferrentur. In operibus autem Dei nihil est frustra. Ergo videtur quod gratia sacramentalis aliquid addat super gratiam virtutum et donorum.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.co] Restitution as stated above (Article 1) is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, gratia secundum se considerata perficit essentiam animæ, inquantum participat quamdam similitudinem divini esse; et sicut ab essentia animæ fluunt ejus potentiae, ita a gratia fluunt quædam perfectiones ad potentias animæ, quæ dicuntur virtutes et dona, quibus potentiae perficiuntur in ordine ad suos actus. Ordinantur autem sacramenta ad quosdam speciales effectus necessarios in vita christiana; sicut baptismus ordinatur ad quosdam spiritualem regenerationem, qua homo moritur vitiis et fit membrum Christi; qui quidem effectus est aliquid speciale præter actus potentiarum animæ: et eadem ratio est in 1 aliis sacramentis. Sicut igitur virtutes et dona addunt super gratiam communiter dictam quasdam perfectionem determinate ordinatam ad proprios actus potentiarum, ita gratia sacramentalis addit super gratiam communiter dictam et super virtutes et dona, quoddam divinum auxilium ad consequendum sacramenti finem. Et per hunc modum gratia sacramentalis addit super gratiam virtutum et donorum.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.1] When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod gratia virtutum et donorum sufficienter perficit essentiam et potentias animæ quantum ad generalem ordinationem actuum 2; sed quantum ad quosdam effectus speciales, qui requiruntur in vita christiana, requiritur sacramentalis gratia.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.2] There are three ways in which one may take away another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above (ad 1).
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per virtutes et dona excluduntur sufficienter vitia et peccata quantum ad præsens et futurum, inquantum scilicet impeditur homo per virtutes et dona a peccando; sed quantum ad præterita peccata, quæ transeunt actu et permanent reatu, adhibetur homini remedium specialiter per sacramenta.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.3] The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of other men.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ratio sacramentalis gratia se habet ad gratiam communiter dictam, sicut ratio speciei ad genus. Unde sicut non æquivoce dicitur animal communiter dictum, et pro homine sumptum, ita non aequivoce dicitur gratia communiter sumpta et gratia sacramentalis.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.4] There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquis potest impedire aliquem ne habeat præbendam, multipliciter: uno modo juste, puta si intendens honorem Dei vel utilitatem Ecclesiæ, procuret quod detur alicui personæ digniori, et tunc nullo modo tenetur ad restitutionem, vel ad aliquam recompensationem faciendam; alio modo injuste: puta si intendat ejus nocumentum quem impedit propter odium vel vindictam, aut aliquid restitui potest. Habetur Causa XIV, q. vi, cap. 1, col. 966. Edit. addiderunt: « Si res aliena, propter quam peccatum est, reddi possit, et non redditur, pœni-tentia non agitur, sed simulatur. Si autem veraciter agitur, » non remittitur... ablatum, si, ut dixi, hujusmodi; et tunc si impedit ne præbenda detur digno, consulens quod non detur, antequam sit firmatum quod ei detur, tenetur quidem ad aliquam recompensationem, pensatis conditionibus personarum et negotii secundum arbitrium sapientis; non tamen tenetur ad æquale, quia illam nondum fuerat adeptus, et poterat multipliciter impediri. Si vero jam firmatum sit quod alicui detur præbenda, et aliquis propter indebitam causam procuret quod revocetur, idem est ac si jam habitam ei auferret, et ideo tenetur ad restitutionem æqualis, tamen secundum suam facultatem.
