Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q72. Reviling
Source context
- Theme
- reviling as a moral and spiritual harm — its nature, species, and gravity
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 70b, 1916-01-08Steiner holds that reviling the truth rebounds upon the reviler himself, indicating a karmic-moral structure in which injurious speech returns to its source.
- GA 70b, 1916-01-10Steiner distinguishes reviling from substantive opposition to truth, noting that verbal attack ultimately falls back upon those who utter it rather than harming the truth itself.
- GA 123, 1910-09-09Steiner treats the Beatitude 'blessed are ye when men shall revile you for my sake' as an initiation-stage statement concerning the ego-conscious soul's capacity to bear undeserved dishonour.
Cross-tradition
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV.3Aristotle treats verbal dishonour as an injury to another's reputation and connects proper response to the virtue of magnanimity, a structural parallel to Aquinas's analysis of reviling as a sin against justice and neighbour.
- Buddhist Vinaya / right speechThe Vinaya's prohibition on abusive speech (pharusa vācā) identifies harsh verbal harm to persons as a breach of right speech, showing cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's category of reviling as a distinct sin against the honour due to persons.
Q72. Reviling
Article 1
[II-II.q.72.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod contumelia non consistat in verbis. Contumelia enim importat quoddam nocumentum proximo illatum, cum pertineat ad injustitiam. Sed verba nullum nocumentum videntur inferre proximo nec in rebus, nec in persona. Ergo contumelia non consistit in verbis.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.arg.2] Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, contumelia videtur ad quam-dam dehonorationem pertinere. Sed magis aliquis potest inhonorari seu vituperari factis quam verbis. Ergo videtur quod contumelia non consistat in verbis, sed magis in factis.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.arg.3] Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, dehonoration quæ fit verbis, dicitur convicium vel improperium. Sed contumelia videtur differre a convicio et ab improperio. Ergo contumelia non consistit in verbis.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.sc] Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jeremiah 20:10, "I heard reviling [Douay: 'contumelies'] on every side." Therefore reviling consists in words.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.sc] Sed contra, nihil auditu percipitur nisi verbum. Sed contumelia auditu percipitur, secundum illud Jerem., xx, 10: Audivi contumelias in circuitu. Ergo contumelia est in verbis.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.co] Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spoken above (64, seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something against another's honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), "compared with words all other signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives." Hence reviling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] "is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words." Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Romans 1:30, "contumelious, proud," says: "The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame others."
[II-II.q.72.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod contumelia importat dehonorationem alicujus, quod quidem contingit dupliciter: cum enim honor aliquam excellentiam consequatur, uno modo aliquis alium dehonorat, cum privat eum excellentia, propter quam habebat honorem, quod quidem fit per peccata factorum, de quibus supra dictum est. Alio modo cum aliquis id quod est contra honorem alicujus deducit in notitiam ejus et aliorum; et hoc proprie pertinet ad contumeliam; quod quidem fit per aliqua signa. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in II De doct. christ., cap. III, col. 37, t. 3, « omnia signa verbis comparata paucissima sunt; verba enim inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi quæcumque animo concipiuntur. » Et ideo contumelia, proprie loquendo, in verbis consistit; unde Isidorus dicit in lib. X Etymol., § 46, col. 372, t. 3, quod « contumeliosus dicitur aliquis, quia velox est, et tumet in verbis injuriæ. » Tamen quia etiam per facta aliqua significatur aliquid, quæ in hoc quod significant, habent vim verborum significantium, inde est quod contumelia extenso nomine etiam in factis dicitur. Unde Rom., I, super illud: Contumeliosos, superbos, dicit Glossa interl., quod « contumeliosi sunt qui dictis vel factis contumelias et turpia inferunt.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.ad.1] Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod verba secundum sui essentiam, id est, inquantum sunt quidam soni audibiles, nullum nocumentum alteri inferunt, nisi forte gravando auditum: puta cum aliquis nimis alte loquitur. Inquantum vero sunt signa repræsentantia aliquid in notitia aliorum, sic possunt damna multa inferre; inter quæ unum est quod homo damnificatur quantum ad detrimentum honoris sui, vel reverentiae sibi ab aliis exhibendæ. Et ideo major est contumelia, si aliquis alicui defectum suum dicat coram multis; et tamen si ei soli dicat, po-test esse contumelia, inquantum ipse qui loquitur, injuste contra reverentiam audientis agit.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.ad.2] One man slights another by deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man's honor. On the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (Q64,65,66): where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have the significant force of words.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod intantum aliquis aliquem factis dehonorat, inquantum illa facta vel faciunt vel significant illud quod est contra honorem alicujus; quorum primum non pertinet ad contumeliam, sed ad alias injustitiæ species, de quibus supra dictum est; secundum vero pertinet ad contumeliam, inquantum facta habent vim verborum in significando.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.ad.3] Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man's faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by "reviling" words. Secondly, there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by "taunts" [convicium], because "vice" is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by "upbraiding" words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Sirach 20:15): "He will give a few things and upbraid much." Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.
