Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q73. Backbiting
Source context
- Theme
- backbiting as a moral and social vice — its boundary with legitimate criticism, and the duty of direct speech
- Soul-faculty
- Consciousness Soul
Steiner
- GA 41bIn 'What Is Practical Theosophy?', Steiner addresses backbiting and slander directly, prescribing that one must never backbite or slander another person but instead speak any grievance openly and directly to the person concerned, and must never repeat as an echo what one hears about others; he also raises the structural question of where the line between backbiting and legitimate criticism falls.
Cross-tradition
- Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II Q73Aquinas defines backbiting (detractio) as the covert diminishment of another's good reputation without their presence, distinguishing it from contumely (direct insult) and from justified disclosure; this tripartite structure shows cross-tradition congruence with the demarcation problem Steiner identifies between slander and honest critical duty.
- Jewish ethical literature (Lashon ha-Ra)The rabbinic category of lashon ha-ra (evil speech about another, even if true) parallels Aquinas's detractio in targeting the covert, reputation-damaging character of speech rather than its factual content alone.
Q73. Backbiting
Article 1
[II-II.q.73.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some [Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and "openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret words.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod detractio non sit « denigratio alienæ famæ per occulta verba, » ut a quibusdam definitur. Occultum enim et manifestum sunt circumstantiæ non constituentes speciem peccati, accidit enim peccato quod a multis sciatur vel a paucis. Sed illud quod non constituit speciem peccati, non pertinet ad rationem ipsius; nec debet poni in ejus definitione. Ergo ad rationem detractionis non pertinet quod fiat per occulta verba.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.arg.2] Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, ad rationem famæ pertinet publica notitia. Si ergo per detractionem denigretur fama alicujus, non poterit hoc fieri per verba occulta, sed per verba in manifesto dicta.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.arg.3] Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, ille detrahit qui aliquid subtrahit, vel diminuit de eo quod est. Sed quandoque denigratur fama alicujus, etamsi nihil subtrahatur de veritate, puta cum aliquis vera crimina alicujus pandit. Ergo non omnis denigratio famæ est detractio.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.sc] It is written (Ecclesiastes 10:11): "If a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."
[II-II.q.73.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccle., x, 14 : Si mordeat serpens in silentio, nihil eo minus habet qui occulte detrahit. Ergo occulte mordere famam alicujus est detrahere.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.co] Just as one man injures another by deed in two ways--openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence--and secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures another by words in two ways--in one way, openly, and this is done by reviling him, as stated above (Question 72, Article 1)--and in another way secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring his good name.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut facto aliquis nocet alteri dupliciter : manifeste qui dem, sicut in rapina vel quacumque violentia illata, occulte autem, sicut in furto et dolosa percussione; ita etiam verbo aliquis dupliciter aliquem lædit : uno modo in manifesto, et hoc fit per contumeliam, ut supra dictum est; alio modo occulte, et hoc fit per detractionem. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis manifeste verba contra alium profert, videtur eum parvipendere; unde ex hoc ipso dehonoratur, et ideo contumelia detrimentum affert honori ejus in quem profertur. Sed qui verba contra aliquem profert in occulto, videtur eum vereri magis quam parvipendere; unde non directe infert detrimentum honori, sed famæ, inquantum hujusmodi verba occulte proferens quantum in ipso est, eos qui audiunt, facit malam opinionem habere de eo contra quem loquitur. Hoc enim intendere videtur, et ad hoc conatur detrahens, ut ejus verbis credatur. Unde patet quod detractio differt a contumelia dupliciter : uno modo quantum ad modum proponendi verba, quia scilicet contumeliosus manifeste contra aliquem loquitur, detractor autem occulte; alio modo quantum ad finem intentum, sive quantum ad nocumentum illatum, quia scilicet contumeliosus derogat honori, detractor famæ. Sic Albertus Magnus.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.ad.1] In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and "openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and by ignorance, as stated above (65, 4; I-II, 6, 5,8).
[II-II.q.73.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in involuntariis commutationibus, ad quas reducuntur omnia nocumenta proximo illata verbo, vel facto, diversificant rationem pecati occultum et manifestum, quia alia est ratio involuntarii per violentiam, et per ignorantiam, ut supra dictum est.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.ad.2] The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod verba detractionis dicuntur occulta, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad eum de quo dicuntur, quia eo absente et ignorante dicuntur. Sed contumeliosus in faciem contra hominem loquitur. Unde si aliquis de alio male loquatur coram multis, eo absente, detractio est; si autem eo solo præsente, contumelia est; quamvis etiam si uni soli aliquis de absente malum dicat, corrumpit famam ejus non in toto, sed in parte.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.ad.3] A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.
