Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q62. Restitution
Source context
- Theme
- obligatory restoration of unjustly taken goods as a condition of justice and rectified social order
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Roman Law (restitutio in integrum)Roman legal doctrine of restitutio in integrum treats restoration of a prior rightful state as the proper remedy for unjust deprivation, providing a jurisprudential analogue to Aquinas's moral-theological grounding of restitution in commutative justice.
- Rabbinic jurisprudence (teshuvah and hashavat avedah)Rabbinic law distinguishes the return of lost or wrongfully held property (hashavat avedah) as a positive commandment structurally parallel to Aquinas's insistence that restitution is a precondition of moral rectification, not merely a counsel.
Q62. Restitution
Article 1
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod restitutio non sit actus justitiæ commutativæ. Justitia enim respicit rationem debiti. Sed sicut donatio potest esse ejus quod non debetur, ita etiam et restitutio. Ergo restitutio non est actus alicujus partis justitiæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.2] Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, illud quod jam transiit, et non est, restitui non potest. Sed justitia et injustitia sunt circa quasdam actiones et passiones, quæ non manent, sed transeunt. Ergo restitutio non videtur esse actus alicujus partis justitiæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.3] Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative than of distributive justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, restitutio est quasi quædam recompensatio ejus quod subtractum est. Sed aliquid potest homini subtrahi non solum in commutatione, sed etiam in distributione, puta cum aliquis distribuens, minus dat alicui quam debeat habere. Ergo restitutio non magis est actus commutativæ justitiæ quam distributivæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.sc] Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.sc] Sed contra, restitutio ablationi oppositur. Sed ablatio rei alienæ est actus injustitia circa commutationes. Ergo restitutio ejus est actus justitiæ, quæ est in commutationibus directiva.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.co] To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod restituere nihil aliud esse videtur quam iterato aliquem statuere in possessionem vel dominium rei suæ; et ita in restitutione attenditur æqualitas justitiæ secundum recompensationem rei ad rem, quæ pertinet ad justitiam commutativam. Et ideo restitutio est actus commutativæ justitiæ, quando scilicet res unius ab alio habetur vel per voluntatem ejus, sicut in mutuo vel depo- Parm. : « quod. » — Parm. : « debetur. » — Parm. omittit : « homo. » — Al. : « sui. » — Al. : « ut quanto minus; » sic in Parm. Restitutio in tota sua latitudine definiri po-test : « Rei acceptæ redditio, vel damni illati compensatio, » intelligendo rem acceptam sive per voluntatem domini ut in mutuo vel deposito, vel contra voluntatem domini in furto vel rapina. Differt restitutio a solutione et satisfactione. Solutio postulat ut res quæ solvitur sit diversa a re pro qua solvitur, et quod nondum fuerit in possessione illius cui solvitur. Satisfactio proprie respicit personam cui fit satis, quamvis non exhibat æquivalens debito. Respicit injuriam illatam seu honorem violatum, etsi nullum aliud damnum sit illatum.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.1] That which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not restitution properly so called.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud quod alteri non debetur, non est, proprie loquendo, ejus, etsi aliquando ejus fuerit; et ideo magis videtur esse nova donatio, quam restitutio, cum quis alteri reddit quod ei non debet. Habet tamen aliquam similitudinem restitutionis, quia res materialiter eadem est; non tamen est eadem secundum formalem rationem, quam respicit justitia, quod est esse suum alicujus. Unde nec proprie restitutio dicitur.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.2] In so far as the word restitution denotes something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nomen restitutionis, inquantum importat iterationem quamdam, supponit rei identitatem. Et ideo secundum primam impositionem nominis, restitutio videtur locum habere præcipue in rebus exterioribus, quæ manentes eædem et secundum substantiam, et secundum jus dominii, ab uno possunt ad alium devenire. Sed sicut ab hujusmodi rebus nomen communicationis translatum est ad actiones vel passiones quæ pertinent ad reverentiam vel injuriam alicujus personæ, seu nocumentum vel profectum; ita etiam nomen restitutionis derivatur ad hæc, quæ licet realiter non maneant, tamen manent in effectu vel corporali, puta cum ex percussione læditur corpus, vel qui est in opinione hominum, sicut cum aliquis verbo opprobrioso remanet homo infamatus, vel etiam minoratus in suo honore.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.3] Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod recompensatio quam facit distribuens ei cui dedit minus quam debuit, fit per comparisonem rei ad rem, ut si quanto minus habuit quam debuit, tanto plus ei detur; et ideo jam pertinet ad justitiam commutativam.
Article 2
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation.
