Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q68. Matters concerning unjust accusation
Source context
- Theme
- moral and legal norms governing unjust accusation, false denunciation, and calumny
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 132, 1911-11-21Steiner observes that children are acutely sensitive to unjust accusation, treating such experiences as significant for soul development — a pedagogical recognition that parallels Aquinas's moral seriousness about the harm done by false accusation to the accused.
Cross-tradition
- Roman Law (calumnia)Roman legal tradition formally distinguished calumnia (malicious false accusation) from prevarication and tergiversation, providing the juridical framework Aquinas systematizes in Q68 into a scholastic moral theology of accusation.
- Hebrew Bible / Mosaic LawDeuteronomy 19:16–19 prescribes that a false witness receive the punishment intended for the accused, a principle of reciprocal justice that Aquinas cites as scriptural grounding for the penalties attached to unjust accusation.
Q68. Matters concerning unjust accusation
Article 1
[II-II.q.68.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved to be innocent [1 Timothy 1:5. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine precept to accuse.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non teneantur omnes ad susceptionem baptismi. Per Christum enim non est hominibus arctata via salutis. Sed ante Christi adventum poterant homines salvari sine baptismo. Ergo et post Christi adventum.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.arg.2] Further, every duty depends on charity which is "the end of the precept" [Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1: wherefore it is written (Romans 13:8): "Owe no man anything, but to love one another." Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man's duty to accuse.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, baptismus maxime videur esse institutus in remedium peccati originalis. Sed ille qui est baptizatus, cum non habeat originale peccatum, non videtur quod possit illud transfundere in prolem. Ergo filii baptizatorum non videntur esse baptizandi. 4 Legitur in Decreto IV, De consecr., cap, cv. col. 1833.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.arg.3] Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Proverbs 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, baptismus datur ad hoc quod aliquis per gratiam a peccato mundetur. Sed hoc consequuntur illi qui sunt sanctificati in utero sine baptismo. Ergo non tenentur ad suscipiendum baptismum.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.sc] It is written (Leviticus 5:1): "If any one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity."
[II-II.q.68.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., III, 5: Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua, et Spiritu sancto, non potest introire in regnum Dei: et lib. De Eccl. dogmatibus, cap. xLI, col. 1220, t. 8 op. Aug., dicitur: « Baptizatis tantum iter salutis esse credimus. »
[II-II.q.68.a.1.co] As stated above (33, 6,7; 67, 3, ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother's amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser's duty to prove: as, for example, when anyone's sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod ad illud homines tenentur, sine quo salutem consequi non possunt. Manifestum est autem, quod nullus potest salutem consequi nisi per Christum. Unde et Apostolus dicit Rom., v, 18: Sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines in condemnationem, sic et per unius justitiam in omnes homines in justificationem vitæ. Ad hoc autem datur baptismus, ut aliquis per ipsum regeneratus incorporetur Christo, factus membrum ipsius: unde dicitur Galat., III, 27: Quicumque in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis. Unde manifestum est, quod omnes ad baptismum tenentur, et sine eo non potest esse salus hominibus.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.ad.1] Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of man.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod nunquam homines potuerunt salvari etiam ante Christi adventum, nisi fierent membra Christi: quia, ut dicitur Act., IV, 12, non * aliud nomen est datum hominibus in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri. Sed ante adventum Christi homines Christo incorporabantur per fidem futuri adventus; cujus fidei signaculum erat circumcisio; ut Apostolus dicit Rom., IV, ante vero quam circumcisio institueretur, sola fide, ut Gregorius dicit, lib. IV Moral., cap. III, præfat., col. 635, t. 4, cum sacrificiorum oblatione, quibus suam fidem antiqui profitebantur, homines Christo incorporabantur. Post adventum etiam Christi homines per fidem Christo incorporantur, secundum illud Ephes., III, 17: Christum habitare per fidem in cordibus vestris. Sed alio signo manifestatur fides rei jam præsentis, quam demonstraretur, quando erat futura, sicut etiam aliis verbis significatur præsens, præteritum et futurum. Et ideo licet ipsum sacramentum baptismi non semper fuerit Manichæi, Pauliciani, Seleuciani et Hermiani baptismum in aqua respuebant. Quintiliani et Coiani fidem sufficere ad salutem prædica-necessarium ad salutem, fides tamen, cujus baptismus sacramentum est, semper necessaria fuit.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.ad.2] Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, "if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors" [Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7 --or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime [Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, illi qui baptizantur, renovantur per baptismum secundum spiritum; corpus tamen remanet subjectum vetustati peccati, secundum illud Rom., VIII, 10: Corpus quidem mortuum est propter peccatum; spiritus vero vivit propter justificationem. Unde et Augustinus probat in lib. VI Contra Julianum, § 52, col. 853, t. 10, quod « non baptizatur in homine quidquid in eo est. » Manifestum est autem quod homo non generat generatione carnali secundum spiritum, sed secundum carnem. Et ideo filii baptizatorum cum peccato originali nascuntur; unde indigent baptizari.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.ad.3] It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of the community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to prove it.