[II-II.q.73.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliquis dicitur detrahere alteri, non quia diminuit de veritate, sed quia diminuit famam ejus. Quod quidem fit quandoque directe, quandoque indirecte: directe quidem quadrupliciter: uno modo, quando falsum imponit alteri; secundo, quando peccatum adauget suis verbis; tertio, quando occultum revelat; quarto, quando id quod est bonum dicit mala intentione factum. Indirecte autem vel negando bonum alterius, vel malitiose reticendo.
Article 2
[II-II.q.73.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to backbiting, as stated above (1, ad 3), is an act of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod detractio non sit peccatum mortale. Nullus enim actus virtutis est peccatum mortale. Sed revelare peccatum occultum, quod, sicut dictum est, ad detractionem pertinet, est actus virtutis vel charitatis, dum aliquis fratris peccatum denuntiat, ejus emendationem intendens; vel etiam est actus justitiæ, dum aliquis fratrem accusat. Ergo detractio non est peccatum mortale.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.arg.2] Further, a gloss on Proverbs 24:21, "Have nothing to do with detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice." But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, super illud Proverb., xxiv: Cum detractoribus non commiscearis, dicit Glossa: « Hoc specialiter vitio periclitatur Sic cod.; in Parm.: « voluntariis. » Porro, evidens est omnia nocumenta proximo illata verbo vel facto esse commutationes ex parte proximi, ut communius, involuntarias. — Parm. addit: « vel minuendo. » — Non legitur in Glos. ord. apud Migne, sed in veteri manuscripta; et ex Rabano totum genus humanum. » Sed nullum pecatum mortale in toto humano genere invenitur, quia multi abstinent a peccato mortali; peccata autem venialia sunt quæ in omnibus inveniuntur. Ergo detractio est peccatum veniale.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.arg.3] Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, Augustinus, in Hom. de igne purgatorio, civ in Append., § 3, col. 1947, t. 5, inter peccata minuta ponit, « quando cum omni facilitate vel temeritate maledicius; » quod pertinet ad detractionem. Ergo detractio est peccatum veniale.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.sc] It is written (Romans 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be deemed a slight sin because it consists in words."
[II-II.q.73.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod Rom., 1, 30, dicitur: Detractores Deo odibiles; quod ideo additur, ut dicit Glossa ord., col. 474, t. 2, « ne leve putetur propter hoc quod consistit in verbis.»
[II-II.q.73.a.2.co] As stated above (Question 72, Article 2), sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Sirach 41:15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great." Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man's good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the manner stated above (Question 62, Article 2) when we were treating of restitution.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccata verborum maxime sunt ex intentione dicentis judicanda. Detractio autem secundum suam rationem ordinatur ad denigrandum famam alicujus. Unde ille per se loquendo detrahit qui ad hoc de aliquo obloquitur, eo absente, ut ejus famam denigret. Auferre autem alicui famam valde grave est, quia inter res temporales videtur fama esse pretiosior, per cujus defectum impeditur homo a multis bene agendis. Propter quod dicitur Eccli., xli, 45: Curam habe de bono nomine; hoc enim magis permanebit tibi quam mille thesauri pretiosi et magni. Et ideo detractio, per se loquendo, est peccatum mortale. Contingit tamen quandoque quod aliquis dicit aliqua verba, per quæ diminuitur fama alicujus, non hoc intendens, sed aliquid aliud. Hoc autem non est detrahere per se, et formaliter loquendo, sed solum materialiter, et quasi per accidens. Et si quidem verba per quæ fama alterius diminuitur proferat aliquis propter aliquod bonum vel necessarium, debitis circumstantiis observatis, non est peccatum nec potest dici detractio. Si autem proferat ex animi levitate, vel propter aliquod non necessarium, non est peccatum mortale; nisi forte verbum quod dicitur sit adeo grave, quod notabiliter famam alicujus lae-dat, et praecipue in his quæ pertinent ad honestatem vitæ: quia hoc ex ipso genere verborum habet rationem peccati mortalis. Sic cod.; in Parm.: « voluntariis. » Porro, evidens est omnia nocumenta proximo illata verbo vel facto esse commutationes ex parte proximi, ut communius, involuntarias. — Parm. addit: « vel minuendo. » — Non legitur in Glos. ord. apud Migne, sed in veteri manuscripta; et ex Rabano desumptum est. — Inter supposititios sermones numeratur. — Parm. omittit: « vel. » — Parm.: « aliquam causam non necessarium. » — Ita mss. et impressi libri omnes; theologi suspicantur redundare vocem: « verborum. » Et tenetur aliquis ad restitutionem famæ, sicut ad restitutionem cujuslibet rei subtractæ, eo modo quo supra dictum est, cum de restitutione ageretur.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.ad.1] As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man's hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse him for the good of public justice.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod revelare peccatum occultum alicujus propter ejus emendationem denuntiando, vel propter bonum justitiæ publicæ accusando, non est detrahere, ut dictum est.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.ad.2] This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of mankind, but "almost," both because "the number of fools is infinite," [Ecclesiastes 1:15 and few are they that walk in the way of salvation, [Cf. Matthew 7:14] and because there are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure someone's good name at least slightly, for it is written (James 3:2): "If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man."
