Greco-Christian stream·Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae (Complete Works of Thomas Aquinas)·Summa Theologiae·Secunda Secundae·Q79. The quasi-integral parts of Justice
Source context
- Theme
- Gratitude and ingratitude as quasi-integral parts of justice, with related obligations of beneficence and liberality
- Soul-faculty
- Intellectual Soul
Steiner
not engaged in the GA corpus
Cross-tradition
- Aristotelian ethicsAristotle's treatment of liberality and magnanimity in the Nicomachean Ethics provides a structural parallel to Aquinas's quasi-integral parts of justice, grounding virtuous giving and gratitude in proportionate reciprocity within social life.
- Stoic ethicsStoic thinkers, particularly Seneca in De Beneficiis, treat the obligation to return benefits as a fundamental social bond, exhibiting cross-tradition congruence with Aquinas's account of gratitude as a debt owed to benefactors.
Q79. The quasi-integral parts of Justice
Article 1
[II-II.q.79.a.1.arg.1] It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.arg.1] Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per hoc sacramentum non conferatur gratia. Hoc enim sacramentum est nutrimentum spirituale. Nutrimentum autem non datur nisi viventi. Cum ergo vita spiritualis sit per gratiam, non competit hoc sacramentum nisi habenti gratiam. Non ergo per hoc sacramentum conferitur gratia, ut primo habeatur: similiter etiam nec ad hoc quod augeatur, quia augmentum spirituale pertinet ad sacramentum confirmationis, ut dictum est. Non ergo per hoc sacramentum conferitur.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.arg.2] Further, a gloss on Psalm 33:15, "Turn away from evil and do good," says: "The former," i.e. to turn away from evil, "avoids sin, the latter," i.e. to do good, "deserves the life and the palm." But any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline from evil is not a part of justice.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.arg.2] 2. Præterea, hoc sacramentum conferitur ut quædam spiritualis refectio. Sed reflectio spiritualis magis videtur pertinere ad usum gratiae quam ad gratiae consecutionem. Ergo videtur quod per hoc sacramentum gratia non conferatur.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.arg.3] Further, things that are so related that one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts of justice.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.arg.3] 3. Præterea, sicut supra dictum est, in hoc sacramento corpus Christi offertur pro salute corporis, sanguis autem pro salute animæ. Sed corpus non est subjectum gratiae, sed anima, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Ergo ad minus quan- Confirmatque fidem, munit, fomitemque remittit. » Ex Richardo, IV, d. 1x, a. 1, q. 2. tum ad corpus per hoc sacramentum gratia non confertur.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.sc] Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that "declining from evil and doing good" belong to the justice of the law.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.sc] Sed contra est quod Dominus dicit, Joan., vi, 52: Panis quem ego dabo, caro mea est pro mundi vita. Sed vita spiritualis est per gratiam. Ergo per hoc sacramentum gratia confertur.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.co] If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of "all virtue" [Cf. 58, 5]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.
On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one's neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one's neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one's neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.
Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others, as shown above (Question 58, Article 2): and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod effectus hujus sacramenti debet considerari, primo quidem et principaliter ex eo quod in hoc sacramento continetur, quod est Christus; qui sicut in mundum visibiliter veniens contulit mundo vitam gratiae, secundum illud Joan., i, 17: Gratia et veritas per Jesum Christum facta est, ita in hominem sacramentaliter veniens vitam gratiae operatur, secundum illud Joan., vi, 58: Qui manducat me, vivet propter me. Unde et Cyrillus dicit, lib. IV In Joan., cap. ii et iii, col. 578, 582, 586, etc., t. 6: « Vivificativum Dei Verbum uniens seipsum propriæ carni, fecit ipsam vivificativam. Decebat enim eum nostris quodammodo uniri corporibus per sacram ejus carnem et pretiosum sanguinem, quæ accipimus in benedictionem vivificativam in pane et in vino. » Secundo consideratur ex eo quod per hoc sacramentum representatur, quod est passio Christi, sicut supra dictum est. Et ideo effectum quem passio Christi fecit in