Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q69. Sins committed against justice: of the part of the defendant
Source context
- Theme
- Sins against justice committed by the defendant: lying, false witness, and contumacious conduct in legal proceedings
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Roman law / ius civileRoman procedural law recognised contumacia (contempt of court) and falsum (false testimony) as distinct offences against the administration of justice, providing the legal-historical background for Aquinas's distinctions in this question.
- Hebrew legal tradition (Exodus 20:16; Deuteronomy 19:16–21)The Mosaic prohibition on false witness and the penalty prescribed for the lying witness (measure-for-measure punishment) constitute a cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's treatment of the defendant's obligation to truthful self-presentation before a tribunal.
Q69. Sins committed against justice: of the part of the defendant
Article 1
[II-II.q.69.a.1.arg.1] It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one's condemnation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): "I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others." Now if the accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod absque peccato mortali possit accusatus veritatem negare, per quam condemnaretur. Dicit enim Chrysostomus, Hom. xxxi super Epist. ad Hebr., a med.: « Non tibi dico ut te prodas in publicum neque apud alium accuses. » Sed si veritatem confiteretur in judicio accusatus, seipsum proderet et accusaret. Non ergo tenetur veritatem dicere; et ita non peccat mortaliter, si in judicio mentiatur. 2. Praeterea, sicut mendacium officiosum est quando aliquis mentitur, ut alium a morte liberet; ita mendacium officiosum esse videtur quando aliquis mentitur, ut se liberet a morte: quia plus sibi tenetur quam alteri. Mendacium autem officiosum non ponitur esse peccatum mortale, sed veniale. Ergo si accusatus veritatem in judicio neget, ut se a morte liberet, non peccat mortaliter,
[II-II.q.69.a.1.arg.2] Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does not sin mortally.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.arg.3] Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above (Question 24, Article 12). But that the accused lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, omne peccatum mortale est contra charitatem, ut supra dictum est. Sed quod accusatus mentiatur, excusando se a peccato sibi imposito, non contrariatur charitati, neque quantum ad dilectionem Dei, neque quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Ergo hujusmodi mendacium non est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.sc] Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to "do all to the glory of God" (1 Corinthians 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue to Achan, "My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not" (Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover one's guilt.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.sc] Sed contra, omne quod est contrarium divinæ gloriæ, est peccatum mortale, quia ex præcepto tenemur omnia in gloriam Dei facere, ut patet I ad Cor., x, 31. Sed quod reus id quod contra se est, confiteatur, pertinet ad gloriam Dei, ut patet per illud quod Josue dixit ad Acham: Fili mi, da gloriam Domino Deo Israel, et confitere atque indica mihi quid feceris, ne abscondas, ut habetur Josue, vii, 49. Ergo mentiri ad excusandum peccatum est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.co] Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins mortally, as stated above (Question 59, Article 4). Now it belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above (67, 1), is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: but it is not lawful for him to lie.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod quicumque facit contra debitum justitiæ mortaliter peccat, sicut supra dictum est. Pertinet autem ad debitum justitiæ quod aliquis obediat suo superiori in his ad quæ jus prælationis se extendit. Judex autem, ut supra dictum est, superior est respectu ejus qui judicatur. Et ideo ex debito tenetur accusatus judici veritatem exponere, quam ab eo secundum formam juris exigit. Et ideo si confiteri noluerit veritatem quam dicere tenetur, vel si eam mendaciter negaverit, mortaliter peccat. Si vero judex hoc exquirat quod non potest secundum ordinem juris, non tenetur ei accusatus respondere; sed potest vel per appellationem vel aliter licite subterfugere. Mendacium tamen dicere non licet.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.ad.1] When a man is examined by the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one whom he is bound to obey.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quando aliquis secundum ordinem juris a judice interrogatur, non ipse se prodit, sed ab alio proditur; dum ei necessitas respondendi imponitur per eum cui obedire tenetur.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.ad.2] To lie, with injury to another person, in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod mentiri, ad liberandum aliquem a morte cum injuria alterius, non est mendacium simpliciter officiosum, sed habet aliquid de pernicioso admixtum. Cum autem aliquis mentitur in judicio ad excusationem sui, injuriam facit ei cui obedire tenetur, dum sibi denegat quod ei debet, scilicet confessionem veritas.