Article 5
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod sacramenta novæ legis non habeant virtutem ex passione Christi. Virtus enim sacramentorum est ad gratiam causandam in anima, per quam spiritualiter vivit. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. xix, § 15 et 16, col. 1552, t. 3: « Verbum prout erat in principio apud Deum, vivificat animas; secundum autem quod est caro factum, vivificat corpora. » Cum igitur passio Christi pertineat ad Verbum, secundum quod est caro factum, videtur quod non possit causare virtutem sacramentorum.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.2] Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, virtus sacramentorum videtur ex fide dependere: quia, sicut dicit Augustinus Super Joan., tract. Lxxx, col. 1840, t. 3, Verbum Dei perficit sacramentum, « non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur. » Sed fides nostra non solum respicit passionem Christi, sed etiam alia mysteria humanitatis ipsius, et principalius etiam divinitatem ejus. Ergo videtur quod sacramenta non habeant specialiter virtutem a passione Christi.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.3] Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sacramenta ordinantur ad hominum justificationem, secundum illud I ad Corinth., vi, 14: Abluti estis et justificati estis. Sed justificatio attribuitur resurrectioni, secundum illud Rom., iv, 25: Resurrexit propter justificationem nostram. Ergo videtur quod sacramenta magis habeant virtutem a resurrectione Christi quam ab ejus passione.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.4] Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, magis debet homo recompensare ei a quo majus beneficium acceptit. Sed ab aliis personis homo plus acceptit beneficii quam ab illo qui mutuavit, vel deposuit, sicut a parentibus. Ergo magis subveniendum est quandoque alicui personæ alteri quam restituendum ei a quo acceptum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.5] Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something has been taken away
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, vanum est restituere illud quod ad manum restituentis per restitutionem pervenit. Sed si prælatus injuste aliquid Ecclesiæ subtraxit et ei restituat, ad manus ejus deveniet: quia ipse est rerum Ecclesiæ conservator. Ergo non debet restituere Ecclesiæ a qua abstulit; et sic non semper restituendum est ei a quo est abla-tum.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.sc] It is written (Romans 13:7): "Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom."
[II-II.q.62.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod super illud Rom., v: In similitudinem prævaricationis Adæ, dicit Glossa ordin., col. 486, t. 2: « Ex latere Christi dormientis in cruce fluxerunt sacramenta, per quæ salvata est Ecclesia. » Sic ergo sacramenta videntur habere virtutem ex passione Christi.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.co] Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above (2; 58, 10). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, sacramentum operatur ad gratiam causandam per modum instrumenti. Est autem duplex instrumentum: unum quidem separatum, ut baculus; aliud autem conjunctum, ut manus. Per instrumentum autem conjunctum movetur instrumentum separatum, sicut baculus per manum. Principalis autem causa efficiens gratiae est ipse Deus, ad quem comparatur humanitas Christi sicut instrumentum conjunctum; sacramentum autem sicut instrumentum separatum. Et ideo oportet quod virtus salutifera a divinitate Christi per ejus humanitatem in ipsa sacramenta derivetur. Gratia autem sacramentalis ad duo præcipue ordinari videtur: videlicet ad tollendos defectus præteritorum peccatorum, in quantum transeunt actu, et remanent reatu; et iterum ad perficiendam animam in his quæ pertinent ad cultum Dei secundum religionem vitæ christianæ. Manifestum est autem ex his quæ supra dicta sunt, quod Christus liberavit nos a peccatis nostris præcipue per suam passionem, non solum sufficienter et meritorie, sed etiam satisfactorie. Similiter etiam per suam passionem initiavit ritum christianæ religionis, offerens seipsum oblationem et hostiam Deo, ut dicitur Ephes., v. Unde manifestum est quod sacramenta Ecclesiae specialiter habent virtutem ex passione Christi, cujus virtus quodammodo nobis copulatur per successionem 1 sacramentorum; in cujus signum de latere Christi pendentis in cruce fluxerunt aqua et sanguis, quorum unum pertinet ad baptismum, aliud ad Eucharistiam, quæ sunt potissima sacramenta.