mundo, hoc sacramentum facit in homine. Unde Super illud Joan., xix: Continuo exivit sanguis et aqua, dicit Chrysostomus, Hom. lxxxv in Joan., § 3, col. 388, t. 14: « Quia hinc suscipiunt principium sacra mysteria, cum accesseris ad tremendum calicem, ut ab ipsa bibiturus Christi costa ita accedas. » Unde et ipse Dominus dicit Matth., xxvi, 28: Hic est sanguis meus... qui pro vobis effundetur in remissionem peccatorum. Tertio consideratur effectus hujus sacramenti ex modo quo traditur hoc sacramentum, quod traditur per modum cibi et potus. Et ideo omnem effectum quem cibus et potus materialis facit quantum ad vitam corporalem, quod scilicet sustentat, auget, reparat et delectat, hoc totum facit hoc sacramentum quantum ad vitam spiritualem. Unde Ambrosius dicit in lib. V De sacramentis, cap. iv, § 24, col. 471, t. 3: « Iste panis est vitæ aternæ, qui animæ nostrae substantiam fulcit. » Et Chrysostomus dicit Super Joan., hom. xLV, a med.: « Præstat se nobis desiderantibus et palpare, et comedere et amplecti. » Unde et ipse Dominus dicit Joan., vi, 56: Caro mea vere est cibus et sanguis meus vere est potus. Quarto consideratur effectus hujus sacramenti ex specibus in quibus traditur hoc sacramentum. Unde Augustinus ibidem, Tract. xxvi in Joan., § 17, col. 1614, t. 3, dicit: « Dominus noster corpus et sanguinem suum in eis rebus commendavit quæ ad unum aliquid rediguntur ex multis; namque aliud, » scilicet panis, « in unum ex multis granis confit: aliud, » scilicet vinum, « in unum ex multis acinis confluit. » Et ideo ipse alibi dicit Super Joan., § 13, col. 1613: « O sacramentum pietatis, o signum unitatis, o vinculum charitatis! » Et quia Christus et ejus passio est causa gratiae et spiritualis refectio, et charitas sine gratia esse non potest, ex omnibus præmissis manifestum est quod hoc sacramentum gratiam confert.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.ad.1] Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod hoc sacramentum ex seipso virtutem habet gratiam conferendi; nec aliquis habet gratiam ante susceptionem hujus sacramenti nisi ex aliquo voto ipsius, vel per seipsum, sicut adulti, vel voto Ecclesiæ, sicut parvuli, sicut supra dictum est. Unde ex efficacia virtutis ipsius est quod etiam ex voto ipsius aliquis gratiam consequatur, per quam spiritualiter vivificetur. Restat igitur ut cum sacramentum realiter sumitur, gratia augeatur, et vita spiritualis perficiatur; aliter tamen quam per sacramentum confirmationis, in quo augetur et perficitur gratia ad persistendum contra exteriores impugnationes inimicorum Christi; per hoc autem sacramentum augetur gratia, et perficitur spiritualis vita, ad hoc quod homo in seipso perfectus existat per conjunctionem ad Deum.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.ad.2] To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz."not to do evil"; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term "decline" shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod hoc sacramentum confert gratiam spiritualiter cum virtute charitatis. Unde Damascenus, lib. IV Orth. fid., cap. xiii, col. 1150, t. 4, comparat hoc sacramentumcarboni quem Isaias vidit, Isai., vi. Carbo enim lignum simplex non est, sed unitum igni; ita et « panis communionis non simplex panis est, sed unitus Divinitati. » Sicut autem Gregorius dicit in Homil. Pentecostes, xxx in Evang., § 2, col. 1221, t. 2, « amor Dei non est otio- 1 Similia leguntur loc. cit.; sed expresse refertur a D. Thoma, Caten. aurea, in eumdem sus: operatur enim magna si est. » Et ideo per hoc sacramentum, quantum est ex sui virtute, non solum habitus gratiae et virtutis confertur, sed etiam excitatur in actum, secundum illud II Corinth., v, 14: Charitas Christi urget nos. Et inde est quod ex virtute hujus sacramenti anima spiritualiter reficitur per hoc quod anima spiritualiter delectatur et quodammodo inebriatur dulcedine bonitatis divinæ, secundum illud Cantic., v, 1: Comedite amici, et bibite, et inebriamini, charissimi.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.ad.3] Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal and completive part.
[II-II.q.79.a.1.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod quia sacramenta operantur secundum similitudinem per 4 quam significant, ideo secundum quamdam assimilationem dicitur quod in hoc sacramento corpus offertur pro salute corporis, et sanguis pro salute animæ, quamvis utrumque ad salutem utriusque operetur, cum sub utroque totus sit Christus, ut supra dictum est. Et licet corpus non sit immediatum subjectum gratiae, ex anima tamen redundat effectus gratiae ad corpus, dum in præsenti membra nostra exhibemus arma justitiæ Deo, ut habetur Rom., vi, et in futuro corpus nostrum sortietur incorruptionem et gloriam animæ.