[II-II.q.73.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod Glossa illa non dicit quod detractio in toto genere humano inveniatur, sed addit « pene, » tum quia stultorum infinitus est numerus, et pauci sunt qui ambulant per viam salutis; tum etiam quia pauci vel nulli sunt qui non aliquando ex animi levitate aliquid dicant, unde in aliquo vel leviter alterius fama minoratur: quia, ut dicitur Jacobi, III, 2: Si quis in verbo non offendit, hic perfectus est vir.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.ad.3] Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.
[II-II.q.73.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur in casu illo quo aliquis dicit aliquod leve malum de alio, non ex intentione nocendi, sed ex animi levitate, vel ex lapsu linguæ.
Article 3
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.1] It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one's neighbor. Because a gloss on Psalm 108:4, "Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me," a gloss says: "Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise again." From this it seems to follow that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are committed against one's neighbor. Therefore backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.1] Ad tertium sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod detractio sit gravior omnibus peccatis quæ in proximum committuntur. Quia super illud psal. cviii: Pro eo ut me diligent, detrahebant mihi, dicit Glossa ordin., col. 1028, t. 4: « Plus nocent in membris detrahentes Christo, qui animas crediturorum interficiunt quam qui carnem ejus mox resurrecturam peremerunt. » Ex quo videtur quod detractio sit gravius peccatum quam homicidium; quanto gravius est occidere animam quam occidere corpus. Sed homicidium est gravius inter cætera peccata quæ in proximum committuntur. Ergo detractio est simpliciter inter omnia gravior.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.2] Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.2] 2. Præterea, detractio videtur esse gra- vius peccatum quam contumelia; quia contumeliam potest homo repellere, non autem detractionem latentem. Sed contumelia vide-tur esse majus peccatum quam adulterium, per hoc quod adulterium unit duos in unam carnem, contumelia autem unitos in multa dividit. Ergo detractio est majus peccatum quam adulterium; quod tamen inter alia peccata, quæ sunt in proximum, magnam gravitatem habet.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.3] Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.3] 3. Præterea, contumelia oritur ex ira, detractio autem ex invidia, ut patet per Gregorium, XXXI Moral., c. xLV, § 88, col. 621, t. 2. Sed invidia est majus peccatum quam ira. Ergo et detractio est majus peccatum quam contumelia, et sic idem quod prius.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.4] Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): "What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they see of the truth?" Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against one's neighbor.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.arg.4] 4. Præterea, tanto aliquod peccatum est gravius, quando inducit graviorem defectum. Sed detractio inducit gravissimum defectum, scilicet excæcationem mentis; dicit enim Gregorius in Regist., lib. XI, Ep. II ad Pallad., col. 4120, t. 3: « Quid aliud detra-hentes faciunt, nisi quod in pulverem sufflant, et in oculos suos terram excitant, ut unde plus detractionis perflant, inde magis nihil veritatis videant? » Ergo detractio est gravissimum peccatum inter ea quæ committuntur in proximum.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.sc] It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed against one's neighbor.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.sc] Sed contra, gravius est peccare facto quam verbo. Sed detractio est peccatum verbi; adulterium autem et homicidium et furtum sunt peccata in factis. Ergo detractio non est gravior cæteris peccatis quæ sunt in proximum.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.co] The essential gravity of sins committed against one's neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man's good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a man's body are more grievous than those which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one's neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters upon life. On the last place come external goods, among which a man's good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Proverbs 22:1): "A good name is better than great riches." Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances.