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.1] When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod « Verbum, prout erat in principio apud Deum, vivificat animas, » sicut agens principale; caro tamen ejus, et mysteria in ea perpetrata operantur instrumentaliter ad animæ vitam; ad vitam autem corporis non solum instrumentaliter, sed etiam per quamdam exemplaritatem, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.2] A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod per fidem Christus habitat in nobis, ut dicitur Ephes., v. Et ideo virtus Christi copulatur nobis per fidem. Virtus autem remissiva peccatorum, speciali quodam modo pertinet ad passionem ipsius Christi. Et ideo per fidem passionis ejus specialiter homines liberantur a peccatis, secundum illud Rom., 11, 25: Quem proposuit Deus propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine ipsius. Et ideo virtus sacramentorum, quæ ordinatur ad tollenda pecata, præcipue est ex fide passionis Christi.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.3] If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod justificatio attributur resurrectioni ratione termini ad quem, qui est novitas vitæ per gratiam; attributur tamen passioni ratione termini a quo, scilicet quantum ad dismissionem culpæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.4] A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succor a parent.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquis de hoc quod est sibi proprium debet magis satisfacere parentibus vel his a quibus acceptit majora beneficia; non autem debet aliquis recompensare benefactori de alieno; quod contingeret si quod debet uni, alteri restitueret; nisi forte in casu extremæ necessitatis, in quo posset et deberet aliquis etiam auferre aliena, ut patri subveniret.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.5] There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. On such a case it is clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod prælatus potest rem Ecclesiæ surripere tripliciter: uno modo si rem Ecclesiæ non sibi deputatam sed alteri, sibi usurparet; puta si episcopus usurparet sibi rem capituli et tunc planum est quod debet restituere ponendo in manus eorum ad quos de jure pertinet; alio modo si rem Ecclesiæ suæ custodia deputatam in alterius dominium transferat, puta consanguinei vel amici, et tunc debet restituere Ecclesiæ, et sub sua cura habere, ut ad successorem perveniat; tertio modo potest prælatus surripere rem Ecclesiæ solo animo, dum scilicet incipit habere animum possidendi eam ut suam, et non nomine Ecclesiæ; et tunc debet restituere, talem animum deponendo.
Article 6
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the person that took it, but by the one that has it.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod etiam sacramenta veteris legis gratiam causarent. Quia, sicut dictum est, sacramenta novæ legis habent efficaciam ex fide passionis Christi. Sed fides passionis Christi fuit in veteri lege, sicut et in nova: Habemus enim eumdem spiritum fidei, ut habetur II ad Corinth., iv, 13. Sicut ergo sacramenta novæ legis conferunt gratiam, ita etiam sacramenta veteris legis gratiam conferebant.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.2] Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sanctificatio non fit nisi per gratiam. Sed per sacramenta veteris legis homines sanctificabantur: dicitur enim Levit., viii, 31: Cumque sanctificacset Moyses Aaron et filios ejus in vestitu suo, etc. Ergo videtur quod sacramenta veteris legis gratiam conferebant.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.3] Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut Beda dicit in Homilia circumcisionis, col. 54, t. 5, « idem salutiferæ curationis auxilium circumcisio in lege contra originalis peccati vulnus agebat, quod baptismus agere revelatæ gratiae tempore consuevit. » Sed baptismus nunc confert gratiam. Ergo circumcision gratiam conferebat, et pari ratione alia sacramenta legalia; quia sicut baptismus est janua sacramentorum novæ legis, ita et circumcision erat janua sacramentorum veteris legis; propter quod et Apostolus dicit Gal., v, 3: Testi Aureolus non admittit quod differentia inter sacramenta veteris et novæ legis assignetur per hoc quod sacramenta novæ legis causant gratiam per virtutem eis inhærentem, alia vero non. Dato quod in circumcisione nulla sit virtus ficor homini circumcidenti se, quoniam debitor est universæ legis faciendæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.sc] He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.sc] Sed contra est quod Gal., iv, 9, dicitur: Convertimini iterum ad infirma et egena elementa; Glossa ordin., col. 579, t. 2, id est, « ad legem, quæ dicitur infirma, quia perfecte non justificat. » Sed gratia perfecte justificat. Ergo sacramenta veteris legis gratiam non conferebant.