But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non sit necessarium ad salutem quod fiat restitutio ejus quod ablatum est. Quod enim est impossibile non est de necessitate salutis. Sed aliquando impossibile est restituere id quod est ablatum; puta cum aliquis abstulit alicui membrum vel vitam. Ergo non videtur esse de necessitate salutis quod aliquis restituat quod alteri abstulit.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.2] Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, committere aliquod peccatum non est de necessitate salutis, quia sic homo esset perplexus. Sed quandoque illud quod aufertur, non potest restitui sine peccato, puta cum aliquis alicui famam abstulit verum dicendo. Ergo restituere ablatum non est de necessitate salutis.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.3] Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, quod factum est, non potest fieri ut factum non fuerit. Sed aliquando alicui aufertur honor suæ personæ ex hoc ipso quod passus est ab aliquo injuste vituperante eum. Ergo non potest ei restitui quod ablatum est; et ita non est de necessitate salutis restituere ablatum.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.4] Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.arg.4] 4. Præterea, ille qui impedit aliquem ab aliquo bono consequendo, videtur illud ei auferre, quia « quod modicum deest, quasi nibil deesse videtur, » ut Philosophus dicit in II Physic., text. 56. Sed cum aliquis impedit aliquem ut non consequatur præbendam, vel aliquid hujusmodi, non videtur quod tenatur ei ad restitutionem præbendæ: quia quandoque non posset. Non ergo restituere ablatum, est de necessitate salutis.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.sc] Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."
[II-II.q.62.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in Epist. clii ad Macedonium, § 20, col. 662, t. 2: « Non remittitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.co] Restitution as stated above (Article 1) is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod restitutio, sicut dictum est, est actus justitiæ commutativæ, quæ in quadam æqualitate consistit. Et ideo restituere importat redditionem illius rei quæ injuste ablata est; sic enim per iteram ejus exhibitionem æqualitas reparatur. Si vero juste ablatum sit, inæqualitas erit si ei restituatur, quia justitia in æqualitate consistit. Cum ergo servare justitiam sit de necessitate salutis, consequens est quod restituere id quod injuste ablatum est alicui, sit de necessitate salutis.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.1] When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in quibus non potest recompensari æquivalens, sufficit quod ibi recompensetur quod possibile est, sicut patet de honoribus qui sunt ad Deum et ad parentes, ut Philosophus dicit in VIII Ethic., cap. ult., ad fin. Et ideo quando id quod est ablatum, non est restituibile per aliquid æqualale, debet fieri recompensatio qualis possibilis est: puta cum aliquis alicui abstulit membrum, debet ei recompensare vel in pecunia vel in aliquo honore, considerata conditione utriusque personæ secundum arbitrium boni viri.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.2] There are three ways in which one may take away another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above (ad 1).
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquis potest alicui famam tripliciter auferre: uno modo verum dicendo et juste, puta cum aliquis crimen alicujus prodit ordine debito servato, et tunc non tenetur ad restitutionem famæ; alio modo falsum dicendo et injuste, et tunc tenetur restituere famam, confitendo se falsum dixisse; tertio modo verum dicendo, sed injuste, puta cum aliquis prodit crimen alterius contra ordinem debitum, et tunc tenetur ad restitutionem famæ, quantum potest, sine mendacio tamen, utpote quod dicat se male dixisse, vel quod injuste eum diffamaverit; vel si non possit famam restituere, debet ei aliter recompensare, sicut et in aliis dictum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.3] The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of other men.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod actio contumeliam inferentis non potest fieri ut non fuerit: potest tamen fieri ut ejus effectus, scilicet diminutio dignitatis personæ in opinione hominum, reparetur per exhibitionem reverentiæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.4] There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.
[II-II.q.62.a.2.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquis potest impedire aliquem ne habeat præbendam, multipliciter: uno modo juste, puta si intendens honorem Dei vel utilitatem Ecclesiæ, procuret quod detur alicui personæ digniori, et tunc nullo modo tenetur ad restitutionem, vel ad aliquam recompensationem faciendam; alio modo injuste: puta si intendat ejus nocumentum quem impedit propter odium vel vindictam, aut aliquid restitui potest. Habetur Causa XIV, q. vi, cap. 1, col. 966. Edit. addiderunt: « Si res aliena, propter quam peccatum est, reddi possit, et non redditur, pœni-tentia non agitur, sed simulatur. Si autem veraciter agitur, » non remittitur... ablatum, si, ut dixi, hujusmodi; et tunc si impedit ne præbenda detur digno, consulens quod non detur, antequam sit firmatum quod ei detur, tenetur quidem ad aliquam recompensationem, pensatis conditionibus personarum et negotii secundum arbitrium sapientis; non tamen tenetur ad æquale, quia illam nondum fuerat adeptus, et poterat multipliciter impediri. Si vero jam firmatum sit quod alicui detur præbenda, et aliquis propter indebitam causam procuret quod revocetur, idem est ac si jam habitam ei auferret, et ideo tenetur ad restitutionem æqualis, tamen secundum suam facultatem.