[II-II.q.72.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod convicium et improperium consistunt in verbis, sicut et contumelia, quia per omnia hæc repræsentatur aliquis defectus alicujus in detrimentum honoris ipsius. Hujusmodi autem defectus est triplex: scilicet defectus culpæ, qui repræsentatur per verba contumeliosa; et defectus generaliter culpæ et pœnæ, qui repræsentatur per convicium, quia vicium consuevit dici non solum animæ, sed etiam corporis; unde si quis alicui injuriose dicat eum esse cæcum, convicium quidem dicit, sed non contumeliam; si quis autem dicat alteri quod sit fur, non solum convicium, sed etiam contumeliam infert. Quandoque vero repræsentat aliquis alicui defectum minorationis, sive indigentiæ, qui etiam derogat honori consequenti quamcumque excellentiam; et hoc fit per verbum improperii; quod proprie est quando aliquis injuriose alteri ad memoriam reducit auxilium quod contulit ei necessitatem patienti. Unde dicitur Eccli., xx, 45: Exigua dabit, et multa improperabit. Quandoque tamen unum istorum pro alio ponitur.
Article 2
[II-II.q.72.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a virtue, viz. of wittiness eutrapelia [Cf. I-II, 60, 5] to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod contumelia, vel convicium, non sit peccatum mortale. Nullum enim peccatum mortale est actus alicujus virtutis. Sed conviciari est actus alicujus virtutis, scilicet eutrapeliæ, ad quam pertinet bene conviciari, secundum Philosophum in IV Ethic., cap. vIII. Ergo convicium sive contumelia non est peccatum mortale. 2. Praeterea, peccatum mortale non inventur in viris perfectis; qui tamen convicia vel contumelias aliquando dicunt, sicut patet de Apostolo, qui ad Galatas, III, 4, dixit: O insensati Galatæ; et Dominus dicit Lucæ, ult., 25: O stulti et tardi corde ad credendum. Ergo convicium sive contumelia non est peccatum mortale. 3. Praeterea, quamvis illud quod est peccatum veniale ex genere possit fieri mortale, non tamen peccatum quod est ex genere mortale potest esse veniale, ut supra habitum est. Si ergo dicere convicium vel contumeliam esset peccatum mortale ex genere suo, sequeretur quod semper esset peccatum mortale; quod videtur esse falsum, ut patet in eo qui leviter ex surreptione vel ex levi ira dicit aliquod verbum contumeliosum. Non ergo contumelia, vel convicium, ex genere suo est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.arg.2] Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle says (Galatians 3:1): "O senseless Galatians!," and our Lord said (Luke 24:25): "O foolish and slow of heart to believe!" Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.arg.3] Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as stated above (I-II, 88, 4,6). Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.sc] Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell, according to Matthew 5:22, "Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire." Therefore railing or reviling is a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.sc] Sed contra, nihil meretur pœnam æternam inferni, nisi peccatum mortale. Sed convicium vel contumelia meretur pœnam inferni, secundum illud Matth., v, 22: Qui dixerit fratri suo, fatue, reus erit gehennæ ignis. Ergo convicium, vel contumelia, est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.co] As stated above (Article 1), words are injurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker's inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person against whom it is uttered. On such a case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in fun, he would not be without blame.