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.co] With regard to a man who has taken another's property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another's property for his own profit but without committing an injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod non potest dici quod sacramenta veteris legis conferent gratiam justificantem per seipsam, id est, propria virtute; quia sic non fuisset necessaria passio Christi, secundum illud Galat., ii, 24: Si ex lege est justitia, Christus gratis mortuus est. Sed nec potest dici quod ex passione Christi virtutem haberent conferendi gratiam justificandi. Sicut enim ex prædictis patet, virtus passionis Christi copulatur nobis per fidem et sacramenta, differenter tamen; nam continuatio quæ est per fidem, fit per actum animæ; continuatio autem quæ est per sacramenta, fit per usum exteriorum rerum. Nihil autem prohibet id quod est posterius tempore, antequam sit, movere, secundum quod praecedit in actu animæ; sicut finis, qui est posterior tempore, movet agentem, secundum quod est apprehensus et desideratus ab ipso; sed illud quod nondum est in rerum natura, non movet secundum usum exteriorum rerum; unde causa efficiens non potest esse posterior in esse ordine durationis, sicut causa finalis. Sic ergo manifestum est quod a passione Christi, quæ est causa humanæ justificationis, convenienter 4 derivatur virtus justificativa ad sacramenta novæ legis, non autem ad sacramenta veteris legis. Et tamen per fidem passionis Christi justificabantur antiqui patres, sicut et nos. Sacramenta autem veteris legis erant quædam illius fidei protestationes, inquantum significabant passionem Christi et effectus ejus. Sic ergo patet quod sacramenta veteris legis non habebant in se aliquam virtutem qua operarentur ad conferendam gratiam justificantem; sed solum significabant fidem per quam justificabantur.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.1] The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod antiqui patres habebant fidem de passione infusa, in baptismo autem sit virtus infusa, deinde gratia conferatur utrobique in eodem gradu; quid ad me de tali virtute inhærente? 1 Ita cum melioris notæ Mss. editi fere omnes. Al. « consequenter. » Christi futura, quæ secundum quod erat in apprehensione animæ, poterat justificare; sed nos habemus fidem de passione Christi praæcedenti, quæ potest justificare etiam secundum realem usum sacramentalium rerum, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.2] Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to whom he confesses.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illa sanctificatio erat figuralis: per hoc enim sanctificari dicebantur quod applicabantur cultui divino secundum ritum veteris legis, qui totus ordinabatur ad figurandam passionem Christi.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.3] Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them from so doing.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod de circumcisione multiplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod per circumcisionem non conferebatur gratia, sed solum auferebatur peccatum. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia homo non justificatur a peccato nisi per gratiam, secundum illud Rom., III, 24: Justificati gratis per gratiam ipsius. Et ideo alii dixerunt quod per circumcisionem conferebatur gratia quantum ad effectus remotivos culpæ, sed non quantum ad effectus positivos gratiae. Sed hoc etiam videtur esse falsum, quia per circumcisionem dabatur pueris facultas perveniendi ad gloriam, quæ est ultimus effectus positivus gratiae; et praëtera, secundum ordinem causæ formalis, priores sunt naturaliter effectus positivi quam privativi, licet secundum ordinem causæ materialis sit e converso; forma enim non excludit privationem, nisi informando subjectum. Et ideo alii dicunt quod circumcisio conferebat gratiam etiam quantum ad aliquem effectum positivum, qui est facere dignum vitaæterna; non tamen quantum ad hoc quod est reprimere concupiscentiam impellentem ad peccandum, quod et aliquando mihi visum est. Sed diligentius consideranti apparet hoc etiam non esse verum, quia minima gratia potest resistere cuilibet concupiscentiae, et mereri vitam æternam. Et ideo melius dicendum videtur quod circumcisio erat solum signum fidei justificantis. Unde Apostolus dicit Rom., IV, 14, quod Abraham accepit signum circumcisionis, signaculum justitiæ fidei. Et ideo in circumcisione conferebatur gratia, inquantum erat signum passionis Christi futuræ, ut infra patebit.