Article 3
[II-II.q.62.a.3.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount taken. For it is written (Exodus 22:1): "If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Now everyone is bound to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound to restore four- or fivefold.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sufficiat restituere simplum quod injuste ablatum est. Dicitur enim Exod., xxii, 1: Si quis furatus fuerit bovem aut ovem, et occiderit vel vendiderit, quinque boves pro uno bove restituet, et quatuor oves pro una ove. Sed quilibet tenetur mandata divinæ legis observare. Ergo ille qui furatur, tenetur restituere quadruplum vel quintuplum.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, "What things soever were written, were written for our learning" (Romans 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Luke 19:8) to our Lord: "If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold." Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he has taken unjustly.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ea* quæ scripta sunt, ad Restitutio in re, ubi possibilis est, sin minus in voto necessaria est ad salutem. Qua autem necessitate? Respondetur necessitate præcepti, non medii. Quidam Græci olim negaverunt restitutionis necessitatem ad salutem. Similiter Erasmus, qui in quinta suorum Operum editione sententiam mutavit. Objicies Christum, Luc., xi, non præcepisse Pharisæis restituere, quos tamen rapinæ arguebat. Consequentiam Sylvius negat, quia non omnia necessaria ad salutem omnibus in locis dicuntur, sed quædam in uno loco, quædam in alio. Christus igitur promittit salutem eleemosynæ, modo cætera adsint. Rachel furata est idola patris sui; David, cum adhuc esset privatus, abstulit boves et oves in Gessur et Gersi, omnia bona Miphiboseth dedit Sibæ: nec restituerunt. Miphiboseth tantum medium partem bonorum suorum David restituere fecit, cognita perfidia et injustitia Sibæ. Generaliter fatendum est non omnia gesta sanctorum esse sancta, nec omnia eorum pœnitentiæ opera esse scripta. Specialiter de Rachele,furtum perpetravit juxta quosdam; secundum alios jure compensationis excusatur, quia dote sua fraudaverat eam pater nostram doctrinam scripta sunt, ut dicitur ad Roim., xv, 4. Sed Lucæ, xix, 8, Zachæus dixit ad Dominum: Si quem defraudavi, reddo quadruplum. Ergo homo debet restituere multiplicatum id quod injuste acceptit.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, no one can be justly deprived of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nulli potest juste auferri id quod dare non debet. Sed judex juste aufert ab eo qui furatus est, plus quam furatus est pro emenda. Ergo homo debet illud solvere, et ita non sufficit reddere simplum.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.sc] On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more than the exact amount taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod restitutio reducit ad equalitatem quod inæqualiter ablatum est. Sed aliquis reddendo quod acceptit simplum. reducit ad æqualitatem. Ergo solum tenetur restituere tantum quantum acceptit. Respondeo dicèndum, quod cum aliquis injuste accipit rem alienam, duo sunt ibi consideranda: quorum unum est inæqualitas ex parte rei, quæ quandoque est sine injustitia, ut patet in mutuis; aliud autem est injustitiae culpa, quæ potest esse etiam cum æqualitate rei, puta cum aliquis intendit inferre violentiam, sed non prævalet. Quantum ergo ad primum, adhibetur remedium per restitutionem, inquantum per eam æqualitas reparatur; ad quod sufficit quod restituat tantum quantum habuerit de alieno. Sed quantum ad culpam adhibetur remedium per pœnam, cujus inflictio pertinet ad judicem; et ideo antequam sit condemnatus per judicem, non tenetur restituere plus quam acceptit; sed postquam condemnatus est tenetur pœnam solvere. ejus Laban. De David et spoliis Gessur et Gersi, David non erat privatus, sed princeps militiae a Saule constitutus, nec revocatus; mandaverat præterea Deus non solum spoliare, sed et occidere illas gentes. De David et Miphiboseth, Cajetanus et plerique commentatores agnosunt Davidem graviter pecasse tum adjudicando Sibæ omnia bona Miphiboseth, parte inaudita, tum huic reddendo medium partem tantum, agnita ejus innocentia. Quoad restitutionem, vel Miphiboseth medietatis suorum bonorum distractioni consensit, vel David præcedentem revocavit sententiam, vel alias Miphiboseth possessiones dedit. Corrigendus est error vulgi putantis animas defunctorum tamdiu in purgatorio torqueri, quamdiu restitutio ad quam tenebantur non mandatur executioni. In purgatorio expiantur peccata propria, non aliena. Possunt tamen hæredes restituendo citius animam defuncti liberare, inquantum restitutio est actio meritoria, et adeo impetratoria liberationis; et ideo forte cap. v « De raptoribus » monentur hæredes incendiarii condigne pro incendio satisfacere, ut liberetur incendiarius. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum; quia lex illa determinativa est pœnæ per judicem infligendæ'; cum ad observantiam judicialis præcepti nullus tenatur post Christi adventum, ut supra habitum est. Potest tamen idem vel simile statui in lege humana, de qua erit eadem ratio.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.co] I answer that, When a man takes another's thing unjustly, two things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence but fails.