[II-II.q.69.a.1.ad.3] He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Psalm 140:4): "Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins": on which words a gloss says: "Shameless men are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have been found out." And Gregory in expounding Job 31:33, "If as a man I have hid my sin," says (Moral. xxii, 15): "It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the sin by defending oneself."
[II-II.q.69.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ille qui mentitur in judicio, se excusando, facit et contra dilectionem Dei, cujus est judicium, et contra dilectionem proximi; tum ex parte judicis, cui debitum negat, tum ex parte accusatoris, qui punitur, si in probationem deficiat. Unde et in psalm. cxL dicitur: Ne declines cor meum in verba malitiæ ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis, ubi dicit Glossa ord., col. 1063, t. 4: « Hæc est consuetudo impudentium, ut deprehensi per aliqua falsa se excusent. » Et Gregorius, XXII Moral., cap. xv, § 30, col. 230, t. 2, exponens illud Job, xxxi: Si abscondi quasi homo peccatum meum, dicit: « Usitatum humani generis vitium est et latendo peccatum commitere, et commissum negando abscondere, et convictum defendendo multiplicare. »
Article 2
[II-II.q.69.a.2.arg.1] It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod accusato liceat calumniose se defendere. Quia, secundum jura civilia, L. « Transigere, » c. « De transactionibus, » in causa sanguinis licitum est cuilibet adversarium suum corrumpere. Sed hoc maxime est calumniose se defendere. Ergo non peccat accusatus in causa sanguinis, si calumniose se defendat.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.arg.2] Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, accusator cum accusato colludens pœnam recipit a legibus constitutam, ut habetur II, quæst. 111, cap. « Si quem pœnituerit, » col. 600. Non autem imponitur pœna accusato per hoc quod cum accusatore colludit. Ergo videtur quod liceat accusato calumniose se defendere.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.arg.3] Further, it is written (Proverbs 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident." Now what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil, he does not sin.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Proverb., xiv, 16, dicitur : Sapiens timet, et declinat a malo, stultus autem transilit, et confidit. Sed illud quod fit per sapientiam, non est peccatum. Ergo si aliquis qualitercumque se liberet a malo non peccat.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.sc] In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap. Onhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod in causa criminali juramentum de calumnia est præstandum, ut habetur Extra De juramento calumniæ, cap. « Inhærentes; » quod non esset si calumniose se defendere liceret. Ergo non est licitum accusato calumniose se defendere.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.co] It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of him according to the order of justice; as, for instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false declaration.
As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile, as shown above (55, 3, seqq.). His conduct in the former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to defend oneself with calumnies.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliud est veritatem tacere, aliud est falsitatem proponere : quorum primum in aliquo casu licet; non enim aliquis tenetur omnem veritatem confiteri, sed illam solum quam ab eo potest et debet requirere judex secundum ordinem juris : puta cum præcessit infamia super aliquo crimine, vel aliqua expressa indicia apparuerunt, vel etiam cum præcessit probatio semiplena. Falsitatem tamen proponere in nullo casu licet alicui. Ad id autem quod licitum est, potest aliquis procedere vel per vias licitas, et fini intento accommodas, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; vel per aliquas vias illicitas, et proposito fini incongruas, quod pertinet ad astutiam, quæ exercetur per fraudem et dolum, ut ex supra dictis patet. Quorum primum est laudabile, secundum vero vitiosum. Sic ergo reo qui accusatur, licet se defendere, veritatem occultando, quam confiteri non tenetur, per aliquos convenientes modos, puta quod non respondeat ad quæ respondere non tenetur. Hoc autem non est calumniose se defendere, sed magis prudenter evadere. Non autem licet ei vel falsitatem dicere, vel veritatem tacere quam confiteri tenetur, neque etiam aliquem dolum vel fraudem adhibere, quia fraus et dolus vim mendacii habent : et hoc est calumniose se defendere.