[II-II.q.68.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod illi qui sunt sanctificati in utero, consequuntur quidem gratiam emundantem a peccato originali: non tamen ex hoc ipso consequuntur characterem, quo Christo configurentur. Et propter hoc si aliqui nunc sanctificatur in utero, necesse esset eos baptizari, ut per susceptionem characteris aliis membris Christi conformarentur.
Article 2
[II-II.q.68.a.2.arg.1] It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation needs not to be made in writing.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod non sit necessarium accusationem in scriptis fieri. Scriptura enim adinventa est ad subveniendum humanæ memoriæ circa præterita. Sed accusatio in præsenti agitur. Ergo accusatio scriptura non indiget.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.arg.2] Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per scripta) that "no man may accuse or be accused in his absence." Now writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that the canon declares that "no accusation in writing should be accepted."
[II-II.q.68.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in lib. De ecclesiast. dogmatibus, cap. xLI, col. 1220, t. 8 op. Aug., dicitur: « Nullum catechumenum, quamvis in bonis operibus defunctum, vitam aternam habere credimus, excepto martyrio, ubi tota virtus sacramenti baptismi completer. » Sed si aliquis sine baptismo posset bant. Calvinus negat baptismum esse necessarium ad delendum originale. Sociniani volunt baptismum esse ritum liberum et indifferentem. salvari, maxime hoc haberet locum in catechumenis bona opera habentibus, qui videntur habere fidem per dilectionem operantem. Ergo videtur quod sine baptismo nullus possit salvari.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.arg.3] Further, a man's crime is made known by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut supra dictum est, sacramentum baptismi est de necessitate salutis. Necessarium autem est, sine quo non potest aliquid esse, ut dicitur V Metaph., text. 6. Ergo videtur quod sine baptismo nullus possit consequi salutem.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.sc] It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Accusatorum) that "the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without the accusation be in writing."
[II-II.q.68.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit Super Leviticum, quæst. Lxxxiv, col. 713, t. 3: « Invisibilem sanctificationem quibusdam affuisse, et profuisse sine visibilibus sacramentis; visibilem vero sanctificationem quæ fit in sacramento visibili, sine invisibili, posse adesse, sed non posse prodesse. » Cum igitur sacramentum baptismi ad visibilem sanctificationem pertineat, videtur quod sine sacramento baptismi aliquis possit salutem consequi per invisibilem sanctificationem.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 67, Article 3), when the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since however verbal utterances are apt to escape one's memory, the judge would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod sacramentum baptismi dupliciter potest alicui deesse: uno modo et re et voto, quod contingit illis qui nec baptizantur nec baptizari volunt, quod manifeste ad contemptum sacramenti pertinet, quantum ad illos qui habent usum liberi arbitrii. Et ideo hi quibus hoc modo deest baptismus, salutem consequi non possunt, quia nec sacramentaliter nec mentaliter Christo incorporantur, per quem solum est salus. Alio modo potest sacramentum baptismi alicui deesse re, sed non voto; sicut cum aliquis baptizari desiderat, sed aliquo casu prævenitur morte, antequam baptismum suscipiat; et talis sine baptismo actuali salutem consequi potest, propter desiderium baptismi, quod procedit ex fide per dilectionem operante, per quam Deus interius hominem sanctificat, cujus potentia sacramentis visibilibus non alligatur. Unde Ambrosius dicit in lib. De obitu Valentin., col. 1435, t. 3, de Valentiniano, qui catechumenus mortuus fuit: « Quem regeneraturus eram, amisi; verumtamenille gratiam quam poposcit non amisit. »