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, verba inquantum sunt soni quidam, non sunt in nocumentum aliorum, sed inquantum significant aliquid; quæ quidem significatio ex interiori affectu procedit. Et ideo in peccatis verborum maxime considerandum videtur ex quo affectu aliquis verba proferat. Cum ergo convicium seu contumelia de sui ratione importet quamdam dehonorationem, si intentio proferentis ad hoc feratur ut per verba quæ profert, honorem alterius auferat, hoc proprie et per se est dicere convicium vel contumeliam; et hoc est peccatum mortale non minus quam furtum vel rapina: non enim homo minus amat suum honorem quam rem possessam. Si vero aliquis verbum convicii vel contumeliæ alteri dixerit, non tamen animo dehonorandi, sed forte propter correctionem vel propter aliquid hujusmodi, non dicit convicium vel contumeliam formaliter et per se, sed per accidens et materialiter, inquantum scilicet dicit id quod potest esse convicium vel contumelia; unde hoc potest esse quandoque peccatum veniale, quandoque autem absque omni peccato. In quo tamen necessaria est discretio, ut moderate homo talibus verbis utatur, quia posset esse ita grave convicium quod per incautelam prolatum auferret honorem ejus contra quem proferretur; et tunc posset homo peccare mortaliter, etiamsi non intenderet dehonorationem alterius; sicut etiam si aliquis incaute alium ex ludo percutiens graviter lædat, culpa non caret.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.ad.1] It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. on the other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad eutrapeliam pertinet dicere aliquod leve convicium, non ad dehonorationem vel ad contristationem ejus in quem dicitur, sed magis causa delectationis et joci; et hoc potest esse sine peccato, si debitae circumstantiae observentur. Si vero aliquis non reformidet contristare eum in quem profertur hujusmodi jocosum convicium, dummodo aliis risum excitet, hoc est vitiosum, ut ibidem dicitur.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.ad.2] Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples "foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God's service, not our own."
[II-II.q.72.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod, sicut licitum est aliquem verberare, vel in rebus damnificare, causa disciplinæ, ita etiam causa disciplinæ potest aliquis alteri, quem debet corrigere, verbum aliquod conviciosum dicere; et hoc modo Dominus discipulos vocavit stultos, et Apostolus Galatas insensatos. Tamen, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro II De sermone Domini in monte, cap. xix, § 66, col. 1299, t. 3, « raro et in magna necessitate objurgationes adhibendæ sunt; ita tamen ut etiam in his ipsis non nobis, sed Deo ut serviatur, instemus. »
[II-II.q.72.a.2.ad.3] Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a word to give but little pain.
[II-II.q.72.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum peccatum convicii vel contumeliæ ex animo dicentis dependeat, potest contingere quod sit peccatum veniale, si sit leve convicium, non multum hominem dehonestans, et proferatur ex aliqua animi levitate, vel ex levi ira, absque firmo proposito aliquem dehonestandi, puta cum aliquis intendit aliquem per hujusmodi verbum leviter contristare.