As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.
Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above (I-II, 104, 3). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, and then the same answer would apply.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.ad.2] Reply to Objection 2. Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was bound to do; hence he had said already: "Behold . . . the half of my goods I give to the poor."
[II-II.q.62.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Zachæus id dixit, quasi supererogare volens; unde et præmiserat: Ecce dimidium bonorum meorum do pauperibus.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.
[II-II.q.62.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod judex condemnando juste potest accipere aliquid amplius loco emendæ, quod tamen, antequam condemnaretur, non debebatur.
Article 4
[II-II.q.62.a.4.arg.1] Objection 1. It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man's seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod aliquis debeat restituere quod non abstulit. Ille enim qui damnum infert alicui, tenetur damnum removere. Sed quando aliquis damnificat aliquem ultra id quod acceptit: puta cum aliquis effodit semina, damnificat eum qui seminavit in tota messe futura; et sic videtur quod teneatur ad ejus restitutionem. Ergo aliquis tenetur ad restitutionem ejus quod non abstulit.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.arg.2] Objection 2. Further, he who retains his creditor's money beyond the stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not take.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille qui detinet pecuniam creditoris ultra terminum præfixum, videtur eum damnificare in toto eo quod lucrari de pecunia posset, quod tamen ipse non aufert. Ergo videtur quod aliquis teneatur restituere quod non abstulit.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.arg.3] Objection 3. Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him, according to Matthew 25:26, "Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where I have not strewed." Therefore it is just that one should restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, justitia humana derivatur a justitia divina. Sed Deo debeat aliquis restituere plus quam acceptit ab eo, secundum illud Matth., xxv, 26: Sciebas quod meto* ubi non semino, et congrego ubi non sparsi. 1 Garcia inutiliter supplevit: «Et etiam illud præceptum nunc non est observandum.» Nam sensus cod. est apertus: «Lex illa (Exodi) determinativa est pœnæ per judicem infligendæ», in alio tempore, non hodie, «cum ad observantiam.» Parm. sequitur Garcia. Si quis aliquem damnificat sine peccato non tenetur ad restitutionem ante sententiam judicis; — si cum peccato veniali, theologi scinduntur; alii dicunt: tenetur, non explicantes an sub gravi, Ergo justum est ut etiam restituat homini aliquid quod non acceptit.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.sc] On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make such a restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod recompensatio ad justitiam pertinet, inquantum aequalitatem facit. Sed si aliquis restitueret quod non acceptit, hoc non esset aequalale. Ergo talis restitutio non est justum quod fiat.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.co] I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having "less"* than his due. [The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin, where 'damnum' stands for 'loss,' and 'minus' for 'less.' Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is called 'gain,' and to have less than you started with is called 'loss.'] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon another.
Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some compensation, according to the condition of persons and things.
From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not actually but only virtually. On like manner he that has money has the profit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quicumque damnificat aliquem, videtur ei auferre id in quo ipsum damnificat; damnum enim dicitur ex eo quod aliquis minus habet quam debet habere, secundum Philosophum, in V Ethic., cap. iv, ante med. Et ideo homo tenetur ad restitutionem ejus in quo aliquem damnificavit. Sed aliquis damnificatur dupliciter: uno modo quia aufertur ei id quod actu habebat; et tale damnum est semper restituenum secundum recompensationem aequalis: puta si aliquis damnificet aliquem diruens domum ejus tenetur ad tantum quantum valet domus. Alio modo si damnificet aliquem, impediendo ne adipiscatur quod erat in via habendi; et tale damnum non oportet recompensare ex aequo, quia minus est habere aliquid virtute quam habere actu; qui autem est in via adipiscendi aliquid, habet illud solum secundum virtutem vel potentiam, et ideo si redderetur ei ut haberet hoc in actu, restitueretur ei quod est ablatum, non simplum, sed multiplicatum; quod non est de necessitate restitutionis, ut dictum est. Tenetur tamen aliquam recompensationem facere secundum conditionem personarum et negotiorum. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum et secundum: nam ille qui semen sparsit in agro, nondum habet messem in actu, sed solum in virtute: et similiter ille qui habet pecuniam, nondum habet lucrum in actu, sed solum in virtute; et utrumque potest multipliciter impediri.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.ad.3] Reply to Objection 3. God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although the gifts themselves are from God without us.
[II-II.q.62.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Deus nihil requirit ab homine nisi bonum quod ipse in nobis seminavit. Et ideo verbum illud vel intelligitur secundum pravam existimatio- ut Vasquez; alii dicunt: tenetur pro ratione culpæ, ut Layman, Soto, etc.; alii dicunt: non tenetur, ut Lessius, Lugo, etc. — Et hac occasione S. Ligorius vocat Lugo inter theologos alios post S. Thomam facile principem. Non erat hic locus. Multo melius etenim ratiocinatur Billuart, dicens imperfectionem peccati non tollere omnem ratio-nem injustitiæ, nec consequenter omnem obligationem restituendi, quæ ex justitia tanquam ex radice oritur. nem servi pigri, qui existimavit se ab alio non accepisse; vel intelligitur quantum ad hoc quod Deus requirit a nobis fructus donorum, qui sunt et ab eo, et a nobis; quam vis ipsa dona a Deo sint sine nobis.