[II-II.q.68.a.2.ad.1] Words are so many and so various that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the judge's sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in writing.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod, sicut dicitur I Reg., xvi, 7, homo videt ea quæ parent; Dominus autem intuetur cor. Ille autem qui desiderat per baptismum regenerari ex aqua et Spiritu sancto, corde quidem regeneratus est, licet non corpore, sicut et Apostolus dicit Rom., ii, 29, quod circumcisio cordis est in spiritu, non in littera, cujus laus non ex hominibus, sed ex Deo est.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.ad.2] Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, "Let no accusation be accepted in writing" it refers to the sending of an accusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when the accuser is present.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod nullus pervenit ad vitam αternam, nisi absolutus ab omni culpa et reatu pœnæ; quæ quidem universalis absolutio fit in perceptione baptismi et in martyrio; propter quod dicitur quod in martyrio omnia sacramenta baptismi complentur, scilicet quantum ad plenam liberationem a culpa et pœna. Si quis ergo catechumenus sit habens desiderium baptismi, quia aliter in bonis operibus non moreretur, quæ non possunt esse sine fide per dilectionem operante, talis decedens non statim pervenit ad vitam αternam, sed patietur pœnam pro peccatis præteritis; ipse tamen salvus erit sic quasi per ignem, ut dicitur I ad Cor., iii, 45.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.ad.3] The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.
[II-II.q.68.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod pro tanto dicitur sacramentum baptismi esse de necessitate salutis, quia non potest esse homini salus, nisi saltem in voluntate habeatur, quæ apud Deum reputatur pro facto.
Article 3
[II-II.q.68.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. iii [Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], "calumny consists in falsely charging a person with a crime." Now sometimes one man falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust through being slanderous.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod baptismus sit differendus. Dicit enim Leo papa, Epist. xvi, c. v, col. 700, t. 4: « Duo tempora, » id est, Pascha et Pentecoste, « ad baptizandum a Romano pontifice legitime præfixa sunt. Unde dilectionem vestram monemus ut nullos alios dies huic observationi misceatis. » Videtur ergo quod oporteat non statim aliquem baptizari, sed usque ad prædicta tempora baptismum differri.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.arg.2] Further, it is stated by the same authority that "collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime." But seemingly this is not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as stated above (1; 33, 7). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, in concilio Aghatensi, can. xxxiv, Decr., can.xcIII de consecrat., dist. iv, col. 1830, legitur: « Judæi, quorum perfidia frequenter ad vomitum redit, si ad legem catholicam venire voluerint octo menses inter catechumenos Ecclesiæ limen introeant; et si pura fide noscuntur venire, tunc demum baptismatis gratiam mereantur. » Non ergo statim sunt homines baptizandi, sed usque ad certum tempus est differendum baptisma.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.arg.3] Further, it is stated by the same authority that "evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation." But this can be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: "If a man repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another." [The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation unjust.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut dicitur Isaiæ, xxvii, 9, iste est omnis fructus, ut auferatur pecatum. Sed magis videtur auferri peccatum vel etiam diminui, si baptismus diu differatur; primo quidem quia peccantes post baptismum gravius peccant, secundum illud Hebr., x, 29: Quanto magis putatis deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem Testamenti pollutum duxerit, in quo sanctificatus est? scilicet per baptismum. Secundo quia baptismus tollit pecata præterita, non autem futura; unde quanto magis baptismus differtur, tanto plura peccata tollit. Videtur ergo quod baptismus debeat diu differri.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.sc] It is stated by the same authority: "The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion."
[II-II.q.68.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli., v, 8: Non tardes converti ad Dominum, et nec differas de die in diem. Sed perfecta conversio ad Deum est eorum qui regenerantur in Christo per baptismum. Non ergo debet baptismus differri de die in diem.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.co] As stated above (Article 1), accusation is ordered for the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for "he that is guilty of collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation. This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere].