Article 3
[II-II.q.72.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod aliquis non debeat contumelias sibi illatas sustinere. Qui enim sustinet contumeliam sibi illatam, audaciam nutrit convicianis. Sed hoc non est faciendum. Ergo homo non debeat sustinere contumeliam sibi illatam, sed magis convicianti respondere.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.arg.2] Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written (Proverbs 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger." Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, homo debet plus se diligere quam alium. Sed aliquis non debeat sustinere quod alteri convicium inferatur; unde Contumelia, convitium et improperium sæpe pro eodem sumuntur, sed tamen distinguuntur. Contumelia est cum objicitur defectus culpæ, ut si dicas injuriose alicui quod sit fur. Convitium est dum objicitur defectus culpæ vel pœnæ, ut si dicas alicui quod sit fur vel lucus. Improperium est dum objicitur minoratio seu indigentia. Attamen hæc tria sunt ejusdem speciei, et habent idem objectum formale, scilicet lædere, vel tollere honorem. Ita Cajetanus, Soto, Sylvius, Serra, etc. Soto et Toletus, quos sequitur Sylvius, excusant a mortali viros infimæ sortis et mulierculas, quæ inter rixandum sese invicem convitiis onerant, et quidquid occurrit evomunt, quia, quæ sic effutiunt, non apprehenduntur ut vera, nec inde graviter læduntur aut lædunt. dicitur Prov., xxvi, 10: Qui imponit stulto silentium, iras mitigat. Ergo etiam aliquis non debet sustinere contumelias sibi illatas.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.arg.3] Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [Hebrews 10:30. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, non licet alicui vindicare se ipsum, secundum illud Rom., xii, 19: Mihi vindicta, et ego retribuam. Sed aliquis non resistendo contumeliæ se vindicat, secundum illud Chrysostomi, Homilia xxii in Epist. ad Rom., a med., et Homilia xliii in Matth., a med.: « Si vindicare vis, sile, et funestam ei dedisti plagam. » Ergo aliquis non debet silendo sustinere verba contumeliosa, sed magis respondere.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.sc] It is written (Psalm 37:13): "They that sought evils to me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Psalm 37:14) he says: "But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."
[II-II.q.72.a.3.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur in ps. xxxvii, 13: Qui inquirebant mala mihi, locuti sunt vanitates; et postea subdit: Ego autem tanquam surdus non audiebam, et sicut mutus non aperiens os suum.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.co] Just as we need patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Augustine's (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on our Lord's precept, "If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other" The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of Matthew 5:39 and Luke 6:29: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He said: "Why strikest thou Me?" (John 18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the attempt, according to Proverbs 26:5, "Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise." Secondly, for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): "Those who are so placed that their life should be an example to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life."
[II-II.q.72.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut patientia necessaria est in his quæ contra nos fiunt, ita etiam in his quæ contra nos dicuntur. Præcepta autem patientiae in his quæ contra nos fiunt sunt in præparatione animæ habenda, sicut Augustinus in lib. I De serm. Domini in monte, c. xix, col. 4258, t. 3, exponit illud præceptum Domini Matth., v, 32: Si quis te percusserit in unam maxillam, præbe ei et aliam*; ut scilicet homo sit paratus hoc facere, si opus fuerit. Non tamen hoc semper tenetur facere actu: quia nec ipse Dominus hoc fecit; sed cum suscepisset alapam, dixit: Quid me cædis? ut habetur Joan., xviii, 23. Et ideo etiam circa verba contumeliosa quæ contra nos dicuntur, est idem intelligendum. Tenemur enim habere animum paratum ad contumelias tolerandas si expediens fuerit. Quandoque tamen opor-tet ut contumeliam illatam repellamus, maxime propter duo: primo quidem propter bonum ejus qui contumeliam infert, ut videlicet ejus audacia reprimatur, et de cætero talia non attentet, secundum illud Proverb., xxvi, 5: Responde stulto juxta stultitiam suam, ne sibi sapiens videatur; alio modo propter bonum multorum, quorum profectus impeditur per contumelias nobis illatas. Unde Gregorius dicit, Sup. Ezech., hom. 1x, § 18, col. 877, t. 2: « Hi quorum vita in exemplo imitationis est posita, debent, si possunt, detrahentium sibi verba compescere; ne eorum prædicationem non audiant qui audire poterant, et ita in pravis moribus remanentes bene vivere contemnant. »
[II-II.q.72.a.3.ad.1] The daring of the railing reviler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for one's own honor. Hence it is written (Proverbs 26:4): "Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him."