Article 5
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.1] It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.1] Ad quintum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod non oporteat semper restitutionem facere ei a quo acceptum est aliquid. Nulli enim debemus nocere. Sed aliquando esset in nocumentum hominis, si redderetur quod ab eo acceptum est, vel etiam in nocumentum aliorum; puta si aliquis gladium depositum redderet furioso. Ergo non semper est restituendum ei a quo acceptum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.2] Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ille qui illicite aliquid dedit, non meretur illud recuperare. Sed quandoque aliquis illicite dat, quod alius etiam illicite accipit; sicut apparet in dante et recipiente aliquid simoniace. Ergo non semper restituendum est ei a quo acceptum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.3] Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus tenetur ad impossibile. Sed quandoque est impossibile restituere ei a quo acceptum est, vel quia est mortuus, vel quia nimis distat, vel quia est ignotus. Ergo non semper facienda est restitutio ei a quo acceptum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.4] Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.4] 4. Præterea, magis debet homo recompensare ei a quo majus beneficium acceptit. Sed ab aliis personis homo plus acceptit beneficii quam ab illo qui mutuavit, vel deposuit, sicut a parentibus. Ergo magis subveniendum est quandoque alicui personæ alteri quam restituendum ei a quo acceptum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.5] Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something has been taken away
[II-II.q.62.a.5.arg.5] 5. Præterea, vanum est restituere illud quod ad manum restituentis per restitutionem pervenit. Sed si prælatus injuste aliquid Ecclesiæ subtraxit et ei restituat, ad manus ejus deveniet: quia ipse est rerum Ecclesiæ conservator. Ergo non debet restituere Ecclesiæ a qua abstulit; et sic non semper restituendum est ei a quo est abla-tum.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.sc] It is written (Romans 13:7): "Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom."
[II-II.q.62.a.5.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., xii, 7: Reddite omnibus debita; cui tributum, tributum; cui vectigal, vectigal.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.co] Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above (2; 58, 10). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod per restitutionem fit reductio ad aequalitatem commutativæ justitiæ, quæ consistit in rerum adæquatione, sicut dictum est. Hujusmodi autem rerum adæquatio fieri non posset, nisi ei qui minus habet quam quod suum est, suppleretur quod deest. Et ad hanc suppletionem faciendam necesse est ut ei fiat restitutio a quo acceptum est.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.1] When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando res restituenda apparet esse graviter nociva ei cui restitutio facienda est, vel alteri, non ei debet tunc restitui, quia restitutio ordinatur ad utilitatem ejus cui restituitur; omnia enim quæ possidentur, sub ratione utilis cadunt. Nec tamen debet ille qui detinet rem alienam, sibi appropriare, sed vel reservare, ut congruo tempore restituatur, vel etiam alibi tradere tutius conservandam.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.2] A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod aliquis dupliciter aliquid dat illicite: uno modo quia ipsa datio est illicita, et contra legem, sicut patet in eo qui simoniace aliquid dedit; et talis meretur amittere quod dedit; unde non debet ei restitutio fieri de his: et quia etiam ille qui acceptit, contra legem acceptit, non debet sibi retinere, sed debet in pios usus convertere. Alio modo aliquis illicite dat, quia propter rem illicitam dat, licet ipsa datio non sit illicita; sicut cum quis dat meretrici propter fornicationem; unde et mulier potest sibi retinere quod ei datum est; sed si superflue aliquid per fraudem vel dolum extorsisset, tenetur eidem restituere.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.3] If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod si ille cui debet fieri restitutio, sit omnino ignotus, debet homo restituere secundum quod po-test, scilicet dando in eleemosynas pro salute ipsius, sive sit mortuus, sive sit vivus, præmissa tamen diligenti inquisitione de persona ejus cui est restitutio facienda. Si vero sit mortuus ille cui est restitutio facienda, debet restitui heredi ejus, qui computatur quasi una persona cum ipso. Si vero ille sit multum distans, debet sibi transmitti quod ei debetur, et præcipue si sit res magni valoris, et possit commode transmitti: alio-quin debet in aliquo loco tuto deponi, ut pro eo conservetur, et domino significari.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.4] A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succor a parent.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod aliquis de hoc quod est sibi proprium debet magis satisfacere parentibus vel his a quibus acceptit majora beneficia; non autem debet ali- quis recompensare benefactori de alieno; quod contingeret si quod debet uni, alteri restitueret; nisi forte in casu extremæ necessitatis, in quo posset et deberet aliquis etiam auferre aliena, ut patri subveniret.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.5] There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. On such a case it is clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention.