[II-II.q.68.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod circa hoc distinguendum est utrum sint baptizandi pueri vel adulti. Si enim pueri sint baptizandi, non est differendum baptisma, primo quidem quia non expectatur in eis major instructio, aut etiam plenior conversio; secundo, propter periculum mortis, quia non potest eis alio remedio subveniri nisi per sacramentum baptismi. Adultis vero subveniri potest per solum baptismi desiderium, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo adultis, non statim cum convertuntur, est sacramentum baptismi conferendum, sed oportet differre usque ad aliquod certum tempus, primo quidem propter cautelam Ecclesiæ, ne decipiatur, sacramentum ficte accedentibus conferens, secundum illud I Joan., iv, 1: No-lite omni spiritui credere, sed probate spiritus, si ex Deo sint; quæ quidem probatio sumitur de accedentibus ad baptismum, quando per aliquod spatium eorum fides et mores examinantur. Secundo, hoc est necessarium ad utilitatem eorum qui baptizantur, quia aliquo temporis spatio indigent, ad hoc quod plene instruantur de fide et exercitentur in his quæ pertinent ad vitam christianam. Tertio, hoc est necessarium ad quamdam reverentiam sacramenti, dum in solemnitatibus præcipuis, scilicet Paschæ et Pentecostes, homines ad baptismum admittuntur, et ita devotius sacramentum suscipiunt. Hæc tamen dilatio est prætermittenda duplici ratione; primo quidem quando illi qui sunt baptizandi apparent perfecte instructi in fide, et ad baptismum idonei, sicut Philippus statim baptizavit Eunuchum, ut habetur Act., viii, et Petrus Cornelium et eos qui cum eo erant, ut habetur Act., x. Secundo propter infirmitatem aut aliquod periculum mortis. Unde Leo papa dicit, ubi supra. « Hi qui necessitate mortis, ægritudinis, obsidionis, persecutionis et naufragii urgentur, omni tempore debent baptizari. » Si tamen aliquis morte præveniatur, articulo necessitatis sacramentum excludente, dum expectat tempus ab Ecclesia institutum, salvatur, licet per ignem, ut supra dictum est. Peccat autem si ultra tempus institutum ab Ecclesia differat accipere baptismum, nisi ex causa necessaria, et licentia prælatorum Ecclesiæ. Sed tamen et hoc peccatum cum aliis deleri potest per succedentem contritionem, quæ supplet vicem baptismi, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.ad.1] A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud mandatum Leonis papæ de observandis duobus temporibus in baptismo, intelligendum est de adultis, excepto tamen periculo mortis, quod semper in pueris est timendum, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.ad.2] Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud de Judæis est institutum ad Ecclesiæ cautelam, ne simplicium fidem corrumpant, si non fuerint plene conversi; et tamen, ut ibidem subditur, « si infra tempus præscriptum aliquod periculum infirmitatis incurrerint, debent baptizari. »
[II-II.q.68.a.3.ad.3] Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist from accusing without committing a sin --in one way, in the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one another--in another way, if the accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.
[II-II.q.68.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod baptismus per gratiam quam confert, non solum removet peccata præterita, sed etiam impedit peccata futura, ne fiant. Hoc autem præcipue desiderandum est ut homines non peccent, secundario autem ut levius peccent, vel etiam ut eorum peccata mundentur, secundum illud I Joan., ii, 1: Filioli mei, hæc scribo vobis ut non peccetis. Sed et si quis peccaverit, advocatum habet apud Patrem Jesum Christum justum; et ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris.
Article 4
[II-II.q.68.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii. [Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod peccatores sint baptizandi. Dicitur enim Zach., xiii, 4: In die illa erit fons patens domui David, et habitantibus Jerusalem: in ablutionem peccatoris et menstruatuæ; quod quidem intelligitur de fonte baptismali. Ergo videtur quod sacramentum baptismi sit etiam peccatoribus exhibendum.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.arg.2] Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of the injury he has done to someone--but not on account of any injury done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has failed to prove his accusation.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Dominus dicit, Matth., ix, 12: Non est opus valentibus medicus, sed maie habentibus. Male autem habentes sunt peccatores. Cum igitur spiritualis medici, scilicet Christi, medicina sit baptismus, videtur quod peccatoribus sit sacramentum baptismi exhibendum.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.arg.3] Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [Septuagint version]: "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [Can. Onfames, caus. vi, qu. 1, which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: "Although we are able to save souls by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation." Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullum subsidium debet peccatoribus subtrahi. Sed peccatores baptizati ex ipso charactere baptismali spiritualiter adjuvantur, cum sit quædam dispositio ad gratiam. Ergo videtur quod sacramentum baptismi sit peccatoribus exhibendum.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.sc] Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): "He that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his accusation inferred."