[II-II.q.72.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod audaciam conviciantis contumeliosi debet aliquis moderate reprimere, scilicet propter officium charitatis, non propter cupiditatem privati honoris. Unde dicitur Prov., xxvi, 4: Ne respondeas stulto juxta stultitiam suam, ne efficiaris ei similis.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.ad.2] When one man prevents another from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for one's own honor as there is when a man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to proceed from a sense of charity.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod in hoc quod aliquis alienas contumelias reprimit, non ita timetur cupiditas privati honoris, sicut cum aliquis repellit contumelias proprias; magis autem videtur hoc provenire ex charitatis affectu.
[II-II.q.72.a.3.ad.3] It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written (Sirach 8:4): "Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire."
[II-II.q.72.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod si aliquis hoc animo taceret, ut tacendo contumeliantem ad iracundiam provocaret, pertineret hoc ad vindictam; sed si aliquis taceat, volens dare locum iræ, hoc est laudabile. Unde dicitur Eccli., viii, 4: Non litiges cum homine linguato, et non strues in ignem illius ligna.
Article 4
[II-II.q.72.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For it is written (Proverbs 11:2): "Where pride is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: 'reproach']." But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod contumelia non oriatur ex ira, quia dicitur Prov., xi, 2: Ubi superbia, ibi contumelia. Sed ira est vitium distinctum a superbia. Ergo contumelia non oriatur ex ira.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.arg.2] Further, it is written (Proverbs 20:3): "All fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: 'reproaches']." Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above (Question 46, Article 1); whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Prov., xx, 3, dicitur: Omnes stulti miscentur contumeliis. Sed stultitia est vitium oppositum sapientiæ, ut supra habitum est; ira autem opponitur mansuetudini. Ergo contumelia non oriatur ex ira.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.arg.3] Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullum peccatum diminuitur ex sua causa. Sed peccatum contumeliæ diminuitur, si ex ira proferatur; gravius enim peccat qui ex odio contumeliam infert quam qui ex ira. Ergo contumelia non oriatur ex ira.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.sc] Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that "anger gives rise to revilings."
[II-II.q.72.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., cap. xlv, § 88, col. 621, t. 2, dicit quod « ex ira oriuntur contumeliæ. »
[II-II.q.72.a.4.co] While one sin may arise from various causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger's end, which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, cum unum peccatum possit ex diversis oriri, ex illo ta- Sic cod.; in Parm.: « animi. » — Parm.: « propter. » — Parm.: « contumeliose. » men dicitur principalius habere originem ex quo frequentius procedere consuevit, propter propinquitatem ad finem ipsius. Contumelia autem magnam habet propinquitatem ad finem iræ, qui est vindicta; nulla enim vindicta est irato magis in promptu quam inferre contumeliam alteri. Et ideo contumelia maxime oritur ex ira.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.ad.1] Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride. Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod contumelia non ordinatur ad finem superbiæ, qui est celsititudo. Et ideo non directe contumelia oritur ex superbia; disponit tamen superbia ad contumeliam, inquantum illi qui se superiores æstimant, facilius alios contemnunt, et injurias eis irrogant; facilius enim irascuntur, utpote reputantes indignum quidquid contra eorum voluntatem agitur.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.ad.2] According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) "anger listens imperfectly to reason": wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from folly on account of the latter's kinship with anger.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, in VII Ethic., c. vi, in princ., « ira non perfecte audit rationem; » et sic iratus patitur rationis defectum, in quo convenit cum stultitia; et propter hoc ex stultitia oritur contumelia secundum affinitatem quam habet cum ira.
[II-II.q.72.a.4.ad.3] According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) "an angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this." Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.72.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum in II Rhetor., cap. iv, ad fin., « iratus intendit manifestam offensam; quod non curat odiens. » Et ideo contumelia, quæ importat manifestam injuriam, magis pertinet ad iram quam ad odium.
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