[II-II.q.62.a.5.ad.5] Ad quintum dicendum, quod prælatus potest rem Ecclesiæ surripere tripliciter : uno modo si rem Ecclesiæ non sibi deputatam sed alteri, sibi usurparet; puta si episcopus usurparet sibi rem capituli et tunc planum est quod debet restituere ponendo in manus eorum ad quos de jure pertinet; alio modo si rem Ecclesiæ suæ custodia deputatam in alterius dominium transferat, puta consanguinei vel amici, et tunc debet restituere Ecclesiæ, et sub sua cura habere, ut ad successorem perveniat; tertio modo potest prælatus surripere rem Ecclesiæ solo animo, dum scilicet incipit habere animum possidendi eam ut suam, et non nomine Ecclesiæ; et tunc debet restituere, talem animum deponendo.
Article 6
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.1] It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the person that took it, but by the one that has it.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.1] Ad sextum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non teneatur semper restituere ille qui acceptit. Per restitutionem enim reparatur aqualitas justitiæ, quæ consistit in hoc quod subtrahatur ei qui plus habet, et detur ei qui minus habet. Sed contingit quando quod ille qui rem aliquam subtrahit alicui, non habet eam, sed devenit ad manus alterius. Ergo non tenetur ille restituere qui acceptit, sed alius qui rem habet.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.2] Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus tenetur crimen suum detegere. Sed aliquando aliquis restitutionem faciendo, crimen suum detegit, ut patet in furto. Ergo non semper tenetur ille qui abstulit restituere.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.3] Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ejusdem rei non est multoties restitutio facienda. Sed quandoque multi simul rem aliquam surripiunt, et unus eorum eam integre restituit. Ergo non semper ille qui acceptit tenetur ad restituendum.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.sc] He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.sc] Sed contra, ille qui peccavit tenetur satisfacere. Sed restitutio ad satisfactionem pertinet. Ergo ille qui abstulit tenetur restituere.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.co] With regard to a man who has taken another's property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another's property for his own profit but without committing an injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa illum qui rem alienam acceptit, duo sunt consideranda : scilicet ipsa res accepta et ipsa acceptio. Ratione autem rei tenetur eam restituere, quamdiu eam apud se habet, quia quod habet ultra id quod suum est, debet ei subtrahi, et dari ei cui deest, secundum formam commutativæ justitiæ. Sed ipsa acceptio rei alienæ potest tripliciter se habere : quandoque enim est injuriosa, scilicet contra voluntatem existens ejus qui est rei dominus, ut patet in furto et rapina, et tunc tenetur ad restitutionem non solum ratione rei, sed etiam ratione injuriosæ actionis, etiamsi res apud ipsum non remaneat. Sicut enim qui percutit aliquem, tenetur recompensare injuriam passo, quamvis apud ipsum nihil maneat; ita etiam qui furatur, vel rapit, tenetur ad recompensationem damni illati, etiamsi nihil inde habeat; et ulterius pro injuria illata debet puniri. Alio modo aliquis accipit rem alterius in utilitatem suam absque injuria, cum voluntate scilicet ejus cujus est res, sicut patet in mutuis; et tunc ille qui acceptit tenetur ad restitutionem ejus quod acceptit, non solum ratione rei, sed etiam ratione acceptionis, etiamsi rem amiserit; tenetur enim recompensare ei qui gratiam fecit; quod non fiet, si per hoc damnum incurrat. Tertio modo aliquis accipit rem alterius absque injuria, non pro sua utilitate, sicut patet in depositis; et ideo ille qui sic acceptit in nullo tenetur ratione acceptionis; quinimo accipiendo impendit obsequium; tenetur autem ratione rei. Et propter hoc si ei subtrahatur res absque sua culpa, non tenetur ad restitutionem; secus autem esset, si cum magna sua culpa rem depositam amitteret.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.1] The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod restitutio non ordinatur principaliter ad hoc quod ille qui plus habet quam debet, habere desinat; sed ad hoc quod illi qui minus habet, suppleatur. Unde in his rebus quas unus potest ab alio accipere sine ejus detrimento, non habet locum restitutio; puta cum aliquis accipit lumen a candela alterius. Et ideo quamvis ille qui abstulit non habeat id quod acceptit, sed in alium sit transla- Ita mss.; editi quidam: « fieret. » Ita mss. et editi veteres, ubi « quæ » tantum III. tum; quia tamen alter privatur re sua, tenetur ei ad restitutionem et ille qui rem abstulit ratione injuriosæ actionis, et ille qui rem habet, ratione ipsius rei.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.2] Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to whom he confesses.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod homo, etsi non teneatur crimen suum detegere hominibus, tenetur tamen crimen suum detegere Deo in confessione; et ita per sacerdotem cui confitetur, potest restitutionem facere rei alienæ.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.3] Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them from so doing.