The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he sins through weakness or carelessness. On this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod peccata quæ committuntur in proximum sunt pensenda per se quidem secundum nocumenta quæ proximo inferuntur, quia ex hoc habent rationem culpæ. Tanto autem est majus nocumentum, quanto majus bonum demitur. Cum autem sit triplex bonum hominis, scilicet bonum animæ, et bonum corporis, et bonum exteriorum rerum; bonum animæ, quod est maximum, non potest aliter ab alio tolli nisi occasionaliter, puta per malam persuasionem, quæ necessitatem non infert; sed alia duo bona, scilicet corporis et exteriorum rerum, possunt ab alio violenter auferri. Sed quia bonum corporis praæeminet bono exteriorum rerum, graviora sunt peccata quibus infertur nocumentum corpori, quam ea quibus infertur nocumentum exterioribus rebus. Unde inter cætera peccata quæ committuntur in proximum, homicidium gravius est, per quod tollitur vita proximi jam actu existens, consequenter autem adulterium, quod est contra debitum ordinem generationis humanæ, per quam est introitus ad vitam. Consequenter autem sunt exteriora bona, inter quæ fama præminet divitiis, eo quod propinquior est spiritualibus bonis; unde dicitur Prov., xxii, 1: Melius est nomen bonum quam divitiæ multæ. Et ideo detractio secundum suum genus est majus peccatum quam furtum; minus tamen quam homicidium vel adulterium. Potest tamen esse alius ordo propter circumstantias aggravantes vel diminuenes. Per accidens autem gravitas peccati attenditur ex parte peccantis, qui gravius peccat si ex deliberatione peccet, quam si peccet ex infirmitate, vel incautela; et secundum hoc peccata locutionis habent aliquam levitatem, inquantum de facili ex lapsu linguæ proveniunt, absque magna præmeditatione.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.1] Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illi qui detrahunt Christo impedientes fidem membrorum ipsius, derogant divinitati ejus, cui fides innititur. Unde non est simplex detractio, sed blasphemia.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.2] Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above (Question 66, Article 09). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer "occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 John 3:15).
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod gravius peccatum est contumelia quam detractio, inquantum habet majorem contemptum proximi; sicut et rapina est gravius peccatum quam furtum, ut supra dictum est. Contumelia tamen non est gravius peccatum quam adulterium. Non enim gravitas adulterii pensatur ex conjunctione corporum, sed ex deordinatione generationis humanæ. Contumeliosus autem non sufficienter causat inimicitiam in alio, sed occasionaliter tantum dividit unitos, inquantum scilicet per hoc quod mala alterius promit, alios, quantum in se est, ab ejus amicitia separat, licet ad hoc per ejus verba non cogantur. Sic ergo et detractor occasionaliter est homicida, inquantum scilicet per sua verba dat alteri occasionem ut proximum odiat vel contemnat. Propter quod in epistola Clementis, Decret., distinct. 1 De pænit., cap. « Homicidiorum, » col. 1526, dicitur « detractores esse homicidas, » scilicet occasionaliter, quia qui odit fratrem suum homicida est, ut dicitur I Joan., III, 15.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.3] Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away from.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod ira quærit in manifesto vindictam inferre, ut Philosophus dicit in II Rhet., cap. iv, ad fin. Ideo detrac- 1 Sic cod.; Parm. argumenti conclusionem omitit. — 2 Parm.: « detractoribus. » — 3 Cod.: « Pius tio quæ est in occulto, non est filia iræ, sicut contumelia, sed magis invidiæ, quæ nititur qualitercumque minuere gloriam proximi. Nec tamen sequitur propter hoc quod detractio sit gravior quam contumelia; quia ex minori vitio potest oriri majus peccatum, sicut ex ira nascitur homicidium et blasphemia. Origo enim peccatorum attenditur secundum inclinationem ad finem, quod est ex parte conversionis; gravitas autem peccati magis attenditur ex parte aversionis.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.4] Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth" (Proverbs 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate of one's neighbor.
[II-II.q.73.a.3.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod quia homo lætatur in sententia oris sui, ut dicitur Proverb., xv, 23, inde est quod ille qui detrahit, incipit magis amare et credere quod dicit, et per consequens proximum magis odire, et sic magis recedere a cognitione veritatis. Iste tamen effectus potest sequi etiam ex aliis peccatis quæ pertinent ad odium proximi.