[II-II.q.68.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit Tract. lxxii in Joan. et Serm. clxix, cap. xi, § 13, col. 923, t. 5: « Qui fecit te sine te, non justificabit te sine te. » Sed peccator, cum habeat voluntatem non dispositam, non cooperatur Deo. Ergo frustra adhiberetur ei baptismus ad justificationem.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.co] As stated above (Article 2), in a case, where the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to Exodus 21:24, "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Consequently it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer a like punishment.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod aliquis potest dici peccator dupliciter: uno modo propter maculam et reatum præteritum, et sic peccatoribus est sacramentum baptismi conferendum, quia est ad hoc specialiter institutum, ut per ipsum peccatorum sordes mundentur, secundum illud Ephes.. v, 26: Mundans eam, scilicet Ecclesiam, lavacro aquæ in verbo vitæ. Alio modo potest dici aliquis peccator ex voluntate peccandi, et proposito persistendi in peccato: et sic peccatoribus non est sacramentum baptismi conferendum. Primo quidem quia per baptismum homines Christo incorporantur, secundum illud iii, 37: Quicumque in Christo baptizati estis, Christum induistis. Quam diu autem aliquis habet voluntatem peccandi, non potest esse Christo conjunctus, secundum illud II Corinth., vi, 14, Quæ participatio justitiæ cum iniquitate? Unde et Augustinus dicit Serm. cccli, c. ii, col. 1537, t. 5, quod « nullus suæ voluntatis arbiter constitutus potest novam vitam inchoare, nisi eum veteris vitæ pœni teat. » Secundo, quia in operibus Christi et Ecclesiæ nihil debet fieri frustra. Frustra autem est quod non pertingit ad finem ad quem est ordinatum. Nullus autem habens voluntatem peccandi simul potest a peccato mundari, ad quod ordinatur baptismus, quia hoc esset ponere contradictoria esse simul. Tertio, quia in sacramentalibus signis non debet esse aliqua falsitas. Est autem signum falsum, cui res significata non respondet. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis lavandum se præbet per baptismum, significatur quod se disponat ad interiorem ablutionem; quod non contingit de eo qui habet propositum persistendi in peccato. Unde manifestum est quod talibus sacramentum baptismi non est conferendum.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.ad.1] As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud verbum est intelligendum de peccatoribus qui habent voluntatem recedendi a peccato.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.ad.2] He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Deuteronomy 19:18-20): "And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother," and this refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: "And thou shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things." Specially, however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter's adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod spiritualis medicus, scilicet Christus, operatur dupliciter: uno modo interius per seipsum, et sic præparat voluntatem hominis, ut bonum velit, et malum odiat: alio modo operatur per ministros, exterius adhibendo sacramenta, et sic operatur id quod est exterius inchoatum. Et ideo sacramentum baptismi non est exhibendem nisi ei in quo interioris conversionis aliquod signum apparet; sicut nec medicina corporalis adhibetur infirmo, nisi in eo aliquis motus vitalis naturæ appareat.
[II-II.q.68.a.4.ad.3] The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: "We cannot remove the disgrace," he may mean either the disgrace attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.68.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod baptismus est fidei sacramentum. Fides autem informis non sufficit ad salutem, nec ipsa est fundamentum, sed sola fides formata, quæ per dilectionem operatur, ut Augusad justificationem non disposito. Editio Romana et posteriores aliæ uno contextu, aliæ ad marginem addunt aliud argumentum: « sed contra est quod Augustinus ad Bonifacium dicit in lib. I De peccator. merit. et remiss. cap. 26, a med.,: « In baptismo aliquis membrum Christi « efficitur. Sed nullus peccator persistens in vo« luntate peccandi potest fieri membrum Christi; « quod est incorporari Christo. » Ergo hujusmodi peccator non est baptizandus quia frustra baptizaretur. » tinus dicit in lib. De fide et operibus, cap. xvi, col. 215, t. 6. Unde nec sacra-mentum baptismi salutem conferre po-test cum voluntate peccandi, quæ fidei formam excludit. Non est autem per impressionem characteris baptismalis ali-quis disponendus ad gratiam quamdiu in eo apparet voluntas peccandi, quia « Deus neminem ad virtutem compellit, » sicut Damascenus dicit lib. II Orth. fid., cap. xxx, col. 971, t. 4.
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