Article 7
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod illi qui non acceperunt non teneantur restituere. Restitutio enim quædam pœna est accipientis. Sed nullus debet puniri, nisi qui peccavit. Ergo nullus debet restituere, nisi qui acceptit.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.2] Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, justitia non obligat aliquem ad hoc quod rem alterius augeat. Sed si ad restitutionem teneretur non solum ille qui acceptit, sed etiam illi qui qualitercumque cooperantur, augeretur ex hoc res illius cui prudentes adhibere in tali casu, in tali negotio. Levis est omissio diligentiæ quam prudentiores adhibere solent. Levissima est omissio diligentiæ quam prudentissimi adhibent. Nemo, secluso contractu, tenetur ad restitutionem damni illati ante sententiam judicis, nisi in damno inferendo admiserit culpam theologicam contra justitiam commutativam. — Est communis contra Adrianum et quosdam antiquos. Secundum jura tam ecclesiastica quam civilia, si animal absque ulla culpa domini damnum causet, puta sata conculcando, sive hominem occidendo, dominus tenetur ad damnum. Instit., lib. IV, tit. ix, Extra., lib. V, tit. xxxvi, cap. fin. « De injuriis. » Sed hæ leges respiciunt duntaxat forum externum et sunt pœnales. De casu fortuito nemo tenetur: ita Petrus Navarrus, Angles, Azorius, Sylvius et alii. Adrianus et Angelus, volentes obligationem oriri ex qualibet culpa, ad restitutionem obligant hominem ex culpa levi aut levissima.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.3] Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or withstanding a thief.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus tenetur se periculo exponere, ad hoc quod rem alterius salvet. Sed aliquando manifestando latronem, vel ei resistendo, aliquis periculo mortis personæ se exponeret. Non ergo tenetur aliquis ad restitutionem propter hoc quod non manifestat latronem, vel non ei resistit.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.sc] It is written (Romans 1:32): "They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., 1, 32: Digni sunt morte non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Ergo pari ratione etiam consentientes debent restituere.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), a person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Ondirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:
"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."
It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below.
In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ad restitutionem tenetur aliquis, non solum ratione rei alienæ quam acceptit, sed etiam ratione injuriosæ acceptanceis. Et ideo quicumque est causa injustæ acceptanceis tenetur ad restitutionem. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: directe scilicet et indirecte. Directe quidem, quando inducit aliquis alium ad accipiendum, et hoc quidem tripliciter: primo quidem movendo ad ipsam acceptanceem, quod quidem fit præcipiendo, consulendo, consentiendo expresse, et laudando aliquem quasi strenuum de hoc quod aliena accipit; alio modo ex parte ipsius accipientis, quia scilicet eum receptat, vel qualitercumque ei auxilium fert; tertio modo ex parte rei acceptæ, quia scilicet particeps est furti, vel rapinæ, quasi socius maleficii. Indirecte vero, quando aliquis non impedit, cum possit et debeat impedire, vel quia subtrahit præceptum, sive consilium impediens furtum vel rapinam; vel quia subtrahit suum auxilium, quo posset obsistere; vel quia occultat post factum, occultat primo paratum; quæ his versibus comprehenduntur: Jussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus, Participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans. Sciendum tamen quod quinque præmisorum semper obligant ad restitutionem: primo jussio, quia scilicet ille qui jubet est principaliter movens, unde ipse principaliter Sic cod.; edit. omittunt: « personæ. » Sensus est quod resistens latroni se exponeret periculo mortis sive suæ, sive ipsius latronis. — Parm.: tenetur ad restituendum; secundo consensus, in eo scilicet sine quo rapina fieri non potest; tertio recursus, quando scilicet aliquis est receptator latronum, et eis patrocinium præstat; quarto participatio, quando scilicet aliquis participat in crimine latrocinii et in præda; quinto tenetur ille qui non obstat, cum obstare teneatur; sicut principes, qui tenentur custodire justitiam in terra, si per eorum defectum latrones increscant, ad restitutionem tenentur; quia redditus quos habent, sunt quasi stipendia ad hoc instituta, ut justitiam conservent in terra. In aliis autem casibus enumeratis non semper obligatur aliquis ad restituendum: non enim semper consilium vel adulatio, vel aliquid hujusmodi, est efficax causa rapinæ. Unde tunc solum tenetur consiliator, aut palpo, id est, adulator, ad restitutionem, quando probabiliter æstimari potest quod ex hujusmodi causis fuerit injusta acceptio subsecuta.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.1] Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non solum peccat ille qui peccatum exequitur, sed etiam qui quocumque modo peccati est causa, sive consiliando, sive præcipiendo, sive quovis alio modo.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.2] He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the "executor," and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod principaliter tenetur restituere ille qui est principalis in facto; principaliter quidem præcipiens, secundario vero exequens, et consequenter alii per ordinem: uno tamen restituente illi qui passus est damnum, alius eidem restituere non tenetur. Sed illi qui sunt principales in facto, et ad quos res pervenit, tenentur aliis restituere qui restituerunt. Quando autem aliquis præcipit injustam acceptanceem, quæ non subsequitur, non est restitutio facienda; cum restitutio principaliter ordinetur ad reintegrandam rem ejus qui injuste est damnificatus.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.3] He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non semper ille qui non manifestat latronem, tenetur ad restitutionem, aut qui non obstat, vel qui non reprehendit; sed solum quando incumbit alicui ex officio; sicut principibus terræ, quibus ex hoc non multum imminet periculum; propter hoc enim potestate publica potiuntur, ut sint justitiæ custodes.