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.ad.1] Human laws leave many things unpunished, which according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since "death is the most fearful of all temporal things" (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod multa secundum leges humanas impunita relinquuntur, quæ secundum divinum judicium sunt peccata, sicut patet in simplici fornicatione; quia lex humana non exigit ab homine omnimodam virtutem, quæ paucorum est, et non potest inveniri in tanta multitudine populi, quantam lex humana habet necesse sustinere. Quod autem aliquis non velit aliquod 1 peccatum committere, ut mortem corporalem evadat, cujus periculum in causa sanguinis imminet reo, est perfectæ virtutis, quia « omnium terribilium maxime terribile est mors, » ut dicitur in III Ethic., cap. vi, a med. Et ideo si reus in causa sanguinis corrumpat adversarium suum, peccat quidem inducendo eum ad illicitum; non autem huic peccato lex civilis adhibet pœnam; et pro tanto licitum esse dicitur.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.ad.2] If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take part in a sin in any way--for the Apostle says (Romans 1:32), that "they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent" to those who sin--it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod accusator, si colludat cum reo qui noxius est, pœnam incurrit; ex quo patet quod peccat. Unde cum inducere aliquem ad peccandum sit peccatum, vel qualitercumque peccati participem esse, cum Apostolus dicat, Rom., 1, dignos morte eos qui peccantibus consentiunt; manifestum est quod etiam reus peccat cum adversario colludendo; non tamen secundum leges humanas imponitur ei pœna propter rationem jam dictam.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.ad.3] The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but by exercising prudence.
[II-II.q.69.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod sapiens non abscondit se calumniose, sed prudenter.
Article 3
[II-II.q.69.a.3.arg.1] It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Romans 13:1): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod reo non liceat judicium declinare per appellationem. Dicit enim Apostolus, Rom., xiii, 1: Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit. Sed reus appellando recusat subjici potestati superiori, scilicet judici. Ergo peccat.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.arg.2] Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from ordinary judges.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, majus est vinculum ordinariae potestatis quam propriæ electionis. Sed sicut legitur II, q. vi, c. xxxiii, col. 632, « a judicibus quos communis consensus elegit, non licet provocare. » Ergo multo minus licet appellare a judicibus ordinariis.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.arg.3] Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, qu. 6, nor a third time on the same point [Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, illud quod semel est licitum, semper est licitum. Sed non est licitum appellare post decimum diem, neque tertio super eodem. Ergo videtur quod appellatio non sit secundum se licita.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.sc] Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).
[II-II.q.69.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod Paulus Cæsarem appellavit, ut habetur Act., xxv.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.co] There are two motives for which a man appeals. First through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): "All those who are oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way." Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above (Article 2). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): "Without doubt a man should be punished if his appeal be declared unjust."
[II-II.q.69.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod duplici de causa contingit aliquem appellare: uno quidem modo confidentia justæ causæ, quia videlicet injuste a judice gravatur; et sic licitum est appellare; hoc enim est prudenter evadere. Unde II, quæst. vi, cap. iii, col. 618, dicitur: « Omnis oppressus libere sacerdotum, si voluerit, appellet judicium, et a nullo prohibeatur. » Alio modo aliquis appellat causa afferendæ moræ, ne contra eum justa sententia proferatur; et hoc est calumniose se defendere, quod est illicitum, sicut dictum est. Facit enim injuriam et judici, cujus officium impedit, et adversario suo, cujus justitiam, quantum potest, perturbat. Et ideo, sicut dicitur II, quæst. vi, cap. xxvii, col. 625, « omni modo puniendus est cujus appellatio injusta pronuntiatur. »
[II-II.q.69.a.3.ad.1] A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for instance "if the proconsul order one thing and the emperor another," according to a gloss on Romans 13:2. Now when a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according to Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus: "The Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or unjust." Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Corinthians 6:6).