[II-II.q.62.a.6.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia restitutio principaliter ordinatur ad removendum damnum ejus a quo est aliquid injuste ablatum, ideo postquam ei restitutio sufficiens facta est per unum, alli non tenentur ei ulterius restituere, sed magis refusionem facere ei qui restituit; qui tamen potest condonare.
Article 7
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.1] It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.1] Ad septimum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod illi qui non acceperunt non teneantur restituere. Restitutio enim quædam pœna est accipientis. Sed nullus debet puniri, nisi qui peccavit. Ergo nullus debet restituere, nisi qui acceptit.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.2] Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.2] 2. Præterea, justitia non obligat aliquem ad hoc quod rem alterius augeat. Sed si ad restitutionem teneretur non solum ille qui acceptit, sed etiam illi qui qualitercumque cooperantur, augeretur ex hoc res illius cui prudentes adhibere in tali casu, in tali negotio. Levis est omissio diligentiæ quam prudentiores adhibere solent. Levissima est omissio diligentiæ quam prudentissimi adhibent. Nemo, secluso contractu, tenetur ad restitutionem damni illati ante sententiam judicis, nisi in damno inferendo admiserit culpam theologicam contra justitiam commutativam. — Est communis contra Adrianum et quosdam antiquos. Secundum jura tam ecclesiastica quam civilia, si animal absque ulla culpa domini damnum causet, puta sata conculcando, sive hominem occidendo, dominus tenetur ad damnum. Instit., lib. IV, tit. ix, Extra., lib. V, tit. xxxvi, cap. fin. « De injuriis. » Sed hæ leges respiciunt duntaxat forum externum et sunt pœnales. De casu fortuito nemo tenetur: ita Petrus Navarrus, Angles, Azorius, Sylvius et alii. Adrianus et Angelus, volentes obligationem oriri ex qualibet culpa, ad restitutionem obligant hominem ex culpa levi aut levissima.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.3] Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or withstanding a thief.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus tenetur se periculo exponere, ad hoc quod rem alterius salvet. Sed aliquando manifestando latronem, vel ei resistendo, aliquis periculo mortis personæ se exponeret. Non ergo tenetur aliquis ad restitutionem propter hoc quod non manifestat latronem, vel non ei resistit.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.sc] It is written (Romans 1:32): "They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them." Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom., 1, 32: Digni sunt morte non solum qui faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt facientibus. Ergo pari ratione etiam consentientes debent restituere.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.co] As stated above (Article 6), a person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Ondirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:
"By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing."
It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below.
In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ad restitutionem tenetur aliquis, non solum ratione rei alienæ quam acceptit, sed etiam ratione injuriosæ acceptanceis. Et ideo quicumque est causa injustæ acceptanceis tenetur ad restitutionem. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: directe scilicet et indirecte. Directe quidem, quando inducit aliquis alium ad accipiendum, et hoc quidem tripliciter: primo quidem movendo ad ipsam acceptanceem, quod quidem fit præcipiendo, consulendo, consentiendo expresse, et laudando aliquem quasi strenuum de hoc quod aliena accipit; alio modo ex parte ipsius accipientis, quia scilicet eum receptat, vel qualitercumque ei auxilium fert; tertio modo ex parte rei acceptæ, quia scilicet particeps est furti, vel rapinæ, quasi socius maleficii. Indirecte vero, quando aliquis non impedit, cum possit et debeat impedire, vel quia subtrahit præceptum, sive consilium impediens furtum vel rapinam; vel quia subtrahit suum auxilium, quo posset obsistere; vel quia occultat post factum, occultat primo paratum; quæ his versibus comprehenduntur: Jussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus, Participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans. Sciendum tamen quod quinque præmisorum semper obligant ad restitutionem: primo jussio, quia scilicet ille qui jubet est principaliter movens, unde ipse principaliter Sic cod.; edit. omittunt: « personæ. » Sensus est quod resistens latroni se exponeret periculo mortis sive suæ, sive ipsius latronis. — Edit. addunt: « modo, ex parte acceptanceis. » — Parm. : tenetur ad restituendum; secundo consensus, in eo scilicet sine quo rapina fieri non potest; tertio recursus, quando scilicet aliquis est receptator latronum, et eis patrocinium præstat; quarto participatio, quando scilicet aliquis participat in crimine latrocinii et in præda; quinto tenetur ille qui non obstat, cum obstare teneatur; sicut principes, qui tenentur custodire justitiam in terra, si per eorum defectum latrones increscant, ad restitutionem tenentur; quia redditus quos habent, sunt quasi stipendia ad hoc instituta, ut justitiam conservent in terra. In aliis autem casibus enumeratis non semper obligatur aliquis ad restituendum: non enim semper consilium vel adulatio, vel aliquid hujusmodi, est efficax causa rapinæ. Unde tunc solum tenetur consiliator, aut palpo, id est, adulator, ad restitutionem, quando probabiliter æstimari potest quod ex hujusmodi causis fuerit injusta acceptio subsecuta.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.1] Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod non solum peccat ille qui peccatum exequitur, sed etiam qui quocumque modo peccati est causa, sive consiliando, sive præcipiendo, sive quovis alio modo.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.2] He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the "commander"; secondly, the "executor," and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod principaliter tenetur restituere ille qui est principalis in facto; principaliter quidem præcipiens, secundario vero exequens, et consequenter alii per ordinem: uno tamen restituente illi qui passus est damnum, alius eidem restituere non tenetur. Sed illi qui sunt principales in facto, et ad quos res pervenit, tenentur aliis restituere qui restituerunt. Quando autem aliquis præcipit injustam acceptanceem, quæ non subsequitur, non est restitutio facienda; cum restitutio principaliter ordinetur ad reintegrandam rem ejus qui injuste est damnificatus.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.3] He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.