Article 2
[II-II.q.79.a.2.arg.1] It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is "a transgression of the Divine law." Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.arg.1] Ad secundum sic proceditur. 4. Videtur quod effectus hujus sacramenti non sit adeptio gloriæ. Effectus enim proportionnatur suæ causæ. Sed hoc sacramentum competit viatoribus, unde et viaticum dicitur. Cum igitur viatores nondum sint capaces gloriæ, videtur quod hoc sacramentum non causet adeptionem gloriæ.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.arg.2] Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word, deed or desire against the law of God," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.arg.2] 2. Præterea, posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus. Sed multi accipiunt hoc sacramentum qui nunquam pervenient ad gloriam, ut patet per Augustinum, XXI De civit. Dei, cap. xxv, col. 741, t. 7. Non ergo sacramentum est causa adeptionis gloriæ.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.arg.3] Further, no species contains all the parts into which its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. Therefore transgression is not a special sin.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.arg.3] 3. Præterea, majus non efficitur a minori, quia nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Sed minus est accipere Christum sub specie aliena, quod fit in hoc sacramento, quam frui eo in specie propria, quod pertinet ad gloriam. Ergo hoc sacramentum non causat adeptionem gloriæ.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.sc] It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.sc] Sed contra est quod dicitur Joan., vi, 52: Si quis manducaverit ex hoc pane, vivet in æternum. Sed vita æterna est vita gloriæ. Ergo effectus hujus sacramenti est adeptio gloriæ.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.co] The term transgression is derived from bodily movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed boundary--and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept.
Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of mortal sin.
But if we consider it formally, namely under its special aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in hoc sacramento potest considerari et id ex quo habet effectum, scilicet ipse Christus contentus, et passio ejus repræsentata; et id per quod habet effectum, scilicet usus sacramenti et species ejus. Et quantum ad utrumque competit huic sacramento quod causet adeptionem vitæ æternæ. Nam ipse Christus per suam passionem aperuit nobis aditum vitæ æternæ, secundum illud Hebr., ix, 15: Novi Testamenti mediator est; ut morte intercedente, accipiant remissionem qui vocati sunt æternæ hereditatis. Unde et in forma hujus sacramenti dicitur: « Hic est calix sanguinis mei, novi et æterni Testamenti. » Similiter etiam reflectio cibi spiritualis et unitas significata per species panis et vini habentur quidem in præsenti, sed imperfecte, perfecte autem in statu gloriæ. Unde Augustinus dicit Super illud Joan., vi: Caro mea vere est cibus, Tract. xxvi in Joan., § 17, col. 1614, t. 3: « Cum cibo et potu id appetant homines ut non esuriant neque sitiant; hoc veraciter non præstat nisi iste cibus et potus qui eos a quibus sumitur immortales et incorruptibiles facit in societate sanctorum, ubi pax erit, et unitas plena atque perfecta. »
[II-II.q.79.a.2.ad.1] Even as legal justice is "all virtue" (58, 5) as regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially "all sin." It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the point of view of legal injustice.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sicut passio Christi, in cujus virtute hoc sacramentum operatur, est quidem causa sufficiens gloriæ, non tamen ita quod statim per ipsam introducamur in gloriam, sed oportet ut prius simul compatiamur, ut postea simul glorificemur, sicut dicitur Rom., viii; ita hoc sacramentum non statim nos in gloriam introducit, sed dat nobis virtutem perveniendi ad gloriam, et ideo viaticum dicitur, in cujus figuram legitur III Reg., xix, 8, quod Elias comedit et bibit, et ambulavit in fortitudine cibi illius quadraginta diebus et quadraginta noctibus usque ad montem Dei Oreb.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.ad.2] The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept; since as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), "a custom of God's people should be looked upon as law." Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against a natural inclination.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod sicut passio Christi non habet suum effectum in his qui se ad eam non habent ut debent, ita per hoc sacramentum non adipiscentur gloriam qui indecenter ipsum suscipiunt. Unde Augustinus dicit Super Joan., exponens illa verba: Manducaverunt manna et mortui sunt, tr. xxvi, § 41, col. 1641, t. 3: « Aliud est sacramentum, et aliud virtus sacramenti. Multi de altari accipiunt, et accipiendo moriuntur. Panem ergo cælestem spiritualiter manducate, innocentiam ad altare apportate. » Unde non est mirum, si illi qui innocentiam non servant, effectum hujus sacramenti non consequuntur.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.ad.3] All these species of sin may include transgression, if we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression.
[II-II.q.79.a.2.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod hoc quod Christus sub aliena specie sumitur, pertinet ad rationem sacramenti, quod instrumentaliter agit. Nihil autem prohibet causam instrumentalem producere potiorem effectum, ut ex supra dictis patet.
Article 4
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.1] It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression. For "delictum" would seem to signify the same as "derelictum" [Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But "delictum" denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it deserves more expiation as appears from Leviticus 5. Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.1] Ad quartum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod per hoc sacramentum non remittantur peccata venialia. Hoc enim sacramentum, ut Augustinus dicit Super Joan., tract. xxvi, § 13, col. 4643, t. 3, est « sacramentum charitatis. » Sed venialia peccata non contrariantur charitati, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Cum ergo contrarium tollatur per suum contrarium, videtur quod peccata venialia per hoc sacramentum non remittantur.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.2] Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which transgression is opposed, as stated above (1, ad 3). Therefore omission is a graver sin than transgression.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.2] 2. Præterea, si peccata venialia per hoc sacramentum remittantur, qua ratione remittitur unum, remittuntur et omnia. Sed non videtur quod omnia remittantur, quia sic frequenter aliquis esset absque omni peccato veniali, contra id quod dicitur, I Joan., 1, 8: Si dixerimus quia * peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus. Non ergo per hoc sacramentum remittitur aliquod peccatum veniale.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.3] Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or mortal.