[II-II.q.69.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod potestati inferiori intantum aliquis subjici debet, inquantum ordinem superioris servat: a quo si exorbitaverit, ei subjici non oportet; puta si aliud jusserit proconsul, et aliud imperator, ut patet per Glossam ord., Rom., xiii, v. 2, col. 512, t. 2. Cum autem jusex aliquem injuste gravat, quantum ad hoc relinquit ordinem superioris potestatis, secundum quam necessitas ei juste judicandi imponitur. Et ideo licitum est ei qui contra justitiam gravatur, ad directionem superioris potestatis recurrere, appellando vel ante sententiam vel post. Et quia non præsumitur esse rectitudo, ubi vera fides non est, ideo non licet catholico ad infidelem judicem appellare, secundum illud II, quæst. vi, cap. xxxii, col. 632: « Catholicus qui causam suam sive justam, sive injustam ad judicium alterius fidei judicis provocat, excommunicetur. » Nam et Apostolus I Cor., vi, arguit eos qui judicio contendebant apud infideles.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.ad.2] It is due to a man's own fault or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordinary judge by the prince.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex proprio defectu vel negligentia procedit quod aliquis sua sponte se alterius judicio subjiciat, de cujus justitia non confidit. Levis etiam animi esse videtur ut quis non permaneat in eo quod semel approbavit; et ideo rationabiliter denegatur subsidium appellationis a judicibus arbitrariis, qui non habent potestatem nisi ex consensu litigantium. Sed potestas judiciis ordinarii non dependet ex consensu illius qui ejus judicio subditur, sed ex auctoritate regis et principis, qui eum instituit. Et ideo contra ejus injustum gravamen lex tribuit appellationis subsidium, ita quod etiamsi sit simul ordinarius et arbitrarius judex, potest ab eo appellari, quia videtur ordinaria potestas occasio fuisse quod arbiter eligeretur. Nec debet ad defectum imputari ejus qui consensit, sicut in arbitrum in eum quem princeps judicem ordinarium dedit.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.ad.3] The equity of the law so guards the interests of the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third time on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly so many times.
[II-II.q.69.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod æquitas juris ita subvenit uni parti, quod altera non gravetur; et ideo tempus decem dierum concessit ad appellandum, quod sufficiens æstimavit ad deliberandum an expediat appellare. Si vero non esset determinatum tempus in quo appellare liceret, semper certitudo judicii remaneret in suspenso; et ita pars altera damnificaretur. Ideo autem non est concessum ut tertio aliquis appellet super eodem: quia non est probabile, toties judices a recto judicio declinare.
Article 4
[II-II.q.69.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put to death.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod liceat condemnato ad mortem se defendere si possit. Illud enim ad quod natura inclinat, semper est licitum, quasi de jure naturali existens. Sed naturæ inclinatio est ad resistendum corrumpentibus, non solum in hominibus et animalibus, sed etiam in insensibilibus rebus. Ergo licet reo condemnato resistere, si potest, ne tradatur in mortem.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.arg.2] Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Sirach 9:18, "Keep thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]" [The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is also lawful for the accused to resist.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, sicut aliquis sententiam mortis contra se latam subterfugit resistendo, ita etiam fugiendo. Sed licitum esse videtur quod aliquis se a morte per fugam liberet, secundum illud Eccli., ix, 18: Longe esto ab* homine potestatem habente occi-dendi, et non suspicaberis timorem mortis, etc. Ergo etiam licitum est reo resistere.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.arg.3] Further, it is written (Proverbs 24:11): "Deliver them that are led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to deliver." Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself from being put to death.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Prov., xxiv, 41, dicitur: Erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem; et qui trahuntur ad interitum liberare ne cesses. Sed plus tenetur aliquis sibi quam alteri. Ergo licitum est quod aliquis condemnatus seipsum defendat, ne in mortem tradatur. spe benignioris sententiæ obtinendæ a judice superiore. Item in civilibus qui causa cadit potest appellare a justa sententia: 1. quando habet novas probationes juris vel facti quas judici inferiori exhibere non potuit; 2. quando sunt opiniones æque probabiles, et sperat judicem superiorem secutu-rum opinionem aliam quam eam quam secutus est judex inferior. Jure tam civili quam ecclesiastico olim concedebantur decem dies a lata sententia ad appellandum, et triginta dies a lata sententia ad obtinendum a judice a quo litteras quas vocant dimissorias, seu « Apostolos. » Alia erat praxis in Gallia. « Apostoli » edicto Francisci primi abrogati sunt. Appellatio debebat fieri intra quadraginta dies a publicatione sententiæ; quibus elapsis, judex, postulante parte adversa, jubebat appellantem exhibere infra triduum aut longiorem terminum pro locorum distantia « l'exploit; » quod si post statum terminum appellans non comparebat, declarabatur irrita appellatio, vulgo « appel désert, » et sententia executioni mandari poterat. Hoc non obstante restabat adhuc appellanti restitutio in integrum per litteras principis ut appellare possit. Poterat ante constitutionem Ludovici XIV anni 1667, tit. 27, a. 7, restitui in integrum usque ad triginta annos; sed usque ad decennium ex hac constitutione, et quantum ad ecclesias et alia loca pia usque ad vicen-nium a significatione sententiæ. In ecclesiasticis negotiis appellatio fieri potest
[II-II.q.69.a.4.sc] The Apostle says (Romans 13:2): "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation." Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God "for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good" [1 Peter 2:14. Therefore he sins in defending himself.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod dicit Apostolus ad Rom., xiii, 2: Qui resistit potestati, Dei ordinationi resistit et ipse sibi damnationem acquirit. Sed condemnatus se defendendo potestati resistit, quantum ad hoc in quo est divinitus instituta ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum. Ergo peccat se defendendo.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.co] A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he sins.
Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to Ezekiel 22:21, "Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood." Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquis damnatur ad mortem dupliciter: uno modo juste, et sic non licet condemnato se defendere; licitum enim est judici eum resistentem impugnare; unde relinquitur quod ex parte ejus sit bellum injustum; unde indubitanter peccat. Alio modo condemnatur aliquis injuste; et tale judicium simile est violentiae latronum, secundum illud Ezech., xxii, 27: Principes ejus in medio illius, quasi lupi rapientes prædam ad effundendum sanguinem. Et ideo sicut licet resistere latronibus, ita licet resistere in tali casu malis principibus; nisi forte propter scandalum vitam, cum ex hoc aliqua gravis turbatio timeretur.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.ad.1] Reason was given to man that he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ideo homini data est ratio, ut ea ad quæ natura inclinat, non passim, sed secundum rationis ordinem exequatur. Et ideo non quælibet non solum post, sed etiam ante latam sententiam; in sæcularibus post latam tantum. Prohibetur catholicis contendentibus inter se appellare ad judicem infidelem. A judicio arbitrorum mutuo partium consensu acceptorum non datur appellatio. Non licet appellare tertio in eadem causa. Appellatio debet fieri gradatim, nullo prætermisso judice medio. Quando temere est appellatum, judex appellationis debet remittere causam ad judicem a quo est appellatum. Appellatio non admittitur a sententia interlocu-toria, nisi importet gravamen irreparabile. Appellatio tanquam ab abusu genus est Gallis proprium, et recens inventum circa finem sæculi xv, et est appellatio a sententiis judicum ecclesiasticorum ad curias regias, quando sententia judicis ecclesiasticici est: 1. contra edicta regia; 2. vel contra sanctos canones; 3. vel contra jura et libertates ecclesiæ gallicanæ; 4. quando judex ecclesiasticus excedit jurisdictionem suam per usurpationem jurisdictionis sæcularis. Reges christianissimi frequentibus edictis effusiorem sine justa causa appellandi licentiam conati sunt coercere, Franciscus I, edicto anni 1539, a. 4, 2, 3, 4; Carolus IX, constit. 1571, a. 5; Henricus III, edicto melodunensi anni 1579, a. 4; blesensi, a. 59. — Vide concilium tridentinum, sess. xxiv, « De reforma-tione, » cap. xx. defensio sui est licita, sed solum quæ fit cum debito moderamine.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.ad.2] When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullus ita condemnatur quod sibi inferat mortem, sed quod ipse mortem patiatur; et ideo non tenetur facere id unde mors sequatur, quod est manere in loco, unde ducatur ad mortem; tenetur tamen non resistere agenti, quin patiatur quod justum est eum pati; sicut etiam si aliquis sit condemnatus ut fame moriatur, non peccat, si cibum sibi occulte ministratum sumat, quia non sumere esset seipsum occidere.
[II-II.q.69.a.4.ad.3] This saying of the wise man does not direct that one should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by resisting against justice.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.69.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod per illud dictum sapientis non inducitur aliquis ad liberandum alium a morte contra ordinem justitiae; unde nec seipsum contra justitiam resistendo aliquis debet liberare a morte.
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