Article 4
[II-II.q.73.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): "Just as we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater." Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.arg.2] Further, it is written (Sirach 4:30): "In no wise speak against the truth." Now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above (1, ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, Eccli., iv, 30, dicitur: Non contradicas verbo veritatis ullo modo. Sed quandoque aliquis detrahit verba veritatis dicendo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo videtur quod non semper teneatur homo detractionibus resistere.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.arg.3] Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius [St. Pius I] says [Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1: "Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are humbled by backbiting." Therefore one ought not to withstand backbiters.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, nullus debet impedire id quod est in utilitatem aliorum. Sed detractio frequenter est in utilitatem illorum contra quos detrahitur; dicit enim Pius papa, in Appendice ad cap. « Oves » VI, quæst. 1, papa, » sed non legitur nisi in Appendice Gratiani. col. 730: «Nonnunquam detractio adversus bonos excitatur, ut quos vel domestica præsumptio, vel aliorum favor in altum extulerat, detractio humiliet. » Ergo aliquis non debet detractiones impedire.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.sc] Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): "Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract others nor listen to backbiters."
[II-II.q.73.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, Epist. lii ad Nepotian., § 14, col. 538, t. 4: « Cave ne aut linguam, aut aures habeas prurientes, id est, ne aut ipse aliis detrahas, aut alios audias detrahentes. »
[II-II.q.73.a.4.co] According to the Apostle (Romans 1:32), they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that" commit sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." Now this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.
Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): "It is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens to backbiting." If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above (Question 19, Article 3).
[II-II.q.73.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum Apostolum ad Rom., i, 32, digni sunt morte non solum qui peccata faciunt, sed etiam qui consentiunt peccata facientibus. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter: uno modo directe, quando scilicet quis inducit alium ad peccatum, vel ei placet peccatum; alio modo indirecte, scilicet quando non resistit, cum resistere possit; et hoc contingit quandoque, non quia peccatum placeat, sed propter ali quem humanum timorem. Dicendum est ergo, quod si aliquis detractions audiat absque resistentia, videtur detractori consentire, unde fit particeps peccati ejus. Et si quidem inducat eum ad detrahendum, vel saltem placeat ei detractio propter odium ejus cui detrahitur, non minus peccat quam detrahens, et quandoque magis: unde Bernardus dicit, lib. II De consid., cap. xiii, § 27, pag. 136, t. 2: « Detrahere, aut detrahentem audire quid horum damnabilius sit non facile dixerim. » Si vero non placeat ei peccatum, sed ex timore, vel negligentia, vel etiam verecundia quadam omittat repellere detrahen tem, peccat quidem, sed multo minus quam detrahens, et plerumque venialiter. Quandoque etiam hoc potest esse peccatum mortale, vel propter hoc quod alicui ex officio incumbit detrahentem corrigere, vel propter aliquod periculum consequens, vel propter radicem, qua timor humanus quandoque potest esse peccatum mortale, ut supra habitum est.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.ad.1] No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, but reviling, as stated above (1, ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above (Question 72, Article 3). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself.
But it is not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to another's good name, hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man's ass lying "underneath his burden," as commanded in Deuteronomy 21:4 [Exodus 23:5].
[II-II.q.73.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod detractions suas nullus audit, quia scilicet mala quæ dicuntur de aliquo, eo audiente, non sunt detractions proprie loquendo, sed contumeliæ, ut dictum est. Possunt tamen ad notitiam alicujus detractions contra ipsum factæ aliorum relationibus pervenire; et tunc sui arbitrii est detrimentum suæ famæ pati, nisi hoc vergat in periculum aliorum, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo in hoc potest commendari ejus patientia, quod patienter proprias detractiones sustineat. Non autem est sui arbitrii quod patiatur detrimentum famæ alterius; et ideo in culpam ei vertitur, si non resistit, cum possit resistere, eadem ratione qua tenetur aliquis sublevare asinum alterius jacentem sub onere, ut præcipitur Deut. xxii.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.ad.2] One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because according to Proverbs 25:23, "the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue."
[II-II.q.73.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod non semper aliquis debet resistere detractori, arguendo eum de falsitate, et maxime si quis sciat verum esse quod dicitur; sed debet eum verbis redarguere de hoc quod peccat fratri detrahendo, vel saltem ostendere quod ei detractio displicet per tristitiam faciei: quia, ut dicitur Proverb., xxv, 23, ventus Aquilo dissipat pluvias, et facies tristis linguam detrahentem.
[II-II.q.73.a.4.ad.3] The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.73.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod utilitas quæ ex detractione provenit, non est ex intentione detrahentis, sed ex Dei ordinatione, qui ex quolibet malo elicit bonum. Et ideo nihilominus est detractoribus resistendum, sicut et raptoribus vel oppressoribus aliorum; quamvis ex hoc oppressis vel spoliatis per patientiam meritum crescat.
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