But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver sin than transgression.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.3] 3. Præterea, contraria mutuo se expellunt. Sed peccata venialia non prohibent a perceptione hujus sacramenti: dicit enim Augustinus Super illud Joan., vi: Patres vestri manducaverunt manna in deserto, et mortuisunt, Tract. xxvi in Joan., § 11, col. 1614: « Innocentiam ad altare apportate; peccata, etsi sunt quotidiana, non sint mortifera. » Ergo neque peccata venialia per hoc sacramentum tolluntur.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.4] Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission is graver than the sin of transgression.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.arg.4] 4. Præterea, major est pœna damni, scilicet carentia visionis divinæ, quæ debetur peccato omissionis, quam pœna sensus, quæ debetur peccato transgressionis, ut patet per Chrysostomum, Super Matth., hom. xxiv, t. 13. Sed pœna proportionatur culpæ. Ergo gravius est peccatum omissionis quam transgressionis.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.sc] It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from an evil deed, i.e. "to transgress," than not to accomplish a good deed, which is "to omit."
[II-II.q.79.a.4.sc] Sed contra est quod Innocentius III dicit, lib. IV De mysterio missæ, cap. xliv, ante med., quod hoc sacramentum « venialia delet, et cavet mortalia. »
[II-II.q.79.a.4.co] The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to Metaph. x [Didot. ed. ix, 4. Wherefore a thing is further removed from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give one's parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a particular transgression.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.co] Respondeo dicendum, quod in hoc sacramento duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum sacramentum et res sacramenti. Et ex utroque apparet quod hoc sacramentum habet virtutem ad remissionem venialium peccatorum. Nam hoc sacramentum sumitur sub specie cibi nutrienis. Nutrimentum autem cibi est necessarium corpori ad restaurandum id quod quotidie deperditur ex caloris naturalis concupiscentia. Spiritualiter autem quotidie aliquid in nobis deperditur ex calore concupiscentiae per peccata venialia, quæ diminuunt fervorem charitatis, ut in secunda parte habitum est. Et ideo competit huic sacramento ut remittat peccata venialia. Unde et Ambrosius dicit in lib. V De sacramentis, cap. iv, § 25, col. 472, t. 3, quod « iste panis quotidianus sumitur in remedium quotidianæ infirmitatis. Res autem hujus sacramenti est charitas, non solum quantum ad habitum, sed etiam quantum ad actum, qui excitatur in hoc sacramento, per quem peccata venialia solvuntur. Unde manifestum est quod virtute hujus sacramenti remittuntur peccata venialia.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.1] "Delictum" in its widest sense denotes any kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of something concerning God, or for a man's intentional and as it were contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, for which reason it demands a greater expiation.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.1] Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod peccata venialia etsi non contrariantur charitati quantum ad habitum, contrariantur tamen ei quantum ad fervorem actus, qui excitatur per hoc sacramentum, razione cujus peccata venialia tolluntur.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.2] The opposite of "doing good" is both "not doing good," which is an omission, and "doing evil," which is a transgression: but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more grievous sin.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.2] Ad secundum dicendum, quod illud verbum non est intelligendum, quin aliqua hora possit homo esse absque omni reatu peccati venialis; sed quia vitam istam sancti non ducunt sine peccatis venialibus.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.3] Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both, strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.3] Ad tertium dicendum, quod major est virtus charitatis, cujus est hoc sacra- Implicite. mentum, quam venialium peccatorum. Nam charitas tollit per suum actum pecata venialia, quæ tamen non possunt totaliter impedire actum charitatis. Et eadem ratio est de hoc sacramento.
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.4] To the sin of transgression there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. On like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, according to Matthew 7:19, "Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire"; and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2009 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis AngliæMARIÆ IMMACULATÆ - SEDI SAPIENTIÆ
[II-II.q.79.a.4.ad.4] Ad quartum dicendum, quod peccato transgressionis respondet et pœna damni propter aversionem a Deo et pœna sensus propter inordinatam conversionem ad bonum commutabile. Similiter etiam omissioni non solum debetur pœna damni, sed etiam pœna sensus, secundum illud Matth., VII, 19: Omnis arbor quæ non facit fructum bonum excidetur, et in ignem mittetur; et hoc propter radicem ex qua procedit, licet non habeat ex necessitate actualem conversionem ad aliquod bonum commutabile.
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