Article 8
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to immediate restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non teneatur aliquis restituere statim, sed potius licite possit restitutionem differre. Præcepta enim affirmativa non obligant ad semper. Sed necessitas restituendi imminet ex præcepto affirmativo. Ergo non obligatur homo ad statim restituendum.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.2] Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is bound to immediate restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus tenetur ad impossibile. Sed quando aliquis non potest statim restituere. Ergo nullus tenetur ad statim restituendum. Quando contractus est in solam recipientis utilitatem, ut commodatum, recipiens tenetur de damno ex culpa juridica levissima, non tamen ex casu fortuito. Quando contractus cedit in solam utilitatem dantis, ut communiter contingit in deposito, recipiens non tenetur de damno, nisi ex culpa juridica lata. Excipe si teipsum deposito obtulisti, vel si aliquid pro custodia recepisti. « Pacto, culpa vel mora pracedentibus, casus etiam fortuitus imputatur. » II Extra, lib. III, tit. xvī, « De deposito. » Nautæ, caupones et stabularii, ut communiter censent auctores, tenentur ex culpa levissima de damno rerum quorum custodiam, etsi gratis, susceperunt. Quando contractus cedit in utilitatem utriusque contrahentis, quis tenetur ex culpa levi. Hæ leges tam ecclesiasticæ quam civiles viden-tur obligare in foro conscientiae ante sententiam judicis. Ita cum D.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.3] Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore at once.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, restitutio est quidam actus virtutis, scilicet justitiæ. Tempus autem est una de circumstantiis quæ requiruntur ad actus virtutum. Cum ergo aliæ circumstantiae non sint determinatæ in actibus virtu-tum, sed determinabiles secundum rationem prudentiæ, videtur quod nec in restitutione sit tempus determinatum, ut scilicet aliquis teneatur ad statim restituendum.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.sc] All matters of restitution seem to come under one head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay compensation, as appears from Leviticus 19:13, "The wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod eadem ratio esse videtur in omnibus quæ sunt restituenda. Sed ille qui conducit opera mercenarii, non po-test differre restitutionem, ut patet per illud quod habetur Levit., xix, 13: Non morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane. Ergo neque in aliis restitutionibus faciendis potest fieri dilatio, sed statim restituere oportet.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.co] Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Sirach 21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the thing.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut accipere rem alienam est peccatum contra justitiam, domino non furi, licet pretium non sit recuperaturus: sic Cajetanus, Soto, Joannes Medina, Major, Sylvius, perfector Tournely, Daelman, Henno, Ethica amoris et alii communius, et juxta
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.1] Although the precept about the making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to withhold another's property.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præceptum de restitutione facienda quamvis secundum formam sit affirmativum, implicat tamen in se negativum præceptum, quo prohibemur rem alterius detinere.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.2] When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando aliquis non potest statim restituere, ipsa impotentia absolvit eum ab instanti restitutione facienda; sicut etiam totaliter a restitutione absolvitur, si omnino sit impotens; debet tamen remissionem vel dilationem petere ab eo cui debet, aut per se aut per alium.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.3] Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cujuscumque circumstantiæ omissio, quæ contrariatur virtuti, pro determinata est habenda, et oportet illam circumstantiam observare; et quia per dilationem restitutionis committitur peccatum injustæ detentionis quod justitiæ opponitur; ideo necesse est tempus esse determinatum ut statim restitutio fiat.
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