[II-II.q.62.a.7.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod non semper ille qui non manifestat latronem, tenetur ad restitutionem, aut qui non obstat, vel qui non reprehendit; sed solum quando incumbit alicui ex officio; sicut principibus terræ, quibus ex hoc non multum imminet periculum; propter hoc enim potestate publica potiuntur, ut sint justitiæ custodes.
Article 8
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.1] It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to immediate restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.1] Ad octavum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non teneatur aliquis restituere statim, sed potius licite possit restitutionem differre. Præcepta enim affirmativa non obligant ad semper. Sed necessitas restituendi imminet ex præcepto affirmativo. Ergo non obligatur homo ad statim restituendum.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.2] Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is bound to immediate restitution.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.2] 2. Præterea, nullus tenetur ad impossibile. Sed quando aliquis non potest statim restituere. Ergo nullus tenetur ad statim restituendum. Quando contractus est in solam recipientis utilitatem, ut commodatum, recipiens tenetur de damno ex culpa juridica levissima, non tamen ex casu fortuito. Quando contractus cedit in solam utilitatem dantis, ut communiter contingit in deposito, recipiens non tenetur de damno, nisi ex culpa juridica lata. Excipe si teipsum deposito obtulisti, vel si aliquid pro custodia recepisti. « Pacto, culpa vel mora pracedentibus, casus etiam fortuitus imputatur. » II Extra, lib. III, tit. xvī, « De deposito. » Nautæ, caupones et stabularii, ut communiter censent auctores, tenentur ex culpa levissima de damno rerum quorum custodiam, etsi gratis, susceperunt. Quando contractus cedit in utilitatem utriusque contrahentis, quis tenetur ex culpa levi. Hæ leges tam ecclesiasticæ quam civiles viden-tur obligare in foro conscientiae ante sententiam judicis. Ita cum D.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.3] Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore at once.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.arg.3] 3. Præterea, restitutio est quidam actus virtutis, scilicet justitiæ. Tempus autem est una de circumstantiis quæ requiruntur ad actus virtutum. Cum ergo aliæ circumstantiae non sint determinatæ in actibus virtu-tum, sed determinabiles secundum rationem prudentiæ, videtur quod nec in restitutione sit tempus determinatum, ut scilicet aliquis teneatur ad statim restituendum.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.sc] All matters of restitution seem to come under one head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay compensation, as appears from Leviticus 19:13, "The wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.sc] Sed contra est quod eadem ratio esse videtur in omnibus quæ sunt restituenda. Sed ille qui conducit opera mercenarii, non po-test differre restitutionem, ut patet per illud quod habetur Levit., xix, 13: Non morabitur opus mercenarii tui apud te usque mane. Ergo neque in aliis restitutionibus faciendis potest fieri dilatio, sed statim restituere oportet.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.co] Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Sirach 21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the thing.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut accipere rem alienam est peccatum contra justitiam, domino non furi, licet pretium non sit recuperaturus: sic Cajetanus, Soto, Joannes Medina, Major, Sylvius, perfector Tournely, Daelman, Henno, Ethica amoris et alii communius, et juxta
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.1] Although the precept about the making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to withhold another's property.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod præceptum de restitutione facienda quamvis secundum formam sit affirmativum, implicat tamen in se negativum præceptum, quo prohibemur rem alterius detinere.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.2] When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod quando aliquis non potest statim restituere, ipsa impotentia absolvit eum ab instanti restitutione facienda; sicut etiam totaliter a restitutione absolvitur, si omnino sit impotens; debet tamen remissionem vel dilationem petere ab eo cui debet, aut per se aut per alium.
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.3] Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.62.a.8.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cujuscumque circumstantiæ omissio, quæ contrariatur virtuti, pro determinata est habenda, et oportet illam circumstantiam observare; et quia per dilationem restitutionis committitur peccatum injustæ detentionis quod justitiæ opponitur; ideo necesse est tempus esse determinatum ut statim restitutio fiat.
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